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Executive Summary
The Federal Trade Commission—with its broad, independent grant of authority and
statutory mandate to identify and prevent unfair and deceptive trade practices—is uniquely situated
to prevent and remedy unfair and deceptive data privacy and data security practices. In an
increasingly digitized world, data collection, processing, and transfer have become integral to
market interactions. Our personal and commercial experiences are now mediated by powerful,
information-intensive firms who hold the power to shape what consumers see, how they interact,
which options are available to them, and how they make decisions. That power imbalance exposes
consumers and leaves them all vulnerable. We all share data concerning ourselves with these
platforms, often unwittingly, and we leave ourselves at the risk of their manipulation and control.
The Commission envisions “[a] vibrant economy fueled by fair competition and an empowered,
informed public.”1 But, this vision cannot be realized in the absence of meaningful consumer trust.
Trust is the oxygen necessary for consumer choice to survive. Where trust is present, consumers
are empowered to invest in companies and share their data knowing they are not going to be
betrayed, manipulated, deceived, or treated unfairly. But where trust is weakened or absent, the
marketplace breaks down and becomes a fertile ground for the development of market failures that
are contrary to the interests of consumers and competition. Recognizing the importance of trust in
digital markets, our comments are organized around three arguments: (i) commercial surveillance
is the correct label for the data practices observed in the market; (ii) notice and choice, centered
around the fiction of consumer consent, has failed as a regulatory regime; and (iii) the Commission
should ground its future data privacy rules in concepts of trust, loyalty, and relational vulnerability.
The harms and benefits of commercial surveillance are wildly imbalanced in favor of
commercial actors, with consumers more vulnerable than ever before. This is why we argue in
Part I that commercial surveillance is the correct terminology for the practices being observed in
digital markets. Humans are increasingly being tracked, identified, classified, and commodified
online. This prevalent surveillance borders on the ubiquitous. It manifests in different ways and is
driven by different market actors, but its cumulative effect is a corporate surveillance regime which
the Commission is correct to label as such. Although commercial surveillance is neither always
good nor always bad, some commercial surveillance practices unacceptably harm consumers. They
also harm digital markets, namely by eroding trust as consumers increasingly feel betrayed by data
practices that contradict their expectations and do not advance their interests. Commercial
surveillance also poses significant risks to our mental health, civil rights, and democracy, in
contravention of established public policy. Such harms are not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or competition, as the benefits of commercial surveillance
disproportionately flow to industry. This is especially true of targeted advertising, where “ad-tech”
middlemen pocket the surplus fees generated by targeting and consumers are preyed upon by an
advertising leviathan supercharged by prevalent surveillance and behavioral psychology. Industry
rakes in profits, giving consumers nothing but risk, dread, and over-hyped, undesired targeted ads.
In Part II we explain why notice and choice has failed to curtail all but the most egregious
industry practices. Notice and choice is overwhelming, illusory, and ineffective. Rather than being
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empowering, notice and choice has proven overly burdensome on consumers and has legitimized
harmful, disloyal commercial surveillance and data security practices. Notice and choice is
plagued by cognitive and structural problems which prevent consumers from effectively engaging
in privacy self-management. These problems reveal a fundamental problem with notice and
choice: rather than giving consumers meaningful choices, notice and choice manufactures consent.
True choice means selecting from an array of options knowing that you will be protected from
harmful practices no matter which option you choose. Consent is more than merely choosing; it
has a moral and legal significance of accepting a certain set of legal arrangements and certain sets
of consequences irrevocably. Consent has its place in law, but a number of pathologies which
undermine the validity of consent are present in digital market interactions. The increasing
prevalence of dark patterns and manipulative design further highlights the failure of notice and
choice. Digital environments are entirely constructed, and companies have considerable power to
shape user action through the design of their tools and services. Design is being weaponized to
undermine consumer choice and nudge consumers into taking actions which are disproportionately
beneficial to companies. Notice and choice creates the market incentives which precipitate
deceptive and manipulative design. There are situations in which consent can be effective, namely
where requests for consent are infrequent, the risks to which consumers are being asked to consent
are vivid, and there are incentives to take each request seriously. Meaningful, informed, consent is
possible where those conditions hold, but those circumstances are rarely present in digital markets.
American privacy must move beyond notice and choice if it is to truly protect the ability of
consumers to make voluntary choices and safely interact in markets.
In Part III we explain why the Commission should ground its data privacy rules in concepts
of loyalty and relational vulnerability. Modern commercial relationships are uniquely risky for
consumers. Modern tech companies are entrenched in our lives and have considerable control over
what we see and click, making consumers vulnerable to companies in unprecedented ways. We
trust these companies with our data out of necessity, but the law fails to stop them from engaging
in self-serving, opportunistic behavior. Not all privacy injuries are caused by disloyal commercial
surveillance, but all disloyal commercial surveillance causes substantial injuries. Such practices
are the very definition of an unfair trade practice for the digital age, because they leave consumers
substantially worse-off, are not reasonably avoidable given consumers’ vulnerability, and negate
any possible offsetting benefits to consumers or competition by poisoning the marketplace. When
companies are free to act in ways disloyal to consumers, they send a message to consumers that
they cannot be trusted with people’s data and mediated experiences. Instead of healthy
competition, companies have strong incentives to generate short-term profits by extracting more
data and attention in increasingly harmful ways. Approaching questions of unfairness through the
frame of disloyalty and relational vulnerability thus reveals why certain commercial surveillance
practices are both unfair and deceptive. Loyalty is what separates harmful commercial surveillance
from market intelligence that can benefit everyone. By narrowing the category of commercial
surveillance to the subset of those practices which are disloyal, the Commission can craft precise
trade regulations which target the most egregious and pressing harms in the marketplace.
These comments identify several trust-preserving rules which the Commission could
implement. The first of these is requiring data minimization (or preventing data maximization),
which would help bridge the gap between privacy and security. Data minimization is a
fundamental element of good data security because unnecessary and disproportionate data
2
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collection worsens the consequences of data breaches and gives fraudsters personal information
which can be used to carry out subsequent attacks. Second, the Commission should prohibit the
practice of providing third-party access to consumer data when that access elevates the self-interest
of the company over that of the consumers, a practice we term as “disloyal gatekeeping.” This
prohibition would still allow for beneficial third-party access, such as contextual advertising.
Third, the Commission should place substantive limits on targeted advertising. This would remove
the market incentives that drive disloyal and exploitative commercial surveillance while still
preserving the incentives for loyal commercial surveillance, such as personalization and product
improvement. Contextual advertising remains a viable alternative that can fuel a free, open internet
without relying on corrosive and disloyal surveillance-based targeting. Fourth, the Commission
should heed the advice of experts and develop rules regarding the design, implementation, and use
of AI systems that are grounded in concepts of loyalty and relational vulnerability. With mounting
evidence that these systems create discriminatory outcomes, companies’ increased reliance on
automated decision-making systems raises grave concerns about their transparency, fairness, and
accountability. These opaque systems diminish consumer trust, to the detriment of consumers,
companies, and competition. Finally, we argue that the Commission should not see this rulemaking
as a binary choice between protecting either (a) children and teens or (b) adults. The Commission’s
focus on protecting children is laudable, but many of the reasons given for protecting children
apply to adults as well. Age is a spectrum, as is the wisdom and maturity that comes with it. Rules
and safeguards which follow arbitrary age distinctions can leave gaps in protection. Digital
markets are plagued by drastic information asymmetry and power differentials. As demonstrated
by the failure of notice and choice and privacy self-management, the same kinds of information
asymmetries and overconfidence that are ascribed to children and teenagers frequently apply to
adults as well. Thus, rather than promulgating specific data privacy rules for children and
teenagers, we believe that the Commission should focus on crafting generally applicable trade
regulations which will protect all Americans from harmful commercial surveillance.
We have previously written that “the corporate, commercial, mobile app-driven internet of
the early 2020s represents probably the most highly surveilled environment in the history of
humanity.”2 Such prevalent surveillance creates individual and social harms, disproportionately
benefits certain industry actors, and erodes trust in the market. The commercial surveillance
industry may have flourished under a notice and choice regime which serves only the interests of
the data hungry companies who hold considerable power of basic aspects of our lives, but human
consumers have not. Nothing about this status quo is inevitable, and the Commission is right to
ask questions about how these practices affect us and what can be done to mitigate the harms of
disloyal commercial surveillance. Substantive limits on commercial surveillance which are
nuanced, narrowly tailored, and elevate consumer wellbeing will not irreparably damage the
internet or spell the end of the advertising industry. To the contrary, the Commission has an
opportunity to pass substantive rules which benefit consumers and companies by fostering trust
and enabling human flourishing. We applaud the Commission for its thoughtful approach to these
questions of critical importance for the future of our economy, our society, and our democracy.
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Introduction
As the only agency at the national level with a broad consumer protection law enforcement
mandate,3 the Federal Trade Commission was created to prevent unfair and deceptive trade
practices, both in enforcement actions and by promulgating trade regulation rules.4 For nearly three
decades the Commission has been the de facto data privacy and data security federal regulator in
the United States, creating an impressive body of enforcement actions akin to a body of common
law.5 In an increasingly digitized world, the collection, use, and dissemination of data has become
integral to consumer experiences in the marketplace. Our personal and commercial experiences
are mediated by powerful, information-intensive firms. These firms are endowed with the power
to shape what consumers see and can click on.6 They also determine just how exposed consumers
are when using a service. That power imbalance makes consumers vulnerable. We share data
concerning ourselves with these platforms, often unwittingly, and we leave ourselves at the risk of
their manipulation and control. The Commission envisions “[a] vibrant economy fueled by fair
competition and an empowered, informed public.”7 Trust is a critical component of that vision.
Where trust is present, consumers are empowered to invest in companies and share their data
knowing they are not going to be betrayed, manipulated, deceived, or treated unfairly.8 This in turn
would allow consumers to engage in responsible innovation in the development of new products
and services in the interests of both consumers and competition. Unfortunately, that is not the
world we have.9 Without trust, the marketplace breaks down and becomes a fertile ground for the
development of market failures that are contrary to the interests of consumers and competition.
The public, tired of being betrayed and commodified, deserve rules that compel loyal behavior and
put their interests first.10 If consumers cannot trust the companies they deal with, they cannot
meaningfully participate in the marketplace. In such a world, consumers, companies, and
competition are all worse off in the long run. The Commission’s vision to protect consumers and
promote healthy competition thus cannot be achieved in the absence of substantive rules which
foster trust by curtailing disloyal data practices.

3

Public Statement, Roscoe B. Starek, III, Protecting the Consumer in the Global Marketplace (June 25, 1997),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/speeches/protecting-consumer-global-marketplace.
4
See Guziak v. FTC, 361 F.2d 700, 703–04 (8th Cir. 1966) (“There appears to be no basis in terms of either history
or logic for holding that the Commission may not assert its power until the interstate activity under scrutiny has
reached a certain magnitude. In fact, one of the objects of the Federal Trade Commission Act was to prevent
potential injury by stopping unfair methods of competition in their incipiency.” (citing FTC v. Raladam Co., 316
U.S. 149 (1942); Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941))).
5
See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
583 (2014).
6
See WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES
(2018).
7
FED. TRADE COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2022 TO 2026 (2022), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
ftc_gov/pdf/fy-2022-2026-ftc-strategic-plan.pdf [hereinafter FTC STRATEGIC PLAN].
8
See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431
(2016).
9
See infra Part I.B.
10
Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, The Surprising Virtues of Data Loyalty, 71 EMORY L. J. 985, 1033 (2022).
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The time is right for this rulemaking. Industry has repeatedly asked for guidance on what
constitutes unfair data practices and data security measures. Consumers likewise need privacy and
data security protections now. Every day that passes without substantive rules limiting injurious
commercial surveillance and lax data security practices further harms consumers and stifles
commerce by leaving companies guessing as to their legal obligations. Although an omnibus
federal privacy law might be a useful supplement to or even preferable to agency rulemaking, the
Commission should not let this process be deterred by the mere possibility of Congressional action.
The FTC has a broad grant of independent bipartisan authority and after all, “Congress envisioned
the FTC to prevent unfair and deceptive practices.”11 An “unfair trade practice” is a capacious term
of art in American law that Congress preferred to a finite, specific, and enumerated list of unfair
activities, in large part because substantive unfairness is itself a large category limited only by the
ingenuity of unscrupulous merchants.12 Its flexibility has allowed the Commission to protect
consumers from industrial practices in the time of the First World War through to algorithmic
decisionmaking in the present. Yet the flexibility of the “unfair trade practices” standard can be
buttressed by specificity through this rulemaking. Moreover, it is highly likely (and desirable) that
the Commission will engage in rulemaking under a future federal privacy statute. Any progress on
rulemaking today will inform both the Commission’s present enforcement actions and any future
rulemaking strategy. (Q25.)
Congress and the FTC have jointly developed the meaning of unfairness over time, largely
through amending the FTC Act and the investigations and cases brought by the FTC and state
attorneys general. The Commission should pursue rulemaking tenaciously because it is limited in
the ways it can continue to develop the concept of unfairness through complaints and consent
orders. The Commission’s own enforcement actions show that harmful data practices are prevalent
and that these data practices jeopardize our privacy and the security of our data. Limited action on
the part of the agency gives oxygen to these harmful practices which are undermining consumer
trust. For that reason, although the Commission’s case-by-case enforcement strategy has helped
and continues to help protect consumers in the marketplace, it is increasingly clear that trade
regulation rules are necessary. Clear and substantive rules would go a long way in curtailing the
kinds of unfettered data abuses witnessed in the marketplace. Section 18 rulemaking (otherwise
known as “Mag-Moss” rulemaking) has the virtue of being “open, iterative, and public.”13 In
contrast to a pure enforcement regime, which provides little opportunity for stakeholders to
intervene in agency actions,
proceeding by rulemaking strengthens the democratic legitimacy of agency action
by providing greater opportunities for input by regulated parties and regulatory
beneficiaries. Public engagement is especially important given Congress’s intent

11

CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 331 (2016).
See generally id.
13
Trade Regulation Rule on Commercial Surveillance and Data Security, 87 Fed. Reg. 51,273, 51,289 (proposed
Aug. 22, 2022) (Statement of Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter).
12
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for the agency to update its conceptions of unfairness and deception regularly to
keep pace with evolving abuses in the marketplace.14
Section 18 rulemaking is further imbued with pro-democratic features such as increased
opportunity for public comments and an opportunity to initiate public hearings.15 By endowing the
Commission with this robust rulemaking authority, Congress clearly envisioned the kind of publicled inquiry at hand in this rulemaking. The Commission is asking questions about matters within
its expertise, and the public is responding in kind.
These comments are organized around three arguments. The first argument is that the
harms and benefits of commercial surveillance are wildly imbalanced in favor of commercial
actors, with consumers more vulnerable than ever. This is why we argue that commercial
surveillance is the correct terminology for the practices which are being observed in digital
markets. Humans are increasingly being tracked, identified, classified, assessed, and commodified
online. This prevalent surveillance manifests itself in different ways and is driven by different
market actors, but the cumulative effect is a corporate commercial surveillance regime which the
Commission is correct to label as it has. Commercial surveillance harms consumers and digital
markets by eroding trust in those markets as consumers increasingly feel betrayed by data practices
that contradict their expectations. These harms are not outweighed by any countervailing benefits
to consumers or competition, as the benefits of commercial surveillance disproportionately flow
to industry. This is especially true of targeted advertising, where ad-tech middlemen pocket the
surplus fees generated by targeting and consumers are preyed upon by an advertising leviathan
supercharged by prevalent surveillance and behavioral psychology. Industry rakes in profits,
giving consumers nothing but risk, dread, and overhyped undesired targeted ads.
The second central argument of these comments is that notice and choice has failed. Rather
than empowering consumers as intended, notice and choice has proven overly burdensome on
consumers and has legitimized harmful, disloyal commercial surveillance and data security
practices. As such, it has had the opposite effect from the one it was intended to have. There are
numerous reasons why notice and choice is ill-suited to promoting good data practices. Notice and
choice is plagued by cognitive and structural problems which prevent consumers from effectively
engaging in privacy self-management. Consent has its place in American law, but a number of
pathologies which undermine the validity of consent are present in digital market interactions.
Digital environments are entirely constructed, and corporate design choices undermine consumer
choice and nudge consumers into taking actions which are disproportionately beneficial to
companies. There are a few situations in which consent can be meaningful and effective, but those
circumstances are rarely present in digital markets. American privacy must move beyond notice
and choice if it is to truly protect the ability of consumers to make voluntary choices and safely
interact in markets.

14

Kurt Walters, Reassessing the Mythology of Magnuson-Moss: A Call to Revive Section 18 Rulemaking at the FTC,
16 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 520, 526 (2022).
15
See Walters, supra note 14,14 at 25–28, discussing the role of informal hearings in Section 18 rulemaking.
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Our third argument points toward a solution: to properly deter unfair trade practices, the
Commission should ground its data privacy rules in concepts of loyalty and relational
vulnerability. Participation in modern society requires consumers to make themselves vulnerable
to companies. Modern tech companies are entrenched in our lives and have considerable control
over what we see and click.16 We trust these companies with our data out of necessity, but the law
fails to stop them from engaging in self-serving, opportunistic behavior. Such practices are the
very definition of an unfair trade practice for the digital age because they leave consumers worseoff, they are not reasonably avoidable given consumers’ vulnerability, and they negate any possible
offsetting benefits to consumers or competition by poisoning the marketplace. When companies
are free to act in ways disloyal to consumers, they send a message to consumers that they cannot
be trusted with people’s data and mediated experiences. Consumers struggle to differentiate
between those companies who have loyal data practices and those who do not, which further
bolsters companies engaged in disloyal practices. Instead of healthy competition, companies have
every incentive to compete to extract more data and attention in increasingly harmful ways.
Approaching questions of unfairness through the frame of disloyalty and relational
vulnerability reveals why certain commercial surveillance practices are both unfair and deceptive.
Loyalty is what separates harmful and beneficial commercial surveillance. By narrowing the
category of commercial surveillance to the subset of those practices which are disloyal, the
Commission can craft precise trade regulations which target the most egregious and pressing harms
in the marketplace. Through this focused approach, the Commission can work towards its goal of
“[a] vibrant economy fueled by fair competition and an empowered, informed public.” 17 We
identify several actions the Commission can take to help foster trust in digital markets: (1)
requiring data minimization by prohibiting companies from engaging in unnecessary and
disproportionate data collection; (2) prohibiting disloyal gatekeeping by prohibiting third-party
access to consumer data where that access is not in the consumer’s best interest; (3) placing
substantive limits on targeted, behavioral, and cross-contextual advertising; (4) heeding the advice
of AI experts and developing rules regarding the design, implementation, and use of AI systems
which increase the fairness, transparency, and accountability of these systems; and (5) rather than
seeing this rulemaking as a binary choice between protecting children and teens or adults, crafting
generally applicable trade regulations which protect all Americans from harmful commercial
surveillance. (Q30.)

16

Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law, 99 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 961, 961
(2021).
17
FED. TRADE COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2022 TO 2026 (2022), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/ftc_gov/pdf/fy-2022-2026-ftc-strategic-plan.pdf.

9

Commercial Surveillance ANPR, R111004
I. The Disproportionate Dangers and Meager Consumer Benefits of Commercial
Surveillance
A. Commercial Surveillance is the Correct Term for the Data Practices Observed in
Digital Markets
To “define with specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce,”18 the Commission rightly seeks to use accurate and clear language.
“Commercial surveillance” is the correct term to use in this rulemaking because it accurately
describes the context in which these practices occur, the prevalence of these practices, the limited
visibility of these practices to consumers, and the power disparities that exist between consumers
and companies engaging in such commercial surveillance. The Commission’s expanded definition
of commercial surveillance in the ANPR captures these factors:
For the purposes of this ANPR, “commercial surveillance” refers to the collection,
aggregation, analysis, retention, transfer, or monetization of consumer data and the
direct derivatives of that information. These data include both information that
consumers actively provide—say, when they affirmatively register for a service or
make a purchase—as well as personal identifiers and other information that
companies collect, for example, when a consumer casually browses the web or
opens an app.19
This definition clarifies that the Commission is concerned with acts or practices affecting
consumer data and that such practices encompass both overt and covert data collection. Concerns
that the term is presumptive or value-laden are misplaced, as these comment demonstrate that some
kinds of commercial surveillance can be mutually beneficial for consumers and businesses when
used in line with consumer expectations and in a way that fosters trust.20 Commercial surveillance
is not always bad, but it is the right term for what is going on here.
The use of the term “surveillance” captures the prevalence of these practices and their
invisibility to consumers. Surveillance is a word that can cause unease, conjuring mental images
of Orwell’s Big Brother and totalitarian societies.21 Notwithstanding those associations,
surveillance is a complex subject that is neither always good nor always bad.22 Sociologist David
Lyon has defined surveillance as “the focused, systemic and routine attention to personal details
for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction.”23 Building on this definition, we24
have previously written:

18

15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (2018).
Trade Regulation Rule on Commercial Surveillance and Data Security, 87 Fed. Reg. 51,273, 51,277 (proposed
Aug. 22, 2022) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking and request for public comment).
20
Infra Part III.
21
NEIL RICHARDS, WHY PRIVACY MATTERS 136–137 (2022).
22
Id. at 138.
23
Id. (citing DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES 18–22 (2007)).
24
For ease of reading, these comments use the term “we” to refer to the prior writings of any of the authors, whether
written jointly or individually.
19
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Four aspects of this definition are noteworthy, as they expand our understanding of
what surveillance is and what its purposes are. First, surveillance is focused on
learning information about individuals. Second, surveillance is systematic, which
is to say that it is intentional rather than random or arbitrary. Third, surveillance is
routine, part of the ordinary administrative apparatus that characterizes modern
societies. Fourth, surveillance can have a wide variety of purposes—sometimes
totalitarian domination, more often subtler forms of influence or control, and
sometimes oversight or protection. . . . To Lyon’s four features of surveillance, I’d
like to add a fifth, which is that surveillance transcends the public-private divide. .
. . In our world, surveillance is performed by the government, by the private sector,
and by a thriving combination of the two.25
Viewed through this lens, the Commission’s use of the term “surveillance” accurately describes
the practices we observe in digital markets and which are under scrutiny in this rulemaking.
Commercial surveillance as defined by the Commission focuses on individual consumers, which
includes human market participants, businesses, and workers.26 Commercial surveillance is also
systematic, as consumers are either directly asked to provide information or companies have
systems in place which automatically collect personal identifiers and other information concerning
consumers. These practices are also routine. Prevalent digital tracking methods, such as the use of
third-party cookies or cross-device tracking for targeted and behavioral advertising, are
commonplace features of the modern internet that are near-ubiquitous. Commercial surveillance
also has a wide variety of purposes. Some of those purposes further trust and improve the consumer
experience, such as the use of cookies to keep a user logged into a portal or when a streaming
service provides personalized recommendations. On the other hand, some purposes of commercial
surveillance practices are more insidious or outright malicious, such as the use of “stalkerware” to
stalk and harass people against their will.27 Thus, the Commission’s own definition of consumer
surveillance is precisely the kind of focused, systemic, and routine attention to personal details
which the definition of surveillance covers.
Recognizing that surveillance in general transcends the public-private divide,28 the use of
the term commercial surveillance also demonstrates the Commission’s caution and careful use of
language to keep the focus of this rulemaking narrow. At issue is the use of human information in
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Trade Regulation Rule on Commercial Surveillance and Data Security, 87 Fed. Reg. 51,273, 51,277 (proposed
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Stalkerware: Phone Surveillance & Safety for Survivors, TECH SAFETY, https://www.techsafety.org/spyware-andstalkerware-phone-surveillance (last visited Sept. 26, 2022).
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the flow of commerce, especially as driven by pecuniary interests.29 As Bruce Schneier has
recognized, “[t]he overwhelming bulk of surveillance is corporate.”30 Danielle Citron has written
that “[e]very day, all day long, products and services . . . track our bodily functions, health
conditions, searches, sexual activities, and correspondence, creating digital archives of our lives at
unimaginable scale.”31 This corporate surveillance is ostensibly a bargain between consumers and
companies. The incentive for companies is clear: “Companies are maximizing the amount of
personal data collected so that they can make money from it. . . . [F]irms amass intimate data to
analyze it, share it, and—yes—sell it.”32 Absent any regulations to the contrary, cheap storage
costs and plentiful opportunities to monetize consumer data create pressure to engage in rampant
collection, storage, and use of our data.33 The incentive for consumers to not resist this prevalent
surveillance is the repeated assurance from tech companies that “they are making our lives
better.”34 Companies employ every tactic they can to convince consumers that this arrangement
benefits them: “In the astute words of privacy researcher Pinelopi Troullinou, ‘seductive
surveillance’ is the name of the game. Firms tell us that the more they know us, the more they can
meet our needs, bring us joy, and simplify our lives.”35 As we discuss below, this is sometimes
true and sometimes untrue.36 Setting aside for now the discussion of which parties benefit from
these practices, the Commission is correct in labeling them as commercial surveillance.
Another virtue of the term “commercial surveillance” is that it correctly implies the
existence and exercise of various forms of power over consumers. As we have written before,
“privacy is inevitably about the distribution and exercise of power.”37 Power is key to
understanding the significance of commercial surveillance and the ways in which it can
substantially injure consumers and competition. Oscar Gandy’s discussion of power as a relative
measure elucidates this point:
Randall Bartlett offers a definition of power that may serve us well as we venture
into battle with those who would ignore the role that information plays in its use.
He defines power as “the ability of one actor to alter the decisions made and/or
welfare experienced by another actor relative to the choices that would have been
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made and/or welfare that would have been experienced had the first actor not
existed or acted.” Defined in this way, power is a relative measure. All actors may
be seen to have some power. The importance of the question is based in the desire
to determine, or to demonstrate . . . that the power of individuals is frequently
overwhelmed by the power of bureaucratic organizations. . . . As we explore the
political economy of personal information, the relative power of individuals in
comparison with that of institutions and organizations becomes highly relevant. . . .
[T]he power that the individual is able to exercise over the organization when she
withholds personal information is almost always insignificant in comparison with
the power brought to bear when the organization chooses to withhold goods or
services unless the information is provided.38
This intrinsic power inequality is present in the Commission’s definition of commercial
surveillance, which focuses on actions taken with respect to consumer data, usually by a trusted
party, such as collection, aggregation, analysis, retention, transfer, or monetization. This implicit
recognition of power inequality tracks the statutory requirements of an unfair trade practice. An
act or practice is not unfair “unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury
to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”39 As Gandy’s discussion of power
explains, commercial surveillance is perpetuated by companies and is unavoidable by consumers
because a consumer’s ability to withhold information is insignificant compared to a company’s
ability to withhold goods or services.
The purpose of this ANPR is to identify only those commercial surveillance practices
which are unfair. Although commercial surveillance always involves the exercise or distribution
of power, sometimes it can be useful on balance. Similarly, a technology is not necessarily disloyal
merely because it benefits its maker.40 A number of mutually beneficial data practices fall within
the Commission’s definition of commercial surveillance: When companies mine user data to
improve services specifically requested by the user (and share that data with trusted third parties
for that purpose), that is a mutually beneficial commercial surveillance practice;41 digital
entertainment services like Netflix, Spotify, etc. utilize data collection and personalization to the
benefits of users;42 and recommendation systems used by companies like Amazon, can benefit
users and platforms alike.43 If all commercial surveillance were presumptively unfair, there would
be no need to promulgate an ANPR as comprehensive and nuanced as this. The Commission is
trying to identify the small subset of data practices that are unfair commercial surveillance under
the Section 5 framework. Unscrupulous parties who fear the specter of regulation may decry the
use of the term commercial surveillance as being presumptive, but it accurately describes their
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practices. This descriptive accuracy is necessary to create clear, effective trade regulation rules.
The systematic and routine collection of personal data to influence commercial activity affects the
ability of consumers to safely, sustainably, and meaningfully participate in the marketplace. To
say the least, the Commission should not shy away from using such accurate language merely
because it may cause some companies to engage in uncomfortable introspection about their own
business models and their attitudes towards consumer data.
B. Commercial Surveillance is Prevalent
When it comes to privacy and digital commerce, Americans are overwhelmingly aware
that they are being surveilled, judged, and nudged constantly by private and public actors. A recent
New York Times op-ed recognized that “[t]o exist in 2022 is to be surveilled, tracked, tagged and
monitored—most often for profit.”44 But consumers crave—and demand—privacy. According to
a recent KPMG survey, ninety-seven percent of respondents said that data privacy is important to
them, and eighty-seven percent characterized it as a human right.45 Despite that clear yearning for
greater protections, consumers are not optimistic about the level of protection they receive. That
same survey found that: sixty-eight percent of consumers don’t trust companies to ethically sell
personal data;46 fifty-four percent don’t trust companies to use personal data in an ethical way;47
fifty-three percent don’t trust companies to ethically collect personal data;48 and fifty-percent don’t
trust companies to protect personal data.49 This sense of distrust is prevalent and harmful to digital
markets. A 2019 report issued by the Pew Research Center revealed that “roughly six-in-ten U.S.
adults say they do not think it is possible to go through daily life without having data collected
about them by companies or the government.”50 A staggering eighty-one percent of the public “say
that the potential risks they face because of data collection by companies outweigh the benefits,”51
and seventy percent think that their personal data is less secure than it was five years ago. 52 These
surveys show just how overwhelmed and powerless consumers feel in the face of commercial
surveillance and how much trust has been eroded. And these consumers are correct. The status quo
of privacy regulation in America (or lack thereof) has created a commercial surveillance leviathan
whose insatiable appetite for data manifests pervasive and harmful surveillance practices. This
commercial surveillance “ecosystem” drives product design to create “a monetizable data stream
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from every buyer,”53 which in turn erodes trust and hampers the ability of consumers to safely
interact in markets.
Jack Balkin concisely summarized the breadth of commercial surveillance when he wrote
that “[w]e rely on digital businesses to perform many different tasks for us. In the process, these
businesses learn a lot about us—our likes, our dislikes, our habits, our movements, websites we
visit, who we communicate with and when we do it, features of our bodies, even how we type on,
click, and touch digital interfaces.”54 The prevalence and breadth of commercial surveillance
makes it difficult to concisely answer the question, “[w]hich practices do companies use to surveil
consumers?” Companies surveil consumers in many different ways, some of which are old and
familiar and many of which are novel and have not yet entered the public consciousness. Different
companies surveil consumers for different reasons and target different types of data from broad
groups of people. For conceptual clarity, we can categorize commercial surveillance practices
under the five areas of collection, personalization, gatekeeping, influencing, and mediation.55 Each
of these categories capture different aspects of the relationship between consumers and the
companies entrusted with our data, and as we will explain below, each category can point the way
towards specific commercial regulations. (Q1, Q3.)
1. Collection
Companies today are creating vast “digital archives” of our lives.56 Rampant data collection
has become a normalized aspect of modern commercial relationships, with new and old
technologies being employed in conjunction to “create comprehensive records of our movements
through physical space, as well as our interests, likes, desires, needs, and physiological states.”57
Data collection is a core feature of digital commerce. Companies act unfairly when they collect
large, unnecessary, sensitive and disproportionate data in ways that inhibit consumers’ ability to
be safe market participants. There is nothing inevitable or accidental about this.58 Shoshana Zuboff
has explained how commercial surveillance as we know it today (marked by unnecessary and
disproportionate data collection) evolved due to market pressures. She recounts how engineers
first noticed that interactions with customers produced “data exhaust,” significant amounts of
information about customer behavior that were a byproduct of normal market interactions. Zuboff
further describes how that data was reconceptualized as “behavioral surplus” which could be used
to improve the quality of the company’s services, benefitting consumers. But crucially, Zuboff
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explains that behavioral surplus had other uses which did not directly benefit the consumers who
were generating it, such as monetizing that data to serve targeted advertisements that could be used
to influence and manipulate consumer behavior.59 Comprehensive consumer tracking and data
collection thus has significant detrimental effects on consumers and on the trust that is necessary
for digital markets to function. Consumers become exposed and vulnerable the moment their data
is collected. If that collection is not limited to what is necessary and proportionate to provide the
service requested by the consumer, then consumers lose trust and digital commerce as a whole
suffers. Moreover, data surreptitiously collected on one set of consumers can be used to influence
and manipulate other consumers.60
The Commission’s definition of commercial surveillance recognizes that data collection
includes both information that consumers actively provide (usually at the request of a trusted party)
and information that companies collect in ways that are passive or covert to consumers. Often,
companies will condition the use of a service or sale of goods on consumers providing personal
information. Sometimes that is a practical necessity, such as providing a payment option and
shipping address for delivery of goods. Other times, companies present these requests as allegedly
voluntary, but they are designed to be so difficult to decline that consumers consent against their
desire to do so. Furthermore, there are pervasive information-collecting practices that are invisible
to all but the most technology-savvy consumers. Persistent trackers surveil users across the web
and compile our browsing history. Third-party cookies have been in use for decades, tracking users
across websites, building user profiles, and leveraging that information to provide targeted
advertising. Even now, as users find new ways to avoid or circumvent cookies, new persistent
tracking methods are being implemented. For more than a decade, devices have been surveilled
via digital fingerprinting (also known as device fingerprinting), a process which amasses
information about consumer devices, such as IP address, operating system, browser selection,
screen resolution, clock settings, font choice, etc., to track an individual computer or device across
the web.61 At the same time, our smartphone apps track our location, contacts, calendar,
bookmarks, and search history.62
Commercial surveillance and data collection have crept into all aspects of our lives.
Schools use AI-empowered tools to scan student social media posts, ostensibly to identify students
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at risk of harming themselves or others, but also to surveil things like student protests.63 Our cars
monitor, log, analyze, and monetize data about our driving habits, including our location history,
phone distraction, how quickly we accelerate, how early we apply the brakes, and even our
entertainment choices.64 Employers increasingly monitor their employees, screenshotting the
websites they visit, recording their faces and voices, logging keystrokes, tracking their location,
and monitoring their calls and texts.65 Video games collect users’ personal information and
leverage information asymmetry, design, and known frailties in human cognition to pressure
players into microtransactions, such as purchasing “loot boxes.”66 Hungry consumers attempting
to simply order a pizza have found themselves being surveilled by session replay tools, software
designed to observe and record mouse movement, clicks, and keystrokes so that analysts can
monitor consumer behavior and optimize websites.67 Thousands of “femtech” apps, designed to
help users track “menstruation, fertility, pregnancies, menopause, pelvic and uterine health,
nursing care, and sexual habits,” collect vast amounts of data about their users, including
information about “cramps, medications, illnesses, the consistency of their vaginal discharge, sex
drive, sexual fulfillment (including whether they orgasmed or not), mood, alcohol use,
miscarriages, and use or nonuse of contraception.”68 A new crop of spyware, ominously known as
“accountability apps,” have cropped up to prevent consumers from viewing “pornographic”
images by monitoring everything they see and do and feeding that information to an appointed
chaperone, even going so far as to take screenshots and eavesdrop.69 Virtual reality headsets
harvest data about our faces, eye movement, and body language.70 Smart watches embedded with
sensors collect a trove of information about our bodies, including whether someone is ovulating.71
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One major sports team—with financial ties to a nation state72—has even developed a “smart scarf,”
which uses “a PPG sensor, accelerometer, temperature sensor, and an electrodermal activity (EDA)
sensor” to track a fan’s physiological reactions during games.73 The increasing presence of
interconnected, sensor-enabled, networked devices, known as the “Internet of Things” (IoT),
exacerbates this surveillance and data harvesting. These devices “are always on, are always with
us and, together, ensure the total surveillance of everyday movements, habits, and intellectual
endeavors.”74 (Q1, Q3.)
Many of these collection practices are facilitated by dominant platforms and other wellknown actors in the surveillance ecosystem. These companies are not solely responsible for the
rise of commercial surveillance, but an inventory of prevalent data collection practices would be
incomplete without at least analyzing the role of these companies in furthering the prevalence of
commercial surveillance.75 Meta Platforms, Inc. reportedly gathers, loses76, and leaks77 vast
amounts of data about consumers, whether they are on Facebook or not. 78 Through its panoply of
devices, apps, online services, and website analytics, Google now collects vast troves of personal
data, including location information, search history, browsing history, contact information, user
IDs, device IDs, usage data, crash and performance data, user content, purchase history, email
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address, text message content, email content, audio data, product interaction, and so on.79 Such
data is collected across services and devices for different purposes, such as advertising, marketing,
analytics, personalization, and functionality.80 Amazon dominates the smart home market,
surveilling consumers through a diverse array of devices including speakers, lightbulbs,
refrigerators, thermostats, doorbells, televisions, and so on.81 Amazon recently released its Halo
Rise sleep tracker which senses breathing and movement during sleep.82 In a move seemingly
designed to normalize the pervasive surveillance from which it profits, Amazon recently launched
a television show featuring footage recorded on the company’s Ring doorbells.83 These devices
listen to us in our most intimate moments, comprehensively track our habits, and map our homes.84
There are increasingly fewer places where consumers can be shielded from the prying eyes and
ears of commercial surveillance, and few if any reasonable steps that they can take to avoid such
pervasive commercial surveillance.
2. Personalization
Personalization, the routine and systemic treatment of people differently based on personal
information or characteristics, is often exalted as a key feature of the modern internet. 85
Personalization embodies several aspects of commercial surveillance, including collection,
aggregation, analysis, retention, transfer, and monetization. Some forms of personalization are
relatively obvious to consumers, like first-party product advertisements, streaming
recommendations, and algorithmically-curated news feeds.86 Personalization also happens in ways
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that are less obvious to consumers, like default settings and layouts. 87 There are positive, loyal
examples of personalization, such as “targeted recommendations for networked connections based
upon intentionally revealed data such as where you work or attended high school.”88
Personalization systems also create harm, however, “such as those that wrongfully discriminate or
have a disparate impact on protected, marginalized, or vulnerable groups of people.”89
“Personalization” of this sort becomes little more than a euphemism for invidious discrimination.
Some practices—masquerading as personalization—are corrosive forms of targeting that
“unreasonably exclude people from opportunities, extract their attention and financial resources,
and expose them to misinformation.”90 Privacy laws enacted at the state level recognize the
potential for this corrosive targeting and have implemented bans on data selling, data sharing, and
targeted advertising. For example, California’s CCPA grants consumers the right to opt out of
cross-context behavioral advertising, which is defined as “the targeting of advertising to a
consumer based on the consumer's personal information obtained from the consumer's activity
across businesses, distinctly-branded websites, applications, or services, other than the business,
distinctly-branded website, application, or service with which the consumer intentionally
interacts.”91 Trade regulation rules prohibiting unfair commercial surveillance practices will thus
need to distinguish between beneficial and injurious forms of personalization. (Q1, Q3.)
3. Gatekeeping
The nature of digital markets results in third parties having considerable access to consumer
data. Trusted parties who are directly interacting with consumers have “a remarkable ability to
facilitate third party access to trusting parties and their data.”92 This happens through “APIs,
advertiser portals, fusion centers, and government backdoors.”93 This is a significant source of
power for major platforms, and where much of the economic incentive to engage in surveillance
comes from. For example, advertisers clamor for user data to deliver targeted advertisements,94
while AI developers want large data sets for training their latest AI models. 95 These third-party
desires, coupled with a duty of profit maximization owed to shareholders, create extreme financial
pressures on companies to enable access to consumer data. Third-party access to consumer data
can be beneficial and loyal. For example, companies might provide anonymous customer data to
an analytics firm for the purpose of improving product quality or to a security firm for increasing
security. But third-party access is frequently detrimental, such as when consumer data is sold to
scammers who then target a company’s users or when a company facilitates a data breach by failing

87

See id.
See id.
89
Id.
90
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 16,16 at 983.
91
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(k) (West 2022) (effective Jan. 1, 2023); see also American Data Privacy and
Protection Act, H.R. 8152, 117th Cong. § 204(c) (2022) (proposing a right for consumers to opt out of targeted
advertising).
92
Hartzog & Richards, supra note 55, at 380.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
88

20

Commercial Surveillance ANPR, R111004
to properly vet the security practices of its vendors. One prominent example which highlights the
importance of gatekeeping is the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal, in which third-party
apps on Facebook enabled data analytics company Cambridge Analytica to extract massive
amounts of data from tens of millions of Facebook’s human customers.96 Reasonable minds can
debate the semantics of whether or not this was a “data breach,” but the underlying concern from
a consumer perspective is more or less the same: consumers trusted Facebook with their data and
that trust was betrayed when Facebook failed to safeguard that data from being extracted and
leveraged against consumers in an attempt to manipulate them politically. (Q1, Q3.)
4. Influencing
Influencing is both a goal and an unavoidable consequence of commercial surveillance.
Every design choice exerts some degree of influence over consumer behavior. We have written
before that
[t]echnologies are artifacts built to act upon the world. Every single design decision
made in the creation of a website or app is meant to facilitate a particular kind of
behavior. The structure of digital technologies will affect people’s choices even if
the effect is not intended by designers. When designers create a drop-down menu,
privacy settings, “I agree” buttons, and any other feature that implicates people’s
privacy, they are influencing them. They can’t avoid it.97
Intentional and unintentional influencing manifests itself in several ways. As discussed above, all
design influences to a degree, but many design choices are innocuous. Of greater concern to the
Commission are the manipulative and harmful intentional attempts to influence. For example,
consumers are frequently unwitting test subjects in experiments designed by companies to increase
engagement and, hence, influence, usually in the form of A/B testing.98 Unlike test subjects in
medical or scientific research by universities, however, these unwitting test subjects have few, if
any protections, like Institutional Review Boards and other safeguards for human subjects
research. These experiments highlight not only the prevalence of surveillance, but also the inability
of consumers to avoid it, as well as the harmful consequences that can arise from such power
imbalances.99
One of the most prevalent and visible ways in which commercial surveillance manifests as
influencing is the set of practices which comprise targeted, behavioral, and cross-contextual
advertising. Targeted advertising, which has been defined in one instance as “displaying to an
individual or device identified by a unique identifier an online advertisement or content that is
selected based on known or predicted preferences, characteristics, or interest associated with the
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individual or a device identified by a unique identifier,”100 is little more than a sophisticated attempt
to influence consumers. Targeted advertising involves many actors, including consumers,
publishers, advertisers, and ad-tech middlemen. It also embodies many aspects of commercial
surveillance: It is fueled by data collection, facilitated by gatekeeping, and results in
personalization. Contextual advertising, an alternative to targeted advertising in which “an
advertisement is displayed based on the content or location in which the advertisement appears
and does not vary based on who is viewing the advertisement,”101 is also an attempt to influence
but one which relies far less on commercial surveillance. The important distinction between these
practices is the degree of risk they entail for consumers and whether they advance consumers’
interests. (Q1, Q3.)
We challenge many of the assumptions underlying the proliferation of targeted advertising
in Part I.D of these comments, but it is helpful at this stage to use the lens of influencing to
introduce the basic set of assumptions which drives this practice. The logic of targeted advertising,
as presented to consumers, is that consumers see only ads which are “relevant”102 to them, which
ostensibly enhances their online experience as an unmitigated good. The logic to advertisers is that
this form of targeting is more likely than alternatives, such as contextual advertising, to result in
purchases – i.e., a change in human behavior caused by the power of prevalent corporate
surveillance.103 This raises important questions about autonomy, manipulation, potential
discrimination, democracy, etc., which we address later in these comments, but it is sufficient to
note at this stage that the purpose of targeted advertising is to influence consumers-an exercise of
power enabled by the detailed information that commercial surveillance generates.
5. Mediation
Digital environments are necessarily and intentionally constructed: The creators of such
environments decide how and within what parameters human users will interact with one another.
This fact implicates consumer privacy and autonomy in significant and serious ways. For example,
in response to partisan accusations of censorship and bias, Google recently launched a pilot
program with the goal of preventing political campaign emails from going to users’ spam
folders.104 Consumers expect their spam filter settings to empower them to make choices about
who communicates with them, what kind of emails land in their inbox, and which are directed to
spam. Despite those consumer expectations, Google is ultimately in control of mediation, and it
facilitates and hinders user behavior through the design of its tools. Another example is the way
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social media platforms, such as Facebook, algorithmically amplify or diminish certain content.105
Selling advertising relies on high “user engagement” to justify high advertising prices, so these
content-shaping algorithms often promote content that is designed to provoke consumers, such as
hate speech or misinformation. Such examples are clear reminders that platforms hold the power
to determine what we see, how we use their services, and with whom we interact. (Q1, Q3.)
***
These five practices—collection, personalization, gatekeeping, influencing, and
mediation—are features of commercial surveillance and natural consequences of the immense
pressure that companies face to monetize consumer data. Whether these practices are good or bad
depend on how they are implemented. The duty owed to corporate shareholders to maximize profit
coupled with the absence of meaningful trade rules governing data practices creates commercial
incentives and business models that lead to lax data security measures and harmful commercial
surveillance practices.106 Unless prohibited from otherwise doing so, companies will continue to
find ways to nudge, influence, and manipulate consumers into divulging personal information or
“consenting” to technical tracking measures. Companies will invest in methods of circumventing
consumer privacy measures, such as the blocking and deletion of tracking cookies. (Q11.)
C. Commercial Surveillance Causes Substantial Injury to Consumers and Society
The Commission is tasked with preventing unfair trade practices—those acts or practices
which cause or are likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which are not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers
or to competition.107 Commercial surveillance inflicts substantial injuries upon consumers,
commerce, and society, but courts and regulators have long struggled to recognize and quantify
privacy injuries.108 This discrepancy arises in part because privacy harms are often small but
numerous, involve a future risk of varied injuries, and often affect society in addition to individual
consumers.109 Another challenge is that there are different ways to conceptualize the harms
inflicted by commercial surveillance, because industry’s insatiable appetite for data, spurred by
the absence of meaningful privacy rules, affects our autonomy, dignity, and society in profound
(albeit diffuse) ways. As we have written before, “[i]n addition to our attention getting wheedled,
manipulated, swindled, or outright taken from us, the appetite for data is producing reduced
cognitive skills, reduced personal intimacy and offline interactions, and a corrosion of
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democracy.”110 One can examine the ways in which commercial surveillance undermines human
values such as identity, freedom, and protection.111 Another option is to examine how commercial
surveillance enables powerful companies to profile and sort, nudge, and manipulate consumers.
These varied examples of harm are important in their own ways, but they do not provide a coherent
framework for the Commission to work from. For trust to flourish in digital markets, we need to
properly identify the myriad ways in which consumer surveillance substantially injures consumers,
including the indirect pecuniary harms which shape consumer behavior. For conceptual clarity,
this subsection divides the harms stemming from commercial surveillance into those inflicted upon
individuals and those inflicted upon society. (Q4, Q7.)
1. Commercial Surveillance Inflicts Substantial Injuries on Consumers Which
Prevent Them from Safely Participating in Markets
There are numerous individual injuries which result from certain commercial surveillance
practices. Professors Danielle Citron and Daniel Solove have produced an extremely useful
typology of privacy harms which should serve as the starting point for a discussion of privacy
harms. In their work, they identify seven basic types of privacy harms: (a) physical harms, (b)
economic harms, (c) reputational harms, (d) psychological harms, (e) autonomy harms, (f)
discrimination harms, and (g) relationship harms.112 The case law surrounding these harms (and
their often contradictory recognition by courts) is nuanced, but each category illuminates how
commercial surveillance causes substantial injury to consumers. In addition to the Citron-Solove
typology of harms, these comments identify two broader categories of individual injuries which
shed light on how to distinguish beneficial and harmful commercial surveillance: exploitation and
the inability to safely interact in markets.
a. Threats of Physical Violence
The improper sharing of personal data promotes, facilitates, and enables physical violence
such as murder, physical assault, and rape.113 Commercial surveillance increases the risk of
physical harm because it vastly increases the amount of personal data in circulation. This
proliferation of consumer data increases the risk of exposure of that data, which in turn makes
consumers more susceptible to physical violence. The law recognizes this risk in certain
circumstances, as evinced by the fact that “[e]ntities handling personal data have been found liable
for negligently, knowingly, or purposefully paving the way for a third party to physically injure
someone.”114 The threat of physical violence only grows as practices such as doxing grow in
popularity every year.115 This risk is especially great for people such as women, members of the
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LGBTQ+ community, and racial, ethnic, and religious minorities who have historically been the
victims of discrimination and marginalization.
b. Direct and Indirect Economic Harm
Unnecessary and disproportionate data collection, processing of personal data, and lax data
security measures can lead to direct and indirect economic injuries. Consumers suffer financially
from identity theft, both the crime itself as well as the time and money spent trying to mitigate risk
of an identity thief acting on that data.116 The Commission has previously brought enforcement
actions where companies’ data security practices were inadequate, even where there was not a
subsequent breach.117 The Commission has also brought an unfairness enforcement action where
a company’s misuse of information obtained in violation of one site’s user agreement subjected
consumers to risk of economic harm.118 The role of data brokers in facilitating identity theft and
other economic harms should not be overlooked. For example, the Department of Justice recently
entered a consent decree with data brokers Macromark, KBM, and Epsilon, each of whom
compiled lists of people profiled as naïve.119 These lists of vulnerable individuals (including
elderly Americans and people suffering from mental health difficulties), known as “suckers lists,”
were sold to scammers who fraudulently solicited money from those vulnerable consumers.120
These scams can have a cascading effect, where a vulnerable consumer is targeted repeatedly and
has their wealth siphoned.121 The loss of important opportunities is a form of indirect pecuniary
harm which warrants consideration. Risk of future economic injury, such as when a receipt
displays too many digits of a credit card number, can be considered a harm as well,122 as recognized
by the Commission’s prior enforcement actions for inadequate security even in the absence of a
data breach.123 (Q9.)
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c. Reputational Harms
Reputation and standing in the community are important traits which have long been
protected by legal doctrines such as libel and defamation law or the false light privacy tort.124
Prevalent commercial surveillance and lax data security, however, have increased the chance of
harm to reputation and social standing via leaks of personal information. Everyone is only one
moment away from virality, and even seemingly innocuous information can be weaponized against
us, harming one’s reputation.125 Not only are these injuries in and of themselves, but loss of
reputation or community standing can have knock-on effects, such as “lost business, employment,
or social rejection.”126 Risk of reputational harm also increases where there are “sloppy,
incomplete, and incorrect records.”127 Inaccurate data can be harmful when exposed, but even
when not exposed to others there is still the challenge of managing and correcting that data, which
is a burden borne by consumers.
d. Psychological Harms
Emotional distress has long been a part of the discussion surrounding privacy harms, going
back to Warren and Brandeis’s germinal 1890 article The Right to Privacy.128 Psychological harms
caused by privacy violations can produce a variety of potential injuries, but the Citron-Solove
typology divides them into emotional distress and disturbance.129 Encompassing emotions such as
“annoyance, frustration, fear, embarrassment, anger, and various degrees of anxiety,” emotional
distress can produce significant harms, as tort law has also recognized for many years.130 Take for
example the emotional harm that Bobbi Duncan suffered when Facebook outed her to her father.131
The social media platform’s default settings allowed users to be added to groups in a public way
without their permission, so Bobbi’s father received an automatic update when Bobbi was added
to the Facebook group for the University of Texas at Austin’s Queer Chorus. This digital privacy
violation resulted in the two becoming estranged and Bobbi falling into depression.132 In addition
to such reckless or negligent practices, malicious practices such as impersonation, doxing, leaking
of intimate images, and threats can create devastating fear.133 Dealing with identity theft leaves a
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heavy emotional toll.134 In cases involving privacy torts, courts recognize “feelings of violation,
mortification, fear, humiliation, and embarrassment” as cognizable harms.135 In contrast to Citron
and Solove’s first category of emotional distress, their second category of disturbance “involves
unwanted intrusions that disturb tranquility, interrupt activities, sap time, and otherwise serve as a
nuisance.”136 Unsolicited telephone calls and text messages are prototypical examples here.137 The
Commission pursued a similar theory of harm in FTC v. Accusearch, where the unconsented-to
disclosure of telephone records subjected consumers to emotional harm, including stalking and
harassment.138 A more subtle and insidious form of disturbance is the way in which our attention
is getting “wheedled, manipulated, swindled, or outright taken from us” by addictive design
decisions which feed industry’s insatiable appetite for data.139 These disturbances waste our time,
distract us, and intrude into our private and personal peace.
e. Autonomy Harms
As previously explained, all surveillance exists for the purposes of influence, management,
protection, or direction—and commercial surveillance is no exception.140 When done to achieve
disloyal, self-serving ends, commercial surveillance can restrict, undermine, inhibit, or unduly
influence people’s choices. These threats to consumer autonomy are significant, and in addition to
harming individual consumers, they undermine trust in markets when they become prevalent.
People want to make choices in accordance with their preferences, but deceptive design and subtle
forms of influence prevent them from doing so. Loss of autonomy can be effectuated in different
ways, and the Citron-Solove typology also helpfully divides these harms into the six
subcomponents of (i) coercion; (ii) manipulation; (iii) failure to inform; (iv) thwarted expectations;
(v) lack of control; and (vi) chilling effects.
i. Coercion
A vivid and age-old example of harm to autonomy is coercion, which occurs where there
is “a constraint or undue pressure on one’s freedom to act or choose.”141 Commercial surveillance
can give rise to coercion where consumers are punished for exercising privacy rights or a service
(most notably a critical service, like medical treatment) is conditioned on agreeing to provide
personal data for purposes unrelated to the service itself.142
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ii. Manipulation
Manipulation is an especially pernicious kind of harm because it is invisible to consumers
if done correctly. Definitions of manipulation vary. Danielle Citron and Daniel Solove define
manipulation as “undue influence over a person’s behavior or decision-making,”143 In an effort to
explain the difference between manipulation, which is harmful, and influence, which is tolerable,
Cass Sunstein has written that “an effort to influence people’s choices counts as manipulation to
the extent that it does not sufficiently engage or appeal to their capacity for reflection and
deliberation.”144 Consistent with the concepts of loyalty and relational vulnerability embraced in
these comments, Shaun Spencer has defined manipulation as “an intentional attempt to influence
a subject’s behavior by exploiting a bias or vulnerability.”145 In its policy statement on unfairness,
the Commission has itself recognized manipulation (trade practices that prevent consumers from
“effectively making their own decisions”) as a substantial injury and unfair trade practice, because
sellers engaging in manipulation “unreasonably create[ ] or take[ ] advantage of an obstacle to the
free exercise of consumer decisionmaking.”146
We have written before that companies act disloyally when they exploit consumer trust by
first profiling and sorting consumers and then nudging them in order to manipulate them to act in
accordance with the company’s interests.147 Governments and companies have long used human
information to profile and sort humans,148 but commercial surveillance has greatly increased the
capacity of powerful organizations to identify, classify, and assess consumers to those consumers’
detriment. We have explained that “the mere act of classification to more effectively drive
purchasing habits is itself an exploitation of data-derived vulnerabilities.”149 This classification has
become more potent as commercial surveillance generates vast troves of consumer data, enabling
more specific and precise classifications. The human information produced by digital activities
may have initially been used only to benefit consumers in the form of improved quality of service
(a loyal data practice to be sure), but it is increasingly employed to predict and influence consumers
in ways which benefit the company alone.150 Once consumers have been profiled and sorted, new
behavioral science tools, coupled with advances in data science, are deployed to nudge consumers
into acting in ways which benefit the company but which are not in consumers’ best interests. 151
The net effect of these “evil nudges” is manipulation. It is well understood now that “entities who
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can control how choices are structured can also control, at least at the margins, what decisions
humans make.”152 Moreover, in the absence of restrictions on such disloyal practices, competitive
market incentives can effectively require companies to leverage choice architecture and behavioral
science to manipulate consumers by exploiting their known irrationalities, nudging consumers in
ways that promote only the company’s financial interests.153 This can be a vicious cycle.
Manipulation facilitates greater extraction of data which provides disloyal companies with evermore detailed and granular data, enabling more effective profiling and sorting, prediction of
consumer behavior, and, ultimately, control.154
iii. Failure to Inform
The failure to inform, defined as “failing to provide individuals with information to assist
them in making informed choices about their personal data or exercise of their privacy rights,” is
a substantial injury to consumers and their autonomy because “it limits people’s ability to make
choices consistent with their preferences.”155 Failure to inform consumers of their rights or to give
important information is an autonomy injury because it impedes those consumers’ “ability to assert
their rights at the appropriate times, to respond effectively to issues involving their personal data,
or to make meaningful decisions regarding the use of their data.”156 For example, the Commission
has previously found that it was an unfair practice for a company to fail to notify its human
customers that “many preexisting files on consumer computers would be designated for public
sharing.”157 In that case, FTC v. Frostwire, the defendants had configured their application’s
default settings so that, upon installation, preexisting files on the consumer’s device were
immediately designated for sharing.158 Failing to inform consumers of that default setting rendered
them unable to effectively protect their files. Where personal data is used to make a decision about
a consumer, failure to inform likewise harms consumers because they are left unable to
“understand how their data affected a decision,” nor are they able to respond.159 Failure to inform
is a serious threat to consumers in modern commercial relationships because online environments
are constructed—consumer action is limited to the options given, and consumers rely on design to
inform them of what they can do. While the notice and choice regulatory regime was meant to
empower consumers by informing them of companies’ data practices, this notice largely has
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proven to be fictitious, leaving consumers unable to make truly informed choices about their
personal data.160
iv. Thwarted Expectations
Relevant to concepts of loyalty and relational vulnerability, thwarted expectations harms
arise where consumers’ choices have been undermined, such as when a company breaks its
promises made about data practices.161 Thwarted expectations leave consumers unable to act in
accordance with their preferences, which undermines the trust which is necessary for consumers
to be safe market participants. The Commission has consistently recognized the harm of thwarted
expectations when enforcing violations of privacy policies as deceptive acts and retroactive
changes to data practices as unfair trade practices.162 For example, in In re Gateway Learning
Corp., the Commission found that it was unfair for a company to retroactively apply privacy policy
changes to personal data they had previously collected from consumers.163 Remedying thwarted
expectations is consistent with the Commission’s core mission, because “[t]he market cannot work
fairly if people’s expectations are completely wrong, if people lack knowledge of potential future
uses of their personal data, and if people have no way to balance the benefits and risks of using
products or services.”164
v. Lack of Control
Another autonomy harm resulting from the consciously constructed nature of modern
commercial relationships is the lack of control, which “involves the inability to make certain
choices about one’s personal data or to be able to curtail certain uses of the data.” 165 Absent
meaningful control, we lose our ability to manage both risk and the peace of mind that comes with
such management.166 At its most extreme, this can entail surreptitious data collection which is
invisible to the consumer. The Commission has previously brought enforcement actions under this
theory as well. For example, the Commission found that a company acted unfairly when it
(i) “installed monitoring software on rented computers and gathered, or caused to be gathered,
sensitive personal, financial, and medical information about consumers from those computers,”
and (ii) “used information improperly gathered from consumers to collect or attempt to collect a
debt, money, or property pursuant to a consumer rental contract.”167 Data subject rights such as

160

See supra Part II, discussing the failure of notice and choice and the importance of design decisions in
empowering and informing consumers; see also Citron & Solove, supra note 108,108 at 851 (“Many courts fixate
on whether plaintiffs have read and relied on the privacy policy of a company, but the privacy policy plays a small
role in forming people’s privacy expectations. This is especially true because hardly anyone reads privacy policies,
and it is not rational to do so given the vast number of organizations collecting data about people.”)
161
See Citron and Solove, supra note 108,108 at 849.
162
See id. at 852; Solove & Hartzog, supra note 5, at 628–30, 640–41.
163
In re Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443, 445–46, 499 (2004).
164
Citron & Solove, supra note 108,108 at 852–53.
165
Id. at 853.
166
Id.
167
Complaint, In re Aspen Way Enters, Inc., FTC File No. 112-3151, No. C-4392 (F.T.C. Apr. 11, 2013)

30

Commercial Surveillance ANPR, R111004
rectification or erasure theoretically empower consumers to exert control over how personal data
is used, but exercising those rights requires design features which enable or facilitate those actions.
Without such protections, control becomes no more than a hollow and pernicious fiction.
vi. Chilling Effects
Commercial surveillance has the potential to create harms well beyond those traditionally
thought of as consumer harms and affecting the very fabric of our democracy. Such harms include
chilling effects which inhibit consumers from “engaging in certain civil liberties, such as free
speech, political participation, religious activity, free association, freedom of belief, and freedom
to explore ideas.”168 These chilling effects deter consumers from reading or researching,169 which
“reduce[s] the range of viewpoints expressed and the nature of expression that is shared.”170
We have written before that privacy not only protects but is essential to enduring human
values such as identity and freedom.171 These are not an exhaustive list of the values which enrich
consumers’ lives and promote healthy commerce, but examining the chilling effects of the
commercial surveillance apparatus on those values paints a morbid picture, one which illuminates
some of the ways in which pervasive commercial surveillance substantially harms consumers,
commerce, and society. Privacy supplies the space for identity development and experimentation,
which is necessary for developing “a diversity of interests, opinions, and identities as a society.”172
Harm to identity formation resulting from commercial surveillance manifests itself in different
ways. Facebook’s “real” name policy, for example, harms consumers by forcing them into one
singular identity, preventing exploration and experimentation. Hyper-personalized digital services
focused on maximizing engagement can create echo chambers which harm consumers’ identities
and civic lives by depriving them of information which is new to them; and excessive exposure
online drives our identities toward mainstream homogeneity.173 Because surveillance transcends
the public-private divide, commercial surveillance also threatens our political freedom in profound
and consequential ways. Surveillance stifles our intellectual freedom and chills the exercise of our
civil liberties.174 Our intellectual freedom is harmed by the hyper-personalization and targeting
described above. Our physical and legal freedom is implicated as well in increasingly powerful
and concerning ways. One sobering example is the threat that pregnant people face in a post-Roe
world. Collected geolocation data, phone location data, internet searches, and purchase history can
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all be used to penalize and prosecute people who seek abortions.175 More generally, surveillance
breeds dangers to political freedom in the form of blackmailing and discrediting, discrimination,
and persuasion.176 Each of these risks chills individuals from fully exercising their civil liberties
and taking advantage of the positive aspects of digital markets and the potential of digital
democracy.
f. Discrimination Harms
Another category of harm that has disastrous social effects in addition to the substantial
injuries inflicted upon individual consumers is discrimination, which “involve[s] entrenching
inequality and disadvantaging people based on gender, race, national origin, sexual orientation,
age, group membership, or other characteristics or affiliations”177 Discrimination harms such as
those felt by women, members of the LGBTQ+ community, and racial and religious minorities
often manifest as other kinds of harms detailed above but with additional harms that are unique to
discrimination. For example, discrimination can be an autonomy harm in that it results in the denial
of opportunities a consumer would otherwise be afforded.178 Period tracking apps sharing
information with employers and insurance companies can result in raised premiums or denied
promotions for the consumers using such apps.179 Women and minorities face increased risk of
physical violence due to online harassment and doxing.180 Survivors of abuse who have nude
photos or embarrassing, intimate information posted online suffer “substantial emotional and
reputational harm.”181 But discrimination does more than lessen someone’s autonomy or raise the
risk of physical violence; it also inflicts different injuries such as “a searing wound of stigma,
shame, and loss of esteem that can turn into permanent scars.”182 These effects combine to create
a “distinct and distinctly harmful type” of psychological harm wherein affected individuals believe
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that they are viewed as being less worthy of respect.183 Disloyal commercial surveillance has ample
potential to enable or facilitate discrimination, such as where sensitive personal data is collected,
where data is processed to further discrimination, or where platforms mediate consumer interaction
with services in such a way as to enable harassment and abusive targeting.
g. Relationship Harms
Commercial surveillance has the potential to damage the intimate personal, professional,
and organizational relationships in our lives.184 The ability to withhold and disclose information is
essential for maintaining relationships, which in turn requires that parties “trust[] each other to
maintain the confidentiality of their information.”185 One example of a personal relationship harm,
discussed above, is how Bobbi Duncan was inadvertently outed by Facebook.186 Facebook’s
default design choice (without customer permission) to publicize if a customer joined a group
outed Bobbi Duncan when she joined Facebook’s for the University of Texas at Austin’s Queer
Chorus group.187 Bobbi’s father saw that his daughter joined this group and the two became
estranged.188 Had Facebook been transparent about its information practices, Bobbi likely would
have concealed this information, not only for the sake of her own privacy but to maintain certain
relationships.
Privacy violations can also lead to professional relationship harms. In the workplace,
persistent and overbroad monitoring of workers is creating a power imbalance and forming a rift
between employers and employees. For example, over the last year, Amazon has implemented AI
cameras in their driver vehicles, requiring drivers to sign forms consenting to the collection and
use of their biometric data to keep their jobs.189 Further, in Amazon’s warehouses, the company
uses sensors and tablets to track workers’ movements and productivity.190 A worker can be fired
if they are adjudged to be under-productive, which has led to higher rates of employee injury and
some workers skipping needed breaks to avoid the risk of losing their job.191 Not only has this
extreme workplace surveillance harmed employees, it has also placed a huge strain on the
employer-employee relationship. Intense workplace surveillance creates an environment of
distrust that can lead to strained workplace environments. Relationships can thus suffer from both
the loss of confidentiality and the loss of trust.192 This loss of trust is most important to the
Commission’s core mission of enabling consumers to be safe market participants.
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h. Inability to Safely Interact in Markets
The injuries detailed above result from a variety of different commercial surveillance
practices which affect different consumers in different ways. One underlying theme of these
injuries is that they result from disloyal commercial surveillance. Not all privacy injuries are
caused by disloyal commercial surveillance, but all disloyal commercial surveillance causes
substantial injuries. The net effect of these injuries is a second-order harm which is central to the
Commission’s mission: the prevalence of disloyal commercial surveillance sabotages the ability
of consumers to be safe market participants. Disloyal behavior causes consumers to mistakenly
trust companies to their detriment, which prevents consumers from participating in the market
because they can no longer trust commercial actors. Due to the unique nature of modern
commercial relationships, consumers have no choice but to expose themselves to commercial
actors who hold significant power over them;193 exposing their data is an unavoidable condition
of modern commercial participation. Every day consumers make themselves vulnerable when they
trust companies with their data and online experiences. Consumers overwhelmingly want
companies to take data responsibility seriously and to take the lead in establishing corporate data
responsibility,194 but companies continue to betray those consumers by succumbing to self-serving,
opportunistic, and exploitative behavior. Companies collect, aggregate, analyze, retain, transfer,
and monetize consumer data and the direct derivatives of that information in ways that conflict
with the best interests of those consumers. In this way, disloyal commercial surveillance betrays
consumers. Consumers suffer these injuries, they are cognizant that they may be similarly injured
again, and having little to no recourse, they are faced with a Hobson’s choice of either being left
at risk of betrayal or not participating in digital markets at all. The idea that consumers should be
able to safely interact in markets is one which the Commission has built out in its prior enforcement
actions, separate from financial harm or extreme emotional damage, and is one which is central to
the very idea of consumer protection law. (Q8, Q9.)
This lens of disloyalty, betrayal, and relational vulnerability gives the Commission a new
way to identify unfair practices in the context of commercial surveillance. The Section 5 unfairness
authority is not limitless, and there will be many situations where a commercial surveillance
practice is disloyal but does not rise to the level of a substantial injury, even when aggregated
across consumers. Nevertheless, a focus on disloyalty will identify a subset of commercial
surveillance practices which are so exploitative that the injury caused does warrant enforcement
under the Commission’s Section 5 powers.195
2. Commercial Surveillance Inflicts Substantial Injuries on Our Mental Health, Civil
Rights, and Democracy in Contravention of Established Public Policy
In addition to the myriad harms suffered by consumers, commercial surveillance can also
impose significant externalities and social harms. The Commission is statutorily empowered to
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consider established public policies as evidence in determining whether an act or practice is
unfair.196 Any trade regulation rules contemplated by the Commission should take notice of the
ways in which pervasive commercial surveillance harms our mental health, civil rights, and
democracy.197
a. Mental Health
The intense pressure to monetize user data pushes tech companies to design our phones
and computers to be addictive, so as to extract ever-increasing amounts of data198 with no regard
to the substantial injuries dealt to “our mental well-being, our social relationships, and even the
very nature of what it means to be a human in our modern world.” 199 Modern technologies are
“designed to be addictive to maximize interaction and data collection.”200 The average person
checks their phone over three hundred times every day.201 This compulsive screen usage wreaks
havoc on our mental health, especially that of children and teenagers,202 and is linked with
increased anxiety, depression, and related physical ailments. 203 Compulsive social media use
creates a sense of FOMO (“fear of missing out”), which in turn leads to negative moods, low levels
of life satisfaction, and threatens consumers’ mental health.204 Increased suicide rates for
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teenagers, especially teenage girls, have been linked to increased screen time.205 Content
promotion algorithms which elevate incendiary, polarizing, hateful, and abusive content for the
sake of increased engagement stimulate outrage and increase the likelihood that those hateful
messages will find their intended targets.206 (Q13, 14, 15, 16, 17)
Mental health harms are not limited to addictive social media and engagement juicing.
Targeted advertising can inflict substantial injuries to mental health as well. Traumatic life
experiences can be perpetuated when advertisements related to that trauma haunt users around the
web, suffocating any chance at healing or escape.207 Consumers worrying about (and hence
searching for information about) infertility are met with constant ads for period products, which
serve as a constant reminder of their fears.208 One woman, for example, was inundated with
tombstone ads after her mother’s death from cancer.209 People who are exploring their sexual or
gender identities can reasonably fear that related “relevant” ads may out them to their families on
terms not of their choosing.210 People who have or are recovering from eating disorders can be
subjected to ads regarding diets or meal supplements, perpetuating their harmful conditions and
impeding their recoveries. Targeted advertisements take our most intimate details and leverage
that vulnerability to try and sell us goods and services, sometimes to traumatic and tragic ends. In
one harrowing example, journalist Gillian Brockell was barraged with baby-related advertisements
for months after learning her baby would be stillborn.211 A personal tragedy—one which should
have been subject to an intimate mourning period— instead became a wound that was reopened
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with every digital interaction. Gillian’s experience is clearly not atypical, as self-help guides have
sprung up to help similarly situated people try to escape the trauma of pervasive pregnancy ads
following a loss.212 (Q13, 14, 15, 16, 17.)
b. Civil Rights
Commercial surveillance also threatens our civil rights. Social media facilitates anonymous
speech by making speech seemingly costless and consequence-free. This might hypothetically be
a good thing in some circumstances,213 but it also leads in practice to “harassment, bile, and abuse
. . . largely against women, people of color, and other marginalized and vulnerable populations.”214
Algorithms which elevate and amplify incendiary and divisive content can cause substantial
injuries to mental health.215 By pushing hateful and incendiary content, those same algorithms can
chill activities and drive users from platforms. Platform optimization therefore implicates our
“cyber civil rights” by reducing the equal ability of all people to make use of those platforms.216
There are also “technological due process” concerns raised by the pervasive and opaque
use of algorithms to make decisions about “people’s health, finances, jobs, ability to travel, and
other essential life activities.”217 Such systems shape our lives in powerful ways and have the
ability to amplify and perpetuate age-old discrimination.218 Modern data discrimination, the
product of from targeted advertising and automated decision-making, manifests itself in a variety
of harmful practices, including “digital redlining, differential pricing, racist search results, and
social media filter bubbles.”219 Earlier this year, the United States Government Accountability
Office prepared a report urging Congress to consider enhancing protections around scores used to
rank consumers.220 Consumer scoring can lead to unfair and discriminatory outcomes when done
without transparency. This problem is amplified when scoring is automated and applied at scale.
To combat these issues, society needs (1) algorithmic accountability centered around fairness,
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transparency, and similar values and (2) data privacy rules which limit the unfettered, exploitative
access to personal data which these algorithms rely upon.221 (Q65, Q69, Q70, Q71.)
c. Democracy & Discourse
Like the mass medias of the twentieth century before it, the internet creates unique
opportunities and challenges for democracy. People have greater access to information and
opportunities to engage with one another, which could in turn boost political accountability and
constructive debate. On the other hand, increased interconnectivity, data processing, and pervasive
commercial surveillance have enabled new forms of “electoral interference, voter suppression, and
demagoguery.”222 Richard Hasen has chronicled how the economics of cheap speech have
“undermined mediating and stabilizing institutions of American democracy including newspapers
and political parties, with negative social and political consequences,” replacing problems of
media scarcity with new-age challenges like “fake news” and the devastation of the business model
of journalism.223 Matthew Crain has concisely captured the threats commercial surveillance poses
to democracy:
The race to commercialize the Internet is over, and advertising is the big winner.
This is excellent news if you are an executive or major shareholder of one of the
handful of companies that dominate the $600 billion global digital advertising
economy. For almost everyone else, advertising’s good fortunes have meant the
erosion of privacy, autonomy, and security, as well as a weakening of the collective
means to hold power accountable. This is because the industry’s economic success
is rooted in its virtually unrestrained monetization of consumer surveillance. Digital
advertising technologies are widely distributed but largely operate under the control
of a few giant companies whose monopoly-like market power has, among other ills,
unleashed a wave of manipulative communication and deepened a revenue crisis
among the nation’s most important journalism outlets. For the ownership class of
Silicon Valley, digital advertising has been a gold mine of epic proportions. For
democratic society, it is gasoline on a fire.224
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Trade regulation rules governing commercial surveillance methods should thus be
cognizant of the ways commercial surveillance facilitates sophisticated voter manipulation,
amplifies rage and hate online, and isolates consumers into “echo chambers.”
i. Commercial Surveillance Facilitates Sophisticated Voter Manipulation
Up to this point, these comments have analyzed manipulation as individual injuries, but
consumer and citizen manipulation inflicts substantial injuries on society as well.225 Commercial
surveillance supercharges the ability to influence and manipulate voters on a massive scale.226 For
example, the 2012 and 2016 United States presidential elections were marked by the use of data
analytics (by both major parties) in driving voter turnout, each of which had a profound effect
upon our democracy.227 Matthew Crain has detailed how “corporate spying,” digital advertising,
and commercial surveillance harmed our democracy by allowing malicious foreign actors to easily
spread misinformation and enabling the corrosive targeting of specific voter groups by both
Republicans and Democrats to try and dissuade select Americans from voting.228
This voter-manipulation ecosystem—a subset of commercial surveillance’s corrosive
targeting practices—is highly sophisticated. Opaque voter-profiling systems, fed by a “vast voter
data-mining ecosystem” comprising “political consulting, analytics, media, marketing and
advertising software companies,” allow political campaigns to target and manipulate narrow
audiences.229 For the 2020 presidential election, the travel patterns of tens of millions of Americans
were analyzed to develop “Covid concern” scores, which were then used to identify “persuadable
Republicans” who campaigners thought might be persuaded to vote Democrat on the basis of
pandemic concern.230 For the 2022 midterm elections, even more voter profile categories were
being developed and utilized. Some of the categories identified include “gun owner,” “pro-choice,”
“Trump 2024,” “racial resentment,” “trans athletes should not participate,” and “U.F.O.s distrust
government.”231 Such scoring systems, relying on information about consumers such as
“demographic profile, socioeconomic status, online activities and offline interests,” enable
political campaigns to predict voter beliefs and likelihood of voting, and then to try and manipulate

225

Citron & Solove, supra note 108,108 at 847.
See Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335 (2014).
227
Hartzog & Richards, supra note 37,37 at 1759
228
CRAIN, PROFIT OVER PRIVACY, supra note 224, at 2–3 (citing Issie Lapowsky, Facebook Exposed 87 Million
Users to Cambridge Analytica, WIRED (Apr. 4, 2018, 5:43 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-exposed87-million-users-to-cambridge-analytica; Alex Stamos, An Update on Information Operations on Facebook,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Sept. 6, 2017), https://about.fb.com/news/2017/09/information-operations-update;
Indictment, United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, No. 18-CR-00032, 2018 WL 914777 (D.D.C. Feb. 16,
2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1035477/download; Scott Shane, LinkedIn Co-Founder Apologizes for
Deception in Alabama Senate Race, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/26/us/reidhoffman-alabama-election-disinformation.html); see also Crain, How Capitalism Destroyed the Internet, supra note
224 (discussing how the techlash against Facebook over its role in these scandals reflected the deeper complaint that
“the pervasive consumer surveillance at the heart of the Internet’s advertising business model was out of control”).
229
Natasha Singer, Why Am I Seeing that Political Ad? Check Your ‘Trump Resistance’ Score, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23,
2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/23/technology/voter-targeting-trump-score.html.
230
Id.
231
Id.
226

39

Commercial Surveillance ANPR, R111004
voters into acting in a particular way. Some of the information used in these profiles comes from
public databases, but the data which enable the most detailed and narrow forms of targeting, such
as browsing habits, shopping records, or location history, come from commercial actors such as
data brokers.232 This politically motivated micro-targeting and manipulation becomes more
effective each passing year as data science methods improve and commercial surveillance makes
ever-increasing amounts of granular consumer data available. These profiles represent a threat to
our privacy, autonomy and democracy—at least to the extent that we think that democratic
elections should be about issues and character rather than which candidates can hire the best data
and behavioral scientists.
These dangers extend beyond the mere manipulation of individual voters through targeting.
As the Supreme Court of North Carolina explained in Harper v. Hall, commercial surveillance
and modern data analytics facilitate extraordinarily effective gerrymandering:
While partisan gerrymandering is not a new tool, modern technologies enable
mapmakers to achieve extremes of imbalance that, “with almost surgical
precision,” undermine our constitutional system of government. Indeed, the
programs and algorithms now available for drawing electoral districts have become
so sophisticated that it is possible to implement extreme and durable partisan
gerrymanders that can enable one party to effectively guarantee itself a
supermajority for an entire decade, even as electoral conditions change and voter
preferences shift.233
This surgically precise level of gerrymandering, which undermines the right to vote, is enabled by
commercial surveillance and the lack of substantive limits on the uses of consumer data.
ii. Engagement-Juicing Precipitates Violence and Undermines Discourse
Social media companies optimize their algorithms to maximize engagement.234 Not only
does this “engagement juicing” threaten our mental health, it also promotes the most hateful,
vitriolic content on platforms, creating “hate-spiralling algorithms.”235 Such algorithms can lead
to distressing ends. For example, Amnesty International has accused Facebook of fueling ethnic
cleansing in Myanmar via its content-shaping algorithm.236 The Mozilla Foundation found
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evidence that TikTok contributed to the spread of disinformation, incendiary rhetoric, lies about
candidates, and calls for ethnic violence in the lead up to Kenya’s presidential election.237 In a case
to be heard in the Supreme Court, a family is suing Google over the death of Nohemi Gonzalez,
who was killed in an ISIS terrorist attack, alleging that Google assisted ISIS by recommending
ISIS videos to its human customers.238 These rage- and hate-producing algorithms are part and
parcel of the commercial surveillance ecosystem because they are designed to keep consumers
engaged for the purpose of harvesting and exploiting their data.239 An ad-based company makes
more money, after all, when its human customers spend more time engaging with the site, and
watch more ads.
In addition to harming our mental wellbeing through the design of addictive services,
personalization practices such as curated social media feeds and targeted advertisements also
undermine our democracy by isolating us from each other. Personalization creates digital spaces
that conform only to that consumer’s political and ideological commitments. Such “echo
chambers” lessen a consumer’s ability to engage with ideologically opposed or different people.240
As detailed above, consumers are being scored and sorted into increasingly granular voter profiles
for the purpose of more “surgical” political message delivery.241 This kind of “nano-targeting”
exacerbates political polarization as consumers are faced with radically different facts and
messaging based on how they are targeted.242
These individual and social harms detailed above underscore the necessity for privacy and
meaningful privacy regulation. Privacy is necessary for human flourishing, whether we
conceptualize these humans as consumers or citizens. Any reasonable conceptualization of human
flourishing needs to include not only autonomy and dignity harms to the individual, but also the
broader mental and social wellbeing implicated by interactions online.
D. The Benefits of Commercial Surveillance Disproportionately Flow to Industry
The individual and social injuries exacted by commercial surveillance are not outweighed
by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. Commercial surveillance propagandists
argue that their practices result in beneficial personalization which outweighs any harms inflicted
by those practices. That argument overstates the benefits of personalization and misinterprets how
the cost-benefit weighing should be applied, but it gains traction in the broader policy discussion
because there is lack of agreement on how to weigh the harms and benefits of commercial
surveillance. The Commission needs a conceptual lodestone to identify and examine the
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countervailing benefits of commercial surveillance under the Section 5 unfairness test. We would
submit that loyalty can be that guiding concept. Loyalty fits well into our existing consumer
protection scheme because it inherently considers the relative benefits to consumers and industry.
1. The Substantial Injuries Inflicted by Targeted Advertising Are Not Outweighed by
Countervailing Benefits to Consumers or Competition
Any discussion about the relative costs and benefits of commercial surveillance must
discuss the assumptions that underlie the proliferation of targeted, behavioral, and cross-contextual
advertising. Targeted advertising, discussed above as an example of both personalization and
influencing, is a much-debated and critically important example of commercial surveillance, given
its role in the rise of prevalent digital tracking. The basic logic offered to defend targeted
advertising, as explained above, is that consumers see more “relevant” ads, advertisers benefit
from higher sales, publishers fund their content through higher ad sales, and everyone benefits
from a free and accessible internet. Such axioms have long justified the spread of increasingly
sophisticated targeting online. In reality, however, things are more complicated.
a. Ad-tech Middlemen Disproportionately Benefit Relative to Advertisers and
Publishers
While advertising generally may be procompetitive, it does not necessarily follow that
targeted advertising is procompetitive. For such an omnipresent practice, one would expect strong
empirical justifications to prove the value that this service provides to consumers, platforms, and
the digital economy as a whole. The reality is that advertisers sell advertising, and the benefits of
targeted, behavioral, and cross-contextual advertising have been exaggerated at best and fabricated
at worst.243 Digital advertising is a huge industry, with some estimates placing the current market
value at $350–600 billion.244 But the benefits of that industry disproportionately flow to a select
few industry actors, leaving consumers and publishers left wondering how this arrangement
benefits them.245 Accountable Tech, in its petition to the Commission calling for rulemaking to
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prohibit surveillance advertising, detailed many of the ways in which commercial surveillance and
targeted advertising disproportionately benefit a select number of actors (the dominant surveillance
advertising firms) in the advertising industry, to the detriment of advertisers, publishers,
consumers, and commerce itself.246 Advertisers are harmed by platforms and publishers who
inflate metrics and defraud advertisers.247 Publishers have perverse incentives to increase traffic
and juice ad impressions however they can, including by buying “rewarded inventory” on mobile
games.248 Publishers also suffer under this system. Dominant platforms have superior targeting
capabilities—they possess vast “user bases” and can use their control over choice architecture to
extract vast amounts of human information from those human “users.”249 That superior targeting
capacity enables those platforms to siphon profits from digital advertising, leaving little value
added for publishers.250 According to one recent study, publishers may only see as little as a 4%
increase in value added from cookies and behavioral advertising, roughly $0.00008 per
advertisement.251 That shocking disparity between the ever-increasing value of the digital
advertising industry and the value added to publishers demonstrates how the commercial benefits
of commercial surveillance disproportionately flow to a small handful of actors. This outcome,
where profits grow year over year but those gains are realized only in an increasingly small subset
of actors, is not good for consumers, competition, or commerce. (Q40.)
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Just because benefits flow disproportionately to industry, it does not follow that these are
benefits to commerce. In fact, many scholars have demonstrated that digital platforms are
characterized by a lock-in effect. Dominant platforms lock-in consumers, extract data, cultivate
extensive profiles on those consumers, aggregate behavioral insights, develop “hyper-personalized
content” that optimizes engagement, and then repeat the cycle.252 This lock-in effect leads to
degradation of products, as ads become more prevalent and consumers have less control over the
products they use, enabling dominant platforms to increase costs on advertisers and publishers.253
Through the introduction of substantive limits on data collection and targeted advertising, the
Commission can break this vicious cycle, enhance competition, and improve the quality of digital
services. (Q27, Q40, Q41, Q42.)
b. Targeting Threatens Consumer Autonomy, Imposes Costs in Terms of Data and
Attention Extraction, and Harms Society
The proliferation of targeted, behavioral, and cross-contextual advertisements online has
largely been premised on two alleged benefits to consumers: (1) the ads that consumers see are
more “relevant” to them, which in turn improves their user experience; and (2) targeted
advertisements enable a “free” internet to exist, saving consumers from paying subscription fees
for every item of content they wish to enjoy. Both of these alleged benefits are problematic, and
neither stand up to close scrutiny. Both of these alleged benefits are framed in ways which
minimize or erase the direct and indirect harms which can flow from targeted advertising to
consumers.
The idea that consumers benefit from seeing more “relevant” ads fails to account for the
direct harms that consumers suffer from this kind of precise targeting. Targeting creates risks of
loss of agency and autonomy. Consumers understand that their data will be tracked when they are
online, but they often do not grasp the extent to which their data is being collected and utilized to
profile, sort, and manipulate them. When companies create detailed behavioral profiles about
consumers, exploit cognitive biases, and effectively deploy targeted advertisements to influence
them, those companies gain an economic advantage. 254 This gives companies a strong incentive
to collect as much data as they can.255 One study found that ninety-one percent of Americans feel
they have lost control over how their data is being collected and used by companies.256 That loss
of control reflects the injury that targeting inflicts on consumer autonomy. As documented above,
tracking facilitates powerful behavioral interventions which diminish consumer choice.257 Another
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issue with the assumption that showing consumers more “relevant” ads is necessarily a good thing
for them is that it is not clear what everyone means when we talk about showing consumers more
“relevant” ads. To whom are these ads are more relevant? We would submit that these ads are
more relevant to advertisers rather than to consumers. Ads are only more relevant to consumers if
they get at what those consumers actually want, (or, maybe more accurately, what is in a
consumer’s calmly calculated actual benefit rather than feeding their id), not what consumers can
be manipulated into agreeing to. One way in which companies influence consumers through
targeting is price discrimination, a tactic companies use to offer a product at various prices
depending on the individual consumer.258 Companies track consumer spending habits and offer
“special offers” to consumers whom the companies have determined will buy a product if those
consumers believe they are getting a good deal. Although that arrangement provides benefits to
consumers in select transactions, the tradeoffs are not worthwhile in the long run. We have built
an all-encompassing, comprehensive, always-on surveillance network just to get people to click
more.259 Companies infringe on our privacy for financial gain, manipulating consumers and the
market with little to no ability from consumers to pushback or avoid these outcomes.260 Trading
privacy preferences for a company’s ability to target consumers directly is not worth it for the
consumer, especially when alternative advertising methods can be utilized to keep company profits
where they are, while affording consumers the privacy protections they require.
The second supposed benefit of targeted advertising from a consumer perspective is that
targeted advertising fuels a “free” internet, saving consumers from having to pay subscription and
access fees to enjoy the majority of digital content.261 Reducing socioeconomic barriers to internet
access is an extremely important goal and we should not lose sight of that, but policymakers must
also account for the myriad ways in which targeted advertising imposes costs on consumers and
the alternatives which would be implemented in lieu of targeted ads, such as contextual ads. As
Chris Hoofnagle and Jan Whittington explain, digital content is not “free”262: although there may
not be a monetary fee to access content, consumers pay for these services and content with their
personal data, attention, and time.263 These companies extract personal data, ignore consumer
privacy preferences, and command their attention.264 Not only do consumers pay for internet use
in the form of attention and data, targeted advertising imposes costs on publishers and advertisers
as well. Companies using targeted advertising hope to benefit from higher sales, an increased
consumer base, and lower marketing and advertising costs by focusing their spending on relevant
consumers. However, there is evidence that targeted advertising is less cost-efficient than
alternatives such as contextual advertising. The cost of targeted advertising may be greater where
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companies rely on third-party firms, such as data brokers, to buy consumer data or distribute their
ads on platforms who charge a higher premium for targeted ads.265 While some companies may
see decreased ad spending by using leveraging data tactics, many are likely to see an increase if
they are not already paying to track user data and distribute targeted ads themselves due to firms
having increased market power in this area.266
c. Contextual Advertising is a Viable Alternative for Companies and Consumers
Targeted advertising is not the only option companies have to reach consumers. Contextual
advertising—which matches advertisements with the content of the page rather than the viewer of
the advertisement267—is a trust-preserving form of targeting which has withstood the test of time.
Contextual advertising benefits consumers, publishers, and advertisers without betraying
consumer trust and without resorting to prevalent commercial surveillance. As Jack Balkin points
out, contextual advertising does not require “an elaborate digital dossier about [you] to be
effective.”268 Instead, organizations pay to have their ads displayed on various pages relevant to
what they are advertising. Contextual advertising was an important advertising tool prior to the
rise of the information economy and commercial surveillance, and it has made a resurgence in
recent years as discussions of online privacy have become more common. Another virtue of
contextual advertising relative to targeted and behavioral advertising, in addition to preserving
consumer trust, is that it is more cost-efficient for advertisers.269 Critics have argued that contextual
advertising is not viable in select circumstances, such as where brand integrity would be damaged
by the content of a news article. It is not clear that this will be the case. For example, consumers
are likely to understand that contextual ads target a particular publisher’s readership rather than
the content of specific stories.270 Furthermore, different advertisers have different tolerances when
it comes to brand integrity. (Q42.)
With contextual advertising as a viable alternative to targeting, substantive limits on
targeted, behavioral, and cross-contextual advertisements are not an existential threat to either the
advertising industry or the notion of a “free” internet. Consumers can still receive relevant ads
while also enjoying stronger privacy protections that are more consistent with their preferences.
Industry members, including publishers, advertisers, and ad-tech middlemen, can still create valuegenerating advertising campaigns which are potentially more cost-efficient than targeting.
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Policymakers are already taking notice of the value of contextual advertising as an alternative. For
example, California’s CCPA grants consumers the right to opt out of cross-contextual behavioral
advertising, defined as “the targeting of advertising to a consumer based on the consumer's
personal information obtained from the consumer's activity across businesses, distinctly-branded
websites, applications, or services, other than the business, distinctly-branded website, application,
or service with which the consumer intentionally interacts.”271 California’s substantive restrictions
on cross-contextual advertising serve both as evidence that alternative advertising methods are
viable and that industry has had ample time to begin preparing for a post-targeting world. (Q42.)
***
Commercial surveillance is a complex phenomenon, involving a diverse range of market
actors, business practices, and individual and social harms. Despite that challenge, the Commission
is correct both to label these practices as commercial surveillance and to treat them as a fitting
subject for investigation and potentially regulation. Commercial surveillance accurately describes
the power dynamic that shifts between the platforms, companies, and merchants employing these
practices and the vulnerable, trusting humans who are left exposed. These practices are highly
prevalent, and consumers undoubtedly experience the real and substantial injuries they inflict.
Commercial surveillance results in disproportionate dangers and meager benefits for consumers.
In contrast, the profits of this surveillance economy flow to a small subset of market actors.
Consumers crave—and demand—privacy. But no protection will come so long as market
incentives push companies to maximize data harvesting, at the expense of their vulnerable, trusting
human customers. Consumers need substantive rules which go beyond mere procedural
protections, and the Commission’s Section 5 authority is the appropriate vehicle with which to
consider providing such protections. This is particularly the case because, as we explain in the next
section, the default “notice and choice” model of privacy regulation used to date has failed to
protect consumers.
II. Notice and Choice Has Failed
For nearly five decades, privacy regulation in the United States has come largely in the
form of “notice and choice.”272 These bedrock elements of the venerable Fair Information Practices
(FIPs) are often implemented and enforced weakly in practice, leading to fictitious notice and
illusory choice. But even zealous adherence to the FIPs would fail to fully protect consumers
because the FIPs are largely procedural. Unfairness, in contrast, is a substantive issue. Rights of
“notice, access, and consent regarding the collection, use and disclosure of personal data”
theoretically allow people to decide for themselves how to weigh the costs and benefits of
commercial surveillance, something Daniel Solove has termed “privacy self-management.”273
Empowering individuals to make decisions about how to manage their data is a laudable goal, but
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experience has taught that this is a futile endeavor when it is the sole regulatory effort. This is
particularly the case in the complex modern digital marketplace in which consumers may have
relationships with dozens or hundreds of platforms, companies, and merchants. Privacy control as
an ideal is illusory, overwhelming, and myopic.274 No matter what reservations we have or what
care we take, there is no way to get things done in the digital age without exposing our data to
third parties; “[n]o other way to reserve the hotel room or seat on the plane, to file the IRS form,
to recall the library book, or to send money to our loved one in prison.”275 Failures of human
psychology and design choices by companies offer the seductive illusion of control in theory where
none exists in reality. Consumers interact with a staggering number of apps and websites on a daily
basis. Exercising meaningful control over privacy with all of those services would occupy literally
all of a consumer’s time and willpower. Finally, an individual’s privacy choices impose
externalities on others which are ignored under a “control” theory. The Commission should
evaluate the effectiveness of notice and choice by the reality which has evolved under this regime:
the prevalence of harmful data practices, unfettered commercial surveillance, and “privacy
nihilism” experienced by consumers. Measured against those effects, it becomes apparent that
notice and choice is an abject failure as a result of its many structural, psychological, and legal
defects. (Q73.)
Before delving into the failures of notice and choice, it is important to clarify that a
rejection of notice and choice is a rejection of the overreliance on consent as a legal mechanism
rather than a rejection of either notice or consumer choice as elements of a properly functioning
consumer market. Companies need to continue providing notice of their data practices because
transparency is critical for trust to flourish in markets, even if any individual consumer is unlikely
to be able to understand what is actually going on. Nevertheless, recognizing the value of notice
and choice and individual concepts does not justify relying on notice and choice as the sole or most
prominent privacy regulatory measure. Opponents of regulation glorify the empowering nature of
notice and choice and decry criticisms of that regime as a rejection of consumer choice and free
agency. But in reality, moving on from notice and choice offers the only chance of truly
empowering people to freely interact in a marketplace. The difference lies in the distinction
between choice and consent. Choice is less consequential than consent. Choice can mean the
ability to elect among a range of reasonable options in an interface, such as selecting a dinner
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option from a menu. Choice can mean selecting between competitors in a marketplace. In that
sense, choice flourishes with competition. Consent is different from choice because consent is
more than merely choosing; consent is legally consequential whereas choice is not. Consent has a
moral and legal significance of accepting a certain set of legal arrangements and certain sets of
consequences irrevocably. Consent changes your legal status and orders relationships in ways that
are potentially legally and economically significant. As Daniel Solove explains, “Consent
legitimizes nearly any form of collection, use, or disclosure of personal data.”276 When companies
talk about notice and choice, therefore, what they really mean is notice and consent, because failure
to object to using a service can become legal consent for the consequences which come with it. In
contrast to that consent-based status quo, these comments envision a better market in which
consumers have a range of choices within a trustworthy, largely loyal environment. To truly
safeguard choice, consumers need to be protected from disloyal, opportunistic, and exploitative
behavior no matter what choices they make. The goal is to maximize consumer choice and then
provide a network of protection. Consent does the opposite because consent is a legal mechanism
that changes a consumer’s legal status based on the choices that they make.
A market that demands consumers grant consent is entirely different from one that merely
offer choices. Free, unfettered choice of the sort that industry voices laud can only happen where
there is trust—meaningful trust backed up by legal consequences for distrustful and disloyal
behavior. The goal should to get to a place that is similar to the fictitious world that companies
portray our world as being, one in which consumers are in a vibrant market and can just pick and
choose the products and services which will make them happy without fear of betrayal. But that
world is not achievable so long as consumers have to keep one hand on their wallets out of fear of
being mugged. Only when consumers trust the marketplace can you have the kind of free,
unfettered, meaningful, wonderful choice that everyone wants. In the absence of trust, choice is
fraught with peril: caveat emptor.
A. Privacy Self-Management Has Proven Ineffective, Untenable, and Undesirable
Opt-out choices have not proved effective in protecting against commercial surveillance.
Despite strong empirical evidence that consumers desire privacy protections,277 few consumers
read privacy notices on a regular basis, opt out of disagreeable data practices, or adjust their privacy
settings online.278 Daniel Solove has identified several well-known defects that prevent consumers
from meaningfully exerting control over their data via privacy self-management and opt-out
choices. First, severe cognitive problems undermine privacy self-management, which prevent
consumers from making “rational” choices regarding their data.279 Privacy notices are long and
difficult for consumers to understand, yet efforts to make such notices more comprehensible can
ultimately reduce how informative they are.280 Consumers also operate under “woefully incorrect
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assumptions about how their privacy is protected.”281 This problem is further compounded by wellknown cognitive biases, which companies exploit to nudge consumers into “consenting” to data
practices.282 (Q5, Q73, Q80.)
Second, there are significant structural barriers that render privacy self-management
impracticable.283 These barriers include the vast number of entities collecting and using personal
data, as well as the inability of users to weigh costs and benefits because privacy harms often result
from the aggregation of data over time rather than discrete moments of collection tied to specific
actions. To use the parlance of Silicon Valley, notice and choice cannot scale. Consumers deal
with hundreds of online entities per day. The frequency with which they are asked to consent to
data practices is overwhelming and exhausting even to the most privacy conscious and wellresourced consumers. The overwhelming demands of such cognitive labor leads consumers to
acquiesce to data practices they otherwise would not freely choose, undermining the effectiveness
and validity of consent. Furthermore, the problem of scale raises the question of whether it is even
economically desirable for consumers to undertake the significant labor and expense of reading
and contemplating scores of privacy policies. Such labor at ordinary scale would take literally
weeks of full-time labor for every consumer; one 2008 study for example estimated that “it would
cost $781 billion in lost productivity if everyone were to read every privacy policy at websites they
visited in a one-year period.”284 Given society’s increased digitization in the intervening years,
that number has unquestionably grown significantly since then. The notice and choice regime
therefore leads to different undesirable outcomes. Either consumers are not actually engaging in
privacy self-management, which begs the question of why we persist with that fiction at all, they
are trying to manage their privacy but at a significant social cost, or they are stuck somewhere in
between with the worst of both worlds. (Q5, Q73, Q80.)
Another structural problem with privacy self-management that raises issues of both scale
and opacity is the problem of data brokers. A vast array of data brokers and other “reservoirs” of
data exist which traffic in consumer data in opaque and often invisible ways.285 That entire industry
embodies the failures of notice and choice, as consumers are both largely unaware of the existence
of these entities and also lack any reasonable means of avoiding their ability to collect, use, and
disseminate their personal information.286 Then there is the problem of aggregation, i.e., that
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disclosing information might reasonably seem innocuous at the time of disclosure but become
harmful as a critical mass of data is aggregated later in time.287 Modern data analytics enables
companies to “deduce extensive information about a person” from such seemingly innocuous data
points.288 This possibility further undermines the premise of privacy self-management, because
consumers are unable to assess the risks and benefits involved with revealing a piece of
information (or agreeing to vague and buried terms relating thereto) without knowing how that
information might be combined with past and future disclosures.289 Related to the problem of
aggregation is the timeframe in which consumers are asked to make these decisions. Immediate
benefits of using a particular service are salient, whereas risks of collection, use, or disclosure of
data often occur far off into the future and in ways which are less apparent to consumers.290 These
effects combine to direct consumers into agreeing to data practices which may not be in their actual
rational interest. (Q5, Q73, Q80.)
A final challenge with relying on privacy self-management that we would like to highlight
is that, due to its overly myopic focus on individual privacy decisions, it fails to internalize
important social benefits and costs of privacy. Privacy is essential to our cultural development, as
“[s]tunting individual creativity and intellectual development impoverishes society at large.”291
Privacy from both the state and private actors is necessary for intellectual freedom and the
development of new ideas.292 These larger social values are implicated by infringements on
individual privacy, but privacy self-management does not account for these broader social
consequences. (Q73, Q80.)
B. Several Well-Known Pathologies Thwart Effective Consent to Commercial
Surveillance
In addition to the general flaws of privacy self-management identified above, digital
consents can be faulty and ineffective in a number of well-documented ways. These “pathologies
of consent,”293 further demonstrate the ways in which opt-out choices have not repeatedly proven
ineffective in protecting against commercial surveillance despite strong consumer preferences for
meaningful privacy. Each of these pathologies, which are pervasive in digital environments,
removes either the “knowing” or “voluntary” dimensions of meaningful consent. (Q73, Q80.)
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The first of these pathologies is the problem of unwitting consent, which occurs where
consumers do not “know what data practices are possible, what they have agreed to, or what the
informational risks of the transactions are.”294 Unwitting consent can take several forms.
Consumers can “fail to understand the legal agreement governing the information relationship
they now have with the company,” which can occur where the agreement is too long, uses
confusing language, is too technical, or is too vague.295 Consumers also may not adequately
understand the technology which mediates their relationship with the company, such as when
consumers overestimate the security of telecommunications systems or consent is “manufactured
through obfuscation, abstraction, and sleight of hand via a user interface.”296 Consumers might
also fail to understand the consequences or risks of the informational relationship.297 Humans
generally struggle to assess future risks created by present decisions,298 and this problem is only
worsened in the context of data practices. A person asked to consent to the collection of biometric
data is unlikely to foresee the downstream risks of harassment, stalking, or discrimination—much
less the creation of prevalent or ubiquitous facial recognition tools.299 Data analytics and
advertising surveillance also entail risks which are hard to foresee, such as the generation of
inferences (and subsequent targeting) based upon sensitive characteristics.300 Notice and choice
advocates argue that unwitting consent can be remedied by greater information disclosure. This
argument fails to understand the insights raised in Solove’s critique of privacy self-management—
namely that making notices more comprehensible either makes them less informative or more
burdensome to read and that truly reading and engaging with notices would be extremely
wasteful.301 Greater information disclosure is also undermined by the pervasiveness of dark
patterns, where companies use choice architecture and the insights of behavioral science to prey
on consumers’ predictable cognitive biases.302 (Q73, Q80.)
A second pathology of consent comes in the form of coerced consent, which occurs where
a consumer’s choice is not truly voluntary.303 Coercion underlies the failure of notice and choice
in several ways, such as “mediated environments that manufacture consent” which are coercive in
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“manipulative and subtle ways.”304 As a starting point, it bears repeating that presence on the
internet is a prerequisite for participation in modern society;305 the internet is a vital means of
participating in commerce, communicating with fellow humans, and even utilizing vital
government services. Furthermore, consumers often lack meaningful choice over which
companies to interact with, especially at the ISP and platform levels.306 Choice and bargaining are
extremely limited for consumers in digital environments. This problem is further compounded by
the rise of dark patterns. Digital environments are entirely constructed and mediated by
platforms.307 Under a notice and choice regime, designers have strong incentives to craft interfaces
which shape and influence consumer decision-making in privacy-invasive ways. Discussed in
greater detail below,308 these interfaces are used to “coerce, wheedle, and manipulate people to
grant [consent].”309 (Q73, Q80.)
Finally, there is incapacitated consent, which involves situations where consent is not
traditionally possible as a matter of law.310 Children are a great example of where consent is
unavailable due to incapacity under the law. The Commission’s COPPA Rule recognizes this and
requires operators to “[o]btain verifiable parental consent prior to any collection, use, and/or
disclosure of personal information from children” under the age of 13.311 Despite the COPPA
Rule’s narrow focus on children under the age of 13, many of the Rule’s justifications are equally
true of children aged 13–18 (and, as we argue below, adults as well). The age of contractual consent
in the US is 18, yet paradoxically we allow teenagers to “consent” to data practices. This raises
questions about the effectiveness and desirability of consent in those situations. (Q18, Q73, Q80.)
C. Manipulative Interface Design and Dark Patterns Are Pervasive Barriers to
Effective Consent
The relationships between design, choice, and consent are significant enough to warrant
their own discussion. Design, defined broadly to include “the work of engineers as well as other
designers such as those who do product design, graphic design, user interface and user experience
design,”312 is critical to the consumer experience. Design encompasses “how a system is
architected, how it functions, how it communicates, and how that architecture, function, and
communication affects people.”313 Design choices “channel user choice,” “shape user
expectations,”314 and can make people vulnerable to both companies as well as other users.315 One
of the reasons design is important is because it determines both the default settings and the range
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of choices available to us. For example, “[s]imply moving around a city with a cell phone or other
digital device may produce lots of information about us.”316 It is well understood now that “entities
who can control how choices are structured can also control, at least at the margins, what decisions
humans make.”317 Design tricks and psychological engineering are nothing new, but these tactics
have grown more sophisticated and harmful in the context of modern commercial relationships.318
Digital environments are constructed and shaped by companies, giving them increased control
over choice architecture. Consumers also struggle to differentiate between apps and software
which are secure and privacy-protective and those which are not.319 Recognizing this power,
“[m]any companies design their interfaces to facilitate and encourage the disclosure of
information, including information we may not even be aware we are disclosing. . . . They also use
algorithms to monopolize our attention and keep us fixed to the site so that we will disclose even
more information.”320 User interfaces can be designed in such a way as to create unwitting consent
by obfuscating what it is consumers are consenting to or hiding the option to decline. 321
Sometimes, controls are outright deceptive and fail to do what they promise.322 Consistent with
this observation, the Commission’s recent report on dark patterns is replete with examples of
manipulative design practices which extract copious amounts of user data.323 (Q73.)
Placing the onus of privacy protection on consumers rather than requiring software and
hardware makers to respect privacy in the design of their products ignores the ways in which
popular digital tools are designed to expose people and manipulate consumers into disclosing
personal information. Under a notice and choice regime, “there are overwhelming incentives to
design technologies in a way that maximizes the collection, use, and disclosure of personal
information.”324 Whether known as “malicious design,” “dark patterns,” or something else, design
choices of this type exemplify the ways in which notice and choice fails to protect consumers from
exploitative data practices.
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At a time when the effects of social media on our mental health—especially the mental
health of children and teenagers—is under exacting scrutiny,325 popular social media app TikTok
provides a useful example of the power of design to exploit consumer vulnerabilities. With over
one billion average monthly users, TikTok has become a major social media platform and rival to
many of the industry’s biggest actors.326 TikTok’s precise tracking of consumer viewing habits
enables it to deliver highly personalized content, but this is not the only design feature that makes
TikTok addictive.327 Beyond the app’s powerful content recommendation algorithms, the
company’s explosive growth is tied to its manipulative user experience design, which “is built to
trigger compulsive use, especially in more impressionable audiences such as teenagers.”328 The
“For You” page, which immediately immerses a consumer in a feed of tailored videos, is a stark
contrast to the kind of network-based content of other social media such as Facebook.329 The use
of full portrait mode, the near lack of a progress bar or other similar indicators, and the autoplay
“endless scroll” are all designed to create “full immersion and the optimization for maximal
consumption.”330 Videos are commonly filmed and displayed as vertical-video monologues,
imitating the intimate experience of video chatting with someone directly. 331 Consumers using
TikTok are also prohibited from scrolling quickly and bypassing several videos at once—the
interface is consciously designed so that they must scroll through each video in their feed.332 Even
the culture of the app, revolving around micro-trends, encourages constant engagement and
involvement.333 These design features achieve their goal: TikTok boasts over one billion users,
and the average American viewer watches 80 minutes of TikTok per day.334 (Q17.)
TikTok also relies on now commonplace design features, such as the use of likes and
subscribers to capture consumer attention via dopamine hits or intermittent reinforcement loops,
to keep people addicted to its service.335 Beyond its efforts to keep people as engaged and addicted
as possible, TikTok also “uses deceptive design to make users share more data than they would do
if that had more information.” For example, during the sign-up process TikTok asks the compound
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question, “Are you over 18 and do you allow TikTok to show personalized ads?”336 Any lawyer
who has taken a deposition knows how duplicitous a question like this is. Users who are over 18
and want the content algorithm to treat them as such may feel compelled to consent to personalized
ads in this situation. There are other, subtler elements of deception. The “Yes” button is
emboldened, whereas the “No” is in a lighter font—a classic dark pattern. The prompt “Confirm
you are above 18 and allow personalized ads” is broken up onto two lines, burying the request for
personalized ads under the question about being 18. TikTok registrants—no doubt eager to click
through to start using the app—will see the top line, gloss over the rest, and accept to confirm their
age, not realizing that they are agreeing to more. These features highlight the importance of design
for consent, privacy, and consumer wellbeing. TikTok is in control of what its customers see, how
they navigate content, and how they interact with one another. TikTok leverages that control to
spur compulsive use, optimizing and personalizing their service in order to “steal as much attention
as it can.”337
TikTok’s addictive design decisions directly precipitate substantial injuries to consumers.
As children globally “spend an average of 75 minutes per day on TikTok,”338 there is increasing
evidence that social media has an especially harmful effect on the mental wellbeing of children
and teenagers.339 There are also significant concerns regarding TikTok’s privacy policies and
practices. TikTok has been accused of spying on keystrokes 340 and engaging in “aggressive data
harvesting.”341 Lingering concerns remain regarding “surveillance, spying and censorship from
China.”342 Finally, children and teenagers are exposed on the app in several different ways.
“Sharenting,” where parents excessively document their child’s life on social media, is rife on the
app as parents trade their child’s privacy for the potential of fleeting moments of virality.343 This
exposure increases the risk of identity fraud, child predation, or cyberbullying, and it often occurs
without meaningful consent.344 Children and teenagers on TikTok (as well as other social media
platforms) unintentionally expose themselves to “malicious individuals and predators online.”345
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To be clear, the foregoing discussion is not offered moral condemnation of TikTok. It is
offered instead as an example of the practices which naturally evolve in response to the market
incentives to monetize consumer data under a notice and choice regime. Like most social media
platforms, TikTok makes money from delivering targeted advertisements and sponsored
consent.346 TikTok is also joining the e-commerce industry, attempting to “create a closed loop
where TikTok handles each and every step from a user discovering something to actually
purchasing it—instead of directing them to an Amazon listing or a Shopify Inc.—powered web
store.”347 Both TikTok’s ability to addict and enthrall consumers and the substantial injuries that
TikTok customers suffer illustrate the inadequacies of notice and choice as the basic data privacy
regime in the United States. For better or worse, TikTok has become a center of culture and
creativity online. Many people, especially children and teenagers, feel compelled to be on the
service, lest they risk social alienation. Platforms like TikTok which embed themselves in the
social and cultural fabric of society should not have carte blanche to exploit consumer data under
the flimsy guise of notice and choice. We should not pretend that TikTok users have any
meaningful understanding of how the app’s algorithms and design decisions entrap them, nor that
these consumers have any meaningful control over these data practices, whether they are children
or adults.
Deceptive, manipulative, and exploitative design decisions are prevalent in digital markets
today. The Commission’s own staff report on this issue makes a compelling case for acting to
prevent companies from using design to exploit consumer trust. Persisting with a notice and choice
regime would only further encourage design choices that work to circumvent user choice and
manufacture flimsy consent.
D. Consent Can Be Effective Only in Select Circumstances, None of Which Are
Present in Most Digital Transactions
All of this is not to say that consent can never be effective. Consent has long been an
integral element of American law.348 In select situations consent is justified, such as where parties
have equal bargaining power, parties have significant resources, and parties knowingly and
voluntarily agree to assume legal obligations.349 The hallmarks of informed consent are that it is
“freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous,” as well as voluntary and revocable. 350 For
data practices, however, there are additional problems with consent beyond its form or substance.
For consent to be effective in the context of data practices, there are heightened conditions that
must be met. Termed “gold standard” consent, this idealized form of consent can meaningfully
enhance autonomy and self-determination, but only if the circumstances and structure under which
consent is sought and received are correct.
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We have written before that there are “three circumstances necessary for an ideal
environment for effective consent.”351 First, requests for consent must be infrequent. In a world
rampant with decision fatigue, constant consent requests are a drain on consumer’s time and
cognitive load.352 In contrast to situations where informed consent is required, such as medical
treatment or scientific research, data subjects are “ceaselessly bombarded with requests for
consent.”353 Making requests infrequent, which requires prioritizing certain consent requests over
others, is necessary for consent to be effective.354 Second, risks must be vivid (i.e., easy to
envision).355 Threats to bodily integrity or damage to liberty or property are easy to envision, but
downstream risks of data practices are abstract.356 Risk accrues incrementally as information is
accumulated bit by bit.357 Data harms also often stay hidden even after they have occurred.358
Finally, there must be incentives to take each request seriously.359 People will not take a request
for consent seriously absent an incentive to do so, and such an incentive comes from “the
magnitude of the stakes involved and the close relationship between the consent and those
stakes.”360 Incentives of this sort are absent where the stakes appear insignificant, where the
relationship between the consent and the risks is too remote, or when people feel powerless—i.e.,
under the typical circumstances in which consumers are asked to make online privacy decisions.361
There are two additional aspects of data consent that further reduce the incentives for a consumer
to take each request seriously. Consent to data practices is dispersed, with thousands of small,
incremental disclosures that are not front of mind for a consumer faced with atomized data consent
requests.362 That leads to consumers making “transaction-rational” decisions and consenting to
data practices which are harmful in the aggregate.363 Furthermore, there are considerable
externalities of consent. One individual’s consent to data practices provides data which helps refine
and empower those practices, leading to more sophisticated targeting of other individuals.364 These
circumstances—infrequency, vivid risks, and proper incentives—are all critical to effective
consent, but they are also fraught with problems in the context of data practices and digital
commerce. The absence of even one of these circumstances is fatal to effective consent. (Q74,
Q78, Q84.)
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***
The well-documented failings of both notice and choice as concepts in privacy selfmanagement combine to form an unwelcome and undeniable reality: consumers in digital markets
have little notice nor any meaningful choice when it comes to commercial surveillance and data
security. Further attempts to resuscitate the long-dead corpse of notice and choice would not only
be a waste of the Commission’s limited time and resources but also a disservice to consumers and
companies alike. To protect consumers from unfair data practices and foster trust in digital
markets, something more is needed: We need substantive limits on harmful data practices.
III. Fostering Trust in Digital Marketplaces
The evidence we have presented up to this point paints a bleak picture for consumers,
competition, and digital markets. Prevalent commercial surveillance and lax data security practices
have wrought significant individual and social harms and eroded public trust in digital markets.
Consumers are eager to reap the benefits of the internet but face unprecedented information
asymmetries and power differentials. Digital businesses learn a lot about us, but “we do not know
a lot about them—their operations, what kinds of data they collect, how they use this data, and
who they share it with.”365 This relational vulnerability leads to consumer exploitation as
companies leverage commercial surveillance to profile, nudge, and manipulate consumers into
acting in ways which do not benefit them. Rather than empowering consumers as promised, our
notice and choice regime has failed to curtail all but the most simple and egregious violations of
consumer expectations, and it has enabled a host of insidious data practices that prey upon
consumer vulnerabilities. It is clear that something more is needed if we are to realize the promises
of the early internet and produce the essential trust that is necessary for humans and companies
mediated by technology to get along with each other for everyone’s mutual benefit.
Jack Balkin has highlighted that “digital companies hold themselves out as trustworthy
enterprises; they insist that our data is safe with them and that our privacy and our safety is their
central concern. They encourage us to trust them so that we will entrust them with our data, indeed,
with our digital lives.”366 It is time that we hold them to those representations with substantive
protections for consumers, rather than merely procedural ones. To fully realize the innovative and
transformative promise of digital markets, we need more than just data protection: we need human
protection.367 This requires implementing a framework which both examines the relationships
between consumers and the companies with which they interact and places trust “at the center of
our digital approach to consumer protection.”368 What we need are rules that focus on human
relationships and vulnerabilities rather than on data, and rules that are substantive rather than
merely procedural. The sections which follow expand on the themes of trust, loyalty, and relational
vulnerability identified above; first by making the case that modern commercial relationships are
uniquely risky for consumers; second, by establishing how commercial data disloyalty is an unfair
trade practice consonant with the elements of Section 5; and third by identifying specific practices
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or categories of commercial surveillance which are ripe for trade regulation rules grounded in
concepts of loyalty and relational vulnerability.
A. Modern Commercial Relationships are Uniquely Risky for Consumers
Modern information relationships are exceptional in ways that the existing regulatory
regime fails to fully recognize. Consumers are extremely vulnerable to digital companies who
“repeatedly invite end users to trust them” despite knowing that “end users are mostly unaware of
the dangers.”369 The current U.S. approach, characterized by caveat emptor and the decay of
contract law around boilerplate, has facilitated the failed “notice and choice” approach to
privacy.370 Procedural protections and watered down application of the FIPs continue to ignore
how companies betray the people who trust them with their data and online experiences every
day.371
We have written before that “[e]ven if it might have been rational for lawmakers and judges
to ignore information relationships in the past, our modern ongoing involvement with the
companies providing the apps and websites we use every day demands more scrutiny.”372 The
affordances of modern platform-consumer relationships are important and dangerous because of
their “speed, immanence, automation, and scale.”373 These affordances and the business models
motivated by them should be central to lawmakers’ approach to modern privacy problems.
Concepts of loyalty accurately reflect how the remarkable affordances of digital technologies
result in wildly imbalanced relationships which go far beyond the standard understandings of armslength dealings between merchants and customers in which parties with relatively equal bargaining
power act competently in service of their own self-interest.374 While the default presumption in
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market transactions is that parties are operating at arms-length, when one party has significant
power over the other and an incentive to abuse that power, lawmakers often create duties and
restraints within these imbalanced relationships to protect vulnerable parties. These power
imbalances can manifest in several different ways, including large disparities in information or
knowledge, reliance on expertise or promises, and discretion and control over that which is
entrusted to one party in the relationship.375 Modern commercial relationships are thus more akin
to our intimate relationships with people that we trust with deeply personal experiences,
information, and our personal safety than to the ones we have with ordinary merchants like
automobile or furniture dealers.376 Digital technologies have insinuated themselves to be an
increasingly invisible part of the fabric of people’s everyday lives and they have an outsized effect
on their wellbeing. When policymakers treat all interactions between people and companies that
offer online services as arms-length relationships, they ignore the role that structure and scale play
in creating relational vulnerabilities.
Modern commercial relationships present many challenges, not all of which can be solved
by loyalty alone. But our next generation of privacy rules will never be complete until it treats
information relationships as imbalanced and capable of great abuse by the dominant party. This is
one of main privacy problems addressed by loyalty. Rather than treating all kinds of information
relationships as equal and fungible, it should increase obligations and restrictions on dominant
parties as they amass power. The more power a company has in a relationship, the more protective
and loyal it must be. A duty of loyalty would add an additional layer to data privacy law. Privacy
would no longer be primarily about the data; instead it would have to consider the relationships
between people and the companies they expose themselves to.377 Such a change in focus would,
perhaps surprisingly to some, mean that our consumer protection law would become even more
focused on protecting consumers.
Although the ongoing interactions between people and digital technologies perhaps might
not seem like a meaningful “relationship” in the traditional sense of the word, these relationships
give rise to the same relational dynamics and abuses that trust rules are meant to address. At the
outset, the interactions between people, platforms, and digital businesses are firmly established as
legal relationships. Courts consistently bind people who use websites and apps to the terms of use
and service agreements imposed by companies.378 Yet technologically-mediated relationships
between people and companies are more than mere legal formalities, even if they are different
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from the meaningful relationships we have with our friends, advisors, and employers. These
relationships involve far more interplay, exposure, and personalization than standard commercial
services and contracts for widgets.
The relationships that people have with brick-and-mortar merchants and providers of
services in a pre-digital era bear little resemblance to the relationships between people and modern
commercial services. Critics of a duty of loyalty have asserted that treating platforms the same as
a doctor strips away the affordances of the platform and the realities of scale.379 But it is the precise
affordances of hardware and software that make the relationship between people and platforms
both highly imbalanced and novel in ways that compel relational rules grounded in concepts of
loyalty. There are at least five traits of the relationship between people and digital technologies
that, when combined, make these relationships highly imbalanced and worthy of intervention at
the relational level: they are ongoing, high frequency relationships that occur within an interactive
environment that is completely constructed for the individual and responsive to the individual by
the dominant party.380 Let’s break these traits apart.
Ongoing. When people buy chairs, or ages ago when they bought CD-ROMs containing
software, they typically engaged in discrete transactions. Although Office Depot or Adobe hoped
customers would return, barring returns or malfunctions, the relationship between customer and
manufacturer or software developer typically had some distance and downtime. Those days are
long gone.381 Platforms leveraging browsers, apps, and cloud computing, however, have
obliterated the concept of discrete one-time interactions. Virtually every interaction requires an
account creation with an intention of an always-evolving delivery of services; one the often autorenews every month or every year. A platform’s ideal scenario is that once a person signs up for
service, they regularly visit and never leave. Systems are, to use the parlance of Silicon Valley,
“optimized for engagement.” Accounts remain updated, data and attention continue to be given,
and patches and updates continue to be delivered with no planned end date. This is even true of
non-platform websites. When you purchase an item online, you typically create an account (or, at
the very least, provide an email address or phone number), install an app or visit a website, any of
which give that company access to your data. Even merely visiting a website creates an ongoing

See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 373 (“The information fiduciaries proposal abstracts speed, immanence,
automaticity, and scale away from that encounter and then assumes they never mattered in the first place. In the
process, it both sacrifices the fiduciary arrangement’s most essential characteristics and fails to reckon adequately
with the characteristics of the platform-consumer relationship that are most problematic.”); Khan & Pozen, supra
note 255, at 514–520.
380
For an interesting approach to how laws might accommodate duties of loyalty and care in parties that demand
high degrees of trust but are not traditionally recognized as fiduciaries, see Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86
WASH. U.L. REV. 665, 691 (2009) (“[F]iduciary law is about signaling to fiduciaries that they ought not to be selfinterested in transactions with and for their beneficiaries; it is generative of trust where costs of distrust are
especially high.”).
381
See Lauren Henry Scholz, Fiduciary Boilerplate: Locating Fiduciary Relationships in Information Age
Consumer Transactions, 46 J. CORP. L. 143, 198 (2020) (“The ideal of the one-off consumer transaction is dead.
Instead of selling or licensing goods and services to consumers, firms today seek to build ongoing, evolving
relationships with consumers based on constant contact. This trend is likely to continue, as the always-on devices
that comprise the Internet of Things proliferate and cover an increasing number of everyday objects.”).
379

62

Commercial Surveillance ANPR, R111004
relationship as you are then tracked across the web and fed targeted advertisements whose purpose
is to lure you back to that site and tempt you into a purchase. This never-ending story justifies rules
designed to foster long term, sustainable relationships between people and platforms.
Frequent. In addition to wanting to be with you forever, digital companies want to be with
you constantly. People may go shopping in physical stores at most once or a few times a week.
They might take occasional advantage of an offline service like babysitting or dry cleaning. But
on average people interact with apps and websites over three hundred times every day.382 Popular
apps often get checked multiple times within the same hour or minute. While we may commonly
use the same tool tens or hundreds of times a day (think how often you pick up a pen, sit in a chair,
or drink from a cup), we might think it strange to browse the aisles of a store or call our financial
advisor ten times a day, every day, for years on end. But how many times have you checked your
phone today? For Facebook, Amazon, Google, Twitter, TikTok, and a host of other dominant
platforms, failure to check in regularly is seen as a problem, and constant interaction from the user
is a rewarded metric. This is true of other digital companies as well, such as news sites, that aim
to keep users either purchasing products or bringing in advertisement revenue by capturing their
attention.
Constructed. Companies leveraging their surroundings to influence their customers and
clients is nothing new. Grocery stores place milk and eggs at the opposite side of the store from
the entrance to encourage people to walk the aisles. Office designers make conference rooms
totally transparent, for when you want everyone to see who you’re meeting with, or completely
opaque, for when you don’t. It happens online as well. As Joel Reidenberg noted in his
foundational article Lex Informatica, companies leverage information technologies to create policy
rules that affect people.383 But the extent to which tech companies control mediated environments
is so great that it deserves sustained scrutiny. Our dealings with companies online occur entirely
on their terms.384 They control who has access, what they see and can do, when they see it and can
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take action, where they receive signals and can make choices, and why particular people see
specific things and are given pre-constructed options. In non-mediated relationships, people have
a degree of flexibility to work within a structured environment. They can choose from an endless
array of physical actions, social interactions, and even change the structure of the environment
themselves. But online, people can only click on the options they are given or address the audience
they have been presented in the format that has been provided. Our ability to interrogate, analyze,
ask questions, tinker, learn and otherwise calibrate our dealings with companies online is virtually
non-existent. As consumers using these services, we are essentially powerless. Data subject rights
of access, rectification, and deletion like those offered by the GDPR theoretically empower us a
little, but they require us to take action in order to be protected. In practice these rights are difficult
to exercise at scale, and, since they are limited only to personal data, data subject rights do very
little to improve our agency within constructed environments outside of personal data transparency
and management.
Interactive. When people consume legacy media like newspapers, magazines, television,
or radio, they are essentially passive. There is no give and take between the mind and the medium;
the flow of information is one-way. It would be a stretch to call these “relationships,” even when
we have subscription contracts with them.385 But by contrast, the relationships between people and
digital services are highly interactive. We create detailed accounts and profiles, search, amass
networked connections, post pictures and status updates, press buttons, tweak settings, adjust
sliders, arrange layouts, and project information streams that we don’t even know about. And, of
course, all of this interactivity can be quantified, optimized, and used to benefit the platform.
Platforms best instantiate interactivity, but this phenomenon is not limited to platforms alone. Even
certain legacy media companies, such as the New York Times, are adapting to provide increasingly
interactive (and responsive) content.386 E-commerce sites, empowered by cheap storage and
improved data analytics, encourage us to provide information about ourselves so that they can
mathematically match our tastes with their products. Prior to the information economy, these
interactions occurred on a smaller scale and were ephemeral.
Responsive. The final twist that makes modern information relationships unique is that the
ongoing, frequent, constructed and interactive nature of digital technologies enables companies to
design their mediated environment to be acutely responsive to people’s choices and profiles. News
feeds and suggested products and information change on the fly according to your previous clicks
and profiles created from personal data accumulated over time. Our mediated environments are
tweaked based on individual data and up-to-the-second wisdom from constant A/B testing to
maximize engagement and keep our eyes glued to the screen.387
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This powerful incentive for “growth hacking” makes the uniquely involved relationship
between digital technologies and people incredibly dangerous. It is far from what should be
considered arms-length. Arms-length relationships might have one or two of the traits listed above.
But no legal, commercial, or social relationship on earth, from merchants to professionals to
employers to loved ones, features the same potent combination of traits as modern technologicallymediated information relationships. They cannot be arms-length when they are already living in
our heads.
The features and affordances of modern commercial relationships thus present unique
dangers. It would be a mistake to treat modern commercial relationships as arms-length, even if
they are scaffolded by consumer protection and data protection public governance rules. They are
too one-sided and involved to tolerate an arms-length fiction. Loyalty is not sufficient to solve all
our privacy problems, but it is necessary so long as the affordances of the tools, incentives for selfdealing, and legal contracting status of the parties places people in danger every time they create
an account online. In this way, a surprising virtue of a loyalty approach is that it reveals how
modern commercial relationships are not anything approaching arms-length transactions. Once
lawmakers patch this bug and embrace the relational turn in privacy law, a number of different
possibilities open up, including supporting public governance, new substantive rules, and a more
collective and systematic approach to privacy.
B. Commercial Data Disloyalty as an Unfair Trade Practice
The Commission should ground its unfair trade practice data privacy rules in concepts of
loyalty and relational vulnerability. Commercial surveillance is an accurate, descriptive label for
the data practices which the Commission has observed in digital markets. While many commercial
surveillance practices are or have the capability of being unfair trade practices,388 not all
commercial surveillance practices are unfair. Loyalty is what separates harmful and beneficial
commercial surveillance. Approaching questions of unfairness through the frame of loyalty, trust,
and relational vulnerability sheds a great deal of light on why certain trade practices that fall within
the broad umbrella of commercial surveillance are both unfair and deceptive. Concepts of loyalty
and relational vulnerability will help the Commission identify the exploitative practices and
business models which are injurious to consumers. Disloyal practices—those self-serving,
exploitative practices where a company acts contrary to a trusting consumer’s best interests and
causes substantial unavoidable harm— are unfair as a general matter, and it is almost impossible
to imagine a disloyal practice that would satisfy Section 5. By narrowing the category of
commercial surveillance to the subset of those practices which are disloyal, the Commission can
craft precise trade regulations which target the most egregious and pressing harms in the
marketplace. Through this focused approach, the Commission can work towards its goal of “[a]
vibrant economy fueled by fair competition and an empowered, informed public.”389

388

See supra Parts I.B. & I.C.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2022 TO 2026 (2022), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/ftc_gov/pdf/fy-2022-2026-ftc-strategic-plan.pdf.
389

65

Commercial Surveillance ANPR, R111004
1. Concepts of Loyalty and Relational Vulnerability Are Consonant with Section 5
Concepts of loyalty and relational vulnerability are fully consonant with the three elements
of Section 5—substantial injury, unavoidability, and the absence of countervailing benefits. Under
a theory of loyalty, betrayal is itself an injury. Betrayal damages the integrity of a relationship and
diminishes trust. This has the secondary effect of diminishing a consumer’s ability to safely and
meaningfully participate in a marketplace. Absent a general duty of loyalty, betrayal is still a
helpful lens through which injuries can be identified. Corporate opportunism and self-dealing leads
to profiling and sorting, nudging, and manipulation. These prevalent practices undermine the
fiction of consumer choice and impose substantial costs on consumers.
Two primary benefits of applying concepts of loyalty and relational vulnerability are that
they naturally speak to the “reasonably avoidable” and “countervailing benefits” prongs of Section
5. Disloyal data practices are not reasonably avoidable by consumers because it is impossible to
participate in modern society without entrusting personal data with companies, it is difficult for
consumers to distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy companies, and digital
experiences are constructed and mediated by companies. In contrast to traditional relationships
between consumers and merchants, consumers can only click the options with which they are
presented. There is no room for negotiation or true, meaningful control. Complicated arrays of
privacy options give the appearance of control, but in reality these options are illusory and
overwhelming. Consequently, consumers have no choice but to trust platforms with their personal
data and mediated experiences. When these companies engage in self-serving, exploitative design
and personal data processing, consumers are therefore powerless to prevent those actions. These
practices are opaque, and consumers are left only with the all-or-nothing proposition of choosing
whether or not to use a particular service. This problem is compounded by the difficulty that
consumers face in trying to discern whether a company is trustworthy. As for the third prong,
countervailing benefits, a disloyal action by definition cannot have a countervailing benefit to
consumers because it is not in a consumer’s best interest. It is also difficult to imagine how the
disloyal betrayal of consumers could somehow benefit competition. The Commission’s unfairness
enforcement actions have long relied on notions of consumer expectations to identify and
prosecute unfair practices. A duty of loyalty would provide greater clarity to companies and
consumers about what constitutes an unfair practice, as a duty of loyalty will be informed both by
preexisting legal precedents as well as the additional betrayal criterion.
Loyalty and relational vulnerability have been implicit themes of the Commission’s prior
enforcement actions. In its complaint against Zoom, the Commission alleged that Zoom made
deceptive claims regarding the use of end-to-end encryption, the level of encryption, and the secure
storage of Zoom meeting recordings, that Zoom unfairly circumvented a third-party privacy and
security safeguard, and that Zoom deceptively deployed the ZoomOpener web server.390 These
privacy and security failings were significant given that consumers rely on videoconferencing
technology in their daily lives and consumers share sensitive information during such meetings,
including “financial information, health information, proprietary business information, and trade
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secrets.”391 The Commission’s recognized the importance of trust and relational vulnerability in
guiding the Commission’s enforcement when it explained that, “[o]ur goal is a safe and secure
Zoom that can continue to provide essential services to enable Americans to conduct business,
engage in learning, participate in religious services, and stay connected.”392 Consumers made
themselves vulnerable when they trusted Zoom to adequately safeguard their data, and Zoom
betrayed that trust. This was a disloyal act, which was also an unfair trade practice, and
understanding Zoom’s acts in terms of disloyalty helps to clarify why those acts were unfair as a
matter of law.
The Commission’s recent enforcement actions against Kochava Inc. and Drizly, LLC
further evince the Commission’s focus on enabling consumers to safely interact in markets. In its
complaint against Kochava, the Commission alleged that Kochava unfairly acquired and sold
consumers’ precise geolocation data in a format which allows entities to “track the consumers’
movements to and from sensitive locations, including, among others, locations associated with
medical care, reproductive health, religious worship, mental health, temporary shelters, such as
shelters for the homeless, domestic violence survivors, or other at risk populations, and addiction
recovery.”393 This data, if released, could lead to “stigma, discrimination, physical violence,
emotional distress, and other harms.”394 Investigating Kochava’s sale of sensitive precise
geolocation data reinforces the principle that consumers must be free from disloyal commercial
surveillance if they are to have the freedom to safely interact in markets. All-encompassing
geolocation data tracking chills consumer behavior. Likewise, the Commission’s recent
enforcement action against Drizly, LLC and the resulting proposed settlement are also pertinent.
Following a 2020 data breach, Drizly, an alcohol delivery e-commerce platform, was accused of
failing to employ reasonable security measures and of making deceptive security statements.395 In
its proposed order, the Commission focused not only on Drizly’s security failings, but also on the
company’s unnecessary data collection, which created additional risks for consumers.396 Imposing
data minimization and data retention limits on Drizly signifies that a company’s commercial
surveillance practices should not unnecessarily expose consumers to risk. Data minimization
means, among other things, that companies have a duty to collect only that personal data that is
necessary to provide a service to consumers that serves their best interests. By contrast, the
collection of personal data that is unnecessary to serve such best interests is self-serving at best
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and disloyal at worst, particularly if such data collection is used in a way that is self-serving,
exposes the consumer to additional risk in case of a data breach or secondary data use, or is used
to the detriment of consumers. Taken in combination, these enforcement actions reinforce the
Commission’s underlying goal of ensuring that consumers can be safe market participants.
2. Loyalty Solves the Consent Dilemma and Has the Added Virtue of Flexibility
The predominant virtue of loyalty-based rules is that they foster trust, enabling consumers
to safely interact in markets. Loyalty has many additional virtues which we have detailed at length
in our prior work: Loyalty focuses on relationships, achieves what a duty of care (avoiding
unreasonable harm) alone cannot, prioritizes human values, and can be both flexible and clear.397
For the purpose of this rulemaking, two important virtues of applying concepts of loyalty worth
highlighting are that (1) loyalty solves the consent dilemma and (2) loyalty offers a flexible
standard to promote ethical and consumer-protective data practices.
Consent has long plagued data privacy.398 The FIPs idealize principles of notice and choice,
but the thin procedural protections which are hallmarks of the dominant U.S. regime of notice and
choice fail to give consumers meaningful control over their data. Consumers have a preference for
greater data privacy but face a dilemma. Basic participation in modern society requires consumers
to entrust other parties with their data, but consumers struggle to differentiate between loyal and
disloyal companies and often face the all-or-nothing decision between using a service and
consenting to whatever data practices are imposed or not using the service at all. This places
consumers in the unenviable position of having to accept the risk that their data will be exploited
even if their preference is for greater privacy and protection. To have true choice and autonomy,
consumers need to be protected from exploitative data practices no matter what choice they make.
This is one of the chief virtues of loyalty: it solves the consent dilemma. As we have written before,
Trust-based protections would require parties in information relationships to
protect the data placed in their care and to treat each other fairly and with deference.
They would prohibit entrusted entities from asking for consent to practices that
would make people unreasonably vulnerable. Lawmakers looking to embrace trust
and minimize the pathologies of consent could leverage rules concerning the design
of technologies and legal prohibitions on consent such as unconscionability to shift
the policy conversation in a way that values both consent and privacy, and protects
the millions and millions of human beings to whom these rules apply.399
Another important virtue of grounding data privacy rules in concepts of loyalty and
relational vulnerability is that loyalty is flexible and adaptable across contexts, cultures, and time.
Not only will this result in greater clarity over time,400 but it also obviates any concerns about
obsolescence. Flexible, standards-based frameworks like negligence, reasonableness (whether in
negligence or in reasonable expectations of privacy), and unfairness, have long been applied in
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American law. That flexibility enables a loyalty-based framework to be “responsive to bigger
structural power concerns and emergent problems driven by the affordances of new tools.”401
(Q95.)
Concepts of loyalty and relational vulnerability have much to offer the Commission as a
conceptual lodestar in this rulemaking, in its future enforcement strategy, and in any future
rulemaking under a federal privacy statute. Loyalty recognizes the unique nature of modern
commercial relationships. Loyalty fosters trust, allowing consumers to safely interact in a healthy,
vibrant marketplace. Loyalty solves the consent dilemma by shifting the risk of exploitative data
practices from consumers to the companies which might act disloyally. Finally, loyalty offers a
flexible, adaptable approach which is capable of withstanding the test of time. Loyalty will not
solve all the problems stemming from society’s digital transformation, but it can be a critical
component of a nuanced, multilayered strategy which animates a just and fair digital future and
promotes human flourishing. It might just be the key element of such a successful strategy.
C. The Commission Should Use Its Rulemaking Authority to Ban Particularly
Harmful Unfair Trade Practices That Have the Hallmark of Disloyalty
The Commission should use its Section 18 rulemaking authority define as unfair trade
practices select commercial surveillance practices which bear the hallmark of disloyalty, targeting
“specific areas where trusted parties have an incentive to engage in self-dealing.”402 We have
written before that “[s]ome data practices might be so dangerous that they should be taken off the
table entirely.”403 Even without couching these rules within an umbrella duty of loyalty, concepts
of loyalty and relational vulnerability can act as an important animating force and interpretive
guide that would bring more coherence, flexibility, and accountability to the enforcement of these
rules.404 By crafting narrow rules which apply concepts of loyalty, the Commission can proscribe
specific harmful practices while still preserving the benefits of safe and sustainable information
exchanges. As a starting point, these comments recommend that the Commission consider rules
pertaining to data minimization, targeted advertising, gatekeeping, and automated decisionmaking. This section also outlines how privacy protections for children and teenagers fit in with
concepts of loyalty as we have explained them so far.
Before delving into the disloyal practices that we have identified as ripe for rulemaking,
we wanted to clarify that any trade regulation rules promulgated by the Commission should be
relatively agnostic about particular categories of data. While sensitive data is a useful proxy to
address particularly harmful kinds of practices, advances in data analytics have enabled companies
to use even seemingly innocuous types of non-sensitive data in order to infer the same kinds of
vulnerabilities for which sensitive data can be a proxy. A better approach than focusing primarily
on the nature of data is focusing on the nature of relationships. Rather than focusing primarily on
the sensitivity of data, the Commission should focus on the vulnerability of relationships, because
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it is in vulnerable relationships that the opportunities for unfairness and deception are most
pronounced and hardest for consumers to avoid harm through reasonable strategies of harm
avoidance. (Q10, Q68, Q91.)
1. Data Minimization Is a Fundamental Element of Good Data Security
“[T]he relationship between privacy and security is vitally important and increasingly
frayed.”405 A schism between security and privacy has formed,406 which has resulted in data
security “being treated as a distinct area centered around safeguards and notification.”407 That
overly narrow view of data security misses the important role that front-door protection plays in
data security.408 Poor privacy undermines even the best data security practices. Put another way,
data that is never collected in the first place cannot be exposed in a data breach. To help bridge
this gap within companies, the Commission should define unnecessary and disproportionate data
collection as an unfair trade practice.409 Data minimization is a fundamental element of good data
security. The Commission has recognized as such in its prior enforcement actions, notably in the
recent CafePress410 and Drizly411 cases, where the companies were ordered to implement data
minimization procedures. Following the Commission’s fiftieth data security settlement in 2014,
the Commission emphasized that companies should “limit the information they collect and retain
based on their legitimate business needs so that needless storage of data does not create
unnecessary of unauthorized access to the data.”412 Companies have thus been on notice for many
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years that they increase the risk and severity of potential data breaches when they collect and retain
data unnecessarily.413 Unnecessary data collection creates vast repositories of data whose mere
existence incentives hackers to breach systems. As Commissioner Slaughter has helpfully
explained, “[H]ackers cannot steal data that companies did not collect in the first place;
requirements that limit what data can be collected, used, and retained could meaningfully foil and
deter data security breaches.”414 Data breaches are to some extent inevitable, and unnecessary and
disproportionate data collection makes breaches more damaging than they otherwise might have
been. Rampant data collection also threatens data security because it gives fraudsters additional
information that can be weaponized against users to carry out later data breaches, i.e. by facilitating
phishing attempts.415 (Q43, Q47.)
The Commission should promulgate a trade regulation rule providing that it is an unfair
practice to collect, process, or transfer data which is not reasonably necessary and proportionate
to provide or maintain a specific product of service requested by the individual to whom the data
pertains. A data minimization requirement would help bridge the gap between privacy and security
by ensuring that companies implement sufficient front end protections on data collection. The
Commission should also consider enumerating select “permitted purposes” which would allow
companies to collect, process, or transfer personal data so long as the company’s purpose is
consistent with one of those permitted purposes. There are many detailed data minimization
proposals from which the Commission could craft a more detailed and nuanced rule, such as the
Electronic Privacy Information Center’s proposal from earlier this year.416 (Q76.)
One of the greatest challenges in implementing substantive limits on appropriate collection
and use of data is determining contextually what data collection is reasonably necessary and
proportionate. This is another area in which concepts of loyalty and relational vulnerability can
add value to the Commission’s work. Grounding a data minimization requirement in concepts of
loyalty can add important clarity to the rule. Data loyalty provides a normative vision for the
boundaries of data minimization by introducing “a value-laden baseline that not only requires an
examination of the purpose of the collection but also elevates the interests of those affected by the
collection.”417 This loyalty-based minimization requirement would consider the type of data
collected and the context of collection relative to the nature of the trusted relationship and the
consumer’s exposure to the trusted party.418Applying this concept, collection generally would shift
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from gathering as much data as possible to collecting data for “improv[ing] the quality of service
in the loyal customer’s interest.”419 (Q45.)
Data minimization is not possible without proper data governance. There are a number of
privacy practices related to data minimization which the Commission should consider in
developing its data minimization framework, such as data mapping and accounting.
Operationalizing a data minimization obligation can lessen the risk of organizations losing track
of what personal data is collected or where that data is kept.420 These are just a few examples of
how a data minimization rule would improve data security practices and potentially help bridge
the gap that often exists between privacy and security compliance within companies. Companies
should only be able to collect and retain data that is adequate, relevant, and necessary, as
interpreted through concepts of loyalty.421 Such a limit on collection would better align with
consumer expectations, protect users from downstream security failings, and foster trust in
commerce. Data security and privacy can thus be mutually reinforcing, and a data minimization
requirement would be a powerful step in achieving both aims. (Q43, Q47.)
2. Loyal Gatekeeping Can Curtail Data Broker Access to Consumer Information
Under the current status quo, companies have strong financial incentives to give third
parties access to trusting parties and their data. This financial pressure breeds disloyalty, which
has manifested itself in a number of high-profile incidents, such as Cambridge Analytica’s
Facebook data exfiltration.422 An increasingly important example is the geolocation data broker
industry, who aggregate data from third-party apps and surveil the private lives of millions of
individuals on behalf of law enforcement and private companies.423 Disloyal gatekeeping is
substantively unfair: it causes substantial injury to consumers, it is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers, and it does not have countervailing benefits to consumers and competition. It is unfair
to consumers for companies to implement APIs, advertiser portals, third-party SDKs, fusion
centers, and government backdoors that facilitate third-party access in ways which conflict with
trusting parties’ best interests. This access invades consumers’ privacy in opaque ways, it exposes
them to unavoidable harm, and it leaves them with little recourse. To protect consumers, the
Commission should prohibit disloyal gatekeeping, the practice of providing third-party access to
consumer data when that access elevates the self-interest of the company over that of consumers.
A gatekeeping requirement could be styled in a number of different ways, such as a duty of care
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and confidentiality, a duty of reasonable gatekeeping, or a duty of reasonable protection. How the
Commission frames and articulates the duty will of course have substantive consequences. But
regardless of how the Commission might choose to frame a duty of loyal gatekeeping, this duty
should still allow for beneficial third-party access, such as contextual advertising or protocols for
interoperability. The Commission should also consider an outright prohibition on the
nonconsensual sale of consumer data. (Q52, Q76.)
3. Targeted, Behavioral, and Cross-Contextual Advertising Should Be Limited
Advertising is baked into the current business model of the internet.424 This rulemaking
will not change that, but the Commission should explore loyalty-based rules limiting targeted,
behavioral, and cross-contextual advertising. The commercial surveillance ecosystem is driven
largely in part by the advertising industry’s perceived need to profile, sort, and influence
consumers. Rampant, unfettered data collection enables companies to build comprehensive user
profiles which, when leveraged with data science and behavioral science, enables advertisers to
exploit consumer vulnerabilities.425 Consumers are in the unenviable position of having to entrust
companies with their data, knowing that these companies are harvesting as much data as possible
to facilitate targeted advertising. But consumers are in no position to assess ex ante whether a
company will target them in a loyal or disloyal way (or whether their data will be sold to a third
party who will unfairly target them down the line). Some uses might be beneficial, such as loyal
personalization and first-party advertising. Some uses might be manipulative, however, like
attempts to dissuade that consumer from voting.426 Furthermore, the benefits of targeted
advertising disproportionately flow to a small subset of actors in the ad-tech industry, to the
detriment of consumers, publishers, and often advertisers themselves.427 Data minimization and
loyal gatekeeping mandates, as detailed above, are substantive limits which would indirectly
curtail the most egregious and trust-eroding forms of targeting by drying up the data streams which
enable the surveillance advertising industry. The Commission can further reinforce those measures
by placing substantive limits on targeted, behavioral, and cross-contextual advertising. Doing so
will remove the market incentives which drive the kinds of rampant, reckless, and disloyal data
collection that expose consumers to risk of harm. (Q76, Q81.)
As Jack Balkin has pointed out, not all targeted advertising is inherently abusive or
inconsistent with the best interests of end users.428 In fact, “much of modern advertising is based
on increasing efficiencies in locating and reaching interested audiences.”429 The challenge is
finding the dividing line between those targeting practices which are exploitative, rising to the
level of an unfair trade practice, and those which are not. This is where concepts of loyalty and
relational vulnerability, as a normative baseline to guide substantive rules, can be informative: “we
should ask what practices of advertising, targeted at end users, do not betray their trust or operate
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against their interests.”430 One important distinction we can draw is between first- and third-party
targeted advertising. Trust cannot flourish when consumers are inundated with online
advertisements that are selected by third parties based on known or predicted interests or traits
associated with that consumer. Such targeting by third parties poses serious risks of unavoidable
injury to consumers.431 In contrast, it would not be unfair for a company to process first-party data
as necessary (consistent with any data minimization obligations) for the purpose of advertising
that company’s own products or services to a consumer. A consumer who seeks out a particular
company or webpage will not feel a sense of betrayal from first-party advertising because it aligns
with their expectations and does not involve unnecessary exposure to a third party with whom the
consumer does not have a relationship.
There are existing legal limits on targeted advertising from which the Commission should
take inspiration. California’s CCPA draws a distinction between “cross-context behavioral
advertising” and “nonpersonalized advertising.” Cross-context behavioral advertising
encompasses “the targeting of advertising to a consumer based on the consumer's personal
information obtained from the consumer's activity across businesses, distinctly-branded websites,
applications, or services, other than the business, distinctly-branded website, application, or
service with which the consumer intentionally interacts.”432 Companies subject to the CCPA are
required to provide an option for consumers to opt out of having their personal information sold
or shared for cross-context behavioral advertising.433 Nonpersonalized advertising, in contrast,
encompasses “advertising and marketing that is based solely on a consumer's personal information
derived from the consumer's current interaction with the business with the exception of the
consumer's precise geolocation.”434 Nonpersonalized advertising is not restricted under the CCPA
so long as “the consumer's personal information is not disclosed to another third party and is not
used to build a profile about the consumer or otherwise alter the consumer's experience outside the
current interaction with the business.”435 This kind of first-party advertising would be consistent
with the notion of loyalty as we articulate it here. (Q42, Q80, Q82.)
Introducing reasonable, substantive limits on targeted advertising would not mean the
death of online advertising. Some forms of targeted advertising could continue if pursued in a
transparent and loyal manner. This could result where consumers give truly informed and
voluntary consent to opt-in to such targeting, giving them true control over how their data is used,
in contrast to the fictitious control perpetuated by the current notice and choice regime. As
discussed above, there is also an opportunity for first-party targeting. Contextual advertising is a
trust-preserving form of targeting which has withstood the test of time.436 Displaying
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advertisements based on the content in which that advertisement appears, rather than who is
viewing that advertisement, can benefit consumers, publishers, and advertisers without betraying
consumer trust. As Balkin identifies, contextual advertising does not require “an elaborate digital
dossier about [you] to be effective.”437 Critics have argued that contextual advertising is not viable
in select circumstances, such as where brand integrity would be damaged by the content of a news
article. It is not clear that this will be the case. For example, consumers are likely to understand
that contextual ads target a particular publisher’s readership rather than the content of specific
stories.438 (Q41, Q42.)
4. Fairness, Transparency, and Accountability Are Necessary to Combat Due Process
Harms of Automated Decision-Making
Companies’ increased reliance on automated decision-making systems, coupled with
mounting evidence that these systems create discriminatory disparate outcomes,439 raises grave
concerns over the fairness, accountability, and transparency of these systems. As we have argued
before, platform optimization threatens our “cyber civil rights,” and algorithmic or automated
decision-making in key aspects of people’s lives, such as health, finance, jobs, travel, and other
essential life activities, raises important concerns about due process.440 Therefore, “[a]ny approach
to data privacy that does not incorporate algorithmic accountability will be incomplete.” 441 The
Commission should heed the advice of AI experts and develop rules regarding the design,
implementation, and use of AI systems which are grounded in concepts of loyalty and relational
vulnerability. The Commission could prohibit the use of algorithms which have an unreasonable
risk of producing disparate outcomes for marginalized communities. Procedural safeguards such
as algorithmic impact assessments will not perfectly eliminate the risk of disloyal, exploitative,
and biased algorithms, but they could help curtail such algorithms by increasing the likelihood that
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disparate impacts are detected and mitigated. Even though it lacks an express duty of loyalty, the
White House’s recent AI Bill of Rights is an informative source from which the Commission can
take inspiration.442 The Commission should also examine the ways in which other jurisdictions,
such as the EU, have attempted to mitigate the risks of algorithms producing disparate outcomes.443
(Q56, Q60, Q62, Q67, Q89.)
5. Data Privacy Rules Should Protect Children, Teenagers, and Adults
When it comes to the important responsibility of protecting children, the Commission does
not face a binary choice between strengthening privacy protections for Americans either under or
over the age of eighteen. To the contrary, many of the methods for protecting the most vulnerable
consumers are applicable to the protection of all consumers, and vice versa. The general agreement
across stakeholders about the importance of protecting children in digital environments actually
illustrates a broader point about problems of commercial surveillance, loyalty, and the data
economy which is true for all consumers. While there is much evidence to indicate that children
and other highly vulnerable populations need protection, the imbalance of the relationship between
all consumers and commercial surveillance companies is so drastically skewed that the most
desirable concepts for preventing unfair practices against children should be applied to the general
population as well.444
In the past few decades, a general consensus has emerged regarding the need to protect
children from the risks and harms which result from being online. Concerns over the privacy and
wellbeing of children lead to the enactment of one of the few data protection laws in the US, the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act. Despite COPPA’s notable successes in protecting young
children online, it has are obvious gaps. Children over the age of thirteen are excluded. The law
predates the advent of modern social media and is ill-equipped to deal with the mental health crises
spurred by these platforms. States are stepping in to fill the gaps, as California has done with its
recent enactment of the California Age-Appropriate Design Code Act.445 There are also new
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obtain an adequacy judgment and thus facilitate transatlantic data transfers under the GDPR.
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See, e.g., Lindsey Barrett, Ban Facial Recognition Technologies for Children—and for Everyone Else, 26 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 223 (2020) (arguing that “children’s heightened vulnerability to privacy violations and
discrimination from the use of facial recognition technologies doesn’t diminish the severity of the harms that other
groups and the population at large experience.”).
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See California Age-Appropriate Design Code Act, A.B. 2273, 2021-2022 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2022).
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federal laws being proposed every year, such as the Kids Internet Design and Safety (KIDS) Act.446
The Commission devotes a substantial number of questions in the ANPR to addressing the effects
of commercial surveillance on the wellbeing of children and teenagers, and there is considerable
support amongst the commissioners for additional privacy rules protecting children and teenagers.
As Commissioner Wilson has recently highlighted,
[r]ecent research reveals that platforms use granular data to track children’s online
behavior, serve highly curated feeds that increase engagement, and (in some
instances) push kids towards harmful content. More broadly, the research reveals a
“catastrophic wave of mood disorders (anxiety and depression) and related
behaviors (self-harm and suicide)” among minors, and particularly teenage girls,
who spend a significant amount of time on social media daily.447
Commissioner Bedoya has likewise emphasized the plight faced by children and teenagers online,
calling for greater scrutiny of product design and more aggressive enforcement of children’s
privacy standards.448 The Commission “has a long history of intervening in the marketplace to
protect children,”449 reflecting a general consensus that children and teenagers are in need of
protection online.
Arguments for protecting children and teenagers online generally coalesce into broad
points about their lack of information, naiveté, autonomy, and decision-making skills. Having less
decision-making experience than adults, children and teenagers have less information about
potential risks of consenting to different data practices. That same lack of life experience leads
children (and especially teenagers) to be overconfident about their ability to make decisions. This
lack of information and experience manifests itself in different ways, such as underdeveloped
media literacy which leads children and teens struggling to distinguish between sponsored content
and news articles.450 There is also evidence that certain injuries resulting from disloyal data
practices disproportionately affect children and teenagers. Teens self-report high percentages of
online use, with forty-six percent stating they are online “almost constantly” and ninety-seven
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Many of the proposals in the KIDS Act, such as prohibitions on manipulative marketing, amplification of
harmful content, and damaging design features would substantially benefit all consumers if broadly implemented,
not just children and teens. See Press Release, Sen. Ed Markey, Senators Markey and Blumenthal, Rep. Castor
Reintroduce Legislation to Protect Children and Teens from Online Manipulation And Harm (Sept. 30, 2021),
https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senators-markey-and-blumenthal-rep-castor-reintroducelegislation-to-protect-children-and-teens-from-online-manipulation-and-harm (describing how the KIDS Act can
make the digital design more ethical).
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Trade Regulation Rule on Commercial Surveillance and Data Security, 87 Fed. Reg. 51,273, 51,299 (proposed
Aug. 22, 2022) (Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Christine S. Wilson).
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HOOFNAGLE, supra note 11,11 at 193.
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Wayne D’Orio, What Is Media Literacy? What Parents Need to Know, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 31, 2022, 9:09 AM),
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percent stating they are online daily.451 Research shows that while both adults and children receive
a boost of dopamine from social rewards online, these feelings are heightened by children and
teens as they are more likely to attach their sense of self to the opinions of their peers and others
online.452 Taken together, these justifications make a compelling argument for increased privacy
protection.
The Commission’s focus on protecting kids is laudable, but the Commission should not
lose sight of the fact that many of the reasons given for protecting children also apply to adults.
There are some meaningful differences between the decision-making capabilities of children and
adults. There are also meaningful differences in the way that privacy harms may affect children
versus adults. For example, there is evidence that time on social media affects adults differently
than it does young people.453 Despite those differences, it is not clear whether these distinctions
are very meaningful from a policy perspective. Questions abound about whether there is a good
reason that privacy protections for children cease at age thirteen rather than eighteen. But there is
also nothing magical about eighteen as a dividing line. As any college professor or parent of young
adults will tell you (something we can also speak to from personal experience), nineteen-year-olds
are only marginally wiser and more mature than eighteen-year-olds, and undergraduate students,
many of whom are also living away from home for the first time, generally struggle under the
strain of commercial surveillance and the overwhelming demands of notice and choice. Age is a
spectrum, as is the wisdom and maturity that comes with it. Rules and safeguards that follow
arbitrary age distinctions fail to see the forest for the trees and leave meaningful gaps in protection.
Adults suffer many of the same harms as children and teens. Adults are similarly ill-equipped to
protect themselves in the face of these platforms. Digital markets are plagued by stark information
asymmetries and power differentials. As discussed above in the analysis of the failure of notice
and choice, the same kinds of information asymmetries and overconfidence that are ascribed to
children and teenagers apply to adults as well. Pointedly, if notice and choice is overwhelming,
illusory, and ineffective for adults, then parental consent cannot be an efficacious way of ensuring
child online privacy.454 The ANPR asserts that teenagers may be characteristically less capable of
anticipating reputational harms than adults, but adults routinely overestimate their ability to selfmanage their own privacy. The general agreement across stakeholders about the importance of
protecting children in digital environments actually illustrates a broader point about problems of
commercial surveillance, loyalty, and the data economy which is true for all consumers.
Commercial surveillance is so prevalent, powerful, and opaque that we are all rendered powerless
before this data hungry leviathan, regardless of how young or old we are. Rather than promulgating
specific data privacy rules for children and teenagers, the Commission should focus on crafting
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generally applicable trade regulations which will protect all Americans from the harmful practices
detailed above. The best protections that the Commission can offer children and teens are the kinds
of generally applicable rules detailed above, especially data minimization, loyal gatekeeping, and
an end to corrosive targeting. (Q12, Q13, Q18, Q19, Q79.) All consumers deserve protection from
disloyal data practices, and consumer protection should mean much more than the digital caveat
emptor that is far too frequently the world that consumers of digital goods and services face.
Conclusion
The status quo of privacy regulation in the United States cannot continue. We have
previously written that “the corporate, commercial, mobile app-driven internet of the early 2020s
represents probably the most highly surveilled environment in the history of humanity.” 455 This
prevalent, even ubiquitous surveillance creates individual and social harms, disproportionately
benefits certain industry actors, and erodes trust in the market. “[P]rivacy is inevitably about the
distribution and exercise of power,”456 and commercial surveillance enables certain market actors
to leverage unreasonable and unavoidable power over consumers, to the detriment of both
consumers and competition. Commercial surveillance has certainly flourished under a notice and
choice regime which serves only the interests of the data hungry companies who hold considerable
power of basic aspects of our lives. Consumers—human beings—have not. It is important to
recognize, however, that there is nothing inevitable about this current state of affairs. These
disloyal, exploitative data practices are everywhere, but they came to be everywhere.457 There is
nothing natural, unavoidable, or inevitable about modern commercial relationships. Furthermore,
neither consumers nor voters really chose this outcome. Advertisers and advertising middlemen,
driven by market incentives and an absence of meaningful data privacy rules, spurred the creation
of the prevalent commercial surveillance practices we languish under today—too often so far
outside the awareness of consumers that any notion of consent or acquiescence borders on the
absurd. To achieve its vision of “[a] vibrant economy fueled by fair competition and an
empowered, informed public,”458 the Commission should pursue Section 18 rulemaking and
consider substantive rules regulating commercial surveillance grounded in concepts of loyalty and
relational vulnerability. Data privacy rules grounded in such concepts would not be a panacea or s
silver bullet, but they are a large step towards what should ultimately be a nuanced, multilayered
strategy of consumer protection in digital markets. Substantive limits on commercial surveillance
that are nuanced, focused, and elevate consumer wellbeing will not irreparably damage the internet
or spell the end of the advertising industry. To the contrary, the Commission has an opportunity to
pass substantive rules which benefit consumers and companies alike by fostering trust, enabling
human flourishing, and delivering on the lofty ideals of early internet pioneers. A sustainable
digital marketplace undergirded by reasonable, substantive consumer protection rules would thus

RICHARDS, supra note 21,21 at 83; see also Lina Khan, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks of Chair Lina M. Khan as
Prepared for Delivery IAPP Global Privacy Summit 2022 Washington D.C. (Apr. 11, 2022),
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20Global%20Privacy%20Summit%202022%20-%20Final%20Version.pdf (citing RICHARDS, supra).
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Hartzog & Richards, supra note 37,37 at 1737.
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See McNamee, supra note 29.
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FED. TRADE COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2022 TO 2026 (2022), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/ftc_gov/pdf/fy-2022-2026-ftc-strategic-plan.pdf.
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offer significantly greater benefits to consumers, competition, and firms over the long run than the
status quo, by encouraging sustainable, trustworthy, loyal information relationships that make all
parties better off.
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THE DANGERS OF SURVEILLANCE
Neil M. Richards∗
From the Fourth Amendment to George Orwell’s Nineteen EightyFour, and from the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to films
like Minority Report and The Lives of Others, our law and culture are
full of warnings about state scrutiny of our lives. These warnings are
commonplace, but they are rarely very specific. Other than the vague
threat of an Orwellian dystopia, as a society we don’t really know why
surveillance is bad and why we should be wary of it. To the extent
that the answer has something to do with “privacy,” we lack an understanding of what “privacy” means in this context and why it matters.
We’ve been able to live with this state of affairs largely because the
threat of constant surveillance has been relegated to the realms of science fiction and failed totalitarian states.
But these warnings are no longer science fiction. The digital technologies that have revolutionized our daily lives have also created minutely detailed records of those lives. In an age of terror, our government has shown a keen willingness to acquire this data and use it for
unknown purposes. We know that governments have been buying and
borrowing private-sector databases,1 and we recently learned that the
National Security Agency (NSA) has been building a massive data and
supercomputing center in Utah, apparently with the goal of intercepting and storing much of the world’s Internet communications for decryption and analysis.2
Although we have laws that protect us against government surveillance, secret government programs cannot be challenged until they are
discovered. And even when they are, our law of surveillance provides
only minimal protections. Courts frequently dismiss challenges to such
programs for lack of standing, under the theory that mere surveillance
creates no harms. The Supreme Court recently reversed the only major case to hold to the contrary, in Clapper v. Amnesty International
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. For helpful comments on prior
drafts, I thank Jim Bohman, John Inazu, Jonathan King, Wendy Niece Richards, and participants
in the Washington University Political Theory Workshop. Special thanks are also due to my coparticipants at the Harvard Law Review Symposium on Privacy and Technology — Professors
Julie Cohen, Paul Schwartz, Dan Solove, and Lior Strahilevitz — and my generous commentators, Danielle Citron, David Gray, and Orin Kerr. Thanks also to my research assistants,
Matthew Cin and Ananth Iyengar, and my faculty assistant, Rachel Mance.
1 See, e.g., ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 1–4 (2005).
2 James Bamford, The Black Box, WIRED, Apr. 2012, at 78, 80.
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USA,3 finding that the respondents’ claim that their communications
were likely being monitored was “too speculative.”4
But the important point is that our society lacks an understanding
of why (and when) government surveillance is harmful. Existing attempts to identify the dangers of surveillance are often unconvincing,
and they generally fail to speak in terms that are likely to influence the
law. In this Article, I try to explain the harms of government surveillance. Drawing on law, history, literature, and the work of scholars in
the emerging interdisciplinary field of “surveillance studies,” I offer an
account of what those harms are and why they matter. I will move
beyond the vagueness of current theories of surveillance to articulate a
more coherent understanding and a more workable approach.
At the level of theory, I will explain why and when surveillance is
particularly dangerous and when it is not. First, surveillance is harmful because it can chill the exercise of our civil liberties. With respect
to civil liberties, consider surveillance of people when they are thinking, reading, and communicating with others in order to make up their
minds about political and social issues. Such intellectual surveillance
is especially dangerous because it can cause people not to experiment
with new, controversial, or deviant ideas. To protect our intellectual
freedom to think without state oversight or interference, we need what
I have elsewhere called “intellectual privacy.”5 A second special harm
that surveillance poses is its effect on the power dynamic between the
watcher and the watched. This disparity creates the risk of a variety
of harms, such as discrimination, coercion, and the threat of selective enforcement, where critics of the government can be prosecuted or blackmailed for wrongdoing unrelated to the purpose of the
surveillance.
At a practical level, I propose a set of four principles that should
guide the future development of surveillance law, allowing for a more
appropriate balance between the costs and benefits of government
surveillance. First, we must recognize that surveillance transcends
the public/private divide. Public and private surveillance are simply
related parts of the same problem, rather than wholly discrete. Even
if we are ultimately more concerned with government surveillance, any
solution must grapple with the complex relationships between government and corporate watchers. Second, we must recognize that
secret surveillance is illegitimate and prohibit the creation of any
domestic-surveillance programs whose existence is secret. Third, we
should recognize that total surveillance is illegitimate and reject the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
Id. at 1147.
See generally Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008) [hereinafter Richards, Intellectual Privacy].
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idea that it is acceptable for the government to record all Internet activity without authorization. Government surveillance of the Internet
is a power with the potential for massive abuse. Like its precursor of
telephone wiretapping, it must be subjected to meaningful judicial
process be-fore it is authorized. We should carefully scrutinize any
surveillance that threatens our intellectual privacy. Fourth, we must
recognize that surveillance is harmful. Surveillance menaces intellectual privacy and increases the risk of blackmail, coercion, and discrimination; accord-ingly, we must recognize surveillance as a harm in constitutional standing doctrine. Explaining the harms of surveillance in
a doctrinally sensitive way is essential if we want to avoid sacrificing
our vital civil liberties.
I develop this argument in four steps. In Part I, I show the scope
of the problem of modern “surveillance societies,” in which individuals
are increasingly monitored by an overlapping and entangled assemblage of government and corporate watchers. I then develop an account of why this kind of watching is problematic. Part II shows how
surveillance menaces our intellectual privacy and threatens the development of individual beliefs in ways that are inconsistent with the
basic commitments of democratic societies. Part III explores how surveillance distorts the power relationships between the watcher and the
watched, enhancing the watcher’s ability to blackmail, coerce, and discriminate against the people under its scrutiny. Part IV explores the
four principles that I argue should guide the development of surveillance law, to protect us from the substantial harms of surveillance.
I. THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE
We are living in an age of surveillance. The same digital technologies that have revolutionized our daily lives over the past three decades have also created ever more detailed records about those lives.
In addition, new technologies, from surveillance cameras and web
bugs to thermal scanners and GPS transponders, have increased the
ability to track, observe, and monitor. The scope and variety of the
types of surveillance that are possible today are unprecedented in human history. This fact alone should give us pause.
But not only have the technologies of surveillance multiplied; so too
have the entities that wish to surveil. Autocratic regimes have long
been the villains in the stories we tell about surveillance, but they are
no longer the only governments that have stepped up their surveillance
activities. Democratically elected governments in the West have deepened their commitment to surveillance of the public as well. Since
2001 this monitoring has often been done in the name of counterterrorism, but it has also been justified as protecting cybersecurity, intellectual property, children from predators, and a seemingly evergrowing list of other concerns. Some of the most well-known and
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valuable publicly traded corporations have also got in on the act, often
with the consent (in varying degrees) of their customers. Surveillance,
it seems, is not just good politics, but also good business.
What, then, is surveillance? Scholars working throughout the
English-speaking academy have produced a thick descriptive literature
examining the nature, causes, and implications of the age of surveillance.6 Working under the umbrella term of “surveillance studies,”
these scholars represent both the social sciences and humanities, with
sociologists making many of the most significant contributions.7
Reviewing the vast surveillance studies literature, Professor David
Lyon concludes that surveillance is primarily about power, but it is also about personhood.8 Lyon offers a definition of surveillance as “the
focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction.”9 Four aspects of this definition are noteworthy, as they expand our understanding of what surveillance is and what its purposes are. First, it is
focused on learning information about individuals. Second, surveillance is systematic; it is intentional rather than random or arbitrary.
Third, surveillance is routine — a part of the ordinary administrative
apparatus that characterizes modern societies.10 Fourth, surveillance
can have a wide variety of purposes — rarely totalitarian domination,
but more typically subtler forms of influence or control.11
A. The Scope of Surveillance
Even a cursory overview of the kinds of surveillance that are being
performed today reveals the scope of the surveillance problem. At the
level of state surveillance, it should be no surprise that autocratic regimes have been among the worst offenders. For example, China has
used Internet activity to detect and censor dissidents,12 and states resisting the Arab Spring uprisings have also keenly sought social media
data in order to stem the tide of the revolts.13 Some activists also suspect that the Vietnamese government may have used computer viruses
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
6

For three recent introductions to this vast literature, see, for example, DAVID LYON, SURSTUDIES (2007); SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY (Kevin D. Haggerty & Minas
Samatas eds., 2010); and THE SURVEILLANCE STUDIES READER (Sean P. Hier & Joshua
Greenberg eds., 2007).
7 See LYON, supra note 6, at 18–22.
8 See id. at 23.
9 Id. at 14.
10 Id.
11 See id. at 15–16.
12 REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED 36–40 (2012).
13 Id.; Anupam Chander, Essay, Jasmine Revolutions, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1505, 1516–17,
1525–28 (2012).
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to monitor the Internet activity and private data of dissidents protesting government mining policies.14
Surveillance is not just for communists and dictators. Democratic
states have also invested heavily in surveillance technologies in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in America, the London subway
bombings of 2005, and other atrocities. Britain is one of the most
heavily surveilled countries in the world, with a network of public and
private surveillance cameras, traffic enforcement cameras, and broad
government powers to examine Internet traffic.15 In the United States,
the NSA has engaged in a program of warrantless wiretapping of telephone conversations. Although many of the details of the wiretapping
and other surveillance programs remain shrouded in secrecy, it is clear
that the investment in surveillance infrastructure remains significant.
And as noted above, a 2012 investigative report by Wired magazine
revealed that the NSA is building a massive supercomputing facility in
the Utah desert, possibly with the goal of capturing and archiving
much of the world’s Internet traffic, with a view to decrypting and
searching it as decryption technologies inevitably advance.16
Surveillance is not just for governments either. Private companies
big and small generate vast fortunes from the collection, use, and sale
of personal data. At the broadest level, we are building an Internet
that is on its face free to use, but is in reality funded by billions of
transactions where advertisements are individually targeted at Internet
users based upon detailed profiles of their reading and consumer habits.17 Such “behavioral advertising” is a multibillion-dollar business,
and is the foundation on which the successes of companies like Google
and Facebook have been built.18 One recent study concludes that this
form of surveillance is so ingrained into the fabric of the Internet “that
a small number of companies have a window into most of our movements online.”19 Other technologies engage in similar forms of private
surveillance. “Social reading” applications embedded into Facebook
and other platforms enable the disclosure of one’s reading habits,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION 143–45 (2011).
Brendan M. Palfreyman, Note, Lessons from the British and American Approaches to Compelled Decryption, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 345, 362 (2009). See generally KIRSTIE BALL ET AL., A
REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: FOR THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER BY
THE SURVEILLANCE STUDIES NETWORK (David Murakami Wood ed., 2006), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/02_11_06_surveillance.pdf; How We Are Being
Watched, BBC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2006, 2:21 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6110866.stm.
16 See generally Bamford, supra note 2.
17 See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING 26–30 (2011).
18 See DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT 260–66 (2010); STEVEN LEVY, IN
THE PLEX 262–63, 336–37 (2011).
19 Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse, 6 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 279 (2012).
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while electronic readers like the Kindle and the Nook track reader behavior down to the specific page of the specific book on which a user’s
attention is currently lingering.20
In recent years, industry, media, and scholars have increasingly focused their attention on the concept of “Big Data,” an unwieldy term
often used to describe the creation and analysis of massive data sets.21
Big Data is notable not just because of the amount of personal information that can be processed, but because of the ways data in one area
can be linked to other areas and analyzed to produce new inferences
and findings. As social scientists danah boyd and Kate Crawford put
it, “Big Data is fundamentally networked. Its value comes from the
patterns that can be derived by making connections between pieces of
data, about an individual, about individuals in relation to others,
about groups of people, or simply about the structure of information
itself.”22 Big Data holds much potential for good in areas as diverse as
medical research, the “smart” electrical grid, and traffic management.23
But Big Data also raises many potential problems in areas such as
privacy and consumer power. For example, the retail superstore Target uses Big Data analytics to infer which of its customers are pregnant based upon their purchases of other products and upon personally identifying data from other sources.24 As the New York Times
Magazine reports, new parents are highly desirable customers not just
because they buy many new products, but because their normally stable purchasing habits are “up for grabs” in the chaotic exhaustion that
accompanies the birth of a child.25 Target uses Big Data to snare new
parents because, as one of its data analysts concedes, “[w]e knew that
if we could identify them in their second trimester, there’s a good
chance we could capture them for years . . . . As soon as we get them
buying diapers from us, they’re going to start buying everything else
too.”26 Big Data analytics enabled Target to discover that expectant
parents display a change in buying habits (for example, buying unscented lotion and magnesium supplements) that mark them as expectant, allowing this kind of (appropriately enough) “targeted” market–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
20 Neil M. Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 GEO. L.J. 689, 698–99 (2013) [hereinafter Richards, The Perils of Social Reading].
21 danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Six Provocations for Big Data 6 (Sept. 21, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
22 Id.
23 See generally Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in
the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. (forthcoming 2013).
24 Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012 (magazine), § 6, at 30,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html.
25 Id.
26 Id.; see also Tom Simonite, What Facebook Knows, MIT TECH. REV. (June 13, 2012),
http://www.technologyreview.com/featured-story/428150/what-facebook-knows/?mod=related.
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ing. Big Data surveillance and analysis thus affect the commercial
power of consumers, identifying their times of relative weakness and
allowing more effective marketing to nudge them in the directions that
watchful companies desire.
The incentives for the collection and distribution of private data
are on the rise. The past fifteen years have seen the rise of an Internet
in which personal computers and smartphones have been the dominant personal technologies. But the next fifteen will likely herald the
“Internet of Things,” in which networked controls, sensors, and data
collectors will be increasingly built into our appliances, cars, electric power grid, and homes, enabling new conveniences but subjecting
more and more previously unobservable activity to electronic
measurement, observation, and control.27 Many of us already carry
GPS tracking devices in our pockets, not by government command,
but in the form of powerful multifunction smartphones. Sociologists
Zygmunt Bauman and David Lyon have identified the spread of surveillance beyond nonconsensual state watching to a sometimes-private
surveillance in which the subjects increasingly consent and participate — a phenomenon that they call “liquid surveillance.”28 Professor
Scott Peppet foresees the “unraveling” of privacy,29 as economic incentives lead consumers to agree to surveillance devices like Progressive
Insurance’s “MyRate” program, which offers reduced insurance rates
in exchange for the installation of a device that monitors driving
speed, time, and habits.30 Peppet argues that this unraveling of privacy creates a novel challenge to privacy law, which has long focused on
unconsented surveillance rather than on surveillance as part of an economic transaction.31
It might seem curious to think of information gathering by private
entities as “surveillance.” Notions of surveillance have traditionally
been concerned with the watchful gaze of government actors like police and prison officials rather than companies and individuals. But in
a postmodern age of “liquid surveillance,” the two phenomena are
deeply intertwined. Government and nongovernment surveillance
support each other in a complex manner that is often impossible to
disentangle. At the outset, the technologies of surveillance — software, RFID chips, GPS trackers, cameras, and other cheap sensors —
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
27 Clive Thompson, Sensors Everywhere, WIRED, Dec. 2012, at 72, available at http://www
.wired.com/opinion/2012/12/20-12-st_thompson/. For a critique of the “Internet of Things,” see
ROB VAN KRANENBURG, THE INTERNET OF THINGS (2008), available at http://www
.networkcultures.org/_uploads/notebook2_theinternetofthings.pdf.
28 ZYGMUNT BAUMAN & DAVID LYON, LIQUID SURVEILLANCE 2–3 (2013).
29 Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a FullDisclosure Future, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1153, 1156 (2011).
30 Id. at 1153–56.
31 Id.
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are being used almost interchangeably by government and nongovernment watchers.32 Private industry is also marketing new surveillance technologies to the state. Though it sounds perhaps like a plot
from a paranoid science fiction novel, the Guardian reports that the
Disney Corporation has been developing facial recognition technologies for its theme parks and selling the technology to the U.S. military.33 Nor do the fruits of surveillance respect the public/private divide. Since the September 11 attacks, governments have been eager to
acquire the massive consumer and Internet-activity databases that
private businesses have compiled for security and other purposes, either by subpoena34 or outright purchase.35 Information can also flow
in the other direction; the U.S. government recently admitted that it
was giving information to insurance companies that it had collected
from automated license-plate readers at border crossings.36
Similarly, while government regulation might be one way to limit
or shape the growth of the data industry in socially beneficial ways,
governments also have an interest in making privately collected data
amenable to public-sector surveillance. In the United States, for example, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of
199437 requires telecommunications providers to build their networks
in ways that make government surveillance and interception of electronic communications possible.38 A European analogue, the EC Data
Retention Directive Regulations of 2009, requires Internet service providers to retain details of all Internet access, email, and Internet telephony by users for twelve months, so that they can be made available to government investigators for cases of antiterrorism, intellectual
property, child protection, or for other purposes.39 This surveillant
symbiosis between companies and governments means that no analysis
of surveillance can be strictly limited to just the government or the
market in isolation. Surveillance must instead be understood in its aggregated and complex social context.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
32
33

See LYON, supra note 6, at 111–12.
Naomi Wolf, The New Totalitarianism of Surveillance Technology, GUARDIAN (Aug. 15,
2012, 4:12 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/aug/15/new-totalitarianism-surveillance
-technology.
34 See Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 688 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
35 See O’HARROW, supra note 1, at 64, 98–103.
36 Cyrus Farivar, License Plates Scanned at Border, Data Shared with Car Insurance Group,
ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 22, 2012, 4:36 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/08/license-plates
-scanned-at-border-data-shared-with-car-insurance-group/.
37 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2006).
38 Id. § 1002.
39 The United Kingdom version of this regulation is The Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations, 2009, S.I. 2009/859 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2009/9780111473894
/contents.
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B. Surveillance Law’s Limited Protections
American law governing surveillance is piecemeal, spanning constitutional protections such as the Fourth Amendment, statutes like the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 198640 (ECPA), and private
law rules such as the intrusion-into-seclusion tort.41 But the general
principle under which American law operates is that surveillance is legal unless forbidden. Perhaps out of a fear that surveillance might be
used to suppress dissent, American law contains some limited protections against government surveillance of purely political activity. For
example, government investigators in antiterrorism cases possess a
powerful tool known as the National Security Letter (NSL). NSLs are
statutory authorizations by which the FBI can obtain information
about people from their telephone companies, Internet service providers, banks, credit agencies, and other institutions with which those
people have a relationship. NSLs are covert and come with a gag order that prohibits the recipient of the letter from disclosing its existence, even to the person whose secrets have been told to the government. NSLs can currently be obtained under four federal statutes: the
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 197842 (RFPA), the ECPA,43 the Fair
Credit Reporting Act44 (FCRA), and the National Security Act of
1947.45 Taken together, these provisions allow the FBI to access a
wide variety of information about people, including historical and
transactional information relating to telephone calls and emails, financial information, and consumer credit information.46 This information
can be obtained by crossing a very low threshold — the FBI must
merely certify in writing that the request is “relevant to an authorized
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
40
41

Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
See generally Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy,
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887 (2010).
42 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (allowing access to personal financial records
held by a wide variety of entities, including casinos, insurance companies, automobile dealerships,
credit unions, real estate companies, and travel agencies).
43 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (allowing access to telephone and email information including billing and
call history, email, subscriber information, and screen names).
44 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see also id. § 1681u (allowing access to
credit history information and the header information on credit reports, including name, address,
and employment history); id. § 1681v (allowing access to a consumer’s full credit report and “all
other information in a consumer’s file”).
45 50 U.S.C. §§ 401–442b (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see also id. § 436 (allowing the issuance of
NSLs in connection with investigations of improper disclosure of classified information by government employees).
46 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 10 (2007).
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intelligence activities.”47 Communications and bank records sought
under the ECPA and the RFPA are protected by the additional requirement that the FBI certify that “such an investigation of a United
States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.”48
Despite these protections, courts lack the tools to enforce them.
This problem predates the current NSL framework. For example, in
1967, the President ordered the U.S. Army to engage in surveillance of
domestic dissident groups, fearing civil disorder in the aftermath of the
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.49 The program expanded
over time to become a large-scale military surveillance program of the
domestic political activities of American citizens.50 In Laird v.
Tatum,51 the Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the
claims that the surveillance violated the First Amendment rights of the
subjects of the program, because the subjects claimed only that they
felt deterred from exercising their First Amendment rights or that the
government could misuse the information it collected in the future.52
The Court could thus declare that “[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill’
are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective
harm or a threat of specific future harm.”53
More recent surveillance cases have followed the lead of the Laird
Court. Challenges to the NSA’s wiretapping program have foundered
because plaintiffs have failed to convince federal courts that secret
surveillance has caused them any legally cognizable injury. In ACLU
v. NSA,54 the Sixth Circuit dismissed any suggestion that First
Amendment values were threatened when the government listened to
private conversations. As that court put it: “The First Amendment
protects public speech and the free exchange of ideas, while the Fourth
Amendment protects citizens from unwanted intrusion into their personal lives and effects.”55 The court concluded that the plaintiffs had
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
47 This precise language is quoted from the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(1)–(2), but the other
NSL provisions are substantially similar. See 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (RFPA); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681u(b), 1681v(a) (FCRA); 50 U.S.C. § 436(a)(3) (National Security Act).
48 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(1)–(2) (ECPA); 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (RFPA). The original FCRA
NSL provision allowing access to the headers of credit reports only, 15 U.S.C. § 1681u(b), contains
such a First Amendment limitation, but since the Patriot Act added § 1681v, which allows for the
full credit report to be obtained without meeting the First Amendment requirement, it is unclear
what practical effect the limitation in § 1681u(b) will have.
49 See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1972).
50 See id. at 6–7.
51 408 U.S. 1.
52 Id. at 13.
53 Id. at 13–14.
54 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007).
55 Id. at 657 n.15 (citations omitted).
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no standing to assert First or Fourth Amendment violations, as they
could not prove that the secret government surveillance program had
targeted them.56 Similarly, in Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc.
v. Bush,57 the government successfully invoked the state-secrets doctrine to stop the plaintiffs from finding out whether they were the subjects of secret surveillance under the program.58 This ruling created a
brutal paradox for the plaintiffs: they could not prove whether their
telephone calls had been listened to, and thus they could not establish
standing to sue for the violation of their civil liberties.59 Despite the
fact that the judges in the case knew whether surveillance had taken
place, they believed that the state-secrets doctrine barred them from
ruling on that fact.60 And the Court’s most recent decision in Clapper
affirmed this approach to standing to challenge surveillance. Plaintiffs
can only challenge secret government surveillance they can prove, but
the government isn’t telling. Plaintiffs (and perhaps civil liberties) are
out of luck.
So far so bad. Or maybe not. Putting the oppression of totalitarian
states to one side, public and private surveillance can have beneficial
effects. All other things being equal, greater security from crime and
terrorism is a good thing.61 So too are the conveniences of modern
communications, email, and the power of a search engine in our pockets valuable advances that improve our quality of life. And a sensible
system of automated traffic regulation can save money and direct
scarce police resources to serious criminals rather than ordinary
motorists.
As a society, we are thus of two minds about surveillance. On the
one hand, it is creepy, Orwellian, and corrosive of civil liberties. On
the other hand, it keeps us and our children safe. It makes our lives
more convenient and gives us the benefit of a putatively free Internet.
Moreover, some influential thinkers argue that data surveillance does
not affect privacy at all. As Judge Posner puts it:
The collection, mainly through electronic means, of vast amounts of personal data is said to invade privacy. But machine collection and processing of data cannot, as such, invade privacy. Because of their vol-ume,
the data are first sifted by computers, which search for names, addresses,
phone numbers, etc., that may have intelligence value. This initial sifting,

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
56
57
58
59
60
61

Id. at 673–74.
507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1204.
See id. at 1205.
See id. at 1204–05.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT 130 (2006) (arguing that adherence to
civil liberties like the right to privacy must be flexible where it conflicts with government antiterrorism efforts).
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far from invading privacy (a computer is not a sentient being), keeps most
private data from being read by any intelligence officer.62

Surveillance is thus confusing. We like its benefits, though we are
fearful (and sometimes dismissive) of its costs. This confusion points
to a larger problem: civil liberties advocates lack a compelling account
of when and why (if at all) surveillance is harmful. As a society, we
have an intuitive understanding that public- and private-sector surveillance is potentially bad, but we do not have an articulate explanation of why it is bad. Some of our intuitions stem from literature, such
as George Orwell’s chilling portrait of Big Brother in Nineteen EightyFour.63 But few critics of government surveillance such as the NSA
wiretapping program and the British data-retention regulations would
suggest that these programs are directly analogous to the evil regime
depicted in Orwell’s dystopia. Moreover, the Orwell metaphor seems
wholly inapplicable to databases used to personalize targeted advertising on the web, the efforts of insurance companies to promote safe
driving, and the practices of online booksellers to sell more books
by monitoring consumers’ shopping habits in ways that used to be
impossible.64
We need an account of when and why surveillance is problematic
to help us see when we should regulate and when we should not. The
following Parts seek to provide an account of some of the dangers of
surveillance and the ways in which laws could mitigate them. I want
to advance two lines of critique to the notion that surveillance does not
create a legally cognizable injury: first, that surveillance by government and private actors threatens intellectual privacy and chills the
exercise of vital civil liberties; and second, that surveillance affects the
power balance between individuals and those who are watching, increasing the risk of persuasion, blackmail, and other harmful uses of
sensitive information by others.
II. SURVEILLANCE AND INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY
The most salient harm of surveillance is that it threatens a value I
have elsewhere called “intellectual privacy.”65 Intellectual-privacy
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
62 Richard A. Posner, Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at A31,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/20/AR2005122001053.html.
63 GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (Irving Howe ed., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
Inc. 1982) (1949).
64 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 29–36 (2004) (critiquing the usefulness of
Orwell’s metaphor as a tool in understanding the private database industry). But see Neil M.
Richards, Essay, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1133 (2006) (suggesting
that the Orwell metaphor retains some validity as a tool to understand electronic surveillance).
65 Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 5, at 389; Richards, The Perils of Social Reading,
supra note 20, at 691.
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theory suggests that new ideas often develop best away from the intense scrutiny of public exposure; that people should be able to make
up their minds at times and places of their own choosing; and that a
meaningful guarantee of privacy — protection from surveillance or interference — is necessary to promote this kind of intellectual freedom.
It rests on the idea that free minds are the foundation of a free society,
and that surveillance of the activities of belief formation and idea generation can affect those activities profoundly and for the worse.66 I
want to be clear at the outset that intellectual-privacy theory protects
“intellectual” activities, broadly defined — the processes of thinking
and making sense of the world with our minds. Intellectual privacy
has its limits — it is a subset of all things that we might call “privacy,”
albeit a very important subset. But importantly, intellectual privacy is
not just for intellectuals; it is an essential kind of privacy for us all.
At the core of the theory of intellectual privacy are two claims, one
normative and one empirical. The normative claim is that the foundation of Anglo-American civil liberties is our commitment to free and
unfettered thought and belief — that free citizens should be able to
make up their own minds about ideas big and small, political and trivial. This claim requires at a minimum protecting individuals’ rights to
think and read, as well as the social practice of private consultation
with confidantes. It may also require some protection of broader social rights, whether we call them rights of association or assembly.67
Protection of these individual rights and social practices allows individuals to develop both intellectual diversity and eccentric individuality. They reflect the conviction that big ideas like truth, value, and
culture should be generated from the bottom up rather than from the
top down.68
These commitments to the freedoms of thought, belief, and private
speech lie at the foundation of traditional First Amendment theory,
though they have been underappreciated elements of that tradition.
But as I have argued elsewhere, a careful examination reveals that a
commitment to freedom of thought is present in virtually every major
text in First Amendment theory.69 In particular, freedom of thought
lies at the core of the modern American tradition of First Amendment
libertarianism, which began with the opinions of Justices Holmes and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
66
67

Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 5, at 403–04.
See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 998 (2011) (“An association is a coming together of individuals for a common cause or based on common values or
goals.”). See generally JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE (2012) (arguing for the protection
of political- and religious-group autonomy under the alternative rubric of the right of assembly).
68 See generally JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF (2012).
69 See Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 5, at 408–12 (exploring this point in greater
detail). For a similar argument, see generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 283 (2011).
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Brandeis in the decade following the end of the First World War. Dissenting from the majority position of the Supreme Court, the two
friends developed theories that justified special protection for speech
and ideas under the First Amendment. The two men advanced slightly different reasons why speech should be protected — Justice Holmes
justified protection in terms of the search for truth, while Justice
Brandeis privileged democratic self-government — but each theory enshrined protection for free thought at its core. For example, Justice
Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States70 is a forceful statement
of the idea that democratic institutions depend on minds’ being able to
freely and fearlessly engage in the search for political truth. As he put
it poetically:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.71

Justice Brandeis also placed the freedom of thought at the foundation of his justification for special protection for free speech. In
Whitney v. California,72 he wrote:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the
State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They
valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be
the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth . . . .73

Thus, in each of the traditional American justifications for freedom
of speech,74 a commitment to freedom of thought — to intellectual
freedom — rests at the core of the tradition.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
70
71
72
73
74

250 U.S. 616 (1919).
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
274 U.S. 357 (1927).
Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Although most courts justify free speech in terms of truth-seeking or democratic selfgovernance, some scholars have argued that free speech is better justified in terms of the autonomy or self-development of the individual. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 990–92 (1978); Martin H. Redish, The Value of
Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593–94 (1982); David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974);
Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 210–19 (1972).
Free thought is a logically necessary precondition for autonomous speech, though this point is underdeveloped in the relevant literature. For an analysis of the relationship between free thought
and autonomous speech, see Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 5, at 406 & n.113, and see
generally Shiffrin, supra note 69.
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The second claim at the core of the theory of intellectual privacy is
an empirical one — that surveillance inclines us to the mainstream
and the boring. It is a claim that when we are watched while engaging in intellectual activities, broadly defined — thinking, reading, websurfing, or private communication — we are deterred from engaging in
thoughts or deeds that others might find deviant. Surveillance thus
menaces our society’s foundational commitments to intellectual diversity and eccentric individuality.
Three different kinds of arguments highlight the ways in which
surveillance can restrain intellectual activities. The first set of arguments relies on cultural and literary works exploring the idea that surveillance deters eccentric or deviant behavior. Many such works owe
a debt to Jeremy Bentham’s idea of the Panopticon, a prison designed
around a central surveillance tower from which a warden could see into all of the cells. In the Panopticon, prisoners had to conform their
activities to those desired by the prison staff because they had no idea
when they were being watched. As Bentham describes this system,
“[t]o be incessantly under the eyes of an Inspector is to lose in fact the
75
power of doing ill, and almost the very wish.” Of course, the most
famous cultural exploration of the conforming effects of surveillance is
Orwell’s harrowing depiction in Nineteen Eighty-Four of the totalitar76
ian state personified by Big Brother. Orwell’s fictional state sought
to prohibit not just verbal dissent from the state but even the thinking of such ideas, an act punished as “thoughtcrime” and deterred by constant state surveillance.77 Some scholars have documented how the modern surveillance environment differs from both
the classic Panopticon and a fully realized Big Brother in important
ways.78 Nevertheless, Orwell’s insight about the effects of surveillance
on thought and behavior remains valid — the fear of being watched
causes people to act and think differently from the way they might
otherwise.
Our cultural intuitions about the effects of surveillance are supported by a second set of arguments that comes from the empirical
work of scholars in the interdisciplinary field of surveillance studies.
Moving beyond the classic metaphors of the Panopticon and Big
Brother, these scholars have tried to understand modern forms of surveillance by governments, companies, and individuals in all of their
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
75 Jeremy Bentham, Panopticon, in 3 OPINIONS OF DIFFERENT AUTHORS UPON THE
PUNISHMENT OF DEATH 321, 328 (Basil Montagu ed., 1816).
76 ORWELL, supra note 63, at 4.
77 Id. at 14.
78 See, e.g., Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 BRIT. J.
SOC. 605, 606–08 (2000); SOLOVE, supra note 64, at 33–35.
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complexities. The scope of this burgeoning literature has been wideranging and provides many examples of the normalizing effects of surveillance in a wide variety of contexts. In his pioneering work in the
1980s, for example, Professor Anthony Giddens argues that surveillance continually seeks the supervision of social actors and carries with
it a permanent risk that supervision could lead to domination.80 More
recent scholars have explored the risks that surveillance poses to democratic self-governance.81 One such risk is that of self-censorship, in
terms of speech, action, or even belief. Studies of communist states
give social-scientific accounts of many of the cultural intuitions about
these self-censoring effects of surveillance,82 but so too do studies of
modern forms of surveillance in democratic societies. For example,
one study of the EU Data Retention Directive notes that “[u]nder pervasive surveillance, individuals are inclined to make choices that conform to mainstream expectations.”83 As I explore below, the scope of
surveillance studies is much broader than merely the study of panoptic
state surveillance; scholars working in this field have examined the full
scope of modern forms of watching, including data surveillance by
private actors. But above all, surveillance scholars continually reaffirm that, while surveillance by government and others can have many
purposes, a recurrent purpose of surveillance is to control behavior.84
A third and final set of arguments for intellectual privacy comes
from First Amendment doctrine. A basic principle of free speech law
as it has developed over the past century is that free speech is so important that its protection should err on the side of caution. Given the
uncertainty of litigation, the Supreme Court has created a series of
procedural devices to attempt to ensure that errors in the adjudication
of free speech cases tend to allow unlawful speech rather than engage
in mistaken censorship. These doctrines form what Professor Lee
Bollinger calls the “First Pillar” of First Amendment law — the
“[e]xtraordinary [p]rotection against [c]ensorship.”85 Such doctrines
take various forms, such as those of prior restraint, overbreadth, and
vagueness, but they are often characterized under the idea of the
“chilling effect.” This idea maintains that rules that might deter potentially valuable expression should be treated with a high level of suspi–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
79
80
81
82

See generally LYON, supra note 6.
See generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE NATION-STATE AND VIOLENCE (1985).
See generally, e.g., SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 6.
See, e.g., Maria Los, A Trans-Systemic Surveillance: The Legacy of Communist Surveillance
in the Digital Age, in SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 173, 174–75.
83 Lilian Mitrou, The Impact of Communications Data Retention on Fundamental Rights and
Democracy — The Case of the EU Data Retention Directive, in SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 127, 138.
84 See, e.g., LYON, supra note 6, at 15; BALL ET AL., supra note 15, at 4.
85 LEE C. BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN 12 (2010).
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cion by courts. As the Supreme Court put it in perhaps its most important free speech decision of the twentieth century, New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,86 the importance of uninhibited public debate means
that, although “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, . . . it
must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive.’”87 As Professor
Frederick Schauer explains, “the chilling effect doctrine recognizes the
fact that the legal system is imperfect and mandates the formulation of
legal rules that reflect our preference for errors made in favor of free
speech.”88 Although the chilling-effect doctrine has been criticized on
grounds that it overprotects free speech and makes empirically unsupported judgments,89 such criticisms miss the point. The doctrines encapsulated by the chilling effect reflect the substantive value judgment
that First Amendment values are too important to require scrupulous
proof to vindicate them, and that it is (constitutionally speaking) a better bargain to allow more speech, even if society must endure some of
that speech’s undesirable consequences.
Intellectual-privacy theory explains why we should extend chillingeffect protections to intellectual surveillance, especially traditional-style
surveillance by the state. If we care about the development of eccentric individuality and freedom of thought as First Amendment values,
then we should be especially wary of surveillance of activities through
which those aspects of the self are constructed.90 Professor Timothy
Macklem argues that “[t]he isolating shield of privacy enables people
to develop and exchange ideas, or to foster and share activities, that
the presence or even awareness of other people might stifle. For better
and for worse, then, privacy is sponsor and guardian to the creative
91
and the subversive.” A meaningful measure of intellectual privacy
should be erected to shield these activities from the normalizing gaze
of surveillance. This shield should be justified on the basis of our cultural intuitions and empirical insights about the normalizing effects of
surveillance. But it must also be tempered by the chilling-effect doctrine’s normative commitment to err on the side of First Amendment
values even if proof is imperfect.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
86
87

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 271–72 (second omission in original) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
433 (1963)).
88 Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,”
58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 688 (1978).
89 See generally, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
90 See COHEN, supra note 68, at 223–25; Julie Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1904, 1912, 1918 (2013).
91 TIMOTHY MACKLEM, INDEPENDENCE OF MIND 36 (2006).
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Intellectual-privacy theory therefore suggests a solution to the confusion that has plagued courts and others in dealing with whether surveillance programs create legally cognizable injuries. Despite often
displaying an intuitive understanding that surveillance might be potentially harmful, courts have struggled to understand why. This absence of clarity has led to courts misunderstanding and diminishing
privacy interests that conflict with other values. When faced with
balancing a vague and poorly articulated privacy right against state
interests such as the prevention of terrorist attacks, surveillance tends
to win. Courts also make the mistake that the ACLU v. NSA court
made and cast surveillance as solely a Fourth Amendment issue of
crime prevention, rather than as one that also threatens intellectual
freedom and First Amendment values of the highest order.92 Other
decisions mirror the mistake of the Al-Haramain court in concluding
that preventing secret surveillance is less important than inconveniencing the executive branch.93 Additionally, some courts can make the
mistake that the Clapper Court made, refusing to recognize as justiciable harms the costly measures that people must adopt to shield their
communications from government surveillance.94
Shadowy regimes of surveillance corrode the constitutional commitment to intellectual freedom that lies at the heart of most theories
of political freedom in a democracy. Secret programs of wide-ranging
intellectual surveillance that are devoid of public process and that
cannot be justified in court are inconsistent with this commitment and
illegitimate in a free society. My argument is not that intellectual surveillance should never be possible, but that when the state seeks to
learn what people are reading, thinking, and saying privately, such
scrutiny is a serious threat to civil liberties. Accordingly, meaningful
legal process (that is, at least a warrant supported by probable cause)
must be followed before the government can perform the digital
equivalent of reading our diaries.
But we must also remember that in modern societies, surveillance
fails to respect the line between public and private actors. Intellectual
privacy should be preserved against private actors as well as against
the state. Federal prosecutions based on purely intellectual surveillance are thankfully rare, but the coercive effects of monitoring by our
friends and acquaintances are much more common. We are constrained in our actions by peer pressure at least as much as by the
state. Moreover, records collected by private parties can be sold to or
subpoenaed by the government, which (as noted above) has shown a
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
92
93
94

See ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 657 (6th Cir. 2007).
See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1201–05 (9th Cir. 2007).
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150–53 (2013).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2239412

1952

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 126:1934

voracious interest in all kinds of personal information, particularly
records related to the operation of the mind and political beliefs.95 Put
simply, the problem of intellectual privacy transcends the public/private divide, and justifies additional legal protections on intellectual privacy and the right to read freely.96 Constitutional law and
standing doctrine alone will not solve the threat of surveillance to intellectual freedom and privacy, but they are a good place to start.
III. SURVEILLANCE AND POWER
The mechanics of intellectual privacy discussed so far depend upon
knowing, or at least fearing, that someone might be watching us. If
we have a sense of privacy, even one that turns out to be an illusion,
we are less likely to change our behavior under the panoptic gaze.
Truly secret and unexpected surveillance, from this perspective, might
appear not to violate our intellectual privacy at all. If we have no inkling that we are being watched, if we really do not care that we are being watched, or if we fear no consequences of being watched, it could
be argued that our intellectual freedom is unaffected. It can thus be
argued that if the NSA Wiretapping Program had never leaked, it
would have posed no threat to intellectual privacy.
There are two problems with this account. First, no program of
widespread surveillance is likely to remain secret forever. At some
point, such a program will inevitably come to light, either by being
leaked (as happened with the NSA program and the Army surveillance
in Laird), or by actions taken pursuant to the program (such as prosecutions or disclosures). The injury suffered by those thus punished
would serve as an example to the rest of us, and the mechanisms of intellectual privacy would come into effect at that point.
Second, surveillance (even secret surveillance) can create additional
harms that are separate from the ones suggested by intellectualprivacy theory. Scholars working in surveillance studies have explored
the phenomenon of surveillance in all of its contemporary complexity,
going beyond the Panopticon to consider private surveillance, the relationships between watchers and watched, and the wide variety of dangers that modern surveillance societies raise.97 Recall in this regard
that Lyon’s definition of surveillance notes that surveillance has a
purpose,98 but in the modern era this purpose is rarely totalitarian
domination. All the same, most forms of surveillance seek some form
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
95
96
97
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of subtler influence or control over others. Even when surveillance is
not Orwellian, it is usually about influencing or being able to respond
to someone else’s behavior. And while surveillance can sometimes
have benign goals (like traffic safety, or parents using baby monitors or
GPS trackers to keep tabs on their children), it is invariably tied to a
particular purpose. Critically, the gathering of information affects the
power dynamic between the watcher and the watched, giving the
watcher greater power to influence or direct the subject of surveillance.99 It might sound trite to say that “information is power,” but
the power of personal information lies at the heart of surveillance.
The power effects of surveillance illustrate three additional dangers of
surveillance: blackmail, discrimination, and persuasion.
A. Blackmail
Information collected surreptitiously can be used to blackmail or
discredit opponents by revealing embarrassing secrets. American political history over the past hundred years furnishes numerous examples of this phenomenon, but perhaps the most compelling is the
treatment of Martin Luther King, Jr., by the FBI. Concerned that Dr.
King was a threat to public order, the FBI listened to his private telephone conversations in order to seek information with which to
blackmail him. As the official government investigation into the Dr.
King wiretaps concluded in 1976:
The FBI collected information about Dr. King’s plans and activities
through an extensive surveillance program, employing nearly every intelligence-gathering technique at the Bureau’s disposal. Wiretaps, which were
initially approved by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, were maintained on Dr. King’s home telephone from October 1963 until mid-1965;
the SCLC headquarter’s [sic] telephones were covered by wiretaps for an
even longer period. Phones in the homes and offices of some of Dr. King’s
close advisers were also wiretapped. The FBI has acknowledged 16 occasions on which microphones were hidden in Dr. King’s hotel and motel
rooms in an “attempt” to obtain information about the “private activities
of King and his advisers” for use to “completely discredit” them.100

Imagine a dissident like Dr. King living in today’s information age.
A government (or political opponent) that wanted him silenced might
be able to obtain not just access to his telephone conversations, but also to his reading habits and emails. This critic could be blackmailed
outright, or he could be discredited by disclosure of the information as
an example to others. Perhaps he has not been having an affair, but
has some other secret. Maybe he is gay, or has a medical condition, or
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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visits embarrassing web sites, or has cheated on his expenses or his
taxes. All of us have secrets we would prefer not be made public.
Surveillance allows those secrets greater opportunities to come out,
and it gives the watchers power that can be used nefariously.
The risk of the improper use of surveillance records persists over
time. Most of the former communist states in Eastern Europe have
passed laws strictly regulating access to the surveillance files of the
communist secret police. The primary purpose of such laws is to prevent the blackmail of political candidates who may have been
surveilled under the former regime.101 The experience of these laws
reveals, moreover, that the risk of such blackmail is one that the law
cannot completely prevent after the fact. Professor Maria Los explains
that “[s]ecret surveillance files are routinely turned into a weapon in
political struggles, seriously undermining democratic processes and
freedoms.”102
More recently, the world observed some of the potential of electronic blackmail during the revolutions in the Arab world. Many observers have argued that the turmoil in Tunisia, Libya, and Syria shows
the liberating potential of digital technologies.103 But the crisis also illustrates the potential of modern surveillance technologies, which have
been deployed by authoritarian governments across the Middle East.
The Libyan government of Colonel Moammar Gadhafi, for example,
attempted to capture Internet and phone communications with the assistance of Western technology companies for later review. As one
journalist remarked about the availability of such “‘massive intercept’
technology” to governments around the world, “[t]oday you can run an
approximation of 1984 out of a couple of rooms filled with server
racks.”104 Using these technologies, the Libyan government obtained
information about dissidents that it was able to use to blackmail them
into silence. And while the Gadhafi regime did not hesitate to use violence against its critics, it found blackmail and harassment to be even
easier tools to use.105 The fact that the Gadhafi regime ultimately collapsed does not diminish surveillance’s blackmail threat.
Even in democratic societies, the blackmail threat of surveillance is
a real one. Surveillance (especially secret surveillance) often detects
crimes or embarrassing activity beyond or unrelated to its original
purposes. The surveillance of Dr. King, for instance, produced evidence of his marital infidelity. In another infamous case, FISAauthorized surveillance of a terrorist suspect produced chilling evi–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
101
102
103
104
105

Los, supra note 82, at 176–77.
Id. at 180.
See, e.g., Chander, supra note 13, at 1508.
Matthieu Aikins, Jamming Tripoli, WIRED, June 2012, at 146, 176.
Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2239412

2013]

THE DANGERS OF SURVEILLANCE

1955

dence of the suspect’s murder of his own daughter for dating the
wrong boy.106 Whether these discoveries are important, incidental, or
irrelevant, all of them give greater power to the watcher. Unscrupulous government officials could engage in blackmail, whether motivated by political or pecuniary considerations. But even faithful government agents who discover illegal activity would now possess the
weapon of selective prosecution, which could be used to influence the
subject, and would be able to wield the threat of mere disclosure of legal but embarrassing activity. Putting the seriousness of the crime to
one side, it is important to realize that wide-ranging secret surveillance
gives coercive power to the watcher.
B. Persuasion
Surveillance also gives the watcher increased power to persuade.
Persuasion is a more subtle exercise of the power differential that can
be used to blackmail, but it can be even more effective. Consider
again Target’s use of Big Data to lure pregnant customers into its
stores. Even if the customers have told no one that they are expecting,
Big Data analytics can look for correlations between pregnancy and
other changes in consumer behavior, for instance, purchasing more
vitamins or scent-free lotions. Once an inference of pregnancy is established, Target’s marketers can offer coupons to the pregnant woman in order to capture her business, knowing that she is at a point in
her life when her buying habits are temporarily in flux before they will
lock in for a period of some years. It is entirely possible that such actions by a retailer like Target could occur without the knowledge of
the pregnant consumer. Indeed, the science of targeted online or “behavioral” advertising seeks to do exactly that: to market products to
consumers based upon detailed profiles collected about their behavior.
The effective sales technique of behavioral “retargeting” allows marketers to go one step further and literally follow targeted consumers
around the web, delivering the same targeted advertisement to them
with enough frequency that they are likely eventually to succumb and
make a purchase in a moment of weakness.107
Governments also use the power of surveillance to control behavior.
For example, one of the justifications for massive closed-circuit television (CCTV) networks in modern urban areas is that they allow police
greater ability to watch and influence what happens on city streets.108
Certainly, the presence of cameras or police can persuade citizens to
obey the law, but it can have other effects as well. The surveillance–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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studies literature has documented the use of government CCTV assemblages to direct public behavior toward commerce and away from
other activities ranging from crime to protest.109 In Britain, where the
science of surveillance-based control is at its most advanced, CCTV
operates in connection with court-ordered injunctions, known as AntiSocial Behavior Orders, to move groups of teens out of the commercial
cores of cities using surveillance and the power of the state to ensure
that commerce continues efficiently.110 Government use of persuasive
surveillance is still in its relative infancy, but since the technologies of
surveillance and Big Data analytics are available to the state as well as
to private companies, we can imagine the government becoming increasingly able to engage in Target-style persuasion in the future.
The bottom line about surveillance and persuasion is that surveillance gives the watcher information about the watched. That information gives the watcher increased power over the watched that can
be used to persuade, influence, or otherwise control them, even if they
do not know they are being watched or persuaded. Sometimes this
power is arguably a good thing, for example when police are engaged
in riot control. But we should not forget that surveillance represents a
persuasive power shift whether the watcher is a government agent or a
corporate marketer, and whether the target is a rioter or law-abiding
citizen. The legal system has rules dealing with power imbalances between consumers and businesses, such as the doctrine of
unconscionability and much of consumer protection law. There are also rules protecting citizens from state coercion, such as the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and the First Amendment’s protections of
freedom of thought and conscience. In our age of surveillance, where
technological change has given the watcher enhanced powers of persuasion, it may well be time to think about updating those doctrines to
restore the balance.
C. Sorting/Discrimination
Many kinds of surveillance are routinely used to sort people into
categories. Some of these forms of sorting are insidious. Consider, for
example, the use of census records by the American, Canadian, and
German governments during the Second World War to identify citizens
to relocate to the Japanese internment camps in North America and
the concentration camps in Europe.111 Others seem innocuous or even
benign. The vast preference engines that power the “free” Internet are
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
109 See, e.g., ROY COLEMAN, RECLAIMING THE STREETS 226–28 (2004); LYON, supra note
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used to profile Internet users for marketing purposes. Companies like
Google amass vast detailed profiles of our web-surfing habits, our interests, and our buying habits.112 Data brokers like Acxiom and
LexisNexis create even more detailed consumer profiles by combining
various kinds of data and sell the data to a wide variety of sources, including direct marketers, background-check companies, and companies consumers may already have a relationship with, such as car dealers or Target.113 Commercial data of this kind can be used to offer
discounts or selective promotions to more or less desirable customers.
The sorting power of surveillance is a major theme among surveillance scholars. In the 1990s, sociologist Oscar Gandy described the
“panoptic sort”: the use of consumer databases to profile consumers,
sort them into categories, and then discriminate among the categories,
allocating opportunities on the basis of the classification.114 More recently, Lyon and other scholars have built on Gandy’s work to show
the ways in which software is increasingly used to sort citizens and
consumers by governments seeking profiles of criminal risk and by
companies seeking profiles of commercial opportunity.115
From one perspective, the use of the fruits of data surveillance in
this way might look like ordinary marketing. But consider the power
that data-driven marketing gives companies in relation to their customers. The power of sorting can bleed imperceptibly into the power
of discrimination. A coupon for a frequent shopper might seem innocuous, but consider the power to offer shorter airport security lines (and
less onerous procedures) to rich frequent fliers, or to discriminate
against customers or citizens on the basis of wealth, geography, gender,
race, or ethnicity. The power to treat people differently is a dangerous
one, as our many legal rules in the areas of fair credit, civil rights, and
constitutional law recognize. Surveillance, especially when fuelled by
Big Data, puts pressure on those laws and threatens to upend the basic
power balance on which our consumer protection and constitutional
laws operate. As Professor Danielle Citron argues, algorithmic
decisionmaking based on data raises issues of “technological due process.”116 The sorting power of surveillance only raises the stakes of
these issues. After all, what sociologists call “sorting” has many other
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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names in the law, with “profiling” and “discrimination” being just two
of them.
IV. LIMITING SURVEILLANCE
These insights into the ways in which surveillance is harmful point
toward identifying remedies that can be built into law, technologies,
and social norms to deter the most dangerous forms of surveillance. In
this section, I outline four principles that we should use to guide the
treatment of surveillance. My purpose is not to propose neat doctrinal
fixes to existing law; as I have shown already, the age of surveillance
raises massive challenges that will require us to think creatively about
how to capture its benefits without sacrificing important civil liberties.
Instead, my purpose is to identify some of the values that the law of
surveillance ought to protect and the principles that should guide its
evolution.
A. Surveillance Transcends the Public/Private Divide
One of the most significant changes that the age of surveillance has
brought about is the increasing difficulty of separating surveillance by
governments from that by commercial entities. Public- and privatesector surveillance are intertwined — they use the same technologies
and techniques, they operate through a variety of public/private partnerships, and their digital fruits can easily cross the public/private
divide. It is probably in this respect that our existing models for understanding surveillance — such as Big Brother and the Panopticon —
are the most out of date. Even if we are primarily worried about state
surveillance, perhaps because we fear the state’s powers of criminal
enforcement, our solutions to the problem of surveillance can no longer
be confined to regulation of government actors. Any solutions to the
problem of surveillance must thus take into account private surveillance as well as public.
In this respect, Professor Orin Kerr is correct when he argues that
federal statutory law has advantages over the Fourth Amendment in
guarding against surveillance in the digital age.117 Not only is statutory law easier to change, but it also can be applied to bind both government and nongovernment actors. A good model in this context is
the federal ECPA and its state-law equivalents. These laws prohibit
wiretapping by private actors and require the government to obtain a
warrant under a standard higher than probable cause before it can engage in wiretapping.118 ECPA has many defects, both in terms of the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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level of protection it offers and in its often-bewildering complexity, but
in transcending the public/private divide, it represents a good model
for dealing with surveillance.
Additional legal protections will be needed to cope with developments in surveillance practices. Because the government can sidestep
many legal restrictions on the collection of data by buying it from private databases, we should place additional restrictions on this growing
form of state surveillance. Such regulations could operate in both directions. In relation to government, we could place restrictions both
on the government’s ability to buy private databases and on its ability
to share personal information with the private sector. Privacy law already has numerous models for this latter category, ranging from the
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994,119 which limits the government’s ability to sell drivers’ license records to industry, to the Privacy
Act of 1974,120 which prevents the government from disclosing many
kinds of records about individuals that it has in its possession. In relation to private actors, we can place special obligations of confidentiality upon the holders of personal information related to intellectual privacy, treating them as information fiduciaries. Our law has long had a
tradition of confidentiality rules, placing nondisclosure obligations on
lawyers, doctors, trustees, librarians, and other information custodians.121 On the Internet, many companies already promise not to share
personal information with governments unless compelled. It would be
but a small step to make such promises the default, or
even the mandatory practice, for certain kinds of particularly sensitive
information.122
B. Secret Surveillance Is Illegitimate
Democratic societies should prohibit the creation of any domesticsurveillance programs whose existence is secret. In a democratic society, the people, and not the state apparatus, are sovereign. In American
law, this tradition goes back to James Madison, and it lies at the very
heart of both First Amendment theory and American constitutionalism
itself.123 These principles are reflected at the core of modern information law. For example, the Supreme Court has made clear that the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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federal Freedom of Information Act124 protects at its core the “citizens’
right to be informed about ‘what their government is up to.’”125 As
Professor Henry Steele Commager put it aptly, “[t]he generation that
made the nation thought secrecy in government [to be] one of the instruments of Old World tyranny and committed itself to the principle
that a democracy cannot function unless the people are permitted to
know what their government is up to.”126
The illegitimacy of secret surveillance also lies at the heart of information-privacy law, which remains guided by the “Fair Information
Practices” drafted by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare in 1973.127 The Code of Fair Information Practices recommended by the Department has continued to influence informationprivacy law throughout the world,128 and the first of its five principles
is the commitment that “there must be no personal-data recordkeeping systems whose very existence is secret.”129
Requiring the existence of domestic-surveillance programs to be
disclosed solves a practical problem that has bedeviled courts trying to
assess legal challenges to secret surveillance programs. How can
plaintiffs prove injury if the government is not required to admit
whether surveillance exists in the first place? A prohibition on secret
surveillance programs solves this problem. When government programs are public — when we have no secret surveillance — courts will
be able to assess their legality in the open. The NSA wiretapping program was hard to challenge because its details were shrouded in secrecy, denials, and unassessable invocations of national security interests.130 At the same time, its shadowy nature created an even greater
threat to intellectual privacy in particular because no one knew if her
telephone calls were being listened to or not. Requiring disclosure of
the existence and capabilities of domestic-surveillance programs to the
general public makes them amenable to judicial and public scrutiny to
ensure their compatibility with the rule of law. At the same time, the
prohibition on secret surveillance systems does not require the government to notify individual targets of surveillance that they are being
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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watched. But fundamentally, surveillance requires legal process and
the involvement of the judiciary to ensure that surveillance is targeted,
justified, and no more extensive than is necessary.
Thus, while covert domestic surveillance can be justified in discrete
(and temporary) instances when there is advance judicial process,
blanket surveillance of all Internet activity menaces our intellectual
privacy and gives the government too much power to blackmail or
discriminate against the subjects of surveillance. In a free society, all
forms of surveillance must be ultimately accountable to a selfgoverning public, and for this reason, secret domestic-surveillance programs of any kind are illegitimate.
C. Total Surveillance Is Illegitimate
Democratic societies should also reject the idea that it is reasonable
for the government to record all Internet and telephone activity with
or without authorization. Government surveillance of the Internet is a
power with the potential for massive abuse, as the (thankfully) failed
attempts by the Gadhafi regime illustrated.131 Like its precursor, telephone wiretapping, Internet surveillance must be subjected to meaningful judicial process before it is authorized. And such authorization
must allow only discrete and limited forms of surveillance. Otherwise,
there would be no constraint on the government’s ability to record and
archive all electronic communications and read them at its leisure.
The magnitude of technological change should not blind us to the important values that our law has protected for decades: the importance
of private communications, intellectual privacy, and unfettered intellectual exploration. Moreover, a world of total surveillance would be
one in which the power dangers of surveillance are even more menacing. In such a world, watchers would have increased power to blackmail, selectively prosecute, coerce, persuade, and sort individuals. A
world of total surveillance is not just science fiction. It is the world
toward which we are slowly creeping, as software is coded, databases
are combined, and each CCTV camera is successively added to the
network.
Rather than jettisoning longstanding civil liberties in our brave
new digital world, we should instead follow the example of federal
wiretapping law, which for decades has rested on the premise that private communications should be exactly that, shielded from the government (and other private actors) except in cases of proven lawenforcement need for limited access to those communications. Such a
regime is a far cry from the security-driven argument for total surveillance, even in an age of terror.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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D. Surveillance Is Harmful
As Parts II and III of this Article demonstrate, many forms of surveillance — covert and overt, public and private — menace our intellectual privacy and the processes of belief formation on which a free
society depends. They also create a power imbalance between the
watcher and the watched that creates risks of blackmail, undue persuasion, and discrimination. Courts and legislatures should therefore
scrutinize any surveillance that threatens these values. But because of
its relationship to First Amendment values and political freedom, surveillance of intellectual records — Internet search histories, email, web
traffic, and telephone communications — is particularly harmful. In
practice, this means that surveillance by government that seeks access
to intellectual records should be subjected to a high threshold before a
warrant can issue. A good model for this rule is Title I of the ECPA,
which provides for a more stringent procedure under federal wiretapping law before a warrant may issue to intercept the contents of a telephone or electronic communication.132 The ECPA requires more than
just the standard probable cause requirement that is the constitutional
floor under Fourth Amendment law. In addition to probable cause,
government agents seeking to tap a phone or electronic communication
must also show three other elements: (1) that the warrant is sought for
a limited time, (2) that the interception of the communication is necessary to obtain the information sought, and (3) that the wiretapping will
be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of information not relevant to the warrant.133 These “super-warrant” protections for communications should be expanded to cover the full range
of intellectual records.
For private-sector surveillance, additional statutory procedures are
necessary to ensure that intellectual records are handled with greater
care by the entities that hold them. We already have piecemeal protections for intellectual privacy against private-sector surveillance, which
could serve as useful models for the extension of intellectual-privacy
protection more broadly.134 For example, the ECPA prohibition
against warrantless wiretapping applies to private actors as well.135
The Act makes private acts of wiretapping illegal, providing severe
criminal and civil liability — up to five years in prison136 and fines or
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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tort liability of $10,000 for each violation of the Act.137 Other good
models for intellectual-privacy protection in the private sector include
the confidentiality obligations placed on video-rental companies by the
Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988,138 on librarians by the vast
number of library-records confidentiality laws, and on print and electronic booksellers in California under its Reader Privacy Act.139
Because surveillance of intellectual activities menaces selfgovernment, our law must also recognize it as a harm in standing doctrine. One of the difficulties that courts have faced in dealing with
surveillance in the past is an inability to articulate exactly why surveillance is harmful. This inability was the problem in Laird and also in
the NSA wiretapping cases. Contrary to the trend of the law, Amnesty
International USA v. Clapper140 held that amendments to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act that authorized the NSA wiretapping
program actually could cause a legally cognizable injury to journalists,
lawyers, and aid workers whose communications with overseas clients
might be subjected to surveillance by the United States government.141
But even that outlier case, which the Supreme Court reversed on appeal, failed to recognize that a reasonable fear of government surveillance threatens the privacy of the surveilled, causing them to act differently. The Second Circuit found standing but rested its conclusions
instead upon injury to the professional duties of the doctors and lawyers who feared that the government was listening. The professional
duties of the plaintiffs in Clapper are important, and the Second Circuit was correct to recognize injuries to those duties as harms under
standing doctrine. But on its own terms, even the Second Circuit
seemed to suggest that only professional elites have standing to challenge surveillance. Such a conclusion is underprotective of the rights
of all people to be free from unlawful surveillance and to be able to
challenge unlawful surveillance in court. As I have argued, intellectual
privacy is not just for intellectuals. If the government is engaged in
unwarranted surveillance of a person’s intellectual activities, that person should have standing to challenge the legality of the surveillance.
The surveillance may or may not turn out to be warranted in each
particular case, but our society’s fundamental commitments to due
process, freedom of the mind, and the rule of law suggest that such
dangerous surveillance should be subject to legal challenge.
Intellectual-privacy theory thus corrects the errors of Clapper,
Laird, and the NSA cases. It would extend protection from surveil–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
137
138
139
140
141

Id. § 2520(2)(B).
18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.90.05 (West 2012).
638 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
Id. at 121–22.
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lance to all people, and not just to professional elites. It explains why
surveillance of reading, thinking, and private communication harms
the development of ideas and beliefs unfettered by the skewing effects
of observation. Accordingly, a reasonable fear of government surveillance that affects the subject’s intellectual activities (reading, thinking,
and communicating) should be recognized as a harm sufficient to
prove an injury in fact under standing doctrine. Such a change to our
law would not be a radical one; in fact, it is precisely the way courts
currently assess challenges to individual free speech rights under the
First Amendment’s chilling-effects doctrine. Since intellectual privacy
protects, at heart, First Amendment values, it is appropriate to extend
these existing and workable doctrinal tools to this related area of the
law.
This is not to say that individual determinations of the chilling of
intellectual activities will always be easy. Determining whether a chill
to intellectual privacy is substantial would certainly present difficult
cases at the margins. In our law, the devil is frequently in the details.
But as the chilling-effects doctrine has demonstrated, courts have managed to balance threats to free speech against competing government
interests. Moreover, because the general details of government surveillance programs should be public, courts and litigants will have more
information with which to assess the effects of surveillance. And even
when publication of the details of surveillance might threaten ongoing
investigations, such details could be released either under seal to the
litigants or shared with the court. Courts have a wide variety of tools
to manage the flow of confidential information that litigation inevitably produces, and they would be well suited to such a task. Such tasks
may be difficult and require judgment, but that is the job of courts.
The alternative to grappling with the civil-liberties threats that surveillance poses is to ignore those threats altogether, to face the prospect
of rendering widespread government surveillance unreviewable and
uncheckable. Democratic societies can do better than that.
V. CONCLUSION
The challenge to our law posed by the Age of Surveillance is immense. The justifications for surveillance by public and private actors
are significant, but so too are the costs that the rising tide of unfettered
surveillance is creating. Surveillance can sometimes be necessary, even
helpful. But unconstrained surveillance, especially of our intellectual
activities, threatens a cognitive revolution that cuts at the core of the
freedom of the mind that our political institutions presuppose. Therefore, surveillance must be constrained by legal and social rules. The
technological, economic, and geopolitical changes of the past twenty
years have whittled away at those rules, both formally on their substance (for example, the Patriot Act and the expansion of National Se-
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curity Letter jurisdiction) and in practice (for example, the pressure
that the technological social practices of the Internet have exerted on
privacy). By thus recognizing the harms of surveillance and crafting
our laws accordingly, we can obtain many of its benefits without sacrificing our vital civil liberties or upending the power balance between
individuals on the one hand and companies and governments on the
other.
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ABSTRACT
Trust—the willingness to accept vulnerability to the actions of others—is the essential
ingredient for friendship, commerce, transportation, and virtually every other activity
that involves other people. It allows us to build things, and it allows us to grow. Trust is
everywhere, but particularly at the core of the information relationships that have come to
characterize our modern, digital lives. Relationships between people and their ISPs, social
networks, and hired professionals are typically understood in terms of privacy. But the
way we have talked about privacy has a pessimism problem—privacy is conceptualized in
negative terms, which leads us to mistakenly look for “creepy” new practices, focus excessively on harms from invasions of privacy, and place too much weight on the ability of
individuals to opt out of harmful or offensive data practices.
But there is another way to think about privacy and shape our laws. Instead of trying
to protect us against bad things, privacy rules can be used to create good things, like trust.
In this paper, we argue that privacy can and should be thought of as enabling trust in our
essential information relationships. This vision of privacy creates value for all parties to
an information transaction and enables the kind of sustainable information relationships
on which our digital economy must depend.
Privacy laws and practices centered on trust would enrich our understanding of the
existing FIP principles of confidentiality, transparency, and data protection, moving them
from procedural means of compliance for data extraction towards substantive principles
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to build trusted, sustainable information relationships. Thinking about privacy in terms
of trust also reveals a principle that should become a new bedrock tenet of privacy law:
Loyalty. Rejuvenating privacy law by getting past Privacy Pessimism is essential if we
are to build the kind of digital society that is sustainable and ultimately beneficial to all—
users, governments, and companies. There is a better way forward for privacy. Trust us.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Trust is beautiful. The willingness to accept vulnerability to the actions of
others is the essential ingredient for friendships, commerce, transportation, and
virtually every other activity that involves other people. It allows us to build
things, and it allows us to grow.
Trust is everywhere, even if it is not obvious. We trust that architects and
builders have created bridges that will support us when we cross them. We trust
that merchants will accept the small, green pieces of paper (or digital code) we’ve
earned in exchange for goods and services. We trust that airplanes will arrive
safely and to the correct airport. We trust that professionals in our service will act
in our best interest, and we trust that our friends will support us and look out for
us. Without trust, our modern systems of government, commerce, and society
itself would crumble.
Trust is also the essential ingredient for our digital lives. So much of modern
networked life is mediated by information relationships, in which professionals,
private institutions, or the government hold information about us as part of
providing a service. Such relationships are everywhere we look. We see them
when we share sensitive personal information with Internet service providers
(ISPs), doctors, banks, search engines, credit card companies, and countless other
information recipients and intermediaries. We also see them as we get information via large and small computers to access apps, social media, and the Internet at large.
Even relationships that used to have no significant informational component—grocery stores, airlines, political party affiliations, and the like—are now
part of the data game. Merchants use data to predict what shoppers will do. Companies give away products and services “for free” just to get the information that
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comes with it. Data brokers amass vast troves of data to enable their clients to
profile, segment, and influence people as consumers or as voters. The stampede
for big data and the development of the “Internet of Things” are only accelerating
these developments. If we want a sustainable digital society, we need strong,
trusted information relationships.
When we talk about personal information changing hands, policymakers,
lawyers, and citizens throughout the world use the word “privacy.” In this context,
privacy means the rules governing the collection, use, and disclosure of information. Ostensibly, privacy rules should encourage and fortify information relationships. They should build trust in these relationships. But they don’t. Rather
than encouraging trust, modern American privacy law encourages companies to
profit in short-sighted ways by extracting as much value as possible from personal
data in the short term. As long as companies don’t cause a narrow set of legally
recognized, largely financial harms, they are essentially free to set up the terms of
information relationships any way they wish. Companies have this power because
of a second hallmark of modern American privacy law, its reliance on a controlbased regime of “notice and choice.” Under this arrangement, terms are hidden in
the fine print of legal notices virtually no one reads, and there is as little meaningful choice as in old-fashioned consumer adhesion contracts. Consumers are left
exposed and bewildered, lamenting what they see as the “death of privacy.”1
Privacy—the legal regime governing the use of personal information—is not
dead, nor is it going away. In a society in which the exploitation of personal data
is an enormous source of value, national and international rules governing that
data are inevitable. But how we talk about privacy matters, as it structures the
terms of a debate in which little is inevitable and so much is up for grabs.
Critically, the way we talk about privacy as lawyers is increasingly inadequate
because it is too often framed in negative terms. Privacy is seen a tax on profits, a
drain on innovation, a dangerous and naive assumption, and a burden on the individual to fend for herself in the digital thicket. Hot information age topics like
“permissionless innovation,” “creepiness,” “privacy harm,” and “the privacy paradox” highlight what is to be lost rather than gained in the privacy debate. In short,
privacy has a pessimism problem.
Such negative ways of thinking about privacy are incomplete and often inaccurate. What’s missing is a positive understanding of privacy in terms of the good
it can potentially do. And what’s missing is the essential relationship between privacy and trust. Privacy Pessimists often ignore trust, even though trust is essential. Yet thinking about information relationships and privacy rules in terms of
trust reveals how privacy protections can be a positive force, generating deeper
and more sustainable information relationships and corporate profits.
We need information relationships to function in our modern networked society. But as users we’re bewildered. Our information is collected, used, and ana-

1. Neil M. Richards, Four Privacy Myths, in A WORLD WITHOUT PRIVACY? 33 (Austin
Sarat ed., 2015) (critiquing the rhetoric of the “death of privacy”).
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lyzed in ways we cannot understand and can rarely control. Given this fact, it
should be no surprise that people feel confused and disempowered when it comes
to their data. Instead of feeling confident that we’ll be protected when we share
information with others, we increasingly feel helpless and resigned to our fate,
whatever that might be.
This is a problem not just for consumers but also for the companies and governments on the other side of these relationships. Without trust, people share less
information, bad information, or no information at all. They become anxious,
bewildered, and suspicious. They lie or self-censor otherwise beneficial information. If people don’t trust a company, they are more likely to switch to a competitor or resist or fail to become fully invested in the commercial relationship.
Our piecemeal laws of personal data create incentives for a quick buck through a
kind of data strip mining. We have a legal regime that encourages a short-term
and short-sighted “monetization” of data that leaves consumers confused and frustrated. This is an inefficient and unsustainable state of affairs, yet both our laws
and the ways we talk about privacy enable it.
Our basic claim in this paper is quite simple: modern privacy law is incomplete because from its inception it has failed to account for the importance of
trust. This gap has biased privacy law and norms toward a pessimistic proceduralism in which harm avoidance is the only substantive value. Trust in information
relationships is necessary for the digital economy not just to function, but to
flourish. Acting together, privacy and trust can do more than avoid harm, but can
create value. We can do better, and should use privacy law promote trust across
the board.
Our argument proceeds in three steps. First, we highlight the problem of Privacy Pessimism. We survey the world of privacy law and describe how and why it
has led us to be pessimistic. Framing the privacy debate over what is being lost
has frustrated the true potential of information rules to benefit everyone. This
frame, which affects both our policies and the ways we talk about them, results in
casting privacy in opposition to other interests like innovation and security. It
leads us to obsess over locating “privacy harms” and scratch our heads over mysteries like “creepiness,” “the privacy paradox” and “notice and choice.” This pessimism is then enshrined in law, which perpetuates the fatalistic cycle.
Second, we propose an alternate vision for privacy by conceptualizing it in
terms of trust. Privacy rules—regulation of information in relationships—have
enormous potential to build the trust necessary for our digital society to flourish.
Our theory of privacy and trust seeks to encourage the creation of long-term, sustainable information relationships to unlock the full potential of data and modern
technology. Thinking about privacy in terms of its potential to build trust focuses
on creating strong social bonds and sustainable, profitable relationships. It serves
the interests of commerce, social relationships, and promotion of free expression
and political engagement. It also shows thinking of privacy exclusively in negative
terms is just plain wrong.
Finally, we suggest how our law and social practices can better promote trust
in government and corporate information relationships. We propose two paths
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forward. First, the Fair Information Practices (FIPs) and their progeny should be
rejuvenated by incorporating trust as a guiding principle. Doing so will add nuance, rigor, and direction to many of the exiting obligations under the many legal
regimes that incorporate the FIPs. Confidentiality becomes more useful and contextual as a duty of Discretion. Transparency becomes more effective and inclusive
if re-conceptualized as an obligation of Honesty. And, security becomes more
complete when framed as a duty of Protection.
We also introduce the new concept of Loyalty as a foundational value for privacy law. Borrowing from the law of fiduciaries, we argue that there should be
limits on the amount of self-dealing one can engage in after being entrusted with
personal information. Consent via the fine print of a legal agreement no one reads
is disloyal and illegitimate. One of the biggest fears in the modern information
economy is that personal information obtained from users will be used against
their interests. The obligation of Loyalty aims to prevent that from happening,
and should be enshrined in statutes as well as the common law torts and consumer protection law.
There is a better way forward for privacy. Trust us.
II.

PRIVACY’S PESSIMISM PROBLEM

Modern privacy law has painted us into a corner. We have designed elaborate, nuanced, and even powerful frameworks to respond to the wrongful collection, use, and dissemination of personal information. For a while, it worked reasonably well. But new problems have come to thwart the best intentions of
privacy law.
Modern privacy law is the offspring of two separate bodies of law. The privacy torts were developed in response to new surveillance technologies and a perceived media aggressiveness,2 while the Fair Information Practices or “FIPs” were
developed in response to electronic databases.3 Tort privacy offers a substantive
principle: Do No Harm when processing personal data. By contrast, the FIPs offer
a procedural framework for managing the collection and flow of personal data
rooted in some opportunity for individuals to have notice of when their data is being collected or used and some choice to control objectionable practices.4 Together, the Harm Principle that comes from tort law and the Control Principle that
comes from the FIPs are the bedrock of modern privacy law, animating everything from statutes like the federal Privacy Act and HIPAA to the substance of
FTC enforcement actions and foreign privacy regimes.
As we discuss below, while the FIPs haven proven to be quite useful as an or-

2. Neil M. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 357,
361-62 (2011).
3. See NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY (2015).
4. See Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History, Version 2.16, Feb.
11, 2015, http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf [http://perma.cc/54DDWPAT]; HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 129 (2010).
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ganizing principle, they are weakening. Not only are the FIPs non-responsive to
some new privacy problems, but they are also centered on the autonomous ideal
of control. As long as users have control to decide when they relinquish certain
privacy rights, then companies are abiding by the FIPs. In the current system of
FIPs-based regulation of personal data, the user is seen as a completely rational,
autonomous actor capable of controlling her down privacy destiny. If she loses
any privacy, it is because she chooses to do so.
This model of choice and control is well established in the privacy literature
at all levels. Some of the most popular theories of privacy cast the concept in
terms of control.5 So too does the dominant system of informal regulation in the
corporate world.6 But both the Harm Principle and the Control Principle are oriented in negative terms—Do No Harm in using data, or at least get some kind of consent before you do. From this perspective, privacy is almost always a negative and
costly concept, a harm to be avoided, or a consent to be obtained before something positive can happen. This is the pathology of Privacy Pessimism, and in this
Part, we describe how Privacy Pessimism has caused us to think about privacy in a
way that is unnecessary, incomplete, and focused on fixing harm rather than creating value. Three dimensions of this pessimism problem are most important. We
call them the Creepy Trap, the Harm Fixation, and the Control Illusion.
A. The Creepy Trap
Most discussions of privacy and new technologies run into accusations of
creepiness at some point. Surveillance-based advertising? Creepy.7 Facebook
tweaking your news feed to make you sad? Creepy.8 The NSA, black box data recorders in cars, eavesdropping Barbie dolls, the Internet of Things, drones, or
Google scanning your Gmail? Each of these practices have been labeled as “creepy”
at one time or another.9

5. Alan Westin defined privacy as an individual’s right “to control, edit, manage, and
delete information about them[selves] and decide when, how, and to what extent information
is communicated to others.” ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967).
6. Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground,
63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 260 (2011); Michael Zimmer, Mark Zuckerberg’s Theory of Privacy, WASH.
POST, Feb. 3, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/mark-zuckerbergs-theoryof-privacy/2014/02/03/2c1d780a-8cea-11e3-95dd-36ff657a4dae_story.html
[http://perma.cc/26KZ-9MLR].
7. See generally JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION (2014).
8. Caitlin Dewey, 9 Answers About Facebook’s Creepy Emotional-Manipulation Experiment,
WASH. POST (July 1, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theintersect/wp/2014/07/01/9-answers-about-facebooks-creepy-emotional-manipulationexperiment [http://perma.cc/FZT9-BJ45].
9. Douglas Rushkoff, NSA’s Phone Snooping a Different Kind of Creepy, CNN (June 6,
2013, 2:34 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/06/opinion/rushkoff-nsa-verizon
[http://perma.cc/9VY3-YVAQ]; Chris Ward, In Car Black Box Data Recorder Sounds Creepy,
DAILYCARBLOG (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.dailycarblog.com/2015/01/car-black-box-datarecorder-sounds-creepy [http://perma.cc/Z86A-DUGR]; Tony Bradley, The Creepy Factor of the
‘Internet of Things’, RSA BLOG (June 17, 2014), http://blogs.rsa.com/creepy-factor-internet-
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This should be no surprise. Creepiness is our first impulse when we encounter changing norms or technologies that leave us exposed or vulnerable. It’s a visceral sensation of discomfort and revulsion, a trigger that tells us when privacy
might be threatened. If we feel that a practice is creepy, goes the intuition, maybe
we should think about regulating it. But the flip side also seems to be true: if
something isn’t creepy, then it probably isn’t a problem.
Creepiness has been explored as a privacy concept. In advice to technology
companies about how to avoid the creepiness reaction from their users, Omer
Tene and Jules Polonetsky suggest that there are “several categories of corporate
behavior that customers and commentators have begun to label ‘creepy’ for lack of
a better word,” activities that don’t violate any established law, but which give
their customers the creeps.10 Tene and Polonetsky advise companies to avoid deploying new technologies (or old technologies in new ways) in ways that seem
creepy. Such limits are necessary, they assert, because “social values are far more
nuanced and fickle that any existing (and most likely future) laws and regulations.
In order to avoid creep, companies should resist the temptation to act with chutzpah, even though brazen and audacious behavior constitutes a hallmark of Silicon
Valley entrepreneurship culture. The challenge is for companies to set the right
tone when seeking intimate relationships with consumers.”11
Creepiness is also embedded in more formal kinds of privacy law. The old
privacy tort of “intrusion into seclusion” protects private places and relationships
from menacing (or creepy) intrusions.12 The Fourth Amendment’s venerable
Katz test requires not only a famous “reasonable expectation of privacy,” but a
subjective expectation of privacy as well.13 This subjective element means that for
the Fourth Amendment to apply, a citizen has to feel violated by a government
intrusion or monitoring. Though rarely phrased in terms of creepiness, Fourth
Amendment law is based upon a similar idea that privacy is only invaded when
there is a felt sense of intrusion of violation.
Helen Nissenbaum’s much-praised theory of privacy as “contextual integrity”

things [http://perma.cc/EQJ2-CB3M]; Cyrus Farivar, Vancouver Man Creeped Out by Drone
Buzzing Near His 36th-Story Condo, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 20, 2014, 12:27 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/08/vancouver-man-creeped-out-by-drone-buzzingnear-his-36th-story-condo [http://perma.cc/5LS3-AXYS]; Benjamin Herold, Lawsuit Alleges
That Google Has Crossed a ‘Creepy Line’ With Student Data, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 17, 2014, 2:49
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/17/google-data-miningstudents_n_4980422.html [http://perma.cc/89LP-8QJX]; Sarah Halzack, Privacy Advocates Try
to Keep ‘Creepy’ ‘Eavesdropping’ Hello Barbie from Hitting Shelves, WASH. POST (Mar. 11 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2015/03/11/privacy-advocates-tryto-keep-creepy-eavesdropping-hello-barbie-from-hitting-shelves [http://perma.cc/VB9RNJBX].
10. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy and Shifting
Social Norms, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 59, 61 (2013-14).
11. Id. at 101.
12. RICHARDS, supra note 3, at 64-72.
13. See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1521-22
(2010).
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also contains overtones of creepiness. Nissenbaum suggests that privacy violations
occur when “context-relative informational norms” are not respected when sharing information.14 Her framework of contextual integrity suggests that “finely calibrated systems of social norms, or rules, govern the flow of personal information
in distinct social contexts (e.g., education, health care, and politics).”15 Individuals
experience privacy violations when those social norms about information are violated in inappropriate ways.16 Nissenbaum’s theory has been highly influential
among academics, and is starting to influence policy, with her work built into the
Federal Trade Commission’s updated approach to regulating privacy.17 At the
core of Nissenbaum’s theory is her claim that we should consider privacy issues in
the first instance when people react to new information practices by expressing
“alarm.”18 In other words, although she does not use the term, something like
creepiness in a particular context is the trigger for a potential privacy violation.
But there is a problem with creepiness, regardless of how carefully it is defined. It might be a very human and natural way to respond to new social or technological circumstances, but it ultimately tells us little about whether a legally
cognizable privacy issue exists. At the outset, creepiness is over-inclusive as a
proxy for information privacy threats. Lots of new technologies that might at first
appear viscerally creepy will turn out to be either unproblematic or beneficial.
Evan Selinger reminds us that early train passengers were not merely creeped out
but terrified, fainting, and complaining of serious maladies from traveling at
speeds that by today’s standard would not constitute speeding in a school zone.19
In the early days of the Internet, many users refused to buy products online, fearing security lapses from digital technologies they didn’t understand.20 Facebook’s
14. NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 129; Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity,
79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 155 (2004).
15. NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 3.
16. Nissenbaum, supra note 14, at 155.
17. Alexis C. Madrigal, The Philosopher Whose Fingerprints Are All Over the FTCs New Approach to Privacy, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/the-philosopher-whosefingerprints-are-all-over-the-ftcs-new-approach-to-privacy/254365/ [http://perma.cc/FMH6SKLK].
18. NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 3, 11. Nissenbaum’s theory offers more than creepiness,
but we note it here because it is (a) prominent and influential, and (b) its violation of “contextrelative information norms” bears a close similarity to the what is colloquially deemed as “creepiness.” As Nissenbaum’s work on context becomes adopted by third-parties into regulation, and
thus loses academic nuance, we predict that her nuanced philosophical treatment is likely to be
folded in with colloquial “creepiness.”
19. Evan Selinger, Why Do We Love to Call New Technologies “Creepy”?, SLATE (Aug. 22,
2012, 3:30 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/08/facial_recognition_software_
targeted_advertising_we_love_to_call_new_technologies_creepy_.html
[http://perma.cc/UZ9W-DZCH].
20. Ye Diana Wang & Henry H. Emurian, An Overview of Online Trust: Concept, Elements,
and Implications, 21 COMPUTERS IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 105 (2005),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.2184&rep=rep1&type=pdf
[http://perma.cc/8TW9-AY5Y].
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News Feed feature “creeped out” many users when it was first introduced because
users were not accustomed to having all their information aggregated in one place
for easy consumption.21 Now the feature is considered to be fundamental both to
the company’s success and to the social awareness of many users of its network.22
But creepiness is also under-inclusive. New information practices that we
don’t understand fully, or highly invasive practices of which we are unaware, may
never seem creepy, yet still present serious threats to values we care about. Take,
for example, surveillance of which we are unaware,23 or the use of secret algorithms to score our lives.24 Such practices may unconstitutionally subject us to
criminal or civil punishment (from jail time to designation on “no-fly” or “watch”
lists), or they may deny us access to health, insurance, or economic opportunities
(in the case of scoring by credit or university admissions algorithms). Such practices may be illegal, inaccurate, or both, but if they operate behind layers of secrecy, we may never learn about them. And things we are unaware of are unlikely to
trigger the creepiness reaction.
Finally, because it rests on psychological reactions to perceived practices,
creepiness is not only socially contingent, but malleable. A pervasive threat to
privacy or our civil liberties can be made less creepy as we become conditioned to
it. Such a threat may remain equally serious, but become normalized as we fit it
into our understanding of the world in which we have to operate, like police corruption, sexism, or drunk drivers. Arguably, the Internet advertising industry,
which relies on detailed surveillance of individual web-surfing to target ads, has
fallen into this category.25 Becoming “normal” in this way hardly removes the
problem, even if we become accustomed or resigned to it. In the context of privacy, consider the ever-expanding reach of data collection, always pushing up
against (and seeking to roll back or desensitize) the creepiness reaction. As
Google’s Eric Schmidt put it honestly in 2010, “Google policy is to get right up to
the creepy line and not cross it.”26
While it may be a natural psychological response to novelty, in the context of
privacy law, creepiness is ultimately a trap. It locks us into a false binary of things
that are creepy and thus potentially problematic, and things that are not creepy and
thus presumably okay. Under the standard story, a finding of creepiness is only

21. danah boyd, Facebook’s Privacy Train Wreck, 14 CONVERGENCE 13
http://www.danah.org/papers/FacebookPrivacyTrainwreck.pdf; Tiffany A. Pempek, Yevdokiya A. Yermolayeva, & Sandra L. Calvert. College students’ social networking experiences on Facebook,
30 J. APPLIED DEV. PSYCH. 227 (2009).
22. Sam Biddle, Facebook’s New News Feed: The Biggest Change in Years, GIZMODO (Mar. 7,
2013, 1:12 PM) http://gizmodo.com/5989228/facebooks-new-news-feed-the-biggest-changein-years-updating-live [http://perma.cc/CAC8-2G95].
23. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013).
24. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, BLACK BOX SOCIETY (2015).
25. ANGWIN, supra note 7, at 4-5.
26. Shane Richmond, Eric Schmidt: Google Gets Close to the “Creepy Line,” TELEGRAPH (October 5, 2010), http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/technology/shanerichmond/100005766/ericschmidt-getting-close-to-the-creepy-line [http://perma.cc/5VZ4-BULW].
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the start of the inquiry. Since some things that are creepy actually turn out to be
desirable (recall the screaming Victorian train passengers and Facebook’s News
Feed), a creepy new technology begs a second question of whether something experienced as creepy is actually harmful. This fixation on harm is another major
symptom of Privacy Pessimism, which we’ll turn to now.
B. The Harm Fixation
A second pathology of Privacy Pessimism is that it is too focused on privacy’s
costs, often to the exclusion of any benefits. From this perspective, privacy is an
injury to be remedied, a cost to be balanced in the ledger book, a harm rather than
an opportunity. After all, goes the logic, we have to find out whether our sense of
creepiness is actually a harmful one or just a false positive.
The Harm Fixation began with Warren and Brandeis, who were concerned
about coverage of elite social functions by newspapers and by the new technology
of “instantaneous photography.” Worried that press coverage of intimate affairs
and the circulation of unauthorized photos were causing psychological harm, they
argued that the common law should recognize a tort to remedy these emotional
injuries.27
Today’s privacy law has expanded far beyond Warren and Brandeis’s tort
claims against the press. Modern privacy law is regulatory in scope, structuring
data relationships in personal data and covering types of information and advanced technologies that nineteenth century lawyers might find indistinguishable
from magic.28 “Instantaneous photography” has nothing on Snapchat or GPS, and
the Fair Credit Reporting Act and FTC investigations are much more complex
and nuanced than a common law tort claim. But even though privacy law has
evolved far from its origins in tort law, tort law’s fixation on compensable individual harm has stubbornly remained with it, even when other elements of the
law of torts have fallen by the wayside.
The Harm Fixation also manifests in the form of balancing tests used to decide whether certain information practices should be permissible or not. For example, Section 5 of the FTC Act, which outlaws unfair and deceptive trade practices, has become the most important piece of legislation for protecting consumer
privacy in the United States.29 But in order for a practice to be deemed unfair, it
must be “likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”30

27. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890); RICHARDS, supra note 3, at 17.
28. This is of course Arthur C. Clarke’s Third Law of Technology, first posited in Leigh
Brackett, The Sorcerer of Rhiannon, ASTOUNDING, Feb. 1942, at 39.
29. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 588 (2014).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2013).
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In privacy-related disputes, companies, agencies, and courts are asked to articulate whether the cost of acting fairly, in this instance to preserve privacy, is
outweighed by the potential benefit to the consumer, which is often articulated as
“cost savings passed on to the consumer.”31 The Obama White House’s proposed
“Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights” wholly embraces balancing privacy risks with
other considerations.32 It provides for a rulemaking procedure that considers
“among other factors, the privacy risks posed by personal data processing by categories of persons of various sizes, experiences, resources, and types of commercial
activity, including nonprofit activity; the importance of mitigating privacy risks;
and the costs and benefits of including those categories of persons as covered entities.”33 This balancing requirement pits privacy and affordability against each other as values in conflict.
Companies, agencies, and courts are not the only privacy pessimists fixated
on the cost of privacy. Critics of privacy regulation bemoan its toll on “innovation” and “progress.”34 Very few companies want to cause problems to people or
hurt them, but focusing on the expense of privacy inevitably frames privacy as
“the cost of doing business” instead of an opportunity to help form long-term, sustainable relationships.35 Even advocates for privacy frequently consider privacy as
a negative value that must be balanced against innovation, efficiency, or security.
Responding to the framing of Privacy Pessimism, there is a large academic literature on “privacy harm” seeking to articulate exactly what the nature of the injury
caused by threats to privacy.36
The Harm Fixation is thus problematic because it frames the privacy inquiry
in negative, costly terms. But there is a second problem. The Harm Fixation also
demands proof that is increasingly elusive.37 In order to be actionable, all of the
privacy torts demand a demonstration of harm that is “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”38 Those arguing against regulation of behavioral advertising assert that regulation is unnecessary because no harm from the practice can be

31. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 29.
32. White House, ADMINISTRATION DISCUSSION DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF

RIGHTS ACT OF 2015 (Feb. 27, 2015),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cpbr-act-of-2015discussion-draft.pdf [http://perma.cc/8SJ6-ND47] (“If a covered entity processes personal data
in a manner that is not reasonable in light of context, the covered entity shall conduct a privacy
risk analysis . . . to examine the potential for privacy risk. Covered entities shall take reasonable
steps to mitigate any identified privacy risks, which shall include, but are not limited to, providing heightened transparency and individual control.”).
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., ADAM THIERER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION (2014).
35. See Richards, supra note 1 (collecting examples).
36. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131 (2011); see also,
Nathan Newman, The Costs of Lost Privacy: Consumer Harm and Rising Economic Inequality in the
Age of Google, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 849 (2014).
37. Calo, supra note 36.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B-D (1977).

Spring 2016]

TAKING TRUST SERIOUSLY IN PRIVACY LAW

443

demonstrated.39 Claims against companies for providing poor data security usually fail unless the plaintiff can demonstrate actual individualized harm, such as financial loss, instead of harms like uncertainty or increased risk shared across large
numbers of people that are large in the aggregate but small for each affected individual.40 The Supreme Court has taken a number of cases in recent years assessing whether allegations of harm are sufficient under the Federal Privacy
Act,41 and a pending case asks whether a private cause of action under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act can ever satisfy Article III standing.42 In these and other
cases, the Supreme Court is increasingly interpreting privacy harm very narrowly.43 State courts also routinely reject notions of privacy that are not immediately
ascertainable or are speculative in nature.44 Given the arc of decisions limiting
notions of what constitutes privacy harm, an alternative focus would be useful.
Harm is, of course, an important concept in our law. It will remain a critical
component in regulatory regimes that punish companies and provide redress
through private causes of action for individuals, whether for identity theft, data
breach, or revenge porn. It is an effective way of determining compensation
amounts and separating important claims from trivial or meritless ones. But the
goal of privacy law shouldn’t solely be to avoid harm. Such a fixation is too rigid
and focuses our attention away from important areas where privacy regulation
can create value, rather than merely remedying injury.
While many laws are designed to deter harm, that is not the only function of
law. Other laws, like tax regulations that provide incentives for charitable giving
and consumer spending, are designed to encourage behavior that is seen as desirable within society.
The Harm Fixation forces us to come up with ill-fitting theories of harm

39. See, e.g., Joel Rosenblatt, Facebook Seeks Dismissal of $15 Billion Privacy Suit,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Oct. 5, 2012, 11:06 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-10-05/facebook-seeks-dismissal-of-15billion-privacy-suit [http://perma.cc/67KN-GASC].
40. See, e.g., Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding no harm from
increased risk of identity theft); Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151 (1st Cir. 2011);
Holmes v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 5:08–CV–00205–R, 2012 WL 2873892 (W.D. Ky. July
12, 2012) (rejecting theory of harm for time and efforts expended to deal with breach); Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 23, 2009) (rejecting standing for increased risk of identity theft); Key v. DSW, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Ohio 2006)
(rejecting standing for increased risk of identity theft); Bell v. Acxiom Corp., No. 4:06CV00485WRW, 2006 WL 2850042 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 3, 2006) (rejecting theory of harm for increased risk
of junk mail).
41. E.g., Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004); Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct.
1441 (2012).
42. See Spokeo v. Robins, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/spokeo-inc-v-robins/ [http://perma.cc/9YKM-HEJ3].
43. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1151 (2013) (“[R]respondents
cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of
hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.”).
44. See, e.g., Holmes, 2012 WL 2873892; Amburgy, 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046; Key, 454 F. Supp.
2d 684; McLoughlin, 2009 WL 2843269; Bell, 2006 WL 2850042.
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when we inevitably sense that there is a problem but cannot easily articulate a
clear, cognizable, and individualized injury. Like an itch that can’t be scratched or
a problem that we just can’t seem to put our finger on, this dimension of Privacy
Pessimism paints us into a corner of narratives like “creepy” that sound compelling at first, but crumble in practice or under scrutiny.45
C. The Control Illusion
A third problem of Privacy Pessimism is its assumption that people can adequately make choices to protect their information. In the United States, privacy
policy is largely centered on the idea that the best way to protect your privacy is to
be careful about what and how much information you disclose and to whom. We
have called this the Control Principle, though it is also called a “notice and choice
regime” or “privacy self-management.”46
When the FTC first started to regulate privacy in the late 1990s, it adopted a
basic notice and choice regime for businesses that was congruous with many of
the FIPs. As long as companies notified people about their information collection,
use, and disclosure practices and gave them a choice to opt out (usually by not using the service), then companies were free to act in any way consistent with the
notice given to consumers. The most salient example of this notice and choice regime is the ubiquitous privacy policy, that dense, unreadable, boilerplate text
tucked away in some corner of virtually every website and application on the Internet.
In most cases that matter, the assumption that users have actual notice or
meaningful choice is an illusion. Privacy self-management is increasingly recognized to be unworkable and possibly even a farce. There are many jokes about
whether anyone reads privacy policies or Apple’s infamously turgid Terms of Service agreement, but these jokes rest on the undeniable truth that privacy selfmanagement is impossible. For example, one study by computer scientists found
that if an ordinary Internet user were to quickly read every privacy policy they
encountered over the course of a year, it would take them seventy-six working
days to do so.47 Another study by leading privacy journalist Julia Angwin revealed
that it was practically impossible to opt-out of pervasive surveillance by governments and companies without practically opting out of society and human contact

45. See, e.g., Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 10.
46. Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126

HARV. L. REV. 1879 (2013); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014).
47. Alex C. Madrigal, Reading the Privacy Policies You Encounter in a Year Would Take 76
Work Days, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2012, 2:25 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/reading-the-privacy-policies-youencounter-in-a-year-would-take-76-work-days/253851 [http://perma.cc/2ZJN-BYLA];
Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J. L.
POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 543 (2009).
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itself.48 The Control Principle is the key element of American data regulation, but
it is false.
When pressed on this point, federal regulators concede the futility of notice
and the absence of real choice about the pervasive collection of personal data. The
White House Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board recognized as much in
its long-awaited report on privacy and surveillance.49 In its report on Big Data,
the White House also repudiated the Control Principle, stating, “[t]he framework
of notice and consent is also becoming unworkable as a useful foundation for policy.”50 Even the FTC has realized the limits of notice and choice.51 The agency’s
report on protecting consumer privacy in the digital age acknowledged that “the
emphasis on notice and choice alone has not sufficiently accounted for other
widely recognized fair information practices, such as access, collection limitation,
purpose specification, and assuring data quality and integrity.”52 Yet despite the
acknowledgment that choice cannot do the work we ask of it, new proposals remain rooted in the Control Illusion. For example, the White House “Privacy Bill
of Rights” released in February 2015 surprisingly remains rooted in a notice and
choice view of the world.53
Such fixation on choice is especially problematic because the illusion of the
Control Principle benefits the rich at the expense of the poor. AT&T’s Internet
service, for example, will let users opt out of a “supercookie” that monitors its users’ habits for $29 a month.54 Privacy then becomes merely a luxury good that

48. ANGWIN, supra note 7.
49. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS

PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS
OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT (Jan. 23, 2014).
50. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING
VALUES 46 (May 2014).
51. Julie Brill, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at Proskauer on Privacy 2
(Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/remarkscommissioner-julie-brill/101019proskauerspeech.pdf [http://perma.cc/CQH4-TA8R] (“[T]he
Notice and Choice model, as it is often deployed today, places too great a burden on consumers.”); Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Introductory Remarks at the FTC Privacy Roundtable 3 (Dec. 7, 2009),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/introductory-remarksftc-privacy-roundtable/091207privacyremarks.pdf [http://perma.cc/XCQ5-PXLW] (“We do
feel that the approaches we’ve tried so far—both the notice and choice regime, and later the
harm-based approach—haven’t worked quite as well as we would like.”).
52. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses and Policymakers 2 (2012),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-reportprotecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf
(also acknowledging the limits of privacy harm, stating “[t]he FTC’s harm-based approach also
has limitations. In general, it focuses on a narrow set of privacy-related harms—those that cause
physical or economic injury or unwarranted intrusion into consumers’ daily lives. But, for some
consumers, the actual range of privacy related harms is much wider and includes reputational
harm, as well as the fear of being monitored or simply having private information ‘out there.’”).
53. White House, supra note 32.
54. Sophia Cope & Jeremy Gillula, AT&T is putting a price on privacy. That is outrageous,
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most people cannot afford. Thus, under the Control Illusion, users simply
“choose” surveillance and the loss of privacy either because they cannot afford anything else, or because (as noted earlier) privacy harm is notoriously hard to calculate. Other times surveillance of everyday life just gets built into modern technologies, whether it is Samsung’s “smart” TVs that record conversations in your
living room, or Lenovo’s laptops that shipped with insecure software that surveilled user web surfing in order to serve ads.55
The reality that the Control Principle is an illusion also provides an answer to
one of the by-products of Privacy Pessimism, the so-called “privacy paradox.” This
is the idea that surveys consistently measure both consumer anxiety about privacy
and behavior that is seemingly at odds with such concerns. Some commentators
use the paradox to suggest that individuals are either hypocritical or ignorant.56
But the privacy paradox is fallacious because it only considers one party in an information relationship: the user. Users given a blunt choice between protecting
their data and participating in modern society really have no choice at all, especially when the terms of any such choice are clouded by confusing technology and
legal mumbo-jumbo, where long-term interests in privacy are hard to value, or
where meaningful choice is an illusion. In fact, given the limited notice and choice
that most of us encounter, the privacy paradox suggests that users care about their
personal data in spite of the limited legal and technological choices they face in
protecting it.57 If our revealed preferences show that we don’t care about privacy,
why do so many of us remain anxious about our personal data?
Ultimately, the Control Illusion reveals the limits of the procedural approach
taken by the FIPs. For years, there was no privacy problem the FIPs purportedly
could not fix. But doing so has worn out the concept amid the explosion of new
data applications. Big Data has challenged the wisdom and practicality of data retention.58 Profiling, discrimination, and other inferential harms happen so re-

GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 2015, 12:09 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/20/att-price-on-privacy?CMP=fb_us
[http://perma.cc/ZB2X-MZN6].
55. Parker Higgins, Big Brother Is Listening: Users Need the Ability to Teach Smart TVs New
Lessons, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/02/bigbrother-listening-users-need-ability-teach-smart-tvs-new-lessons [http://perma.cc/9YA9EZPN]; Seth Rosenblatt, Lenovo’s Superfish Security Snafu Blows Up in its Face, CNET (Feb. 20,
2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/superfish-torments-lenovo-owners-with-morethan-adware [http://perma.cc/WW29-PBVC].
56. Stuart N. Brotman, Grappling with the Privacy Paradox, BROOKINGS INST. (July 8, 2014,
7:30 AM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/techtank/posts/2014/07/8-brotman-privacyparadox#.U7xJMEM6Z4M.twitter [http://perma.cc/A6ZC-MDKS]; Steve Lohr, The Privacy
Paradox, a Challenge for Business, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2014, 2:12 PM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/the-privacy-paradox-a-challenge-forbusiness/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/VGC2-LU4P]; Diane Brady, Privacy
Paradox: Americans Happy to Share Personal Data With Big Business, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(June 25, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-06-25/privacy-paradoxamericans-happy-to-share-personal-data-with-big-business [http://perma.cc/Z3LH-892E].
57. Richards, supra note 1 (suggesting the existence of such a “reverse privacy paradox.”).
58. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of
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motely from the source as to remove any doubt that the “choice” offered to users
who disclose personal in the modern world is usually an illusion. After all, what
choice can users have to opt out of profiling by ad networks and data brokers of
whose existence they are unaware?
The FIPs have been whittled away to an empty shell in many areas of privacy
law, especially the law protecting consumers in their Internet usage in the United
States. In many areas, the FIPs have become little more than a set of procedural
protections lacking a substantive theory of what privacy is and why it matters.
From this perspective, it should be no wonder why so many people are pessimistic about privacy.59
***
Behold, then, the traditional story we tell ourselves about privacy, a story we
have called “Privacy Pessimism.” Privacy is under threat from new technologies
and business practices that we perceive as “creepy.” When we encounter a creepy
privacy practice, tort law has trained us to see if there is any harm. Yet in many
instances, regardless of the harm, we feel like our consent is being wrongly manufactured using fine print and malicious design. The Harm Fixation limits our ability to think about what privacy can do for us, while the fiction of the Control Illusion manufactures consent through the operation of the FIPs.
Privacy Pessimism is reactive, negative, and largely ineffective at protecting
individuals in information relationships. It is worn out. If privacy law is to survive, if ordinary people are to have any meaningful participation in when, whether, and how their data is being used, some positive articulation of what good privacy can do is necessary. We offer such a theory in the next Part.
III.

A THEORY OF PRIVACY AND TRUST

Getting past privacy’s pessimism problem requires companies and confidants
to recognize that protecting the privacy of others is mutually beneficial. Businesses, intermediaries, carriers, and intimates must want privacy for articulable reasons beyond moral or ethical concerns. Without articulable benefits to recipients
of personal information, we will never escape Privacy Pessimism.
Our current set of ground rules about what kinds of data uses are permissible
will not create a sustainable digital society. To remedy this problem, we offer a
new theory of privacy and trust. Put simply, privacy matters because it enables
trust. Privacy rules can govern the uses of information in relationships, and these
rules can build trust. Trust-promoting privacy rules allow people to safely disclose
personal information in ways that benefit not just individuals, but the entities
they share their data with as well. Understanding how privacy rules can promote
trust goes beyond the Harm Principle. Instead of remedying speculative harm,

Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239 (2013).
59. See Richards, supra note 1, at 59 (“[T]he available evidence suggests that people do in
fact care about privacy, but they are bewildered by the difficulty of protecting their personal
information in a time of rapid technological change and limited options.”).
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privacy can promote trust and promise a way forward for the safe and equitable
collection, use, and disclosure of information in long-term, sustainable relationships. Similarly, trust mitigates the problems and distrust that stem from the Control Illusion. From this perspective, privacy isn’t a paradox, it is essential to our
digital future. It’s not a drain on progress, but rather a signpost to the way forward.
D. Conceptualizing Trust
Trust is an essential component of healthy relationships and healthy societies.60 Although various disciplines define trust in various ways, at bottom, “trust
is a state of mind that enables its possessor to be willing to make herself vulnerable to another—that is, to rely on another despite a positive risk that the other will
act in a way that can harm the truster.”61 Trust allows cooperation with other
people in spite of the fact that exposing ourselves enables them to harm us.
There is a vast literature on trust across a variety of academic disciplines,
from social sciences like political science and psychology to fields as wide-ranging
as medicine, management, and neuroscience.62 There is also substantial legal
60. See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY 26 (1995); Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 217 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988); PIOTR SZTOMPKA, TRUST: A
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 25 (1999); THE WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 632
(James F. Childress & John Macquarrie eds., 1986); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust,
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1745-46
(2001); Eli Bukspan, Trust and the Triangle Expectation Model in Twenty-First Century Contract
Law, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 379, 415 (2013).
61. Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REV.
1717, 1723-24 (2006) (citing Denise M. Rousseau et al., Not So Different After All: A CrossDiscipline View of Trust, 23(3) ACAD. MGMT. REV. 393, 394-395 (1998)). See also FUKUYAMA, supra note 60; Gambetta, supra note 60; Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1461
(2005); Sirkka L. Jarvenpaa & Emerson H. Tiller, Customer Trust in Virtual Environments: A Managerial Perspective, 81 B.U. L. REV. 665, 677-78 (2001).
62. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974); BERNARD BARBER, THE
LOGIC AND LIMITS OF TRUST (1983); Morton Deutsch, Cooperation and Trust: Some Theoretical
Notes, in 10 NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 275 (1962); Gambetta, supra note 60;
RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS (2002); Jack Knight, Social Norms and the Rule
of Law: Fostering Trust in a Socially Diverse Society, in TRUST IN SOCIETY 354 (Karen S. Cook ed.,
2001); PAUL SEABRIGHT, THE COMPANY OF STRANGERS: A NATURAL HISTORY OF ECONOMIC LIFE
(2004); TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH (Roderick M. Kramer
& Tom R. Tyler, eds., 1996); Philip Worchel, Trust and Distrust, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 174 (William G. Austin & Stephen Worchel eds., 1979); Mark A. Hall
et al., Measuring Patients’ Trust in Their Primary Care Providers, 59 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 293
(2002); Hill & O’Hara, supra note 61, at 1796; Brooks King-Casas et al., Getting to Know You:
Reputation and Trust in a Two-Person Economic Exchange, 308 SCI. 78 (2005); Michael Kosfeld et
al., Oxytocin Increases Trust in Humans, 435 NATURE 673 (June 2, 2005); Kevin A. McCabe &
Vernon L. Smith, A Comparison of Naïve and Sophisticated Subject with Game Theoretic Predictions,
97(7) PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3777 (2000); Special Topic Forum on Trust In and Between Organizations, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 393 (Denise M. Rousseau et al. eds., 1998); See also Julian B. Rotter,
Interpersonal Trust, Trustworthiness, and Gullibility, 35 AM. PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (1980) (“Common sense
tells us that interpersonal trust is an important variable affecting human relationships at all lev-

Spring 2016]

TAKING TRUST SERIOUSLY IN PRIVACY LAW

449

scholarship on the role of the law in general in generating or discouraging trust,63
as well as in such sub-disciplines as contracts, corporations, and the law of fiduciary duties.64 Our purpose in this paper is not to advance a theory of trust for all
purposes or even all purposes in the law. Our goal is more modest. While we recognize and draw from the vast scholarly literature on trust, we have no wish to
enter academic debates other than how we should think about privacy rules in a
digital society, for that problem is large enough.
We offer instead a theory of trust in the context of information relationships
that allows us to better understand why legal, technological, and social rules regulating the collection, uses, and flows of information in those relationships can
make us all better off.65 Put simply, privacy rules are necessary to build the trust
our digital society needs not merely to function sustainably over the long term,
but also to flourish. There have been occasional references to trust in the scholarship on law, technology, and privacy, but trust has failed to develop as a core justification for why privacy matters.66 In this paper, we make exactly that case: that
thinking of privacy in terms of trust is essential, and that trust must become an
essential part of the legal conversations about data, innovation, technology, and
privacy.
In the context of information relationships, trust means the willingness to
become vulnerable to a person or organization by disclosing personal infor-

els . . . .”); Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U.
L. REV. 361, 362 (2001); Russell Hardin, Distrust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 495, 496 (2001); Justin (Gus)
Hurwitz, Trust and Online Interaction, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1579 (2013).
63. Hill & O’Hara, supra note 61, at 1720; Tamar Frankel and Wendy J. Gordon, Symposium: Trust Relationships, 81 B.U. L. REV. 321 (2001); Tyler, supra note 62.
64. See, e.g. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION (1981); Blair & Stout, supra note 60 at 1738 (“We contend that people often trust,
and often behave trustworthily, to a far greater degree than can possibly be explained by legal
or market incentives.”); John J. Chung, Promissory Estoppel and the Protection of Interpersonal
Trust, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 37, 38-39 (2008).
65. A very small number of legal scholars have suggested that trust might be important
in privacy disputes. Indeed, this is a claim that each of us has made in prior work. See Richards,
supra note 1; RICHARDS, supra note 3. In a forthcoming article, Ari Waldman draws on the work
of sociologists to argue that sociological notions of trust are broader than the “everyday trust”
we have in our friends and family members. Waldman concludes from this analysis that privacy
and trust are the same thing. Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in
the Twenty-First Century, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 559, 629. While we agree with Waldman that
modern understandings of privacy fail to account for trust, we disagree with him to the extent
that he thinks trust and privacy are just synonyms for each other. In our view, privacy and trust
are distinct concepts, and trust is an important end that privacy law can serve. Privacy rules—
rules governing the treatment of personal information—can serve many purposes, not just remedying the harms of Privacy Pessimism, but protecting our civil liberties, see RICHARDS, supra
note 1, and a whole host of other goals. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY
(2009). Rather than bind all of privacy law to the mast of trust, for the reasons we give in this
article, we think it is sufficient (and more nuanced) to argue that rules governing personal data
in information relationships are trust-promoting, and that this function is essential for the kind
of sustainable digital society we should want to build.
66. See, e.g. Hurwitz, Trust and Online Interaction, supra note 62; Helen Nissenbaum, Securing Trust Online: Wisdom or Oxymoron, 81 B.U. L. REV. 635 (2001); Waldman, supra note 65.
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mation. Some terminology is necessary to aid in precision. We will refer to disclosers of this personal information as trusters, the act of sharing sensitive personal information as entrusting, and the recipient of such information as entrustees.
While the natural term for one entrusted with personal information is a “trustee,”
we are mindful of the specific meaning of this term within, for example, fiduciary
and estate law. We will use the term “entrustee” for greater precision, but we are
also mindful that the power of an information recipient to harm another is part of
the historical basis for the imposition of a trustee relationship in the law of fiduciaries.67 The difference between an “entrustee” and a “trustee” may be negligible in
practice. We nevertheless want to separate them because an “entrustee” is a factual
description (“someone has entrusted their data with me . . .”), while becoming a
“trustee” means the imposition of legal obligations (“. . . and the law requires me as
her Trustee to treat it a certain way”).
Let us illustrate how these terms work in practice. We are all trusters at various times. As trusters, we share data by entrusting it with entrustees. A truster
can be a bank customer, the user of a search engine, or a customer at Target. In
these cases, the entrustee is the bank, the search engine, or the big box retailer,
and the information being entrusted can be financial data, search queries, or information about the consumer’s purchases.
When trusters entrust information about themselves, they make themselves
vulnerable. Their vulnerability might include increased risk of information misuse, unauthorized disclosure, manipulation, or loss of autonomy. A bank could
leave their account numbers on a laptop in an airport.68 A search engine could
turn their queries over to the government69 or the general public.70 Target could
guess that they are pregnant and market to them at their time of vulnerability,71
or Target could itself be the victim of a data breach.72 The possibilities for disclosure, injury, or manipulation in such cases are limited only by the human potential for innovation. Once a truster’s information is disclosed, she no longer has
sole control over its use and dissemination.73 She is exposed and at the mercy of

67. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 135 (2007).
68. See, e.g., Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Forbes v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D. Minn. 2006).
69. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
70. See, e.g., Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller Jr., A Face is Exposed for AOL Searcher No.
4417749, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html?pagewanted=all
[http://perma.cc/Y2YL-DJQQ].
71. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=all
[http://perma.cc/TPV6-WNGY].
72. A Message from CEO Gregg Steinhafel about Target’s Payment Card Issues, TARGET (Dec.
20, 2013), http://corporate.target.com/discover/article/Important-Notice-Unauthorizedaccess-to-payment-ca [http://perma.cc/9S7W-J8ZG].
73. Woodrow Hartzog, Chain-Link Confidentiality, 46 GA. L. REV. 657, 658 (2012)
(“[I]ndividuals lose control of their personal information once they disclose it on the Internet.”).
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the entrustee.
When people disclose personal details within information relationships, two
distinct kinds of vulnerabilities occur. The first is vulnerability to actions by the
trustee. One of us has written regarding surveillance that “information gives the
watcher increased power over the watched that can be used to persuade, influence, or otherwise control them.”74 The same is true within information relationships. Employees can be immediately fired, insurance can be denied, friends can
be embarrassed, lovers can be devastated by the disclosure of secrets or sexy photos. Increasingly, Internet users can be manipulated by technological design guided by companies with an intimate knowledge of their background and preferences. If you know your customers well, it is much easier to nudge them into
doing what you want them to do, even when it is a choice they might not otherwise have made freely.75
A second kind of vulnerability faced by trusters is to third parties who receive
the personal information from the entrustee. This can happen when the entrustee
sells or rents the data “downstream,” or it can happen when the entruster’s security is breached by a true third party. An ISP might sell web-surfing habits to an advertising company or data broker.76 Any retailer, data broker, or other entity
might get hacked by online criminals.77 When trusters intentionally or unintentionally disclose entrusted information to others, entrustees can be manipulated,
user profiles can be impersonated, reputations can be destroyed, and bank accounts can be cleaned out.
Virtually every disclosure of personal information in the modern age leaves
the discloser vulnerable in some way, if even only incrementally. As a result, every information relationship involves some degree of trust, or willingness to become vulnerable. This is true even if that trust is not a conscious one on the part
of the truster.78 The phenomenon of trust exists in all information relationships,
though of course to different degrees. The key, then, is determining which information relationships require extra scrutiny from the law.
E. Why Trust Matters in Information Relationships
Because disclosure of personal data leaves people vulnerable, trust is the glue
that holds together virtually every information relationship. An information relationship is any relationship that requires personal information to develop or

74. Richards, supra note 23, at 1956.
75. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014); Duhigg,

supra note 71.
76. Natasha Singer, Your Online Attention, Bought in an Instant, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/18/technology/your-online-attention-bought-inan-instant-by-advertisers.html?pagewanted [http://perma.cc/D6DA-C3C6].
77. Michael Riley et al., Missed Alarms and 40 Million Stolen Credit Card Numbers: How Target Blew It, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/201403-13/target-missed-alarms-in-epic-hack-of-credit-card-data [http://perma.cc/6C67-758Y].
78. Cross, supra note 61, at 1459; Hill & O’Hara, supra note 61, at 1721-22.
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achieve a particular goal. This includes a person’s relationship with merchants,
doctors, employers, common carriers, intermediaries, friends, and intimate partners.79 And in practice, privacy rules—rules governing the uses of personal information—are essential requirements for the existence of these trust-dependent relationships in the first place.
Trust in these relationships produces numerous benefits, but three are particularly worth highlighting. These three values—commerce, social interaction,
and free expression—cannot exist without a willingness to become vulnerable to
the actions of others.
Commerce. Commercial relationships, the engine of any economy, are entirely a product of trust. Without this trust, our modern way of life simply would
not exist. When privacy is conceptualized as trust, it becomes clear how privacy
can be essential for business.80 If consumers cannot trust businesses with information, they will be hesitant to buy goods and services that require information
relationships. Online commerce is particularly reliant upon trust.
Trust is essential to nearly every component of commerce, not just aspects
involving privacy and personal information. Trust in commerce begins with the
most common initiator of a commercial exchange—a promise which leads to a
contract.81 As first-year law students learn, the most important tool in commerce,
the contract, is essentially a mechanism for encouraging and protecting trust.82

79. See, e.g., Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Trusting and Trustworthiness, 81 B.U. L.
REV. 523, 523 (2001); Cross, supra note 61, at 1459; see also G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and
Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV.
221, 265 (1991); cf. Hurwitz, supra note 62 (discussing the vital role of trust between Internet
users, Internet intermediaries, and the architecture of the Internet itself); Andrew J. McClurg,
Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality,
74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 913 (2006); Joel Reidenberg & Francoise Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental
Role of Privacy and Confidence in the Network, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105 (1995); Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 554-55 (2001); Ethan J. Leib, Friends As Fiduciaries, 86
WASH. U. L. REV. 665, 673 (2009).
80. Nicole Ozer, Privacy and Free Speech: It’s Good for Business, ACLU CAL. (2d ed. 2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2013/04/aba_national_sym
posiumontechnologyinlaboremploymentlaw/2_conley.authcheckdam.pdf
[http://perma.cc/L45X-5DQK].
81. Bukspan, supra note 60, at 382-83. Bukspan notes how “[t]he idea of interpersonal
trust has personal, social, moral, psychological, and utilitarian advantages that are consistent
with common sense and easily relatable. Thus, it comes as no surprise that interpersonal trust
has been adopted into many fields, particularly social and economic fields. From a social perspective, trust is understood as a vital element in the relationship between people.” Id. Buskpan
argued that trust is an essential ingredient for commerce, stating: “Mutual trust is a tool that is
used to avoid economic pitfalls . . . . [I]nterpersonal trust promotes cooperation and contributes
to economic performance in large organizations.” Id.; see also Cross, supra note 61, at 1460
(“There is evidence that legal regulation strengthens securities markets around the world. Because investment in corporate equity requires at least a modicum (and sometimes a great deal)
of trust, this evidence suggests the positive effect of the law. Other international evidence
shows the benefit of the law and contracts on overall economic growth, providing more evidence that law is associated with greater trust.”).
82. Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Promises, Trust, and Contract Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 25, 25-26
(2002) (“By making a promise, a person invites another to trust, and to break a promise is to
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While trust has not been fully embraced in regulatory conversations about
privacy, it has played a critical role in commerce and consumer protection. Kenneth A. Bamberger and Deirdre K. Mulligan’s research into the practices of corporate privacy officers revealed that “promoting consumer trust, rather than protecting individual privacy, motivates many recent privacy interventions.”83
Intimacy. People simply cannot be close to each other without trusting others with personal information, which is often deeply sensitive. We trust those we
love by revealing ourselves (sometimes quite literally). We expose our hopes and
fears, our wishes and secrets, our body parts, and our desires to intimates, trusting
that they will not reveal what we have shown and told them to others. Most especially, we trust that they will be loyal with our confidences and will not use what
they have learned against us.
Trust is an essential component for friendship as well. Friends share basic
kinds of information such as hobbies, opinions, and jokes. But true friendship is
based upon much more personal disclosures and experiences. Psychologists Irwin
Altman and Dalmas Taylor have shown that the strength of relationships is based
upon the frequency of reciprocal personal disclosure and degree of vulnerability
that reciprocal disclosure creates.84 In other words, the quality of friendships is
defined by the extent to which we trust each other with personal disclosures.85
Altman’s theory of privacy as a boundary regulation process works with his social
penetration theory to establish that privacy is “selective control of access to the

abuse that trust.”). Bellia noted that many theorists have argued that “in order to maximize aggregate preferences, one must have some incentive to rely on certain promises. The incentive
to rely on a promise exists only to the degree that a promise is trustworthy.” Id. Bellia summarizes the theorists who claim that the role of contract is essentially “to protect the ability of individuals to trust promises in circumstances in which that trust is socially beneficial.” Id. at 28
(“In many contexts, it is the enforceability of promises that creates possibilities for relationships
of lesser trust to ripen into relationships of greater trust.”); see also Bukspan, supra note 60, at
379 (“The concept of trust best explains the true nature of contract law and is found in key contract-law doctrines, such as good faith and public policy.”).
83. Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 6, at 260. According to Bamberger and Mulligan,
“[t]he language of ‘trust,’ and the connection between privacy and consumer protection, first
arose on the global stage during the early days of the commercial Internet.” Id. at 279. Bamberger and Mulligan found that trust was truly the impetus for companies who sought to protect
privacy. The privacy leaders they interviewed as part of their research equated privacy to trust
and respect for people, even if they had difficulty articulating what trust rules should look like.
Id. at 283 (“The link between privacy, trust, and commerce was underscored by repeated consumer pushback after corporate privacy blunders. Companies announced information-sharing
deals only to cancel them once masses of consumers made their objections known.”)
84. IRWIN ALTMAN & DALMAS A. TAYLOR, SOCIAL PENETRATION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS (1973); Irwin Altman, Reciprocity of Interpersonal Exchange, 3 J.
THEORY SOC. BEHAVIOUR 249 (1973); Dalmas A. Taylor, The Development of Interpersonal Relationships: Social Penetration Processes, 75 J. SOC. PSYCH. 79 (1968); see also STEPHEN LITTLEJOHN,
THEORIES OF HUMAN COMMUNICATION 250 (2002) (describing social penetration theory as
“[t]he idea that relationships become more intimate over time when partners disclose more and
more information about themselves”).
85. Altman, Reciprocity of Interpersonal Exchange, supra note 84; Taylor, The Development of
Interpersonal Relationships: Social Penetration Processes, supra note 84.
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self.”86 This insight might seem intuitive, but it has yet to be fully incorporated
into a policy that promotes trust in the interests of establishing and maintaining
friendship and intimacy.87
This theory helps us understand why we disclose even more information on
social media when we have privacy settings.88 At first, the research around privacy settings confused us. Why would those that are contentious enough about privacy to employ privacy settings actually share more information? The reason is
that people disclose more when they trust. When they believe that the other party
is trustworthy, they are more likely to share, just as they do with their doctors,
lawyers, and spiritual advisors. When control is not an illusion, trusted sharing
can occur. Privacy is thus not merely an interest for selfish users. Contrary to the
mantra of Dave Eggers’ fictitious social network “The Circle” in his novel of the
same name, privacy is not theft.89 Instead, it is good for businesses like social media that need users to share with friends in order to be considered successful.
Trust enables the strong relationships that make sustainable digital business possible.
Expression. Finally, trust within information relationships is critical for free
expression and a precursor to many kinds of political engagement. We have become used to talking about the Internet purely in the economic language of the

86. IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: PRIVACY, PERSONAL
SPACE, TERRITORY, CROWDING (1975); Stephen T. Margulis, On the Status and Contribution of
Westin’s and Altman’s Theories of Privacy, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 411, 412 (2003). Other scholars have
built upon Altman’s concept to theorize that disclosure happens only when we trust that the
information is safe within an outer boundary. SANDRA PETRONIO, BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY
(2002); Valerian J. Derlega & Alan L. Chaikin, Privacy and Self-Disclosure in Social Relationships,
33 J. SOC. ISSUES 102 (1977); Leysia Palen & Paul Dourish, Unpacking “Privacy” for a Networked
World, CHI ’03 PROC. ACM SIGCHI CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS COMPUTING SYS., Apr. 5-10, 2013,
at 129, 130; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919,
919-20 (2005).
87. See generally ETHAN LEIB, FRIEND V. FRIEND: THE TRANSFORMATION OF FRIENDSHIP
AND WHAT THE LAW HAS TO DO WITH IT (2011); Leib, supra note 79, at 670 (“We should accept
close friendship as triggering certain fiduciary duties. Courts have already started to treat
friends as fiduciaries—and there is much that can be appreciated about friendship itself when
friends begin to see their relationships through the lens of the fiduciary concept.”); see also
Ethan J. Leib, Contracts and Friendships, 59 EMORY L.J. 649, 652 (2010).
88. Laura Brandimarte, Alessandro Acquisti & George Loewenstein, Misplaced Confidences: Privacy and the Control Paradox, http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/09/Misplaced-Confidences-acquisti-FPF.pdf
[http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Misplaced-Confidencesacquisti-FPF.pdf]; see also Fred Stutzman, Ralph Gross & Alessandro Acquisti, Silent Listeners:
The Evolution of Privacy and Disclosure on Facebook, 4 J. PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY 7 (2012);
Maritza Johnson, Serge Egelman & Steve Bellovin, Facebook and Privacy: It’s Complicated, SYMP.
ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY, July 11-13, 2012,
http://www.guanotronic.com/~serge/papers/soups12-facebook.pdf [http://perma.cc/37EQMC2T]; Somini Sengupta, Study: Facebook Users More Protective Even as They Reveal More About
Themselves, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2013), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/05/studyfacebook-users-more-protective-even-as-they-reveal-more-about-themselves
[http://perma.cc/98QB-ZKRU].
89. DAVE EGGERS, THE CIRCLE (2013).
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market. From this perspective, Internet users are consumers rationally maximizing their preferences. But the Internet has long been a forum for political engagement and free speech, and it was such well before the “dot-com” era and the
rise of the surveillance economy turned the Internet into a shopping mall as well.
It remains a source of political fundraising,90 political information,91 and political
activism.92 The Internet’s consumers are also citizens, and the way their access to
information is structured has enormous effect on political debate and the political
process more generally.
The architecture of the Internet relies upon our ability to trust each other in
routing communications.93 People must also be able to trust recipients with possibly controversial ideas that are not yet fully formed. Thus, as a practical matter,
people need to be able to rely upon intermediaries and recipients to engage politically and further the free speech ideals of self-development, self-governance, government accountability, and the search for truth. Trust is not only necessary to
protect our economic interests; it is an essential component of our political rights
and civil liberties. Without privacy rules promoting trust in digital systems, even
freedom of speech is imperiled.
In our lifetimes, communication technologies based upon paper have increasingly been supplemented or even replaced by digital forms; emails have replaced
letters, websites have replaced newspapers, and electronic books (and books ordered over the Internet) have begun to rival those sold in bookstores for market
share. These digital technologies have been a force for good, expanding both our
access to knowledge and our practical ability to engage in free expression. But
while our digital technologies expand our reach, they are capable of monitoring
our reading, thinking, and private communications in ways that would be impossible for paper-based technologies. Whenever we shop, read, speak, and think, we
now do so using computers that create records of these activities.94
Our ISPs, for example, have records of every web site we visit—a virtual transcript of our intellectual explorations, of our reading and thinking. Consider further all the searches you may have entered into Google’s search box, or everything

90. Aaron Smith, The Internet’s Role in Campaign 2008, Pew Research Center, Apr. 15,
2009, http://www.pewinternet.org/2009/04/15/the-internets-role-in-campaign-2008
[http://perma.cc/MZT5-FPPE].
91. Amy Mitchell et al., Political Polarization and Media Habits, Pew Research Center, Oct.
21, 2014, http://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits
[http://perma.cc/H78D-MDH8]; Amy Mitchell, State of the News Media 2014, , Pew Research
Center, March 26, 2014, http://www.journalism.org/2014/03/26/state-of-the-news-media2014-overview [http://perma.cc/37ZU-XGAS].
92. Yochai Benkler et al., Social Mobilization and the Networked Public Sphere: Mapping the
SOPA-PIPA Debate, Berkman Center Research Paper No. 2013-16 (July 19, 2013).
93. Hurwitz, supra note 62, at 1580 (“From its inception in the 1960s through commercialization in 1993, the Internet was a relatively simple network that was designed, constructed,
and used by a relatively small community of research and governmental institutions with
broadly aligned incentives . . . [E]ven as these institutions gave way to diverse commercial interests, trust remained an organizing principle”).
94. RICHARDS, supra note 3, at 1.
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you have said on the phone. Many powerful but shadowy entities, from data brokers to the National Security Agency, have shown an interest in our intellectual
records—our reading habits, surfing habits, and private communications. Such
activities threaten our intellectual privacy, the protection from surveillance or interference when we are engaged in the processes of generating ideas—thinking,
reading, and speaking with confidantes before our ideas are ready for public consumption.
Surveillance or interference of our reading and thinking can drive our beliefs
to the average, the mainstream, and the boring. Many studies document the often
substantial deterrent effects of surveillance on criminal activity, from employee
theft95 to misbehavior by police.96 But in a free society surveillance can have a
substantial chilling effect on thought, reading habits, and private speech. Recent
studies, for example, demonstrate that the Snowden revelations produced a
chilling effect on Google searches, in areas not merely related to national security,
but also things that were unrelated to the NSA’s dragnet, like divorce lawyers,
mental illness, and weight loss.97 Another study suggested that surveillance makes
writers and journalists more likely to self-censor.98
As a society, we say frequently that we care about individuality, diversity, eccentricity, and the vibrant weirdness that freedom makes possible. If we don’t
have intellectual privacy, all of these important values that make life worth living
are threatened. But rules protecting intellectual privacy can safeguard the trust in
our digital tools to enable fearless and unfettered intellectual exploration and private communication. This is a reality that librarians recognized decades ago,
when they established both professional duties and legal requirements protecting
the privacy and confidentiality of patron records.99 Today librarians remain
among the most trusted information professionals.100
Intellectual privacy rules produce the trust in digital systems that enables engagement with ideas, political association, and truly free speech to flourish. From
this perspective, trust-promoting privacy rules serve not merely economic values,
but those of a constitutional magnitude as well. Trust is essential for the kind of
society we want to live in. To review, trust drives commerce and it creates the
conditions for intimacy and free expression. If we want to flourish as humans, we
must be able to trust each other.

95. Lamar Pierce et al., Cleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology Monitoring on
Employee Theft and Productivity, MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 5029-13 (Oct. 15, 2014).
96. See generally, Richards, supra note 23 (collecting examples).
97. Alex Marthews & Catherine Tucker, Government Surveillance and Internet Search Behavior, SSRN (Apr. 29, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2412564.
98. Chilling Effects: NSA Surveillance Drives U.S. Writers to Self-Censor, PEN America (Nov.
12, 2013), http://www.pen.org/sites/default/files/Chilling%20Effects_PEN%20American.pdf
[http://perma.cc/S27M-7R3U].
99. Neil M. Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 GEO. L. J. 689 (2013).
100. Maureen Sullivan et al., Librarians Working Together, American Libraries Magazine,
(June 25, 2013), http://americanlibrariesmagazine.org/2013/06/25/librarians-workingtogether [http://perma.cc/PE6E-3435].
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REJUVENATING PRIVACY LAW THROUGH TRUST

Privacy law’s legacy of harm and control has left our privacy torts useless and
the FIPs threadbare. Privacy law is not just pessimistic. It is worn out. In this Part,
we show how trust can rejuvenate privacy law and policy.
First, trust can add nuance and force to foundational privacy concepts such as
confidentiality, transparency and security by reimagining them as discretion, honesty, and protection. In addition to rejuvenating old privacy concepts, we introduce loyalty as a foundational concept in privacy law. We argue that entrustees
have a duty to avoid unreasonable and dangerous self-dealing. These concepts are
not new. They are foundations of one of the most established legal concepts involving trust in relationships: the law of fiduciaries.
A. Relying on Fiduciaries
The best place to look for wisdom on how to secure trust is from relationships that are defined by trust—fiduciaries. Fiduciaries are an ancient concept in
the common law, and the central goal of fiduciary law is to protect against the exploitation of a vulnerability created by trust in another.101 From this perspective,
fiduciary relationships are the paradigm case for law enabling trust by imposing
duties such as care, loyalty, and confidentiality. It should thus be no surprise that
most if not all fiduciary relationships also fit within the larger category we have
been calling “information relationships.”
A few prominent privacy and cyberlaw scholars have also suggested that privacy law might take cues from the law of fiduciaries. Jack Balkin has proposed
looking to the law of fiduciaries in the privacy context, explaining that “[t]he concept of an information fiduciary helps us understand how we might protect digital
privacy while not running afoul of the First Amendment. . . . Traditionally, a fiduciary is a person who has a relationship of trust with a party (the beneficiary),
and who is authorized to hold something valuable—for example—the beneficiary’s

101. Leib, supra note 79, at 732; J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES (1981); Robert C.
Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS 55 (John W. Pratt &
Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985); Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991); Kenneth B.
Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking—Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW. U. L.
REV. 1 (1985); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 37
DUKE L.J. 879 (1988); Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L.
REV. 303 (1999); Robert Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L.
393 (2007); Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, 9 OX. J. LEGAL STUD. 285 (1989) [hereinafter Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation]; Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795
(1983); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1675 (1990); Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promised Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy,
and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897; L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69; J.C. Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 L. Q.
REV. 51 (1981); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1399 (2002); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1975).
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assets or other property—and manage them on the beneficiary’s behalf.”102 Daniel
Solove has also suggested looking to the law of fiduciaries as a way to guide sound
policy in the age of data brokers who collect an overwhelming amount of personal information.103
We agree with Balkin and Solove that the concept of fiduciaries helpfully reorients privacy and crystalizes the concept of trust in information relationships.
To be clear, though, we are not recommending that all relationships of trust
should automatically be considered as fiduciary in nature. Imposition of the full
panoply of fiduciary duties is a serious and burdensome decision. But the law need
not face the binary choice of treating information relationships as either “fiduciary” or “unprotected.” Surely some middle ground exists between these two extremes. Accordingly, we recommend that duties inspired by fiduciary law can apply in a flexible and variable way across the full spectrum of information
relationships.
In relationships where vulnerabilities are minimized because there is only a
small amount of trust, these remedies should be applied sparingly or lightly.
Where there is greater trust (or greater potential for exposure), entrustees should
be held to higher duties of care and loyalty. Rather than relying on a rigid fiduciary/nonfiduciary distinction, we propose a more flexible approach that recognizes
the role of trust is all information relationships. Yet our fundamental point is that
the law of fiduciary relationship can helpfully shed light on the specific duties and
actions that promote and erode trust.
B. Improving the Existing FIPs
Although the FIPs are worn out, they remain the foundational structure for
the regulation of personal data, not only in the United States, but throughout the
world.104 Replacing the FIPs entirely would be a daunting task. But fortunately,
what is needed is not the replacement of the FIPs, but rather their rejuvenation
from a procedural means of manufacturing consent into a substantive system of
regulating the processing of personal data in the interests of all. Trust can provide
the source of that rejuvenation, allowing us to rethink the FIPs in ways that are
positive, substantive, and inspiring, rather than pessimistic, procedural, and depressing. When viewed through the lens of trust-building the existing FIPs of
Confidentiality, Transparency, and Security become the substantive obligations of
Discretion, Honesty, and Protection. Even more importantly, when we thinking
about privacy in terms of trust suggests the adoption of a new Fair Information
Practice: Loyalty.
102. Jack Balkin, Information Fiduciaries in the Digital Age, BALKINIZATION,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/information-fiduciaries-in-digital-age.html
[http://perma.cc/T65R-MNZB]. Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First
Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1183 (2016).
103. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (2006).
104. See Gellman, supra note 4.

Spring 2016]

TAKING TRUST SERIOUSLY IN PRIVACY LAW

459

Our proposed modifications are not merely word games. Discretion, Honesty, Protection, and Loyalty offer an alternative vision of privacy protection that
escapes the Harm Principle and the Control Illusion. They identify the substantive
values that privacy law should embrace if it is to promote the trust that is essential
for sustainable information relationships. But critically, when we argue that privacy law should promote trust, this requires a meaningful, substantive level of
trust rather than trickery. By contrast, our vision for a rejuvenated, positive theory of privacy protection requires real trust; trust that is accountable. It is for this
reason that the substantive principle of loyalty must be understood as essential to
the information privacy law project.
1.

Confidentiality as Discretion

The concept of confidentiality is perhaps the earliest and most foundational
in all of privacy law.105 Despite its entrenched and robust presence in the doctrine, confidentiality is a surprisingly under-developed concept. In most forms of
existing regulation, confidentiality is conceptualized merely as nondisclosure. For
example, the limited tort of breach of confidentiality prohibited those within confidential relationships from divulging confidential information to any unauthorized parties.106 As a FIP, confidentiality is articulated as a mere limit on disclosure. This can either take a vague form like “there shall be limits on the external
disclosures of information about an individual a record-keeping organization may
make,”107 or be tethered to the purpose of collection and contingent upon the
consent of the data subject.108
Conceptualizing confidentiality solely in terms of nondisclosure obligations
has limited this otherwise dependable, bedrock concept. In many ways, characterizing confidentiality solely in terms of nondisclosure is like characterizing safe
sexual practices solely in terms of abstinence—it’s effective, but risks overkill and
is often too costly. Because confidentiality is so restricting, most people in information relationships are not confidants. They are free to share the information
with whomever they wish. The law is rightfully reluctant to make most recipients
of information bound by a legal obligation of confidentiality. People need to be
able to share most of the information they receive, whether they are businesses
and intermediaries or friends and acquaintances.
105. Richards & Solove, supra note 67, at 135.
106. Id.
107. Privacy Protection Study Commission (PPSC) report, Personal Privacy in an Infor-

mation Society at 501-502 (1977), http://epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report
[http://perma.cc/L4MG-VMUK].
108. OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data (1980)
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransbor
derflowsofpersonaldata.htm [http://perma.cc/98M6-3BBX] (“Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in accordance
with [the Purpose Specification Principle] except: a) with the consent of the data subject; or b)
by the authority of law.”).
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Yet people still trust recipients of personal information who are not confidants not to hurt them with that personal information. Is there a middle ground
between confidentiality and “every man for himself”? We argue that there is.
There are ways other than rigid nondisclosure that entrustees can protect trustors. They can limit to whom they disclose information, they can limit what they
share with others, and they can control how they share information to make sure
they preserve the trust placed in them. We argue that entrustees can combine all
of these strategies: nondisclosure, limited disclosure, trustworthy recipients, and
obfuscation to be discreet.
Perhaps the most basic assumption people make when disclosing personal information is that the recipient will be discreet. Discretion, defined as “the quality
of behaving or speaking in such a way as to avoid causing offense or revealing
private information,”109 is an implicit part of most information relationships.110
We trust doctors not to reveal information about our health and mental state; we
trust lovers not to kiss and tell; and we trust ISPs and search engines not to reveal
our search history. In information relationships, the quickest way to betray a trust
is indiscretion: revealing personal information to the wrong person or in the
wrong way.
The most robust form of discretion is confidentiality, which we have elsewhere characterized as an obligation of nondisclosure in relationships.111 Discretion is a broader concept than confidentiality, as it recognizes that trust can be
preserved even when the trustee shares information in limited ways. Our disclosures on social media demonstrate this notion of discretion as “appropriate disclosure.”
Most disclosures on social network sites like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram are not confidential. Yet there is an expectation that they are less than “public”—that they will not be read by most people, just by our friends or perhaps our
“friends” in the Facebook sense. Professor Lior Strahilevitz has observed this phenomenon and argued that privacy law should take a lesson from the way we expect our disclosures to travel through our offline social networks.112 Strahilevitz
explains that “given the . . . ease with which juicy secrets can spread among people, one might expect that we would play our cards close to our vests, refusing to
reveal these embarrassing details to anyone. Yet it is likely that most of us have

109. Discretion, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARIES,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/discretion
[http://perma.cc/U5EP-T6DZ].
110. Lee Rainie et al., Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
(Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/05/anonymity-privacy-and-securityonline [http://perma.cc/MSP9-27Q3], (detailing the importance of control over information
and importance of authorization of recipients); Susannah Fox, Trust and Privacy Online, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (Aug. 20, 2000), http://www.pewinternet.org/2000/08/20/trust-andprivacy-online [http://perma.cc/2EDC-THU2].
111. Richards & Solove, supra note 67.
112. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919
(2005).
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shared our most embarrassing details with other people: spouses, siblings, parents, best friends, clergy, psychiatrists, coworkers, or perhaps even strangers on
transatlantic flights . . . . By common parlance, we still consider these facts to be
“secrets” even after we have revealed them to a handful of people.”113 Strahilevitz
draws from sociology, network theory, and related disciplines to argue that people make risk calculations when sharing information. They often assume that
their disclosures will stay within certain social networks even if it doesn’t remain
completely confidential.114 Such calculations rely not merely on notions of practical obscurity, but on discretion as well.115
So trust is preserved when entrustees exercise sound discretion in choosing
what and to whom personal information is revealed. It can also be preserved
when individuals refrain from becoming entrustees. But at its core, discretion
protects against wrongful disclosure, and nondisclosure enables our ability to
make friendships, communicate with other people, and participate in society.116
As Daniel Solove explains, “social judgment and social norms can impede these
practices . . . . Protection against disclosure shields us from the harshness of social
judgment, which, if left unregulated, could become too powerful and oppressive.”117
When people are confident that their entrustees will be discreet with their
personal information, they become free to engage in commercial and social activities that form the basis of modern society.118 We gossip, we love, we shop, and
we seek help. This has benefits not just for the individual, but also for society as a
whole. Commercial activity keeps the lights on. Seeking help from medical professionals benefits public health. The exploration of political beliefs leads to a better-informed electorate, better political decisions, and potentially better leaders.
All because entrustees remain discreet.
Privacy law should embrace discretion, which reflects the blurry and contextual lines between “public” and “private.” Regulators, legislators, and judges should
create some kind of obligation on entrustees to obfuscate disclosures such that the
general public or specifically unauthorized parties are unlikely to find or understand entrusted information, even when the information relationship is not

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See generally Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity,

101 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2013); Lauren Gellman, Privacy, Free Speech, and ‘Blurry-Edged’ Social Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1315 (2009).
116. Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1064 (2003).
117. Id. (“People’s lives in the public sphere are precarious, for they are constantly subject
to the judgment of others and to the sting of social sanctions. It is because people care so much
about their public lives, about how others in society regard and treat them, that protection
against disclosure is important.”).
118. Obligations of nondisclosure also allow people to disclose information that might be
used against them, such as credit card numbers, health conditions, and any number of other
kinds of personal information that can lead to lost employment, identity theft, and reputational
harm.
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strictly confidential. The tort of breach of confidentiality could be enhanced by
taking discretion into account. The Federal Trade Commission could find a lack
of discretion in some instances to be an unfair or deceptive trade practice. Such
laws could look to whether entrustees made sure that recipients of data were
trustworthy or whether they ensured that certain kinds of information were not
publicly available through search engines like Google.
2.

Transparency as Honesty

One of the bedrock notions of privacy law is that companies should be transparent about their data collection, use, and disclosure practices so that individuals
will be on notice of any potentially worrisome practices and can tailor their disclosures accordingly.119 The FIPs refer to this as the “Openness,” that “[t]here
should be a general policy of openness about developments, practices and policies
with respect to personal data. Means should be readily available to establish the
existence and nature of personal data, and the main purposes of their use, as well
as the identity and usual residence of the data controller.”120 The law and regulations built upon the FIPs often refer to this as “notice and choice,” which we discussed above.
In a notice and choice regime, mere disclosure and transparency is usually
sufficient to relieve a company of its legal obligations. As long as the data collector
is putting its practices out there, it often does not matter whether the data subject
reads or even knows about an entrustee’s data practices. This is the Choice Illusion in practice. But if trust is to be kept, it is not sufficient to be merely “open” or
“transparent.” Trust in information relationships requires an affirmative obligation of honesty to correct misinterpretations and to actively dispel notions of mistaken trust.
At a minimum, entrustees must be honest and open with those who disclose
personal information to them. The duty of candor and disclosure is a significant
one for fiduciaries.121 Generally speaking, fiduciary trustees should keep those to
119. See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1027, 1049 (2012) (citing Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory
System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (2007) (“[D]isclosure schemes comport with the prevailing political philosophy in that disclosure preserves individual choice while avoiding direct
governmental interference.”)); Joel Reidenberg, et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the
Notice and Choice Framework, 11 I/S: A J. OF L. & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y 485 (2015).
120. OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data, OECD
http://www.oecd.org/internet/interneteconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandt
ransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm [http://perma.cc/GWP4-8YNY].
121. Ethan J. Leib, Friends As Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665, 675 (2009) (“This may
take the form of requiring doctors to reveal their personal financial interests to their patients
(even when those interests are “unrelated to the patient’s health”) or it may take the form of a
general “accounting” requirement, necessitating accurate bookkeeping subject to inspection by
the beneficiary as well as the disclosure of all relevant information pertaining to the relationship.”); Balkin, supra note 102 (“The fiduciary’s duty of loyalty may also create a duty of honesty
to disclose to the beneficiary how the fiduciary is handling the assets or property.”).
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whom they are accountable informed. This means accommodating requests for
inspection and either affirmatively disclosing or making information available
upon request.122 One rationale for this obligation is that trustees must have the
information necessary in order for them to be able to enforce the obligations of
the trustee.123 Obligations of transparency and honestly also help ensure that the
trustees are complying with their duty of care and duty of loyalty.
Beyond the narrow category of legal fiduciaries such as trustees, principles of
honesty are essential to information relationships more generally. Earlier in our
argument, we explained that while the Control Illusion is part of Privacy Pessimism, the problem is one of excessive weight placed on individuals to manage
their own privacy from complex, generalized, and often hidden notices. Honesty,
by contrast, requires more affirmative steps than passive notice, and includes an
obligation to make sure that trusters are actually aware of things that matter to
them.124 It takes the fiction out of constructive notice to require actual notice.
Honesty also serves the additional function of forcing companies to take stock of
their information practices in order to be accurate when keeping individuals informed.125
A focus on honesty can also drive particularized remedies designed to build
and maintain trust. California has already mandated privacy policies for mobile
apps. GLB and COPPA also require notice. FTC Commissioner Julie Brill’s “Reclaim Your Name” campaign, which is designed to increase data broker transparency, is a promising approach for building consumer trust in disclosing personal
information.126
To be sure, there are many obstacles to ever fully “informing” individuals
about a certain practice or risk.127 Information can be too vast or complex to convey, and the audiences can be too diverse. The goal should not be more notice,
but better notice. But the goal of honesty-based disclosure in these sorts of cases is
broader than just informing. While notice rules are horrible at informing people,

122. Id.
123. This guiding principle can be seen in the law of irrevocable trusts. See, e.g., Lauren Z.

Curry, Agents in Secrecy: The Use of Information Surrogates in Trust Administration, 64 VAND. L.
REV. 925, 929 (2011) (“Under the most basic principle, a beneficiary of an irrevocable trust is
always entitled to information about the trust that is reasonably necessary to allow the beneficiary to enforce the trust, even if the terms of the trust restrict disclosure.”).
124. Calo, supra note 119.
125. Peter P. Swire, The Surprising Virtues of the New Financial Privacy Law, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 1263, 1264-65 (2002) (“[C]ritics have largely overlooked . . . important benefits from these
notices. Perhaps most significantly, publication of the notices and the new legal obligation to
comply with them have forced financial institutions to engage in considerable self-scrutiny as to
their data handling practices.”).
126. Julie Brill, Demanding Transparency From Data Brokers, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/demanding-transparency-from-databrokers/2013/08/15/00609680-0382-11e3-9259-e2aafe5a5f84_story.html
[http://perma.cc/2LMD-ZLPV].
127. See generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE FAILURE OF MANDATED
DISCLOSURE (2014).
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they can be very good at generating the skepticism necessary to avoid a misplaced
trust. Information practices that are secret or shrouded in secrecy are inherently
untrustworthy. Faced with such practices, skeptics act more judiciously or refrain
entirely from accepting risk, even if they aren’t entirely sure of what they are
avoiding or how likely an undesired action or effect is.
“If I had only known” is a common response by victims of alleged wrongdoing
by others. This refrain is based upon the theory that if certain information had
been presented, the would-be victim could have acted differently, or at least
knowingly accepted her fate. The idea of notice as savior is the foundation for
many disclosure-based regulatory regimes such as privacy policies, Miranda
warnings, informed consent, and health warnings on unhealthy products.128
However, the discussion surrounding notice too often misses the fact that individuals need not fully appreciate risk in order to avoid it. They only need to become skeptical enough to avoid a misplaced trust. If companies or government
entities want to avoid creating skeptics, they must embrace and protect the trust
users place in them and be honest and transparent.
There are several ways the law might implement honesty requirements.
Mandated disclosure regimes might be leveraged to help build trust or, in the
least, encourage the kind of skepticism we have mentioned above. Mandated disclosure regimes such as privacy policies, nutrition labels, or informed consent are
popular because they are relatively cheap and use a soft regulatory touch. But they
are also seen as ineffective, particularly with respect to privacy policies.129 No one
reads the fine print on websites and mobile apps, nor should they be expected to.
A focus on trust might remedy the problems with privacy policies as a tool
for consumers. While it is one thing for a company to be forced to list in the fine
print the ways in which it collects and shares people’s information, it is something
else entirely for a company to be forced to admit, “You cannot trust us to be discreet, honest, loyal, or protective.” Indications of trust are more intuitive and useful to consumers than dry recitations of what types of information are collected
and vague assurances that personal information will only be disclosed to “third
party affiliates.”
Another way privacy law could better encourage and protect trust is to better
situate the concept within the existing law of deception and fraud. Courts and
policymakers could find that when people and companies invite or encourage
trust, they are making a representation that they must keep. Under this notion, to
breach a trust is to deceive. Equating a breached trust with deception will empower the Federal Trade Commission to declare certain breached trusts a deceptive
trade practice under Section 5.130
Betrayed trusters could also look to the tort of fraud or the law of contracts.
This approach would be similar to the finding of an implied confidence, where
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 15 U.S.C § 45; Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common

Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014).
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even though no explicit promise of privacy was made, the surrounding norms and
context make it clear a trust was invited and a reasonable person would expect it
to be maintained.131
Trust need not be exclusively a matter of government policy. Companies can
also voluntarily adopt trust-enhancing internal policies, safeguards, and organizational schemes. As with data security, companies can segment entrusted information from less critical data and limit the accessibility of the information. Company executives can make trust a priority by requiring employee training,
enshrining trustworthy practices in employee manuals and regularly enforcing
these obligations. Companies can delete data when it is no longer needed and collect no more information than is necessary for the information relationship. Even
if a company accidentally fails to be discreet or protective, it can help maintain
trust by creating and implementing a response plan for when a trust is breached.
Because trust is good for business, companies should be competing to be the
most trustworthy. Companies that earn the trust of their users will get more information and sales. Consumers that trust companies will have less reason to flee
to competitors who might be less trustworthy. The end result is that the information economy can flourish while still protecting consumers. Everyone wins,
except the untrustworthy.
3.

Security as Protection

Attackers have always sought unauthorized access to personal information.
This is why file cabinets have long contained locks and even the earliest databases
were protected by passwords. Such stores of information were maintained by
“secretaries,” a profession dating to medieval times as “one who is entrusted with
private or secret matters; a confidant; one privy to a secret.”132
Tort law has been slow to recognize data security obligations because harms
from data breaches can be very difficult to prove.133 (This is of course but another
manifestation of the harm fixation). By contrast, the FIPs have always required
data security, with language usually along the lines of “personal data should be
protected by reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure of data.”134 Policymakers
have tended to interpret security requirements in terms of the process data holders must take to protect against attackers.135 This mainly consists of regularly auditing data assets and risk, minimizing data, implementing technical, physical, and

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Woodrow Hartzog, Reviving Implied Confidentiality, 89 IND. L.J. 763, 764 (2014).
Secretary, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2015).
See infra Part II.
OECD PRIVACY GUIDELINES, supra note 120, at § 5.
See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Commission Statement Marking the FTC’s 50th Data
Security Settlement (Jan. 31, 2014),
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140131gmrstatement.pdf
[http://perma.cc/WH5U-66AF]; 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a) (2015); 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 6801-6809.
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administrative safeguards, and creating and following a data breach response
plan.136
New threats to data require a more holistic approach to data security than just
protecting held data. Entrustees must adopt a mentality of data stewardship,
which includes protecting information passed on to others. Put simply, in order
to preserve a trust, entrustees must protect data, not just secure databases. This
requires going beyond firewalls and passwords and affirmatively acting in the interest of data holders. This is the obligation of Protection.
While there are antecedents to Protection from common law duties owed by
bodyguards (for physical protection) and banks and lawyers (for protection of secrets and money), Protection has taken on particular importance in the digital
age.
In the early 2000s it became clear that personal data was a critical component
of our national infrastructure and that external threats to personal data were
mounting. The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse has reported that since 2005 there
have been over 4,400 data breaches made public with a total of over 932 million
records breached.137 Such estimates are even more startling given that they fail to
include the vast number of data breaches that companies have not reported and
the unknown number of breaches occurred without companies realizing that they
have happened. Data protection is largely hidden from consumers, who typically
have no way of knowing how securely their data is being held, or even if databases containing their personal information have been compromised. People in
this situation (which is to say, all of us) can only hope that companies will reasonably protect the data that has been entrusted to them.138
That data is constantly under attack is no secret. Almost every week a national story breaks detailing the latest data breach, leading 2014 to be dubbed by some
as “the year of the breach.”139 Most individuals likely anticipate that trustees will
keep information reasonably safe.140 This was highlighted by the recent massive
Office of Personnel Management data breach, where a number of commenters

136. Id.
137. Chronology of Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE,

http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach [http://perma.cc/T2F9-BFF8].
138. BRUCE SCHNEIER, LIARS AND OUTLIERS: ENABLING THE TRUST THAT SOCIETY NEEDS TO
THRIVE (2012).
139. See, e.g., P.J. Smith, Lessons Learned from 2014: The Year of the Breach, WIRED
INNOVATION INSIGHTS (Dec. 26, 2014, 10:41 AM),
http://insights.wired.com/profiles/blogs/lessons-learned-from-2014-the-year-of-the-breach
[http://perma.cc/U8U3-FZB9]; Tara Seals, 2014 So Far: The Year of the Data Breach,
INFORMATION SECURITY (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/2014the-year-of-the-data-breach [http://perma.cc/NLR7-2RSA]; Daniel Fisher, If 2014 Was the Year
of the Data Breach, Brace for More, FORBES (Jan. 2, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/01/02/if-2014-was-the-year-of-the-databreach-brace-for-more [http://perma.cc/Q9X3-B7GF].
140. HELEN NISSENBAUM, Will Security Enhance Trust, or Supplant It?, in TRUST AND
DISTRUST WITHIN ORGANIZATIONS: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES, ENDURING QUESTIONS 155 (Roderick Kramer & Karen Cook eds., 2004).
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stated a betrayal of their trust in the government to protect their highly sensitive
personal information.141
People need to be able to trust that entities will protect their data against attackers. Computer company Lenovo breached its users’ trust when it surreptitiously installed malware on its new laptops. This code altered users’ search results
to show them different ads than they would otherwise have seen.142 The secret
deployment of the malware also weakened the laptops’ security settings, exposing
the computer’s browsing history to hackers with the ability to use a particular exploit against the software. In addition to being dishonest and disloyal, this weakening of the computers’ security settings violated the duty of Protection.143
Protection means more than just setting up a few technical safeguards like
firewalls, user authentication requirements, and encryption. It requires a more
complete commitment to data protection that includes having procedures to
regularly audit the stores of personal information and continuously assess risk using updated threat models, minimizing data collection and storage, instituting
procedural and physical safeguards, and preparing a response plan in case of a
breach.
Data protection also involves more than just data security. It involves protecting the identity and sensitive attributes of those in stored and released data
sets. This means as a practical matter that Discretion will often be essential to
protect security as well. The government of New York City betrayed the trust of
its tourists and citizens when it released data on 173 million individual taxi trips
that were improperly deidentified, inadvertently making it trivial to identify people in the data set.144 Data sets (big or small) that are shared with others must also
be properly scrubbed and protected to minimize the risk that any particular individual will be re-identified. Requirements of this sort are particularly important
now that data science is getting better at reidentifying allegedly “anonymized” data
sets.145 More robust techniques of deidentification are being developed, such as
k-anonymity and differential privacy, and Protection requires that entrustees (es141. Jamie Winterton, How OPM Betrayed Me, SLATE (July 16, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/07/opm_security_clearance_hac
k_i_trusted_the_government_it_betrayed_me.html?wpsrc=sh_all_dt_tw_top
[http://perma.cc/79FT-VEW2].
142. Rosenblat, Lenovo’s Superfish Security Snafu Blows Up in Its Face, supra note 55.
143. Id.
144. Alex Hern, New York Taxi Details Can Be Extracted from Anonymized Data, Researchers
Say, THE GUARDIAN (June 27, 2014, 10:57 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/27/new-york-taxi-details-anonymiseddata-researchers-warn [http://perma.cc/PKV3-A4F4].
145. See generally Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure
of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010); Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons,
25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2011); Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1117 (2013); Daniel Barth-Jones, The ‘Re-Identification’ of Governor William Weld’s
Medical Information: A Critical Re-Examination of Health Data Identification Risks and Privacy Protections, Then and Now (June 18, 2012), http://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Reidentification-of-Governor-Welds-Medical-Information-Daniel-Barth-Jones.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4BLU-FF6T].
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pecially sophisticated commercial ones) stay abreast of such Protection innovations.146
Just as our physical security is a combination of technologies like door locks
and legal prohibitions on burglary and assault, so too must data Protection rely on
law as well as technologies and marked protections. Such legal protections can include contracts prohibiting recipients from reidentification attempts and obligating them to mandate their duties as entrustees to all downstream holders of the
data.147 For example, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and
the FTC recently suggested that those who receive anonymized data, whether it
be researchers or companies, must promise in advance (preferably via contract)
not to attempt to reidentify it.148 The data security threats our digital society faces
are complex, and we should not shirk from sophisticated, multilayered solutions
along these lines. Protection of personal data demands no less.
C. Introducing Loyalty as a Foundational Privacy Value
One of the foundational obligations of a fiduciary is loyalty, which is an obligation to avoid in self-dealing at the expense of the entrustee.149 Yet the concept
of loyalty is completely missing from privacy law that regulates those who accept
information in a fiduciary-like context. We propose that trust in information relationships can be promoted by establishing loyalty as a foundational concept in
privacy law.
Personal information is valuable. In the technology industry, it is commonplace to state that “data is the new oil,” meaning a fundamental source of value in
the information economy.150 People are becoming wise to the fact that “free” services are only free in the sense that companies do not charge money for them.
Their cost is frequently an implicit or unwitting transaction of the customer’s personal information and mental attention to advertisements targeted on the basis of

146. See generally Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. COLO. L. REV.
1117 (2013).
147. See generally Robert Gellman, The Deidentification Dilemma: A Legislative and Contractual Proposal, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 33 (2010); Woodrow Hartzog,
Chain-Link Confidentiality, 46 GA. L. REV. 657 (2012).
148. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 FED. REG. 44,512,
44,519-20 (July 26, 2011); FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 2 (2012),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-reportprotecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf ,
William McGeveran et al., Deidentification and Reidentification in Returning Individual Findings
from Biobank and Secondary Research: Regulatory Challenges and Models for Management, 13 MINN.
J. L. SCI. & TECH 485 (2012); Robert Gellman, supra note 147.
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt. a (“A trustee . . . is under a duty not
to profit at the expense of the beneficiary . . . unless authorized to do so by the terms of the
trust.”); Ethan J. Leib, supra note 79.
150. ANGWIN, supra note 7, at 32.
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that data.151 Given the commercial value of personal data, it is not surprising that
entrustees in information relationships are tempted to use personal information
they receive for their own benefit.
The duty of loyalty is a bedrock principle of the law of fiduciaries. A trustee,
for example, cannot lend entrusted funds to herself; nor can trust property be
bought by a trustee unless explicitly authorized by the trust instrument.152 The
rationale behind the obligation to avoid self-dealing is to cut off avenues for
fraud. As one court put it, “The rule is founded in the highest wisdom. It recognizes the infirmity of human nature, and interposes a barrier against the operation of selfishness and greed. It discourages fraud by taking away motive for its
perpetration.”153 Formal trustees are bound to act in the interest of the principal.
Outside the formal context of fiduciary law, not all self-dealing will betray
trust. Companies can legitimately use entrusted personal information to their
benefit in many different ways. Data can be mined to offer and improve services,
effectively anonymized for public research, and even shared with others also willing to preserve a trust. Facebook leverages the personal information of its users to
create a precise advertising service. One of Amazon’s most valuable features is its
recommendation system, which relies upon user data.154 Websites routinely
share deidentified data with others for profit and to simply fine-tune their services.155
Such activities are loyal only up to a point, as personal information can quite
easily be used to the detriment of trusters. Recall that when we trust others by
disclosing our personal information, we expose our vulnerabilities. We regularly
expose our preferences, our weaknesses, our desires, and our tendencies to act in
a certain way. Disclosure creates power in trustees who can exploit our personal
information for their own gain.
The law of consumer protection, for example, is littered with examples of
disloyal companies that have misused personal information entrusted to them, for
example by using credit card information or other financial data to engage in un-

151. Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s
Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606 (2014); Jan Whittington & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Unpacking Privacy’s Price, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1327 (2012).
152. See In re Noonan’s Estate, 63 A.2d 80, 83 (Pa. 1949) (holding the executor liable
for self-dealing in selling the trust property where he had a personal interest in
the transaction that might affect his judgment); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 170(1) cmt. b (1959) (“A trustee with power to sell trust property is under a duty not to sell to
himself . . . [even if he] acts in good faith . . . [and] pays a fair consideration.”).
153. In re Ryan’s Will, 52 N.E.2d 909, 923-24 (N.Y. 1943) (quoting Justice Kent in Bergen v. Bennett, 1 Caines, Cas., 19); see also Charles Bryan Baron, Self-Dealing Trustees and the
Exoneration Clause: Can Trustees Ever Profit from Transactions Involving Trust Property?, 72 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 43 (2012).
154. Richards, Social Reading, supra note 99.
155. See, e.g., Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar & Jack Gillum, HealthCare.gov Quietly Sharing Personal Data, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2015),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/20/healthcaregov-quietly-sharingpersonal-data/?page=all [perma.cc/PLG4-ADUA].
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authorized transactions. In FTC v. Hill, the FTC alleged that defendant used consumers’ financial and credit card data to “pay for goods or services without the
consumers’ consent.”156 Less nefarious, but equally disloyal, was Orbitz’s tactic of
showing pricier hotel rooms to users it knew were using Apple computers, based
upon the assumption that these users were used to paying more for goods and
services.157
Disloyalty can take a variety of forms, many of which are not merely financial. Consider the Facebook emotional contagion experiment, in which researchers manipulated Facebook’s news feed by, among other things, showing fewer
positive posts to some users to see if they would lead to greater user expressions
of sadness.158 Exploiting the power to make trusters unwittingly sad (or angry, or
hungry, or aroused) is the definition of disloyalty.
Consider also Uber, the app-based transportation network and taxi company.
Uber is entrusted with incredibly sensitive data beyond financial information, including where its users currently are, where they have been, and where they are
going. The company created an interface it ominously called “God View,” which
let administrators see all of the cars in a city as well as the users who are waiting
for cars.159 When “God Mode” was used to entertain corporate party-goers by
pointing out one-night stands, this was not loyal. (It had many other issues, of
course, including not being discreet). More infamously, Uber was disloyal when it
contemplated mining its database to find information to smear journalists who
were critical of its business.160 In such cases, the threat of exposure has ramifications not just for the journalists who used Uber, but political and free expression
ones from its chilling of public debate.
Ryan Calo has helpfully coined the term “digital market manipulation” to describe this practice of leveraging personal information against consumers in mediated environments.161 Calo argues that some manipulations of users which exploit vulnerabilities should be legally actionable.162 Our theory of privacy as trust

156. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. Sitesearch
(D.Ariz., Dec. 22, 2014),
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/141223leaplabcmpt.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4U7C-DQ6K].
157. Dana Mattioli, On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered to Pricier Hotels, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23,
2012, 6:07 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304458604577488822667325882 [perma.cc/X23K-TJDJ].
158. Dewey, 9 Answers About Facebook’s Creepy Emotional-Manipulation Experiment, supra
note 8.
159. Kashmir Hill, ‘God View’: Uber Allegedly Stalked Users For Party-Goers Viewing Pleasure,
FORBES (Oct. 3, 2014, 11:32 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/10/03/godview-uber-allegedly-stalked-users-for-party-goers-viewing-pleasure [perma.cc/MXV5-68P7].
160. Ben Smith, Uber Executive Suggests Digging Up Dirt on Journalists, BUZZFEED (Nov. 17,
2014, 6:57 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/bensmith/uber-executive-suggests-digging-updirt-on-journalists#.guwMYyV65 [perma.cc/RH8R-XFJE].
161. Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, supra note 75.
162. Id.
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helps to explain why this should be the case, by better capturing the essence of the
wrongdoing (here, as trust-destroying disloyalty).
More broadly, many of our deep-seeded fears about “big data,” genetic information, and discrimination are at base fears about disloyalty.163 After a recent
public investigation of big data’s discriminatory potential,164 the FTC expressed
its serious concerns about the use of big data analytics to unfairly exclude lowerincome consumers.165 Similar fears of digital “redlining” undergird the White
House’s study of big data.166 Companies could use big data to exclude disadvantaged populations from the marketplace. Much of this exclusion could be justified
as fair competition. However, the law should prohibit unreasonable self-dealing
and regulate disloyal entrustees of information. This could be done through presumptions of trust created via tort law by expanding the breach of confidentiality
tort or through regulatory mechanisms like a consumer privacy bill of rights or
Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair and deceptive trade practices.
But regardless of how it is implemented, loyalty is essential to any theory of privacy that meaningfully safeguards trust.
V.

CONCLUSION

We have thought about privacy in pessimistic and outdated terms for too
long. Uses of personal information can certainly cause anxiety and stimulate feelings of creepiness, they can absolutely cause harm, and individual choice certainly
will have an appropriate role to play in our digital future. But Privacy Pessimism
is a limited and incomplete way of conceptualizing questions of personal information and new technologies. It looks only to the costs of privacy rules rather
than their benefits, and in so doing blinkers our vision, preventing us from imagining ways in which privacy rules can create value rather than impose costs and
inefficiencies.
Understanding privacy in terms of its ability to promote trust solves the
problem of Privacy Pessimism. Information relationships have long been essential
to our lives, and the growth of digital networked technologies has only deepened
their importance. Our venerable information relationships with doctors, lawyers,
and merchants recognized the importance of information rules, and how those
rules could produce the trust necessary for the kinds of long-term relationships
that served the interests of trusters, entrustees, and society as a whole. Yet these
understandings were perhaps so obviously correct as to be implicit and rarely re-

163. Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671

(2016).
164. See FTC, Big Data: A Tool for Inclusion or Exclusion?: Event Webpage, FTC (Sept. 15,
2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2014/09/big-data-tool-inclusion-orexclusion [perma.cc/74CF-6DRF].
165. Id. (“For example, high-income consumers may receive offers for ‘gold level’ credit
cards and low-income consumers may receive offers for subprime credit cards.”).
166. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING
VALUES 46 (May 2014).
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marked upon.
As we embark on the creation of new information relationships involving
new entrustees and new kinds of personal information, we must ensure that the
essential elements of social trust are built into them so that our new relationships
can be as sustainable as our older ones. This observation is, we believe, the most
important contribution this Article makes. Trust is necessary for a sustainable
digital future, and trust-promoting privacy rules can create individual and social
value. If trust becomes a major part of the privacy conversation; if we look beyond
Privacy Pessimism towards a kind of Privacy Optimism that can guide social
norms and legal rules, we believe that our intervention will have been a success.

THE PATHOLOGIES OF DIGITAL CONSENT
NEIL RICHARDS* AND WOODROW HARTZOG**
ABSTRACT
Consent permeates both our law and our lives—particularly in the
digital context. Consent is the foundation of the relationships we have with
search engines, social networks, commercial web sites, and any one of the
dozens of other digitally mediated businesses we interact with regularly. We
are frequently asked to consent to terms of service, privacy notices, the use
of cookies, and so many other commercial practices. Consent is important,
but it’s possible to have too much of a good thing. As scholars have
documented, while consent models permeate the digital consumer
landscape, the practical conditions of these agreements fall far short of the
gold standard of knowing and voluntary consent. Yet as scholars,
advocates, and consumers, we lack a common vocabulary for talking about
the different ways in which digital consents can be flawed.
This article offers four contributions to improve our understanding of
consent in the digital world. First, we offer a conceptual vocabulary of “the
pathologies of consent”—a framework for talking about different kinds of
defects that consent models can suffer, including unwitting consent, coerced
consent, and incapacitated consent. Second, we offer three conditions for
when consent will be most valid in the digital context: when choice is
infrequent, when the potential harms resulting from that choice are vivid
and easy to imagine, and where we have the correct incentives choose
consciously and seriously. The further we fall from these conditions, we
argue, the more a particular consent will be pathological and thus suspect.
Third, we argue that our theory of consent pathologies sheds light on the
so-called “privacy paradox”—the notion that there is a gap between what
consumers say about wanting privacy and what they actually do in practice.
Understanding the “privacy paradox” in terms of consent pathologies
shows how consumers are not hypocrites who say one thing but do another.
On the contrary, the pathologies of consent reveal how consumers can be
nudged and manipulated by powerful companies against their actual
interests, and that this process is easier when consumer protection law falls
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far from the gold standard. In light of these findings, we offer a fourth
contribution—the theory of consumer trust we have suggested in prior work
and which we further elaborate here as an alternative to an over-reliance
on increasingly pathological models of consent.
INTRODUCTION
Consent permeates our law. It is one of its most powerful and most
important building blocks. This should be no wonder. We live in a society
that lionizes individual choice in the many social roles we play every day,
whether as consumers, citizens, family members, voters, lovers, or
employees. Consent reinforces fundamental cultural notions of autonomy
and choice. It transforms the moral landscape between people and makes
the otherwise impossible possible.1 It is essential to the exercise (and
waiver) of fundamental constitutional rights, and it is at the essence of
political freedom, whether we are talking broadly about a “social contract”
or making political choices for individual candidates and referenda in the
voting booth.
Consider the substantial amount of legal work that consent performs. It
is the basis of contracts, whether for goods, services, real estate, or marriage.
The consent of the governed is the basis for the rule of law in democratic
societies and was an important basis for the American Revolution. Consent
can also work magic. When consent is present, trespassers can become
dinner guests, a battery can become a welcome pat on the back, and even
what would otherwise be a sexual assault can become an act of intimacy.2
Consent’s power, its usefulness, and its resonance with norms of
autonomy and choice make it an easy legal tool to reach for when we want
to regulate behavior. Just as activities that have no harm might warrant
lesser (or no) regulation, what consenting adults choose to do together takes
that activity presumptively beyond the law’s regulatory power. This is true
whether the activity happens in the open or behind the proverbial closed
doors. Consent’s power is particularly justified in cases of what we might
1.
For a more developed history of consent for data practices and contemplation of its role, see
NANCY KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS (2019); Elizabeth Edenberg & Meg Leta
Jones, Analyzing the Legal Roots and Moral Core of Digital Consent, 21 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1804
(2019); Meg Leta Jones, The Development of Consent to Computing, 2019 IEEE ANNALS OF THE
HISTORY OF COMPUTING (forthcoming).
2.
Edenberg & Jones, supra note 1, at 1804–05 (“Valid consent can render permissible an
otherwise impermissible action. It transforms the specific relations between the consenter and consentee
about a clearly defined action. We can consent to sexual relations, borrowing a car, surgery, and the use
of personal information. Without consent, the same actions can become sexual assault, theft, battery,
and an invasion of privacy.”).
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call “gold standard” consent—agreements between parties who have equal
bargaining power, significant resources, and who knowingly and voluntarily
agree to assume contractual or other legal obligations.
Perhaps nowhere has consent been deployed more frequently as a legal
concept than in the context of digital goods and services. Consent is the
foundation of the relationships we have with search engines, social
networks, commercial web sites, and any one of the dozens of other digitally
mediated businesses we interact with regularly. We are frequently asked to
consent to terms of service, privacy notices, the use of tracking cookies, and
so many other commercial practices. But it’s possible to have too much of
a good thing. As we and other privacy law scholars have documented
elsewhere, while consent models permeate the digital consumer landscape,
the practical conditions of these agreements fall far short of the gold
standard.3 Think about your own agreements with the social networks you
use, the apps you install on your phone, or the Amazon Alexa that might sit,
listening, in your kitchen or bedroom. Do you know what you agreed to?
Have you read the agreements? Did you have a meaningful choice? While
the answer to these questions is usually “no,” the dominant legal regime that
applies in the United States is that the terms and conditions of these services
are valid as long as there is some kind of “notice and choice” to consumers.4
In practice, and as enforced with occasional exception by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), notice-and-choice models can be legally sufficient
even if the notice is buried somewhere in a dense privacy policy, and the
choice is take-it-or-leave-it—accept what a company wants to do with your
data or not use the service at all.5

3.
See, e.g., NANCY KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS (2013) [hereinafter KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS];
MARGARET RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW
(2012); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy's Trust Gap, 126 YALE L.J. 1180 (2017)
[hereinafter Richards & Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap]; Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking
Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431 (2016) [hereinafter Richards & Hartzog,
Taking Trust Seriously]; Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1880 (2013); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 529
(2007); Scott Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus & the Threat of a Full Disclosure
Future, 105 NW. L. REV. 1153 (2011); Scott Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps
Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security & Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85 (2014).
4.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS iii (2010); Woodrow Hartzog, The
New Price to Play: Are Passive Online Media Users Bound by Terms of Use?, 15 COMM. L. & POL'Y
405 (2010) [hereinafter Hartzog, The New Price to Play].
5.
See, e.g., Richards & Hartzog, Privacy's Trust Gap, supra note 3, at 1198; Richards &
Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 3, at 444.
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While criticism of the over-use of consent in the consumer privacy
context is rising, critics lack a shared vocabulary with which to discuss
when consent is legitimate, when it is flawed, and how to talk about and
distinguish those flaws.6 Our lack of the right words and concepts with
which to talk about defects in consent models runs into the rhetorical,
cultural, and legal power of consent. As a consequence, consent criticism
can fail to gain traction in the minds of those who are undecided or who
have taken consent’s powerful “consenting adults” rhetoric at face value.
This results in a projection of gold standard norms onto the deficient digital
landscape in ways that we want to suggest are pathological. In this article,
we offer a conceptual framework for thinking about when consent is valid
and when it has pathologies, and a conceptual vocabulary for talking about
different kinds of pathologies that consent models can suffer. Our analysis
is focused on the consumer privacy context, but we believe that our model
and the vocabulary of the pathologies of consent can be useful in many of
the other areas of the law in which consent is frequently applied.
Let us be clear about our claim: We are not arguing for a wholesale
rejection of consent. A legal system without consent would be so radically
different from what we have that it would be almost unimaginable. More
fundamentally, we believe that consent should retain its prominent place in
our law generally. Our argument is more nuanced. Consent is undeniably
powerful, and often very attractive. But we have relied upon it too much,
and deployed it in ways and in contexts to do more harm than good, and in
ways that have masked the effects of largely unchecked (and sometimes
unconscionable) power.7 The gold standard of consent to data practices has
been articulated throughout our law as being “knowing and voluntary.”8
European law uses an analogous method to require consent that is “freely
given, specific, informed," and voluntary.9 But this ideal can only exist
6.
See Solove, supra note 3, at 1880–81; see also Edenberg & Jones, supra note 1, at 1810–14
(arguing in favor of locating the normative core of consent for data practices).
7.
See Solove, supra note 3, at 1894.
8.
See infra Part I.
9.
For example, the EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) embodies this
concept by defining “consent” to require “any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous
indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action,
signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her.” Regulation 2016/679, art.
4(32), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 34. Recital 32 of the GDPR explains further that “Consent should be given
by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of
the data subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, such as by a written
statement, including by electronic means, or an oral statement.” Regulation 2016/679, pmbl. ¶ 32, 2016
O.J. (L 119) 1, 6.
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under certain circumstances,10 which is what we hope to illuminate in this
essay. We argue that consent is most valid when we are asked to choose
infrequently, when the potential harms that result from the consent are easy
to imagine, and when we have the correct incentives to consent consciously
and seriously. The further we fall from this gold standard, the more a
particular consent is pathological and thus suspect.
Beyond the conceptual framework and vocabulary, we offer a third
contribution to our understanding in this area. We believe that the theory of
consent pathologies offered here complicates a seductive but simplistic
story that has been offered in tech policy circles for over a decade. This is
the notion of the “privacy paradox”—the idea that consumer anxiety about
privacy is undermined by the fact that consumers act in privacy-diminishing
ways in practice. Understanding this phenomenon in terms of consent
pathologies reveals that consumers are not hypocrites who say one thing but
do another that reveals their true preferences. On the contrary, the
pathologies of consent show how consumers can be nudged and
manipulated by powerful companies against their actual interests, and this
phenomenon is easier when the legal regime that purports to protect
consumers falls far from the gold standard. As a fourth contribution, we
suggest that the solution is not to double down on our increasingly
pathological models of consent, but to look to other mechanisms that are
more sensitive to relationships and power differentials, such as those
designed to inspire the social trust that makes consent less necessary.
Our argument has four parts. In Part I, “the Empire of Consent,” we
survey the many instances of consent in our law, illustrating both the varied
work that consent performs and the varied tests for consent that courts and
legislatures have produced. We show how different legal regimes produce
different formulations on a continuum of how consent should be measured
by the law, and how much consent is necessary in particular contexts.
Toward the more restrictive end of the continuum, models of consent
coalesce around the standard of “knowing and voluntary,” for example in
the relinquishment of a fundamental right such as the right to a jury trial.
Yet in the digital context, the rhetorical practice of many technology
companies is to talk like they are offering informed consent while offering
something far inferior legal or practical matter.

10.
See Edenberg & Jones, supra note 1, at 1805 (“Consent can be legally binding, as long as the
transaction has met certain legal requirements or institutional standards defining the scope of consent.
The legal notion of consent is built on the moral notion; however, problems arise when legally binding
consent fails to capture the relevant morally legitimate transference of rights and obligations.”).
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The heart of our article is Part II, “the Pathologies of Consent,” in which
we offer a conceptual framework of the ways in which consent to data
practices might fall short of the gold standard. We begin with a note on our
methodology, adapted from the method by which the economist Richard
Thaler developed a series of critiques of the dominant rational actor model
in economics, thereby significantly contributing to the development of the
field of behavioral economics.11 We then offer three different sets of
circumstances in which we suspect that consent may be less accurate, useful
or legitimate. First, there is unwitting consent, which takes the “knowing”
out of “knowing and voluntary.” This can take at least three forms, including
not understanding the legal agreement, not understanding the technology
being agreed to, or not understanding the practical consequences or risks of
agreement. Second, there is coerced consent, a consent that takes the
“voluntary” out of “knowing and voluntary,” for example in cases where a
person is confronted with a choice between consent and the loss of an
important asset such as their life or their job. Third, there is incapacitated
consent, in which voluntariness is not available as a matter of law, such as
with children and others who are categorically incapable of legally
consenting.
In Part III, “Ideal Consent,” we suggest a set of preconditions necessary
for consent to achieve the ideal of being knowing and voluntary. Without
these preconditions, we argue that consent models will not be particularly
useful or legitimate. In fact, without these preconditions, consent models for
data practices risk being harmful and corrosive to the very autonomy they
seek to protect. First, the choice to be made must be infrequent (so as not to
overload the capacity of our minds to make rational choices). Second, the
harms which we might incur by granting consent must be vivid (i.e., they
must be easy to imagine).12 Third, the stakes of a decision to consent must
be significant (i.e., there is ample incentive to take each decision seriously).
Consent works well where these three criteria are satisfied. But where some
or all of these criteria are not present, consent starts to lose both its
usefulness and its very legitimacy. We call the presence of these three
factors gold standard consent, and argue that it should be the benchmark
against which the legal and ethical validity of consent are measured.

11.
For Thaler’s own description of his process, see RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE
MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (2016). For an application of this process in privacy law
scholarship, see ANITA ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? (2010).
12.
See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1027, 1027 (2013).
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In Part IV, “Beyond Consent,” we offer a roadmap for a world in which
consent is cabined to the contexts in which it is most effective and most
legitimate. As elsewhere in the paper, we use the example of the laws
regulating consumer technologies powered by human information as our
example. We argue that while consent will and should remain an important
option in the legal toolbox, we should resist the easy but troublesome
tendency of always going to consent in the first instance. In other words, we
argue that consent should not be a common tool in modern data protection
regimes. To use the parlance of Silicon Valley, consent does not scale. It is
almost entirely incompatible with the modern realities of data and
technology in all but the most limited of circumstances.
Instead, building on other work, we propose a privacy framework with a
major focus on the concept of trust.13 Trust-based protections would require
parties in information relationships to protect the data placed in their care
and to treat each other fairly and with deference. They would prohibit
entrusted entities from asking for consent to practices that would make
people unreasonably vulnerable. Lawmakers looking to embrace trust and
minimize the pathologies of consent could leverage rules concerning the
design of technologies and legal prohibitions on consent such as
unconscionability to shift the policy conversation in a way that values both
consent and privacy, and protects the millions and millions of human beings
to whom these rules apply.
I. THE EMPIRE OF CONSENT
Consent flows through our legal system to such an extent that it would
be almost impossible to imagine our law without it. Consent’s importance
in our law has been recognized for generations. Henry Sumner Maine
famously observed in 1861 that “the movement of the progressive societies
has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.”14 Maine’s argument
was that unlike the premodern societies characterized by social interactions
structured by kinship and other forms of hierarchical ordering, modern
societies were increasingly characterized by social interactions structured

13.
See generally Richards & Hartzog, Privacy's Trust Gap, supra note 3; Richards & Hartzog,
Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 3; ARI WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST (2018); Jack Balkin,
Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016).
14.
1 HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 101 (J.H. Morgan ed., J.M. Dent & Sons 1917) (1861).
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by contracts—private agreements whose chief hallmark was consent.15
Consent thus became one of our basic social structures, and if we look for
it, we can see it everywhere.
Let us take a moment to be precise about what we mean here. When we
talk about “consent” in this article, we mean a legal relationship
characterized in form or substance by agreement or a concurrence of wills.16
In a moral sense, we mean to rely on Edenberg and Jones’s definition of
consent as “effective communication of an intentional transfer of rights and
obligations between parties. Valid consent transforms the specific relation
between the consenter and consentee about a clearly defined action.”17 In its
strongest form, as Justice Story memorably put it in 1835, “[c]onsent is an
act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a
balance the good or evil on each side.”18 Yet as we will see below, the
prevalence of consent in our law includes weaker forms, including
presumed consent and even fictive consent. In this Part, we survey at a high
level some of the ways in which Maine’s observation about contractual
ordering has proven correct by showing how our law can be viewed in a
very real sense as an empire of consent.
Perhaps the easiest place to begin an appreciation of the role of consent
in our law is the common law. As all lawyers are familiar, contract law’s
basic elements of offer and acceptance are predicated on the notion of
consent. Contractual consent is objective, meaning it does not matter what
you actually thought you were consenting to, only what you objectively
manifested consent to.19 Contract law also allows consent to alternative
dispute resolution, via arbitration or mediation clauses, at least when such
contracts are not adhesionary, and there is bargaining power between the
contracting parties.20
Property law’s hallmark is the right of alienation—the voluntary right to
agree to transfer one’s property, real or personal—to another.21 This
15.
Katharina Isabel Schmidt, Henry Maine’s “Modern Law”: From Status to Contract and Back
Again?, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 145, 154 (2017).
16.
Cf. Consent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A voluntary yielding to what
another proposes or desires; agreement, approval, or permission regarding some act or purpose, esp.
given voluntarily by a competent person; legally effective assent.”).
17.
Edenberg & Jones, supra note 1, at 1811.
18.
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 222 (1835).
19.
Hartzog, The New Price to Play, supra note 4.
20.
E.g., Sutton's Steel & Supply, Inc. v. Bellsouth Mobility, Inc., 776 So. 2d 589, 597 (La. Ct.
App. 2000).
21.
Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2079 (2012).
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principle runs throughout the law of property, but it is easiest to appreciate
in the rules governing gifts, which require donative intent (a donor
voluntarily intending (i.e., consenting) to give a gift to the donee), delivery
(physical transfer of the gift to the donee), and acceptance (consent to the
gift by the donee).22 Similarly, consent allows exceptions to the right to
exclude, whether by turning a trespasser into a dinner guest, or by allowing
the creation of licenses, easements, and bailments.
Consent is less central in tort law, which imposes duties that flow to the
general population or some subset thereof, like in the case of the duty to
exercise reasonable care. But consent remains important, for it can work to
assume the risks of someone else’s actions. Thus, if you are my karate
instructor, and you negligently (or even recklessly) injure me, I might be
unable to recover if I sue you because I assumed the risk of engaging in the
dangerous sport and consented to spar with you in the first place.23 Or if you
go to watch the Boston Red Sox and are injured by a foul ball, the Red Sox
will probably be immune from suit because you are presumed to have
accepted the risk of injury by consenting to watch them play at Fenway Park
(or wherever).24
With respect to intentional torts like assault, battery, conversion, and
trespass, consent is typically treated as an affirmative defense.25 Consider a
surgical procedure, which would be a legal battery without consent, and
even where some consent is supplied can become a battery again when
consent is exceeded.26 Consider further the important role consent plays in
the complex of “privacy torts,” the subset of intentional torts dealing with
the collection, dissemination, and use of sensitive personal information. The
four torts recognized by William Prosser27—intrusion into seclusion,
disclosure of private facts, false light publicity, and appropriation of
likeness—are all negated by consent to the invasion of privacy.28 Thus, for
example, it violates the intrusion tort when a surgeon photographs a patient
during cosmetic breast surgery, and the patient’s consent form does not
22.
Guardian State Bank & Tr. Co. v. Jacobson, 369 N.W.2d 80, 83–84 (Neb. 1985).
23.
E.g., Levine v. Gross, 704 N.E.2d 262, 263 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
24.
Costa v. Boston Red Sox Baseball Club, 809 N.E.2d 1090 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004).
25.
Consent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16.
26.
E.g., Kaplan v. Mamelak, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
27.
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). For additional background
about the privacy torts and Prosser’s role in their creation, see G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 176–179 (expanded ed. 2003); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J.
Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887 (2010).
28.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2) (1977).
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cover such uses of the photographs.29 Consent to have your image used for
commercial purposes is also a defense to an action for appropriation of
likeness for commercial gain.30 Of course, there are more intentional torts
governing the collection, use, and disclosure of information than the four
recognized by Prosser. A full “expanded set” of privacy torts includes
trespass, breach of confidence, defamation, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.31 Yet even this broader group of torts can be negated by
defense—a trespasser with permission becomes a licensee or even a guest,32
permission to disclose eliminates a duty of confidentiality,33 and you can
permit (or pay) someone to say mean or false things about you. In all of
these cases, if you consent, you cannot sue.
Beyond contracts, property, and tort, consent also plays an important role
in the law regulating family and sexual relations. For over a century, courts
have recognized that “[t]he fundamental principle of all marriage is mutual
consent.”34 This principle was echoed in Obergefell v. Hodges, when the
Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of
marital choice, a concept that runs throughout its analysis.35 The foundation
of the Court’s analysis is thus its statement that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s liberty guarantee “extend[s] to certain personal choices
central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that
define personal identity and beliefs.”36 The Court concluded that “[u]nder
the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal
treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their choices and
diminish their personhood to deny them this right.”37 Consent runs broadly
throughout the rest of family law as well; it can be the difference between a
loving sexual act and sexual assault or rape. The age at which it becomes
legal to engage in sexual activity is of course known as the “age of
29.
Judge v. Saltz Plastic Surgery, 330 P.3d 126 (Utah Ct. App. 2014).
30.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
31.
NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES FOR THE DIGITAL
AGE 158 (2015).
32.
E.g., State v. Pixley, 200 A.3d 174, 177 (Vt. 2018) (explaining that trespass requires a person
to enter the land without legal authority or consent).
33.
E.g., Grimminger v. Maitra, 887 A.2d 276, 279 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 2005) (patient consent serves
as an affirmative defense to a claim of a breach of physician-patient confidentiality).
34.
Recent Cases: Marriage — Validity — Common-Law Marriage — Mistake as to Existence
of Prior Marriage Between the Parties, 34 HARV. L. REV. 561, 561 (1921) (summarizing the holding of
Great N. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 254 F. 683 (8th Cir. 1918)).
35.
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015).
36.
Id. at 2597.
37.
Id. at 2602.
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consent.”38 Consent is also the key feature in the legality of some sexual
activities in BDSM39 and is also an issue when elderly married couples
engage in sexual activity when one partner has lost the capacity to legally
consent.40
Beyond the common law, consent also plays a critical role in the context
of digital privacy regulation. In the United States, the dominant regime of
privacy regulation is known as “notice and choice.” As interpreted by the
Federal Trade Commission under its Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices
authority, this has meant that consumers are presumed to have consented to
data practices as long as there has been some kind of “notice” to the
consumer about what is happening and some kind of “choice” about
whether they want it to happen. A recent FTC report on company
surveillance of consumers across digital devices (for example tracking
laptop web browsing activity to deliver targeted ads to the same consumer
on a cell phone) is illustrative of the FTC’s approach:
As with traditional forms of tracking, companies should offer
consumers choices about how their cross-device activity is tracked.
And, when companies offer such choices, the FTC Act requires that
the companies respect them. To the extent opt-out tools are provided,
any material limitations on how they apply or are implemented with
respect to cross-device tracking must be clearly and conspicuously
disclosed.41
In practice, however, such requirements are relatively easy to comply with,
as all a company needs to do to avoid FTC liability for unfair or deceptive
trade practices if challenged is show that their use of consent is neither
deceptive nor unfair.42 Thus “notice” can mean a vague but not false
description of data practices buried deep within a long privacy policy and
“choice” can mean no more than the choice to use the service in the first
place (Apple, Android, or no phone at all, for example).43 It is perhaps for
38.
E.g., State v. Holloway, 916 N.W.2d 338, 345 (Minn. 2018) (“What has been known as
statutory rape—sexual conduct with a person not of the age of consent—has been a crime in Minnesota
since it was first organized as a territory.”).
39.
See William Eskridge, The Many Faces of Sexual Consent, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 47, 49–
50 (1995); Margo Kaplan, Sex-Positive Law, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 117 (2014).
40.
Alexander Boni-Saenz, Sexual Advance Directives, 68 ALA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2016).
41.
FED. TRADE COMM'N, CROSS-DEVICE TRACKING: AN FTC REPORT 13 (Jan. 2017).
42.
Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (prohibiting the use of “unfair” or “deceptive” trade practices in or
affecting interstate commerce).
43.
WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF
NEW TECHNOLOGIES 58–72 (2017) [hereinafter HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT].
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this reason that when Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg testified before
Congress in response to a series of privacy scandals involving his company,
his defense, first and foremost, was that Facebook puts its users in
“control,”44 a good sound bite, but one that can be all but meaningless as a
legal requirement.
Consent within Europe’s data protection frameworks is more rigorous
than in parts of US privacy law. Indeed, unlike US law, the European Union
(EU) treats privacy and the related but distinct concept of data protection as
fundamental rights. Consent remains central to this fundamental rightsbased approach, although Europe’s modern data protection regime is
skeptical of over-relying on the notion.45 Recital Seven of the EU General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR explicitly states that “Natural persons
should have control of their own personal data.”46 This control is effectuated
significantly through the mechanism of “informed consent” as a basis for
legitimizing data processing.47 Beyond the GDPR, the reasoning behind the
44.
Written Testimony from Facebook to House Energy and Commerce Committee for Record
of April 11, 2018 Hearing (June 29, 2018), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF00/20180411/108090/
HHRG-115-IF00-Wstate-ZuckerbergM-20180411.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7LR-L7XU] (note: the word
‘control’ is mentioned over 1,000 times). It goes on like this for a while. See also Dan Fletcher, How
Facebook is Redefining Privacy, TIME (May 20, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,
9171,1990798-4,00.html [https://perma.cc/D66L-4FG3] (“‘The way that people think about privacy is
changing a bit . . . . What people want isn't complete privacy. It isn't that they want secrecy. It's that they
want control over what they share and what they don't.’”); Anita Balakrishnan, Matt Hunter & Sara
Salinas, Mark Zuckerberg Has Been Talking About Privacy for 15 Years—Here’s Almost Everything
He’s Said, CNBC (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/21/facebook-ceo-mark-zuckerbergsstatements-on-privacy-2003-2018.html [https://perma.cc/Q4QM-JGFA] ("‘When I built the first version
of Facebook, almost nobody I knew wanted a public page on the internet. That seemed scary. But as
long as they could make their page private, they felt safe sharing with their friends online. Control was
key.’”); Emily Stewart, The Privacy Question Mark Zuckerberg Kept Dodging, VOX (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/11/17225518/mark-zuckerberg-testimony-facebookprivacy-settings-sharing [https://perma.cc/DQ84-Q2GD] (“‘Every time that a person chooses to share
something on Facebook, they’re proactively going to the service and choosing that they want to share a
photo, write a message to someone, and every time, there is a control right there, not buried in settings
somewhere but right there when they’re posting, about who they’re sharing with.’”).
45.
See Edenberg & Jones, supra note 1; see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Bart van der Sloot &
Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, The European Union General Data Protection Regulation: What It Is
And What It Means, 28 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 65, 68 (2019) (“[T]he GDPR is constitutionally
skeptical of U.S. lawyers’ favorite tool: consent, particularly of the low-quality or ‘take it or leave it’
variety. The GDPR’s architects realized that if low-voluntariness consent could justify data activities,
the GDPR would just become another exercise in clicking ‘I agree’ to unread, unnegotiable terms. The
GDPR requires high-quality consent, on par with important life decisions, such as consent to medical
treatment. In many contexts, the burdens the GDPR places on consent make consent impossible as
mechanism to make data uses legal. Moreover, many rules in the GDPR are not waivable and continue
to apply after somebody has consented to data use.”).
46.
Regulation 2016/679, pmbl. ¶ 7, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 2.
47.
Regulation 2016/679, art. 7, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 37.
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EU ePrivacy Directive is that it “enhances end-user’s control by clarifying
that consent can be expressed through appropriate technical settings.”48 But
as we will discuss in the Parts that follow, hard-coding consent through legal
or technical code is fraught at best. It also probably makes things worse
because it offers an illusion of control that dulls impetus for meaningful
change while entrenching the pathologies of the concept into the very design
of information technologies.49
American constitutional law does not recognize a broad constitutional
right to privacy the way the EU does. But when constitutional rights are at
issue in privacy or elsewhere, U.S. law (like the EU) puts consent at the core
of rights jurisprudence. Indeed, consent is at the very core of American
constitutionalism. Consider these familiar founding words from the
beginning of the Declaration of Independence: “We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed.”50
Consent’s importance runs throughout constitutional law, particularly
with respect to the doctrine of waiver. Constitutional rights can be waived,
and waiver is essentially the consent to give up that right. When it comes to
waiver, however, the Supreme Court has made clear that consent to waiver
must be clearly and freely given. Sometimes this is textual, such as where
the Third Amendment expressly includes consent as a defense to the
quartering of soldiers in private homes: “No Soldier shall, in time of peace
be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of
war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”51 More significantly,
numerous constitutional rights can only be waived where there is a showing
that such waivers are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. This is the case,

48.
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning the
Respect for Private Life and the Protection of Personal Data in Electronic Communications and
Repealing Directive 2002/58/EC, at 3.4, COM (2017) 10 final (Jan. 10, 2017).
49.
See, e.g., HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT, supra note 43; Lee Bygrave, Data Protection
by Design and by Default: Deciphering the EU's Legislative Requirements, 4 OSLO L. REV. 105 (2017);
Woodrow Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control, 4 EUR. DATA PROTECT. L. REV. 423 (2018),
https://edpl.lexxion.eu/article/edpl/2018/4/5/display/html [https://perma.cc/T4LA-HNE8] [hereinafter
Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control].
50.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
51.
U.S. CONST. amend. III.
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for example, for both the right to counsel52 and the right to trial by jury.53
Many constitutional rights can also be contracted around. For example, the
First Amendment permits non-disclosure agreements—contracts not to
speak—such as where journalists agree with confidential sources not to
disclose their names in exchange for a story.54 The Supreme Court has held
that such contracts are enforceable against the press consistent with the First
Amendment even where the identity of the source is itself newsworthy.55
Consent is also a critical element of health law. Reflecting the
importance of the human interests involved, rules for consent in the health
context are strict in ways resembling constitutional law, often requiring a
heightened form of consent known as “informed consent.” One of the
foundations of modern biomedical ethics is the Belmont Report, a product
of the National Research Act of 1974, which established a commission to
study the basic ethical principles that should undergird biomedical and
behavioral research involving human subjects.56 The Belmont report
announced three “Basic Ethical Principles” of “respect for persons,”
“beneficence,” and “justice,” and it offered three “applications” of these
principles, the first of which was “informed consent.”57 The Belmont
Report’s definition of informed consent states “[r]espect for persons
requires that subjects, to the degree that they are capable, be given the
opportunity to choose what shall or shall not happen to them.”58 In practice,
the Report urged that subjects be given the relevant information on which
to make their decision, that researchers ensure that test subjects have
comprehension of the information surrounding their decision, and that
decisions be made in accordance with the idea of voluntariness.
The Belmont Report has been tremendously influential in the field of
biomedical ethics, and today its recommendations are reflected in the
Common Rule, the ethical rule that governs U.S. government funded
biomedical and behavioral research. The Common Rule prescribes detailed

52.
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994).
53.
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942).
54.
Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 669–70 (1991).
55.
Id. See generally Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil
Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650 (2009).
56.
The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects
of Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 (Apr. 18, 1979).
57.
Id. at 23,193.
58.
Id. at 23,195.
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substantive and documentary requirements for “informed consent.”59 There
are extensive professional and academic literatures on informed consent in
a variety of medical contexts reflecting substantial work and reflection. One
classic treatise, for example, identifies five critical elements for truly
informed consent—disclosure; comprehension or understanding;
voluntariness; decision-making capacity or competence; and
authorization.60
The “knowing and voluntary” waiver standard from constitutional law
and the informed consent standard from biomedical ethics each represent a
kind of what we might think of as a “gold standard” consent. One could add
another such example from the commercial context—freely negotiated
agreements between sophisticated parties who have equal bargaining
power, significant resources, and who knowingly and voluntary agree to
assume contractual or other legal obligations. These are the models from
which consent derives its strength—decisions to engage in activity based
upon full information and free, voluntary, and informed choice. They are
consent in its strongest and most legitimate form.
Let’s take a step back at this point and look at the forest rather than the
trees. Our review of consent models in the law can be distilled into three
important principles. First, consent requirements are prevalent in many—if
not most—areas of American law, running throughout common law,
constitutional law, and regulatory law. Second, consent models vary in how
strictly they protect consenting individuals, from the stringent consent
requirements in constitutional law and health and human subjects research
all the way down to the opt-out consents in commercial transactions that are
so common in the digital environment. Third, despite this variance, there
does exist a “gold standard” of consent, which is stringent and highly
protective of individuals, whether we call it “informed consent,” “knowing
and voluntary” agreement or waiver, or something else entirely. We would
suggest that in spite of consent’s variance in practice, it is this gold standard
of consent that policymakers, advocates, and others refer to when they talk
about consent. Indeed, even Facebook’s public statements about “control”
in the abstract evoke a much stronger notion of consent than the watereddown legal requirements under which the company operates in practice (at
least in the United States). When companies like Facebook negotiate
59.
See Common Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116 (general requirements for informed consent), 46.117
(documentation requirements for informed consent).
60.
RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT
274 (1986); see also Natalie Ram, Tiered Consent and the Tyranny of Choice, 48 JURIMETRICS 253,
259–60 (2008).
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acquisitions or commercial deals with other companies, they typically enjoy
(for themselves) gold standard consent informed by the finest lawyers
money can buy. Yet when their individual human customers agree to use
their services, it is fair to say that the level of information and power
available to those individual humans is some distance away from the gold
standard. It is to this gap between the gold standard of consent companies
enjoy and the weaker kinds of consent many consumers “enjoy” in the
digital environment that we will now turn.
II. THREE PATHOLOGIES OF CONSENT
When he was a young academic, the American economist Richard Thaler
kept a list of ways in which people consistently acted irrationally. Thaler’s
list was not merely a lark by a bored iconoclastic graduate student. His list
documented a series of human behaviors that the dominant theory of
economics, the rational actor theory, failed to adequately explain. Again and
again, Thaler kept encountering observable patterns of human behavior that
were squarely at odds with the foundational assumption of economics that
human beings act rationally to maximize their utility.
Thaler’s list became a research agenda, as he and others began
experimental studies of the behaviors he had observed. This community of
scholars kept working, and these critiques of the dominant rational actor
model helped to create the field of behavioral economics.61 This field
proceeds from the evidence that human beings do not always behave as the
rational actor model assumes that they would—Thaler refers to these
fictional humans as “econs.” Instead, the field assumes that people behave
in an observable and empirically-demonstrable way like “humans”:
sometimes acting rationally, sometimes less than fully rationally, and
sometimes irrationally. Behavioral economists, building on the work of
Thaler and his mentors Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, attribute
these behaviors to cognitive structures—and limitations—in the human
brain.62 They argue that humans, in the words of another leading scholar in
the field, are not merely irrational, but predictably so.63 Kahneman offers
helpful metaphor for understanding how the human mind works. Most of
the time, we operate using “System One,” an automatic system of cognition
that relies upon heuristics and assumptions to help us navigate the world.
61.
See generally THALER, supra note 11.
62.
See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
63.
See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS (2008).
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Other times, when we encounter something new or really want to think
something through, we use what Kahneman calls “System Two.” System
Two is more analytical and rational, but it is also lazy and relies as much as
it can on System One because “thinking slow” is taxing on our energies and
on the sugar reserves in our brain. System One allows us to drive to work
while what we think of as our mind (“System Two”) is occupied by the
news. System One allows us to carefully read a law review article, even
though we might derive more pleasure when we breeze through a novel (or
a Netflix stream) using System Two.64
In this Part, we adapt Thaler’s list methodology to privacy law—
specifically to three scenarios we have observed in which consumers in the
digital environment “consent” to data practices in ways that seem irrational.
We offer these cases as “Pathologies of Consent” and conclude that
sometimes the behavior can be explained by defects in the law, especially
where the law requires less than “gold standard” consent, whereas other
times the behavior may be explained by particular features of human
cognition. Nevertheless, like Thaler’s list, our suggestions are theoretical.
To the extent we make empirical claims, such claims are primarily anecdotal
rather than (at present) proven by experimental social science. In this
respect, we follow a similar privacy law methodology to the one used by
Anita Allen in her classic work Unpopular Privacy.65
Thaler’s list complicated a relatively simplistic story that the rational
actor model told about human behavior. We believe that our list of consent
pathologies complicates a more specific (but equally simplistic) rational
actor story that has circulated in privacy circles for a number of years as the
“privacy paradox.” The “privacy paradox” is the assertion that although
people might express a concern for privacy in the abstract, their actual
behavior suggests that they do not actually care about their privacy in
practice. Observers coming from a rational actor perspective suggest that
the actions of consumers (what an economist would call their revealed
preferences) indicate that consumers do not really care about privacy at all,
and that concerns about privacy in the consumer context are overblown.66
To return to Mark Zuckerberg’s testimony before Congress, if Facebook
puts consumers in control of their privacy, but consumers continue to
consent to privacy-revealing practices and act in privacy-destructive ways,
they have no one to blame but themselves. Buyers beware.
64.
KAHNEMAN, supra note 62, at 20–24.
65.
See ALLEN, supra note 11.
66.
E.g., Patricia A. Norberg et al., The Privacy Paradox: Personal Information Disclosure
Intentions versus Behaviors, 41 J. CONSUMER AFF. 100 (2007).

1478

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 96:1461

We believe that the three pathologies we offer in this Part complicate this
simplistic and self-serving story, and we explain why consumers might
understandably care about their privacy and agree to data practices that
undermine their privacy and expose them to the risks of informational
harms. (We also note that scholars working in the Thaler tradition have
already begun the process of experimental testing of the ways in which
consumers understand privacy in practice, with initial findings that confirm
the intuitive and theoretical model we offer here.)67
There are certainly more than three ways in which consent in practice
can deviate from gold standard consent, but for present purposes the three
we offer here will suffice. They are unwitting consent, coerced consent, and
incapacitated consent.
A. Unwitting Consent
Let’s say that you are signing up for a new account with a tech company
whose app or web site will let you do something. Perhaps you are signing
up for a loyalty club at your local coffee or bagel shop, perhaps you are
signing up for a new taxi app, dating app, or social network, or perhaps your
iPhone or Android needs a security update that you fear will lead to a data
breach if you don’t agree. Like most consumers, you’re in a hurry. (In the
bagel example, maybe the people queuing behind you want to buy their
bagels,68 or maybe you are just hungry and want to finish the transaction so
you can eat.) In any event, most consumer transactions these days have an
informational component—the social network you join, the bagel app you
download, the web sites you read, or the car you buy. The problem is, most
consumers don’t know what data practices are possible, what they have
agreed to, or what the informational risks of the transaction are.
This is the problem of unwitting consent. In the complex technological
and legal landscape in which the contemporary digital consumer finds
herself, understanding what is going on can be challenging. Yet people are
harried, busy, and distracted, so they understandably click the “I agree”
button and move on with their day, hoping that all will be well. This is
67.
For excellent reviews of the theoretical and empirical research in this field, see Alessandro
Acquisti, Curtis Taylor & Liad Wagman, The Economics of Privacy, 54 J. ECON. LITERATURE 442
(2016); Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte & George Loewenstein, Privacy and Human Behavior
in the Age of Information, 347 SCIENCE 509 (2015).
68.
In full disclosure, this is exactly what happened to one of the authors of this article recently,
at an Einstein Brother’s Bagels. The friendly clerk urged him to install the loyalty app at the point of
sale, while the hungry customers behind him pressured him into clicking “I agree.”
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unwitting consent. Unwitting consent takes the “knowing” out of “knowing
and voluntary.” Simply put, far too often, far too many people in the digital
environment have little to no idea about what data practices or exposure that
they are consenting to. Compounding this problem (and enabling business
practices that create and prey upon unwitting consent) is the conclusion
reached by several courts that privacy policies, standing alone, are simply
not enforceable as contracts.69 At the same time, privacy policies that are
incorporated into the terms of use that people consent to by clicking “I
agree” are generally recognized as part of a binding contractual agreement.70
In fact, one of the reasons consent is such a poor fit for data practices is
that boilerplate contract law is largely agnostic to whether people actually
know what they are agreeing to. This is known as the objective theory of
contracts. Under this theory, the intent of the parties, for example, ‘I thought
I was agreeing to “X,” is irrelevant. Instead, the contract is formed based on
what a reasonable person would have been led to believe in the relevant
context (an objective standard).71 Although this doctrine is criticized by
many as it applies to boilerplate contracts,72 generally parties need not have
a “meeting of the minds” in the classic contractual sense. Rather, a
“reasonable communication” of the terms will suffice.73 In data processing
contexts with lengthy terms of use agreements, this dynamic puts all of the
risk on the user, because consent can be effective even if you have no idea
what you just agreed to. Once again, buyer beware.
Unwitting consent can take several forms. First, consumers can fail to
understand the legal agreement governing the information relationship they
now have with the company. This can happen when the legal agreement is
69.
In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. 04-126, 2004 WL 1278459, at *16–18 (D. Minn. 2004);
In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 316–18 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
70.
Hartzog, The New Price to Play, supra note 4, at 408; Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design As
Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1635 (2011) (“When courts seek to determine a website user's privacy
expectations and the website's promises to that user, they almost invariably look to the terms of use
agreement or to the privacy policy.”).
71.
Hartzog, The New Price to Play, supra note 4, at 416; see also Wickberg v. Lyft, No. 1812094-RGS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213281 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2018)
72.
See KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS, supra note 3; RADIN, supra note 3; Hartzog, The New Price to
Play, supra note 4.
73.
See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 429 (2d Cir. 2004); Molnar v. 1-800Flowers.com, No. 08-cv-0542, 2008 WL 4772125, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008) (stating that “courts
have held that a party's use of a website may be sufficient to give rise to an inference of assent to the
terms of use contained therein”); Southwest Airlines Co. v. Boardfirst, LLC, No. 3:06-cv-0891, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96230, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007); Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d
974, 982 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (stating that “the browser wrap license agreement may be arguably valid and
enforceable”).
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too long (such as Apple’s notoriously lengthy Terms of Services
Agreement),74 the legal agreement uses confusing language, structure, and
syntax (such as when consent forms deploy double and triple negatives or
switch from “opt out” to “opt in” options in a series of choices),75 the legal
agreement is too technical for ordinary readers to understand (many privacy
policies reference technologies like pixel tags and MAC addresses, which
are likely foreign concepts to the average user),76 or the legal agreement is
too vague to specify exactly what is being agreed to (consider Amazon’s
notoriously vague “Privacy Notice” which features terms like “we share
your information with third parties, to permit them to send you marketing
communications.”). 77
A second dimension of unwitting consent is where consumers do not
understand the technology that mediates their relationship with the
company. For example, most people don’t realize that telecommunications
74.
Apple’s iOS Terms of Service (TOS) is notoriously long. Its current version, for iOS12, is
6,901 words long. iOS Software Agreement, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/iOS12.pdf
[https:// perma.cc/VC8B-8V48]. However, Apple’s web site also contains thirteen other TOS
agreements for iOS 3.1, 4.1, 5.0, 5.1, 6.0, 7.0, 8.0, 8.1, 9.0, 9.1, 10, 11, and 11.2. In 2017, cartoonist R.
Sikoroyak turned the related Apple iTunes TOS agreement into a 96-page comic book starring Steve
Jobs as its hero and featuring classic comic book styles and characters from The Simpsons to Snoopy to
Family Circus. See Bonnie Burton, Steve Jobs, Superhero: Graphic Novel Meets iTunes Service Terms,
CNET (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.cnet.com/news/itunes-terms-of-service-graphic-novel-comic-rsikoroyak/ [http://perma.cc /DC88-8PS5].
75.
Consider this example from a request by a California school system regarding student
directory information:

HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT, supra note 43, at 145. Or this confusing series of choices from “opt
out” to “opt in”:

Trick Questions, DARK PATTERNS, https://darkpatterns.org/types-of-dark-pattern/trick-questions
[https://perma.cc/7R7F-6FYD].
76.
Privacy
Policy,
THE
STREET,
INC.,
http://corporate.thestreet.com/privacy
[https://perma.cc/3WS9-RMT3].
77.
Amazon.com
Privacy
Notice,
AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/c
ustomer/display.html?nodeId=468496 [https://perma.cc/2AE4-B4L7].
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systems are remarkably insecure.78 We give consent to these companies
upon the assumption that their systems will protect us, but we are often
mistaken about how those systems are configured. A prominent recent
example is the scandal over Facebook’s user interface that allowed for the
exfiltration of massive amounts of data to Cambridge Analytica, the data
firm accused of, among other things, dubious data practices with respect to
electoral politics.79
Technically, Facebook users “consented” to the collection and sharing
of this data via their privacy settings.80 Facebook went to great lengths to
emphasize this fact, stating “Aleksandr Kogan requested and gained access
to information from users who chose to sign up to his app, and everyone
involved gave their consent. People knowingly provided their
information.”81 But a closer look reveals that this consent was basically
manufactured through obfuscation, abstraction, and sleight of hand via a
user interface. Users likely had little idea what they were agreeing to, in no
small part because the way the technology actually worked was opaque to
users.
Professor Ian Bogost, who also had an application using the same
interface as that at issue in the Cambridge Analytica scandal, wrote of
Facebook’s system:
App authorizations are not exceptionally clear. For one thing, the user
must accept the app’s request to share data with it as soon as they
open it for the first time, even before knowing what the app does or
why. For another, the authorization is presented by Facebook, not by
the third party, making it seem official, safe, and even endorsed.82

78.
Sarah Jamie Lewis (@SarahJamieLewis), TWITTER (Jan. 8, 2019, 10:34 PM), https://twitter.
com/SarahJamieLewis/status/1082888359008120832 [https://perma.cc/U632-3P5F]; Joseph Cox, Big
Telecom Sold Highly Sensitive Customer GPS Data Typically Used for 911 Calls, VICE, (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/a3b3dg/big-telecom-sold-customer-gps-data-911-calls [http
s://perma.cc/DDH8-HEMH].
79.
See, e.g., The Cambridge Analytical Files, GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/n
ews/series/cambridge-analytica-files [https://perma.cc/TL6P-PA3Y].
80.
Ian Bogost, My Cow Game Extracted Your Facebook Data, ATLANTIC (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/03/my-cow-game-extracted-your-facebook-data
/556214/ [https://perma.cc/CN2R-9LD4].
81.
Paul Grewal, Suspending Cambridge Analytica and SCL Group from Facebook, FACEBOOK:
NEWSROOM (Mar. 17, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/03/suspending-cambridge-analytic a/
[https://perma.cc/76FD-7MUR].
82.
Bogost, supra note 80.

1482

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 96:1461

Bogost was critical of Facebook’s flimsy consent structure, explaining
that “[t]he part of the Facebook website where apps appear, under the blue
top navigation (as seen above), introduces further confusion. To the average
web user, especially a decade ago, it looked like the game or app was just a
part of Facebook itself.”83 Bogost noted the seamless nature of the website
that lacked a clear boundary between Facebook’s navigation and the thirdparty app. He explained that “[i]f you look at the browser address bar while
using a Facebook app on the website, the URL begins with
“apps.facebook.com,” further cementing the impression that the user was
safely ensconced in the comforting, blue cradle of Facebook’s care.84
Of course, that impression bore little relationship to reality. When people
opened a third-party app, Facebook’s servers passed along a request to the
server where the app developer hosts their services. Then, the app sent all
of its responses back to Facebook, which formatted the responses as if they
were coming from Facebook rather than the third party.85 Through this
setup, the third-party app was able to access significant amounts of personal
and potentially sensitive information.86
As the previous description suggests, consumer are unlikely to
understand the complexities of layered applications and their correlated,
opaque, data flows. We certainly are no experts. Lacking such knowledge,
the “consent” requested by Facebook in this manner seems farcical. Bogost
accused Facebook of “presenting apps as quasi-endorsed extensions of its
core service to users who couldn’t have been expected to know better.”87
The reason people felt so violated by Facebook could be that “they might
never have realized that they were even using foreign, non-Facebook
applications in the first place, let alone ones that were siphoning off and
selling their data. The website always just looked like Facebook.”88
Another prominent example of unwitting consent involves third party
tracking through the use of advertising technology, or “ad tech,” as it is
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Id. (describing that as an app developer using Facebook’s interface “I was able to access two
potentially sensitive pieces of data without even trying. The first is a player’s Facebook ID. . . . Those
data could be correlated against other information—data collected from Facebook, fashioned by the app,
or acquired elsewhere. . . . The second type of information is a piece of profile data [my app] received
without asking for it. Back in 2010, Facebook still allowed users to join “networks” —affiliations like
schools, workplaces, and organizations. In some cases, those affiliations required authorization, for
example having an email address at a domain that corresponds with a university.”).
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
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known in the industry. Ad tech involves technologies like ad networks,
which serve “as a broker between a group of publishers and a group of
advertisers,”89 and ad servers, which are “used by ad networks, publishers,
advertisers, and ad agencies to manage, run, and report on their advertising
campaigns.”90 These networks and technologies are remarkably complex,
with auctions conducted in milliseconds and involve a bevy of different
companies processing your data to serve ads personalized on the basis of
that data.91 Even advocates of consent regimes realize how daunting this
problem is, conjuring up euphemisms like “consent strings” for ad tech to
simplify and streamline compliance.92
In January 2017, the FTC released a staff report on the problem of crossdevice tracking, the practice discussed above in which “platforms,
publishers, and ad tech companies try to connect a consumer’s activity
across her smartphones, tablets, desktop computers, and other connected
devices. The goal of cross-device tracking is to enable companies to link a
consumer’s behavior across her devices.”93 The FTC’s proposed solutions
to this problem, however, were underwhelming. It recommended merely
that “companies engaged in cross-device tracking: (1) be transparent about
their data collection and use practices; (2) provide choice mechanisms that
give consumers control over their data; (3) provide heightened protections
for sensitive information, including health, financial, and children’s
information; and (4) maintain reasonable security of collected data.”94
Consistent with much of American privacy law, this amounted to notice,
choice, heightened notice and choice for a few sensitive areas, and data
security.
89.
Maciej Zawadziński, What is an Ad Network and How Does It Work?, CLEARCODE (Mar. 7,
2018), https://clearcode.cc/blog/what-is-an-ad-network-and-how-does-it-work/ [https://perma.cc/4D64DP7D].
90.
Id.
91.
Id.
92.
Nicole Lindsey, Could GDPR Consent String Fraud Bring Down the Whole Ad Tech
Ecosystem?, CPO MAGAZINE (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.cpomagazine.com/data-protection/could-gdp
r-consent-string-fraud-bring-down-the-whole-ad-tech-ecosystem/ [https://perma.cc/V5MT-VUGF] (“A
consent string is a unique series of numbers generated by a publisher’s consent management platform
(CMP) and then shared with all digital ad partners. The consent string includes information such as the
identity of a vendor, whether or not they have user consent to use data to serve them personalized ads,
and how any identifying personal data can be used. The most important consent data is a single bit (a
‘1’ or a ‘0’) that tells an ad tech vendor whether they can serve up personalized ads. If the value is ‘1,’
then the ad tech vendor has user consent; if the value is ‘0,’ then the ad tech vendor does not have user
consent.”).
93.
FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 41, at i.
94.
Id. at ii.
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But given the complexity of ad tech, this puts companies in a nearly
impossible situation: either they must simplify enough to keep the
information digestible or be detailed enough to fully explain data collection
and use practices, which requires some explanation of how the technology
actually works. This approach will let everyone down, and consumers will
be lost either way. As one of us has explained:
The modern data ecosystem is mind-bogglingly complex, with many
different kinds of information collected in many different ways,
stored in many different places, processed for many different
functions, and shared with many other parties. All that nuance gets
glossed over when companies try to simplify and shorten
information, the risk hidden or made to seem more benign through
abstraction.95
But if companies are too specific, people will suffer from decision fatigue
and depleted limited resources to actually reach or process the tomes of
information thrown at them. Unwitting consent lies in every direction.
A third version of unwitting consent is that consumers might not
understand the consequences or risks of the informational relationship. As
a general rule, people have difficulty assessing future risks created by
present decisions.96 We’re far too optimistic; we rely too much on the past
and lived experience over reliable, generalizable data; we discount future
costs too much; and we think the way things are now will stay that way.97
But this is what we are asked to do every time a company asks for consent
to collect and process our data. Even on good days where people are feeling
sharp and contemplative, they are asked to construct scenarios where the
granting of consent might come back to bite them or somehow be used in
an adverse way against them. But unlike playing football or having surgery,
where at least people can get a ballpark sense of risk through guestimation,

95.
Woodrow Hartzog, User Agreements are Betraying You, MEDIUM (June 5, 2018), https://med
ium.com/s/trustissues/user-agreements-are-betraying-you-19db7135441f
[https://perma.cc/2MWQJCJC].
96.
See, e.g., Caroline Beaton, Humans Are Bad at Predicting Futures That Don’t Benefit Them,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/11/humans-are-bad-atpredicting-futures-that-dont-benefit-them/544709/ [https://perma.cc/4NPP-KHQG]; Kate Morgan, Why
You’re So Bad at Predicting the Future, MEDIUM (Jan. 3, 2019), https://medium.com/s/2069/why-youreso-bad-at-predicting-the-future-68e14a5f41a4 [https://perma.cc/3SKY-CXN5]; Bruce Schneier, Why
the Human Brain is a Poor Judge of Risk, WIRED (Mar. 22, 2007), https://www.wired.com/2007/03
/security-matters0322/ [https://perma.cc/4PLD-DQQ7].
97.
See Beaton, supra note 96.

2019]

THE PATHOLOGIES OF DIGITAL CONSENT

1485

there’s an entire universe of consequences that most people don’t even think
about when asked for consent to data practices.
Privacy—the rules governing human information—is valuable because
it helps protect against a wide array of harms. Privacy protects against so
many harms, in fact, that it can be easy to overlook them. Some harms occur
far downstream from the points of salience for people, like the point of
collection, initial disclosure, or data breach. Consider consent to things like
biometrics, particularly facial recognition technology.98 These surveillance
technologies intuitively implicate the dangers of surveillance: the chilling
effect of being watched and a generalized fear of retaliation or adverse
consequences that might follow.99 But many of the harms of facial
recognition might not immediately spring to mind when people ask for
consent to use this technology. People’s faceprints can make harassment
and stalking easier.100 They can gradually shift communally supported due
process values like “presumed innocent” to “people who have yet to be
found guilty of a crime.”101 They can facilitate the suffocation that follows
when rules are perfectly enforced.102 They can reduce the cost of sorting,
categorizing, discriminating, and denying opportunities, benefits, or needed
support and treatment in furtherance of surveillance capitalism.103
Data analytics and advertising surveillance can also involve this kind of
unwitting consent. For example, consider how many times people are asked
to click “I agree” to certain advertising technologies. There are credible
allegations that the process used to target advertisements to internet users
98.
Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Facial Recognition is the Perfect Tool for Oppression,
MEDIUM (Aug. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/facial-recognition-is-the-perfect-tool-for-oppressi
on-bc2a08f0fe66 [https://perma.cc/45RL-6HXD].
99.
See Neil Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013).
100. See Kevin Rothrock, Facial Recognition Service Becomes a Weapon Against Russian Porn
Actresses, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 26, 2016), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/04/facial-recogniti
on-service-becomes-a-weapon-against-russian-porn-actresses/ [https://perma.cc/F4HG-6SXF].
101. Anne-Marie Slaughter & Stephanie Hare, Our Bodies or Ourselves, PROJECT SYNDICATE
(July 23, 2018), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/dangers-of-biometric-data-by-annemarie-sla ughter-and-stephanie-hare-2018-07?barrier=accesspaylog [https://perma.cc/4N8L-8FC9].
102. See Tara Francis Chan, 22 Eerie Photos Show How China Uses Facial Recognition to Track
Its Citizens as They Travel, Shop—And Even Use Toilet Paper, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 12, 2018),
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-china-uses-facial-recognition-technology-surveillance-2018-2
[http://perma.cc /TE5E-3HVX].
103. See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2018); Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance
Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75 (2015); Clare Garvie
& Jonathan Frankle, Facial-Recognition Software Might Have a Racial Bias Problem, ATLANTIC (Apr.
7, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/the-underlying-bias-of-facial-recog
nition-systems/47699 1/ [https://perma.cc/N64Q-ZYG7].
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based upon surveillance of their reading habits allows inferences (and
targeting) based upon sensitive characteristics, such as race, sexual
orientation, health, pregnancy status, and other factors.104 The possibly
apocryphal big data anecdote that is now infamous in tech circles involves
a story in the New York Times Magazine describing how retail giant Target
was able to use a young woman’s purchase history and other seemingly
benign pieces of information to accurately guess that she was pregnant (and
subsequently send her targeted advertisements) before the teenager’s father
found out.105 In any event, predictive analytics are no doubt outstripping
most peoples’ notions of what is capable with data.106 Asking people to
consent to risks that seem like science fiction is another example of
consent’s sickness. But the bottom line remains that much if not most
consent in the digital context suffers from the pathology of unwitting
consent.
B. Coerced Consent
Sometimes a choice is not really a choice; it can be an unpleasant game
of “would you rather” with a choice between a bad option and a terrible one.
This is the problem of coerced consent, a choice that takes the “voluntary”
out of “knowing and voluntary.” Coerced consent can occur, for example,
where a person is confronted with a choice between consent and the loss of
an important asset such as their life or their job. “Coercion” is of course a
provocative term. We use it intentionally here to describe a number of cases
on the continuum from fully “voluntary” consent to truly involuntary “sign
or die” consent. The closer we get to “sign or die,” the more coercive a
consent will be. While this category might include traditional forms of
coercion that would invalidate agreements under the doctrine of duress,
mediated environments that manufacture consent can also be coercive in
more manipulative and subtle ways.

104. See Natasha Tiku, Privacy Groups Claim Online Ads Can Target Abuse Victims, WIRED (Jan.
27, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/privacy-groups-claim-online-ads-can-target-abuse-victims/ [ht
tps://perma.cc/AE4D-8T4V].
105. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&hp [https
://perma.cc/K247-ZGHZ]; see also Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant
Before Her Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/
how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/#7f3530266686 [https://perma.c
c/B7FJ-7JX7].
106. See, e.g., Hideyuki Matsumi, Predictions and Privacy: Should There Be Rules About Using
Personal Data to Forecast the Future?, 48 CUMB. LAW REV. 149, 159–69 (2017).
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Like the case of unwitting consent, coerced consent uses the language of
gold standard consent to obscure unpleasant consequences. For example, in
2017 the U.S. Congress eliminated Obama Administration privacy
protections limiting what cable providers like Verizon and Comcast could
do with consumer internet browsing history. At a town meeting with
constituents, Congressman James Sensenbrenner declared that when it
comes to ISP privacy:
Nobody's got to use the Internet. . . . Internet companies have invested
an awful lot of money in having almost universal service now. The
fact is that, you know, I don't think it's my job to tell you that you
cannot get advertising for your information being sold. My job, I
think, is to tell you that you have the opportunity to do it, and then
you take it upon yourself to make that choice. . . . [sic] That’s what
the law has been, and I think we ought to have more choices rather
than fewer choices with the government controlling our everyday
lives.107
When pressed for clarification by the press, Sensenbrenner’s office
explained that “people can choose whether or not they want to use certain
websites. For instance, in using Facebook, people have the option to agree
(or not agree) with its terms of agreement, which covers what kind of
information the social media site collects from its users.”108
There are of course obvious problems with this logic—the very logic that
has been used by industry and regulators to avoid meaningful privacy
regulation in the United States for decades. First, to “choose” not to use the
Internet is in a very real sense to “choose” not to participate in modern
society or the modern economy. This might not quite be “sign or die,” but
it’s close to “sign or not live like most people.” Second, when it comes to
Internet Service Providers, consumers often face no practical choice
between providers. ISPs like Comcast or Verizon often operate in virtual or
actual monopolies for broadband services. To “choose” not to use one’s
monopolist cable company for wired broadband is functionally to “choose”
once again not to use the Internet at home. (Good luck streaming Netflix on
your phone data plan.) Third, even with respect to individual services at the
platform layer, there is once again a paucity of choice. If you want to use
social networking to connect to your friends or family, Facebook is often
107. Kristine Phillips, ‘Nobody’s Got to Use the Internet’: GOP Lawmaker Who Voted to Scrape
Web Privacy Rules, CHICAGO TRIB. (Apr. 15, 2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworl
d/politics/ct-sensenbrenner-web-privacy-20170415-story.html [https://perma.cc/JZS9-AZSS].
108. Id.
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the only real choice. And even if your friends are on Instagram, Facebook
(and its data practices) own that too.
Our point is that most consumers in the digital environment have highly
limited options for consent, much less for bargaining. This is particularly
the case where monopoly power or something like it applies. Even where
there is some choice among services (Lyft versus Uber, for example), those
services may offer functionally identical data terms. Finally, even where
there is “choice” among alternatives, this is by no means the end of the ways
in which firms can structure, influence, and nudge consumer choice in ways
they desire. The coercion continuum is a function not only of the market
power of companies, but also of those companies’ power over the design of
interfaces to shape and to influence consumer decision-making. This results
in “dark patterns,” a term coined by user experience designer Harry
Brignull. According to Brignull, dark patterns are “tricks used in websites
and apps that make you buy or sign up for things that you didn't mean to.”109
Security researcher Greg Conti calls these patterns “malicious” or “evil
interfaces.”110 Conti and Edward Sobiesk define malicious interfaces simply
as those that “deliberately violate usable design best practices in order to
manipulate, exploit, or attack the user.”111 And they are everywhere.
Common examples of malicious interfaces include “disabled back
buttons, browsers with ‘sponsored’ default bookmarks, unexpected and
unnecessary forms, blinking advertisements, and pop-ups covering desired
content.”112 These malicious interfaces often coerce users into disclosing
private information.113 Conti and Sobiesk identified eleven kinds of
malicious interfaces:
Coercion – Threatening or mandating the user’s compliance.
109.
110.

DARK PATTERNS, https://darkpatterns.org/ [https://perma.cc/7322-X5ME].
Gregory Conti & Edward Sobiesk, Malicious Interface Design: Exploiting the User, 2010
WORLD
WIDE
WEB
CONFERENCE
271,
271
(2010),
http://www.gregconti.com/publications/201004_malchi.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5HN4-HUWY]
[hereinafter Conti & Sobiesk, Malicious Interface Design] (arguing that security and human-computer
interaction committees need to come together to fix deceptive designs); see also Tim Jones, Facebook’s
‘Evil
Interfaces,’
ELEC.
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Apr.
29,
2010),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebooks-evil-interfaces [https://perma.cc/PQT6-MSEV].
111. Conti & Sobiesk, Malicious Interface Design, supra note 110, at 271 (arguing that security
and human-computer interaction committees need to come together to fix deceptive designs).
112. Gregory Conti & Edward Sobiesk, Malicious Interfaces and Personalization’s Uninviting
Future, IEEE COMPUT. SOC’Y & RELIABILITY SOC’Y 72, 72 (May/June 2009),
http://www.rumint.org/gregconti/publications/j3pri.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWD2-S6B5] [hereinafter
Conti & Sobiesk, Malicious Interfaces and Personalization’s Uninviting Future] (noting that many
individuals are tricked or coerced into divulging information they do not intend or do not want to
divulge).
113. Id.
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Confusion – Asking the user questions or providing information that
they do not understand.
Distraction – Attracting the user’s attention away from their current
task by exploiting perception, particularly pre-attentive processing.
Exploiting Errors – Taking advantage of user errors to facilitate the
interface designer’s goals.
Forced Work – Deliberately increasing work for the user.
Interruption – Interrupting the user’s task flow.
Manipulating Navigation – Creating information architectures and
navigation mechanisms that guide the user toward interface designer
task accomplishment.
Obfuscation – Hiding desired information and interface elements.
Restricting Functionality – Limiting or omitting controls that would
facilitate user task accomplishment.
Shock – Presenting disturbing content to the user.
Trick – Misleading the user or other attempts at deception.114
Because companies have strong incentives to obtain consent, it is no
surprise many of these malicious interfaces are used to coerce, wheedle, and
manipulate people to grant it. Examples ranging in severity abound. Some
terms of use agreements just won’t let you say no. They only let you put off
saying yes until “later.” Other kinds of mediated consent leverage
psychological pressure to manufacture consent. Consider the concept of
what Brignull calls “confirmshaming,” that is, “the act of guilting the user
into opting into something. The option to decline is worded in such a way
as to shame the user into compliance.”115 Consider the request from
MyMedic to send users notifications, which forces those who do not wish
to receive notification to click a button labeled “no, I prefer to bleed to
death.”116 It’s a subtle form of psychological coercion, but at scale these
attempts can deplete our resolve.
114. Conti & Sobiesk, Malicious Interface Design, supra note 110, at 273.
115. Confirmshaming, DARKPATTERNS, https://darkpatterns.org/types-of-dark-pattern/confirmsh
aming [https://perma.cc/5BEZ-RCQL]; see also Confirmshaming, TUMBLR http://confirmshaming.tumb
lr.com/ [https://perma.cc/K8UA-N963].
116. MYMEDIC, https://mymedic.com/ [https://perma.cc/TZY3-HCTG].
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Other examples abound. “Roach motels” make it easy to enroll or give
consent, but difficult to leave.117 “Forced continuity” quietly extends your
consent past initial authorizations with affirmative opt-out obligations.118
While Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s book Nudge offered an optimistic
account of how to use the insights of behavioral economics to influence
“choice architecture” for social good through what they called “benevolent
paternalism,” many tech companies today seem to be using it as a cookbook
for coercive and manipulative decision structures.119
C. Incapacitated Consent
The third pathology of consent is incapacitated consent. Like coerced
consent, incapacitated consent takes the “voluntary” out of “knowing and
voluntary,” but in this case it does so as a matter of law rather than as a
matter of circumstance. Incapacitated consents are those where
voluntariness is simply not available as a matter of law, such as with
children and others who are categorically incapable of legally consenting.
While incapacitated consent may be the easiest of the pathologies to
understand, here, too, some examples will help to illuminate the problem.
Laws in the United States and Europe have regulated the ways in which
companies can collect data about children for some time, though with
limited effectiveness.120 For example, the one area in which the United
States has a generally applicable Internet data protection regime is the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), which
regulates online data collection from children. Yet even though the general
age of contractual consent in the United States is 18, COPPA only regulates
collection from children under the age of 13.121 This means that even though
children from 13–18 are legally incapable of contractual consent, it is
perfectly legal to treat them as consenting adults for data collection purposes
under the prevailing “notice and consent” regime.122
117. Types of Dark Pattern, DARKPATTERNS, https://darkpatterns.org/types-of-dark-pattern
[https://perma.cc/G89G-FZDN].
118. Id.
119. See RICHARD R. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); see also Conti & Sobiesk, Malicious Interfaces and
Personalization’s Uninviting Future, supra note 112.
120. See Simone van der Hof, I Agree, Or Do I? A Rights-Based Analysis of the Law on Children’s
Consent in the Digital World, 34 WIS. INT’L L.J. 409, 412, 425 (2016).
121. 5 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6505 (2019); 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2018).
122. While an amendment to COPPA has been proposed that contains additional protections, the
statute would still heavily rely upon consent. See Makena Kelly, New Privacy Bill Would Give Parents
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In practice, moreover, whether legally or illegally, it has been trivially
easy to circumvent the consent of legally incapacitated minors in ways that
have led to serious financial and even physical harm. For example, both
Apple and Facebook have come under fire for making it too easy for
children to run up large debts in app stores or in-app purchases using their
parents’ credit cards.123 More recently, the dating apps Tinder and Grindr
were investigated by the UK government after police investigated more than
thirty cases of child rape resulting from children avoiding the age checks on
the application interfaces.124 Companies may protest after such incidents
that they do not intend minors to use their services (and that they put in place
measures to forestall this). However, the combination of easy-to-install
applications and a permissive regulatory regime makes it all but inevitable
that minors will use apps and engage in online and offline activities, ranging
from data collection to sex, that they lack the legal capacity to consent to.
Simply put, a notice and choice regime coupled with the general goal of
“putting users in control” cannot solve the problem of incapacitated consent.
While the Mark Zuckerbergs of the world might lionize control and
consent, the digital consumers of the world face a very different reality than
the idealized one presented by the CEOs and marketing departments of
technology companies. The idealized model paints a picture of consent that
evokes the knowing and voluntary gold standard, and relies upon the gold
standard’s power for its legitimacy. In practice, however, the version of
consent that most consumers face is a significant and pathological departure
from the gold standard. Unwitting consent takes the “knowing” out of
“knowing and voluntary;” coerced and incapacitated consent take the
“voluntary” out of “knowing and voluntary.” Our articulation of this
vocabulary for pathologies of consent is intended to provide a useful way to
identify and critique the ways in which consents in practice fall short of the
gold standard in theory. Once we can identify the problems, we will be
better placed to prescribe solutions, and it is to this that we now turn.
an ‘Eraser Button’ and Ban Ads Targeting Children, VERGE (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.theverge.co
m/2019/3/12/18261181/eraser-button-bill-children-privacy-coppa-hawley-markey [https://perma.cc/U
U9X-LLG7].
123. See Nathan Halverson, Facebook Knowingly Duped Game-Playing Kids and Their Parents
Out of Money, REVEAL NEWS (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.revealnews.org/article/facebook-knowinglyduped-game-playing-kids-and-their-parents-out-of-money/ [https://perma.cc/4KLK-7QTR]; Press
Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Apple Inc. Will Provide Full Consumer Refunds of at Least $32.5 Million
to Settle FTC Complaint It Charged for Kids’ In-App Purchases Without Parental Consent (Jan. 15,
2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/01/apple-inc-will-provide-full-consumer-r
efunds-least-325-million [https://perma.cc/P5UJ-4E2R].
124. See Ben Quinn, Tinder and Grindr Face Questions Over Age Checks After Rape Cases,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/feb/10/tinder-and-grindr-facequestions-over-age-checks-children [https://perma.cc/Z5ED-8NKK].
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III. IDEAL CIRCUMSTANCES FOR CONSENT
Although the notion of informed consent in digital environments is
deeply problematic, it could still play an important role under the right
circumstances. The key is to understand the conditions under which consent
can meaningfully enhance autonomy and self-determination. Of course, as
discussed above, the foundational notion of informed consent to data
practices is that it must be “freely given, specific, informed and
unambiguous.” This includes notions of voluntariness and revocability.
However, we contend that the problem with consent for data practices
isn’t necessarily in the form or substance of the consent itself. Many
scholars have examined how to substantively improve requests for informed
consent.125 But an additional, sometimes fatal, problem lies with the
circumstances in which consent is given. Informed consent is only useful in
particular contexts. If the circumstances and structure under which consent
is asked and given are wrong, that consent will be ineffective even if it is
“freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous.” In this Part, we
propose three circumstances necessary for an ideal environment for
effective consent. To be meaningful, requests for consent must be
infrequent, the risks of giving consent must be vivid and easy to envision,
and data subjects must have an incentive to take each request seriously.
Sadly, these conditions are scarce in modern data exchanges, but we believe
that identifying the problems consumers face in these transactions allows us
to identify the contexts in which consent can do valuable and legitimate
work.
A. Infrequent Requests
One key to understanding why the pathologies of consent to data
practices are so problematic in the digital environment is the fact that there
are no limits on the number of requests for consent. Every day, every digital
consumer is implicitly or explicitly asked to consent to data collection and
processing practices for many, if not most, of the websites they visit, the
online accounts they create, the services they sign up for, and the apps they
use. Consider your web browsing on laptop and phone, GPS navigation,
search engines, smartphone operating systems, social networks, taxi
services, travel booking, video and audio streaming services, and all of the
125. See, e.g., Florian Schaub, Rebecca Balebako, Adam Durity & Lorrie Faith Cranor, A Design
Space for Effective Privacy Notices, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PRIVACY 365 (Evan
Selinger et al. eds., 2018); Batya Friedman, Peyina Lin & Jessica K. Miller, Informed Consent by Design,
in SECURITY AND USABILITY 495 (Lorrie Faith Cranor & Simson Garfinkel eds., 2005).
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other “free” or paid services you use which serve you ads or otherwise
collect your data. The result is a casual familiarity turned ennui that leads
us to gloss over the terms because we know that another request is just
around the corner. Because each consent request is a drain on our time and
cognitive load, we wisely choose to conserve our efforts. As one of us has
written elsewhere,
Anyone that has turned off notifications for apps like Facebook’s
Messenger can attest to the relentless, grinding requests for the user
to turn them back on almost every time the app is opened. Many can
relate to the experience of a child asking for candy, over and over,
until the requests become too much to ignore and we give in, simply
to quiet them. Willpower can feel like a finite, vulnerable, and
subjective resource, and systems are designed to deplete and erode it.
Once our willpower and ability to make choices has been
compromised, the control users have been given is meaningless.126
Compare this depressing state of affairs to environments with informed
consent, such as medical treatment, clinical trials, surgeries, and scientific
research. Request for consent to these practices do not come often, by sheer
virtue of the fact that treatment and trials are relatively uncommon.
Thankfully, surgery is not a daily routine. This provides a necessary
downtime and the space to both take consent requests seriously and go about
living the rest of our lives. People have the ability to consider informed
consent to surgery carefully because they know that they will not be asked
for consent to another surgery in a few minutes. Critically, if they decline
to give consent to a surgery, people know that they won’t be pestered again
and again until they say yes. Necessary medical intervention is something
of a flashpoint in time: people either agree or don’t agree to treatment and
then get on with it. Practically speaking, the very need to ask for consent to
surgery just doesn’t present itself very often.
There is no such practical constraint for consent requests for data
collection and processing. Data collection and sharing in the modern world
is frequent, and is becoming as routine as walking, eating, and breathing.
Data subjects are ceaselessly bombarded with requests for consent. There
are no limits on the number of times a company is allowed to ask for a
126. See, e.g., Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control, supra note 49, at 429 (footnote
omitted) (citing AM. PSYCHOL. ASSOC., WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT WILLPOWER: THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE OF SELF-CONTROL (2012), https://www.apa.org/helpcenter/willpower.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A2DH-QBE8]); John Tierney, Do You Suffer From Decision Fatigue?, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 17, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/magazine/do-you-suffer-from-decision-fa
tigue.html [https://perma.cc/LJ68-4MJ6].

1494

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 96:1461

person’s consent, and there are no limits on the number of companies that
may simultaneously ask for it. Even if we could consider each individual
request rationally, our cognitive bandwidth is overwhelmed.
If consent is to be effective, it must happen infrequently. This means hard
choices regarding which requests are more important than others and which
kinds of companies should be prioritized. This might feel inherently
paternalistic. Who are lawmakers to demote the importance of particular
requests? But when all consent requests are important, none of them are.
Failing to limit who can ask for informed consent, when they can ask, and
how many times ignores the reality that people need time and space if their
choices are to be meaningful. When choices are too frequent, consent loses
its moral legitimacy as a justification for action.
B. Vivid Risks
At the JFK Medical Center, the consent form for open heart surgery
explicitly states that the risks for the procedure include “bleeding requiring
blood transfusion or return to surgery for repair, nerve damage, heart, liver,
kidney or lung complication and/or even in rare cases death.”127 That’s
serious stuff. But the list goes on, including “complications arising in the
post-operative period preventing normal recuperation. . . . [including] long
term ventilation, confusion, fluid accumulation of the lungs, pneumonia,
cardiac arrhythmias, fever and abnormal laboratory results. Also infection,
long term healing and/or scarring of the surgical site incisions may occur
and may require further treatment including surgical repair.”128
Scars, bleeding, fluid accumulation, and death. These are vivid—and
thus easy—risks for us to envision. So is the risk of consenting to things like
government searches, which might result in imprisonment. These risks
might even be too vivid, as once we’ve thought of them they can be difficult
to push out of our heads.129 We even consent to accept the risk of harm in
everyday goods and services like rental car agreements that hold the driver
127. JFK MEDICAL CENTER, CONSENT FORM FOR OPEN HEART SURGERY 1, https://jfkmc.com/uti
l/forms/Consent-for-Open-Heart-Surgery.pdf [https://perma.cc/QA4V-GKLC].
128. Id.
129. Cf. KAHNEMAN, supra note 62, at 326 (discussing experimental research suggesting that such
so-called “vivid” outcomes tend to be viewed as more likely by human brains than a strict rationality
calculus would suggest). One of the ongoing debates for informed consent to surgery is that the more
vivid risks, even if incredibly unlikely, might have undue sway over a patient’s decision. See David
Thomasma, Telling the Truth to Patients: A Clinical Ethics Exploration, 3 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE
ETHICS 375 (1994).
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responsible for losses or dry cleaners who limit liability for damage to
clothes to things like replacing or repairing. But personal data is different
from bodily integrity or damage to our liberty or property. The risks of data
practices are so opaque that there’s an ongoing debate as to whether they
should even be legally recognized.130 Certain kinds of surveillance and data
practices might be “creepy,” but that’s the word we use when we have
difficulty specifying exactly the risks we are facing.131 In fact, most of the
risks we face from modern data practices arrive not with a bang but a
whimper, if we hear them at all. Information is accumulated bit by bit, with
risk accruing incrementally. This makes envisioning the plethora of harms
difficult because there is rarely a single moment in time that people can
point to when the envisioned risk materializes. Unlike severed arteries and
being put in prison, how can people envision “databases of ruin” that have
reached the critical mass of jeopardy?132 Informed consent regimes for data
will only work if the risks are vivid.
Even worse, these risks that we are being asked to waive through consent
might materialize without our even knowing it. People typically know when
they have a heart attack or suffer complications from surgery or
pharmaceuticals. But our data could be being used against us this very
moment, and we wouldn’t know it. Hackers could, right now, be opening
credit cards in your name as a result of that data breach last year that you
didn’t know you were involved in either. That lack of feedback further
frustrates our ability to adequately envision the risks. Even when
manifested, data harms often stay hidden. And our risk calculus is further
funneled into wild speculation, paranoia, or overconfidence.
Of course, some data-related harms are easy to envision, such as being
humiliated because a deeply-held secret is revealed, having your identity
stolen, or being fired or denied insurance coverage on the basis of a personal
data dossier or big data prediction. But the problem is that these harms are
difficult to predict and difficult to trace from particular disclosures of
information. This leads us to our final pre-condition for gold standard
consent.

130. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1 (2011) (offering a
theory of privacy harm as legally-cognizable); Daniel Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk & Anxiety:
A Theory of Data Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737 (2018) (same).
131. Evan Selinger, Why Do We Love to Call New Technologies “Creepy?,” SLATE (Aug. 22,
2012), https://slate.com/technology/2012/08/facial-recognition-software-targeted-advertising-we-loveto-call-new-technologies-creepy.html [https://perma.cc/KXT6-7UMY]; see also Richards & Hartzog,
Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 3.
132. Paul Ohm, Don’t Build a Database of Ruin, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 23, 2012), https://hbr.org
/2012/08/dont-build-a-database-of-ruin [https://perma.cc/G2MS-QR48].
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C. Incentives to Take Each Request Seriously
Certain decisions demand to be taken seriously. The reason people
hesitate before consenting to skydiving and surgery is that if it goes wrong,
they could die. Mental and physical safety are powerful motivators to
understand the risks of particular decisions. Imprisonment and exoneration
are powerful motivators to weigh when granting consent to government
searches. Even some frequent decisions to grant consent demand to be taken
seriously, like participating in sports involving physical contact. It’s not just
that the choices are infrequent and the risks are vivid. It’s that for gold
standard consent there must be a clear incentive to critically analyze and
deliberate the request for consent because of the magnitude of the stakes
involved and the close relationship between the consent and those stakes.
Requests for informed consent are, by definition, individualized and
atomized. The moral weight of these frameworks is concentrated in the
information delivered to the subject and the subject’s voluntary execution
of a legally significant choice. Through this call and response, people’s
autonomy is ostensibly respected, which can justify a host of actions that
would otherwise be objectionable. But these justifications break down when
people have little incentive to meaningfully consider what is being asked of
them. This incentive can be diminished either because the stakes appear
insignificant or because people cannot easily see how their decision is
consequential because the relationship between the consent and the risks is
too remote. Others simply have little incentive to take each request seriously
because they feel powerless.133
Consider the common fatalistic sentiment that privacy is already dead.134
Ian Bogost argues that it’s hopeless to try and opt out of surveillance
capitalism, proclaiming that “the age of privacy nihilism is here.”135 Bogost
133. Kimberlee Morrison, Pew: Internet Users Feel Powerless Against Digital Data Mining,
ADWEEK (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.adweek.com/digital/pew-internet-users-feel-powerless-digitaldata-mining/ [https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=4014-40406-40412-48449] (describing PEW
RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA (Nov.
12, 2014), https://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/ [perma.cc/6VDK5UFP]); Brian Byer, Internet Users Worry About Online Privacy But Feel Powerless to Do Much About
It, ENTREPRENEUR (June 20, 2018), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/314524 [https://perma.cc/2Y
R6-ZLQS].
134. See Neil M. Richards, Four Privacy Myths, in A WORLD WITHOUT PRIVACY: WHAT LAW
CAN AND SHOULD DO? 33 (Austin Sarat ed., 2015) (debunking the “Privacy is Dead” myth).
135. See Ian Bogost, Welcome to the Age of Privacy Nihilism, ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/08/the-age-of-privacy-nihilism-is-here/568198/
[https://perma.cc/A83C-GEJE].
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paints a bleak picture, in which “[e]verything you have done has been
recorded, munged, and spat back at you to benefit sellers, advertisers, and
the brokers who service them. It has been for a long time, and it’s not going
to stop.”136
It’s hard to blame anyone who feels this way, even if there’s so much
privacy left to fight for.137 Tech companies are now the backbone of the
American economy. They are multi-billion dollar companies that have their
fingers in nearly every aspect of our lives. Even if people were merely
skeptical of the tech giants with the most personal data, sometimes called
the “Big Five” (Amazon, Google, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft), people
would likely find it difficult, if not impossible, to live a normal, modern life
without interacting with them.138 For the ninety-one percent of Americans
that feel that they have lost control over their data, why should any single
request for consent compel any forethought at all?139 Under this view, our
consent is a fait accompli—something to quickly agree to without
deliberation, because there is little point in resistance.
Another way consent can break down is it can be very difficult to draw
a line from the practices that need consent to the stakes of the decision. Data
harms, unlike physical harms, are not localized. They occur offstage and far
away, on servers in remote countries and in boardrooms in faraway cities.
The Internet is littered with infographics attempting to chart the flow of data
from users to platforms to third party vendors and onward downstream.140
The expanse of it all is mind boggling. In this light, data subjects have little
reason to avoid clicking “I agree” because the services they are using are
local, such as the Facebook or Uber app, and the risks are remote, such as
unobserved data flows on the other side of the world. Again, people would
have little incentive to deliberate because, frankly, they have little notion of
the stakes, and the benefits of consent are right at their fingertips.
Finally, consent justifications are weakened when each particular request
is just one tiny piece of the larger risk puzzle. Our consent to data practices
136. Id.
137. Evan Selinger, Stop Saying Privacy is Dead, MEDIUM (Oct. 11, 2018), https://medium.com/s/
story/stop-saying-privacy-is-dead-513dda573071 [https://perma.cc/WD74-6DUZ].
138. For an in-depth exploration of the difficulties of escaping the Big Five, see Kashmir Hill,
Life Without the Tech Giants, GIZMODO (Jan. 22, 2019), https://gizmodo.com/life-without-the-tech-giant
s-1830258056 [https://perma.cc/2P4E-E9J6].
139. See Kimberlee Morrison, Pew: Internet Users Feel Powerless Against Digital Data Mining,
ADWEEK (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.adweek.com/digital/pew-internet-users-feel-powerless-digitaldata-mining/ [https://perma.cc/2SNP-F296].
140. See, e.g., ImBrentJames, A Healthcare Data Flow Diagram Showing the Complexity That
TKY Could Help Simplify, REDDIT (Aug. 2017), https://www.reddit.com/r/THEKEYOFFICIAL/comme
nts/99q4ny/a_healthcare_data_flow_diagram_showing_the/ [https://perma.cc/2V22-98M4].
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is astonishingly dispersed. Thousands of apps and services ask us for small,
incremental disclosures, few of which involve the kind of information
collection that might give people pause. While dating apps and platforms
that collect sensitive and large amounts of personal data might cause some
people to consider their risks, it’s not as though people share all their
information at once. Instead, it trickles out over time, such that our
incentives to deliberate at the point of agreement are small because we don’t
know how much information we will ultimately end up sharing. Most of the
time, it probably seems like a small amount. This is like the problem of
death by a thousand cuts. And there’s little guidance for people regarding
which individual cuts matter. So people make the transaction-rational
decision to chalk up each individual request for consent as “no big deal” in
perpetuity. Such an environment is no place to condition our well-being.
Finally, people don’t have great incentives to weigh the externalities of
consent. That is, typically people only consider how a particular consentedto action will affect themselves. By allowing consent to companies to collect
and process my data, those companies can then better target ads to everyone
else who uses the service. One person’s data becomes a point of comparison
that allows for refined targeting, processing, and use elsewhere in the
system. People probably don’t take into account this externality when
deciding whether to agree or not to give consent for data processing. There
just aren’t enough incentives for people to consider the implications of data
processing for other people on a consistent basis, which creates a collective
action problem, another pathology of consent to data practices to add to the
list.
IV. BEYOND CONSENT
America desperately needs a new direction for its privacy rules. Notions
of consent, control, and transparency have dominated data protection
discussions for years, and the result is a sea of “I agree” buttons, drop-down
menus, and switches that we are unable to navigate.141
In terms of meaningfully protecting our privacy, this approach has been
a spectacular failure. The shortcomings of consent and transparency are
141. We have offered a preliminary version of these thoughts here: Woodrow Hartzog & Neil
Richards, It’s Time to Try Something Different on Internet Privacy, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/its-time-to-try-something-different-on-internet-privacy/2018/12/2
0/bc1d71c0-0315-11e9-9122-82e98f91ee6f_story.html?utm_term=.5cd05e778a52 [https://perma.cc/F6
7G-DF5Y].
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particularly visible in the United States. Congress is still trying to settle on
its approach to privacy, but most of the current proposals still build off the
notice and choice model.142 The FTC has made a heroic effort to be the top
U.S. privacy cop, but it has been starved of the legal tools and financial
resources it needs to do a proper job.
America has a bad reputation for privacy.143 The world is watching and
judging, and the economic stakes are enormous. International data flows are
essential for the global economy to function without fundamentally—and
expensively—restructuring the Internet to America’s huge financial
detriment. American tech companies depend on being able to smoothly
import European data for processing. But, in 2015, a European Court ruled
that America’s privacy protections were so poor that it struck down the
“Safe Harbor” agreement, which helped enable an international flow of
data.144 Our current data sharing agreement with Europe, called the EU/U.S.
“Privacy Shield,” is in jeopardy.145 If it fails, we will need a good
replacement.
Europe and others have encouraged the U.S. to adopt a law similar to the
EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation. But a “U.S. GDPR” seems
destined to suffer from the same consent pathologies we have explored in
this article. As discussed above, the GDPR and forthcoming ePrivacy
directive borrow too heavily from the control and transparency playbook.

142. CAMERON F. KERRY, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, BREAKING DOWN PROPOSALS FOR PRIVACY
LEGISLATION: HOW DO THEY REGULATE? (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/breakin
g-down-proposals-for-privacy-legislation-how-do-they-regulate/
[https://perma.cc/QGR9-FUYL];
CAMERON F. KERRY, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, WHY PROTECTING PRIVACY IS A LOSING GAME TODAY—
AND HOW TO CHANGE THE GAME (July 12, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-protectin
g-privacy-is-a-losing-game-today-and-how-to-change-the-game/
[https://perma.cc/5HVK-FLHS];
CONSUMERS INT'L, THE STATE OF DATE PROTECTION RULES AROUND THE WORLD (2018), https://ww
w.consumersinternational.org/media/155133/gdpr-briefing.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N5L-DRLR].
143. MARY MADDEN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN
THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-per
ceptions/ [perma.cc/6VDK-5UFP]; Copy That: America Should Borrow From Europe's Data-Privacy
Law, ECONOMIST (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/04/05/america-shouldborro w-from-europes-data-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/RKM2-3ENN]; Samuel Gibbs, What Is 'Safe
Harbour' and Why Did the EUCJ Just Declare It Invalid?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.thegu
ardian.com/technology/2015/oct/06/safe-harbour-european-court-declare-invalid-data-protection [https
://perma.cc/B4PS-SFV8].
144. See Ellen Nakashima, Top E.U. Court Strikes Down Major Data-Sharing Pact Between U.S.
and Europe, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/eucourt-strikes-down-safe-harbor-data-transfer-deal-over-privacy-concerns/2015/10/06/2da2d9f6-6c2a-1
1e5-b31c-d80d62b53e28_story.html?utm_term=.9ac8bcde9495 [https://perma.cc/SUK3-WD6M].
145. See Hayley Evans & Shannon Togawa Mercer, Privacy Shield on Shaky Ground: What’s Up
With EU-U.S. Data Privacy Regulations, LAWFARE (Sept. 2, 2018, 2:31 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/privacy-shield-shaky-ground-whats-eu-us-data-privacy-regulations
[https://perma.cc/895C-Y3EW].
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Our current approach too often results in nothing more than cluttered
minds and inboxes, with people resigned to take-it-or-leave it choices for
ad-supported web or social media. Relying upon consent to justify data
practices rests on the dubious assumptions that people understand what they
are being told, and we can meaningfully calculate the risk of our choices
online and exercise agency through mediated technologies.
It should be no wonder that under this framework, privacy—our human
information policy—has begun to fall apart, often in breathtaking ways.
We’ve seen a cascade of high-profile privacy failures like the Edward
Snowden disclosures, the Cambridge Analytica scandal, the targeting of
fake news based on data about political preferences, and data breach after
data breach after data breach. Backing this up is an entire ecosystem
dependent upon an illusion of control and wheedling, cajoling, and
extracting consent by any method possible.
In spite of the failures of control and transparency, some lawmakers are
considering doubling down on this failed strategy. But no matter how much
control we are given, it will never work online. As we’ve tried to show in
this essay, consent regimes burden data subjects with all of the risks of
understanding and self-protection while keeping the data machine
humming. Consent does not scale without losing its legitimacy.146 The
control that consent regimes promise us ends up being illusory and
overwhelming. Even when companies are transparent, it doesn’t lead to
reform. Big tech platforms and shadowy advertising companies make their
fortunes while the rest of us are watched, nudged, exploited, and exposed to
data breaches and the manipulation of politics and elections.
There is a better way.
We should have rules that are more sensitive to relationships and power
disparities. One way to do this is for lawmakers to create rules designed to
protect our trust—trust in the Internet, trust in those entities that hold our
data and promise to use it for our benefit, trust in our economy and in our
digital society.147 Being trustworthy in the digital age means being discreet
with our data, honest about the risk of data practices, protective of our
personal information, and, above all, loyal to us, the data subjects.148
There are some indications that lawmakers are willing to consider a trustbased approach to modern privacy rules. In late 2018, U.S. Senator Brian
146.
147.
148.

See, e.g., Julie Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2019).
See Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 3.
Id.
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Schatz introduced the “Data Care Act of 2018.”149 Among other things, the
bill goes beyond control and transparency goals in favor of three key nonwaivable trust-based obligations for companies that use the Internet to
collect personal information about people: duties of care, loyalty, and
confidentiality. These duties are modeled after what is required of those in
a fiduciary relationship, such as a trustee designed to care for a trust on
behalf of a beneficiary, but they would apply more broadly if this bill were
to pass.150 They would require tech companies of all kinds to act more like
doctors than telemarketers.
Trust rules would eschew consent regimes in favor of obligations to be
protective and discrete and refrain from manipulative practices. They would
aim to keep tech companies from elevating their short-term profits over our
long-term interests. And ideally, legislative efforts built around trust would
give regulators the resources they need and prohibit companies from using
dense terms of use agreements to get us to waive those obligations. An
explicit rejection of flimsy “consent” regimes is an important step forward
for American privacy regimes.151 Companies should be obligated to be
trustworthy regardless of what we clicked to “agree” to online.
Another way lawmakers could address some of the pathologies of
consent is by targeting abusive trade practices. Sunstein and Thaler’s Nudge
is not a cookbook for manipulators, but it has been used as such, and the law
should step in to negate these practices. One of us has argued elsewhere that
rules against abusive trade practices and abusive design of information
technologies can help mitigate some of the inherent vulnerabilities of
control regimes.152
The notion of abusive design can be found in consumer protection law,
which aims to protect consumer choice. The most prominent prohibition on
abusive practices in the United States comes from the relatively new
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act authorized the CFPB to
prohibit any “abusive” act or practice that:
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand
a term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or

149. S. 3744, 115th Cong. (2018). (In full disclosure, we provided feedback on this bill in draft
form.)
150. See HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT, supra note 43, at 99.
151. The bill specifically provides that “The rights and remedies provided under this Act may not
be waived or limited by contract or otherwise.” S. 3744, 115th Cong. § 5 (2018).
152. HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT, supra note 43.
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(2) takes unreasonable advantage of—
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service;
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the
consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or
service; or
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered
person to act in the interests of the consumer.153
Rules against abusive trade practices look to the problems people have in
assessing risks and benefits even with accurate, truthful information. They
should begin with an internal inquiry into how we process information.154
Since the pathologies of consent are all related to our limitations in
processing information, this seems as good of a place as any for privacy
reform to begin with.
It’s time to take a bold step forward. America has an opportunity to
redefine itself as the country that protects the trust that people give to
companies. By embracing trust, America can become a leader on privacy
instead of following the path of false promises, diminishing returns, and the
tedium and vicious banality of mindless clicks of “I agree” buttons. Call it
legal innovation, if that’s what it takes. But whatever we call it, by requiring
that companies respect our trust, America can pave the way for a safe,
sustainable, and profitable digital future.
CONCLUSION
Tools are only fit for certain purposes. Legal tools are no different from
physical tools in this respect. Frederick Schauer once likened legal tools to
the problem of driving a nail into a board when you have a pipe wrench but
no hammer. Pipe wrenches are great for tightening or loosening pipes, but
153. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5531 (West 2019) (emphasis added).
154. Patrick M. Corrigan, "Abusive" Acts and Practices: Dodd-Frank's Behaviorally Informed
Authority over Consumer Credit Markets and Its Application to Teaser Rates, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL'Y 125, 127 (2015) (“While shopping for the best offer, consumers may misperceive the real
costs and benefits of a consumer product or service because of a lack of information about the product
or service or due to a misunderstanding of the information available to them. The former is said to be a
problem of imperfect information, while the latter is said to be a problem of imperfect or bounded
rationality. Problems of imperfect information are extrinsic to the consumer, while problems of
imperfect rationality are intrinsic.”).
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they make lousy hammers. You could certainly try to drive the nail into the
board with a pipe wrench, but you probably wouldn’t get it in straight, if
you get it in at all. And you’d probably damage the pipe wrench.155 Schauer
was talking about the First Amendment, but consent is a bit like a pipe
wrench as well—it is incredibly useful, even necessary, where it’s the right
tool for the job, but it can be easily overused, to the detriment of both the
task and the tool.
We have over-used the tool of consent to the point that it has become
badly damaged. Consent does and should play an essential role in our law,
but it cannot do everything well all the time. The over-use of consent in the
digital context, combined with limited legal policing of the sufficiency of
consent has allowed great fortunes to be created on the basis of personal
data, but it has also exposed consumers to data breaches, identity theft, and
a surveillance economy unprecedented in human history, one which
stretches the very notion of “consent” to say that it was ever actually agreed
to. More fundamentally, the manufacturing of consent by exploiting
consent’s pathologies has diminished the trust in our digital environment
that is the key ingredient toward a better future. We can do better, but in
order to do so, we need to recognize the pathologies of consent, and limit
consent to the contexts in which it is most justified. Going forward, we must
rely on strategies other than fictive, manufactured, or coerced consent to
minimize the risks and harms of our information economy, if we seek to
take advantage of its benefits in a sustainable, ethical, and progressive way.

155.

Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH
(Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002).
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A Relational Turn for Data Protection?
Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog*

If there’s one thing everyone in the data protection debate can agree on, it’s that it’s all
about the data. All over the world, data protection regimes fixate on when data can
be collected, how it is being processed, when it can be accessed or should be deleted, and whether it is personal, sensitive, or deidentified. This is true even for approaches that seem quite different at first glance, such as the U.S. and EU.1
But what if our shared focus on the data is too narrow? Data protection as a concept
is a relatively new response to a specific technology: the database. In the decades following the Second World War, societies began to realize that data could be aggregated, made searchable, and stored in a pristine state for a remarkably low cost. Lawmakers needed a plan to make sure data could be collected and stored in these databases
in a safe and sustainable way. The Fair Information Practices Principle (FIPs), developed with contributions from Americans and Europeans, laid the blueprint for privacy on both sides of the Atlantic.2 These principles focus on procedural rights like transparency, consent, safeguards, purpose limitations, and data minimization, in service
of informational self-determination and a sustainable environment for data processing. Because they emphasize choice and individual autonomy, FIP-based regimes tend
to lack substantive prohibitions on particular kinds of data practices. The concept of
data protection has been wildly successful in terms of adoption by government and
industry. But has it been effective? The jury is still out.
The strongest implementation of the FIPs to date is the GDPR, which has been lauded
for its robust and holistic approach. But the GDPR has also failed to reckon with the
sheer power of the modern data industrial complex. These companies risk more than
just our dignitary interests in our personal data – they control what we see, what we
click, and in many cases what we believe. Data is dangerous in the hands of these
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companies not just because it is personal to us, but because in their hands it becomes
power that can be wielded to control people and institutions.3 It exposes us in ways
that risk more than just identification or denial of control. Data protection regimes
were not designed to confront this kind of adversary.4 Originating in the 1970s, when
home computing and mobile phones were still science fiction in the mode of Star Trek,
the FIPs were a managerial approach for an analog age. Their approach never questioned that data processing might not always be a worthy endeavor, or that what seemed
like large amounts of data in the 1970s might seem quaint a half-century later. Most
importantly, the FIPs approach never considered that future consumers and citizens
might create so much data and have so many commercial and government accounts
that informational self-determination could become impossible. Today, unfortunately,
we are living in that never-considered future.
There is, however, a different way to approach data privacy. It has less to do with the
data itself and more to do with people and their relationships. Specifically, it looks at
how the people who expose themselves and the people that are inviting that disclosure relate to each other. It is concerned with what powerful parties owe to vulnerable parties not just with their personal information, but with the things they see, the
things they can click, the decisions that are made about them. It’s less about the nature of data and more about the nature of power. And it can make data protection work
better. We call this the relational turn in privacy law. The folly of our modern privacy
predicament is our failure to anticipate the sheer power that results from the scale and
size of these large tech companies. We had our eyes trained so much on the data that
we lost sight of the power that comes from inequality and inequity in relationships,
even when data is fairly processed. But it wasn’t always this way.
Long before databases or even film cameras, privacy law was primarily about relationships. American understandings of privacy are traditionally dated to Warren and Brandeis’ influential 1890 law review article ‘The Right to Privacy,’ which called for a cause
of action against the press for spreading true but private facts.5 The authors rested their
argument on a large and sometimes ancient body of law protecting information in the
context of relationships, including evidentiary privileges, confidential relations, blackmail law, and government records.6 But unlike studio photographers, married couples,
pen-pals, and trustees, the new, aggressive press of the Gilded Age didn’t have a relationship with the subjects of its reportage. Warren and Brandeis thus conceived of ‘the
right to privacy’ as tort-based rather than relationship-based, applying weakly to all
the world rather than strongly in the context of existing relationships.7 It focused on

3
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the nature of the data and whether it was public or private, which became a focus on
whether data uses were ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person’ in American tort law,
and whether the data being processed was ‘sensitive’ or not in data protection regimes.8
Although the database shifted the focus of privacy law away from relationships of trust
for quite some time, America seems to be rekindling its appreciation for them, perhaps
recognizing the limits of focusing too closely on the nature of the data and too little
on the relationships in which that data is used. A scholarly movement taking relationships seriously in privacy law that began over decade ago is increasingly active and
visible.9 Some scholars (including the authors of this paper), have advocated for legal
rules that draw upon the law of fiduciaries to impose duties of loyalty, confidentiality,
and care on tech companies as a way of curbing harmful self-dealing and reckless behavior from tech companies in their data processing and the design of their products.10
Lawmakers in the U.S. have also proposed legislation that cements these duties within information relationships of trust.11
The clear advantage of a relational approach is that it is acutely sensitive to the power disparities within information relationships. Tech companies control what we see,
what we can click on, and what sorts of information they want to extract from their
customers. They have incredible resources that help them predict and nudge our behavior and have the financial incentive to keep us ever more exposed. Duties of loy-
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alty protect against self-dealing and duties of care protect against dangerous behavior.
The greater the power imbalance and the more people are made vulnerable through
exposure, the stricter the duty to which the trusted party is held.12
Data protection regimes, by contrast target, imbalances of power within relationships
more indirectly by looking to the nature of the data. Rules under the data protection
model are largely procedural ones, with a few important exceptions. These provisions
are combined with data subject rights against all who process their data, and structural proportions, under the idea fair processing is, in and of itself, a way to mitigate power. But these frameworks are not primarily intended to restrict processing, rather to ensure that processing happens in a legitimate manner.13 Thus, while relational duties
explicitly prioritize the best interests of vulnerable parties, data protection regimes ostensibly pre-code the best interests of data subjects into rules and rights built around
the fair information practices. But data privacy should be about more than just the FIPs
and informational self-determination.14 Properly understood, data privacy is about civil rights, free expression, freedom from harassment, collective autonomy interests, and
how personal information is leveraged to erode our attention spans, our mental wellbeing, and our public institutions. The GDPR, CCPA, and other data protection regimes
around the world fail to undertake a holistic inquiry that is sufficiently sensitive to such
values except in the case of ‘legitimate interest’ processing.
Data protection frameworks are not agnostic to the status and power of actors, of
course. Much hinges on whether people are processors, controllers, or data subjects.
But these frameworks typically do not account for the power imbalances between these
parties. They essentially treat all relationships between data subjects and controllers
the same. Put another way, data protection law flattens the power dynamics of specific relationships, treating your relationship with Google the same the one you have with
your grocer. And while Google and your grocer might collect some similar kinds of
information in the abstract – your shopping habits and credit card information, for example – you are significantly more vulnerable to Google or any tech platform than you
are to your grocer. By controlling your mediated environments in ways that expose
you, these companies are able to leverage information they have about you, your network, and people it thinks are similar to you to choose what ads you see, whose posts
you see, how you are able to interact with them, and what other people see about you.
The relational turn in data privacy rachets up the obligations based in a way that is proportional to this exposure.
We think a relational turn for data protection would be superior to the current model,
even of the GDPR, which is still FIPs-based in its bones. A relational turn would provide a path towards more substantive rules that would limit how peoples’ data could
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be used against them. It would focus on the real problem that privacy and data protection law should tackle – the power consequences of information relationships, making legitimacy of processing a question of fundamental fairness rather than data hygiene. Substantive data rules would demand more than that data serve a ‘legitimate
interest’ of the data processor.15 They would focus on the power consequences of processing on the data subject, whether we apply some version of the classic fiduciary
duties of care, confidentiality, and loyalty, or the trust-promoting duties of honesty,
protection, discretion, and loyalty that we have called for in other work.16
Perhaps equally important, duties of loyalty and care would allow data protection
regimes to finally jettison the concept of consent, which it has long been skeptical of.
Instead of obsessing over whether the consent people gave was a truly meaningful, informed, and revocable choice, relational duties allow for a decoupling of choice and
consent. People would be protected no matter what they choose.17
Notably, the European Commission might have just taken the first major step towards
a relational turn in E.U. data protection law. On Nov. 25, 2020, the Commission issued a proposal for a regulation on European data governance (Data Governance Act).18
This proposal includes a remarkable number of bold data privacy interventions designed to increase trust in data intermediaries, including the idea that ‘Data sharing
providers that intermediate the exchange of data between individuals as data holders
and legal persons should, in addition, bear fiduciary duty towards the individuals, to
ensure that they act in the best interest of the data holders.’19 We have long argued for
a similarly articulated duty for those entrusted with our information and our online experiences. We think this duty should be the foundation of modern data privacy frameworks and should be applied in a much broader way to encompass all information relationships with significant power disparities.
Much work remains to be done in fleshing out some of the practical the details of the
relational turn.20 Neither Rome nor the FIPs were built in a day, and for all of its flaws,
the FIPs model does have the advantage of a half-century’s head start. But we worry
that if we continue to head down the path of focusing solely on data in service of informational self-determination, it will actually have the effect of continuing to disempower human beings rather than helping them. Ultimately we face a question of what
we want the law to do here, and we believe strongly that the informational self-deter-

15 Cf GDPR Art 6.
16 Eg, Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog, ‘Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law’ (2016) 19 Stan Tech L Rev 431; Neil Richards and Woodrow
Hartzog, ‘A Duty of Loyalty in Privacy Law’ (2020) (unpublished manuscript) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3642217>.
17 For an extended critique of consent-based models for data processing, see Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog, ‘The Pathologies of
Digital Consent’ (forthcoming 2019) Wash U L Rev <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3370433>.
18 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on European data governance (Data Governance Act), <https://ec.europa.eu/digitalsingle-market/en/news/proposal-regulation-european-data-governance-data-governance-act> (2020).
19 ibid
20 Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog, ‘A Duty of Loyalty in Privacy Law’ (2020) (unpublished manuscript) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3642217>; Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog, ‘The Pathologies of Digital Consent’ (forthcoming 2019) Wash U L Rev
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3370433>.
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mination model has been a failure in practice and promises more failure as it confronts
the new problems on the horizon: ever-increasing volumes of processing, algorithmic
decisionmaking, artificial intelligence, and augmented reality. It’s time to try something different. Lawmakers and judges should focus on power and vulnerability and
place substantive limitations on the ability of the powerful to manipulate us against
our interests. After all, the goal of data protection law should be to promote trust in
the digital environment, rather than stoke fear, anxiety, and a sense of being overwhelmed by its complexity. Building trust requires us to focus directly on power imbalances in relationships rather than indirectly through data rules. It’s time for data
protection’s relational turn.
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PRIVACY’S CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT
AND THE LIMITS OF DATA PROTECTION
WOODROW HARTZOG *
NEIL RICHARDS **
Abstract: America’s privacy bill has come due. Since the dawn of the internet,
Congress has repeatedly failed to build a robust identity for American privacy law.
But now both California and the European Union have forced Congress’s hand by
passing the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). These data protection frameworks, structured around
principles for fair information processing called the “FIPs,” have industry and privacy advocates alike clamoring for a “U.S. GDPR.” States seem poised to blanket
the country with FIPs-based laws if Congress fails to act. The United States is thus
in the midst of a “constitutional moment” for privacy, in which intense public deliberation and action may bring about constitutive and structural change; and the
European data protection model of the GDPR is ascendant. In this Article, we highlight the risks of U.S. lawmakers embracing a watered-down version of the European model as American privacy law enters its constitutional moment. Europeanstyle data protection rules have undeniable virtues, but they will not be enough.
The FIPs assume data processing is always a worthy goal, but even fairly processed
data can lead to oppression and abuse. Data protection is also myopic because it ignores how industry’s appetite for data is wrecking our environment, our democracy,
our attention spans, and our emotional health. Even if European Union-style data
protection was sufficient, the United States is too different from Europe to implement and enforce such a framework effectively on its European law terms. Any
U.S. GDPR would in practice be what we call a “GDPR-lite.” Our argument is
simple: in the United States, a data protection model cannot do it all for privacy,
though if current trends continue, we will likely entrench it as though it can. Drawing from constitutional theory and the traditions of privacy regulation in the United
States, we propose instead a “comprehensive approach” to privacy that is better fo© 2020, Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards. All rights reserved.
*
Professor of Law and Computer Science, Northeastern University.
**
Koch Distinguished Professor of Law and Director, Cordell Institute, Washington University.
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cused on power asymmetries, corporate structures, and a broader vision of human
well-being. Settling for an American GDPR-lite would be a tragic ending to a real
opportunity to tackle the critical problems of the information age. In this constitutional moment for privacy, we can and should demand more. This Article offers a
path forward to do just that.

INTRODUCTION
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is here, and America now
faces an existential choice on privacy. The European Union’s (EU) new comprehensive privacy law took effect in May 2018, and it is transforming American
privacy law and practice. 1 Some effects of the GDPR were predictable. For example, because the GDPR protects the personal data of Europeans even when
that data is processed in the United States, it was bound to affect how large
American companies process the data of their European customers and employees. The extensive GDPR requirements have led many global technology companies to comply with GDPR requirements firm-wide, a compliance effect that
was also relatively easy to predict.
Some effects of the GDPR were less obvious before the fact. The GDPR is
the most prominent example of the governing framework for collecting, storing,
and using personal data, commonly referred to as “data protection.” 2 Data pro1
See, e.g., Michael D. Birnhack, The EU Data Protection Directive: An Engine of a Global Regime, 24 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REP. 508, 508 (2008) (noting the global impact of the EU’s predecessor to the GDPR); Lillian Edwards, Data Protection: Enter the General Data Protection Regulation, in LAW, POLICY AND THE INTERNET 77, 77 (Lilian Edwards ed., 2019) (calling the GDPR the
most important development in data privacy law’s history); Graham Greenleaf, The Influence of European Data Privacy Standards Outside Europe: Implications for Globalization of Convention 108, 2
INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 68, 75 (2012) (showing the EU’s influence on other nations’ data privacy
laws); Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 771, 772–73 (2019)
(noting that the new GDPR has caused U.S. corporations to spend billions of dollars on compliance,
and that the European framework is making its way into discussions on data privacy throughout the
United States); Lee A. Bygrave, Transatlantic Tensions on Data Privacy 12 (Transworld, Working
Paper No. 19, 2013), http://transworld.iai.it/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/TW_WP_19.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CTC8-X9LM] (claiming the “overwhelming bulk of countries that have enacted data privacy laws have followed, to a considerable degree, the EU model”); Ira Rubinstein & Bilyana Petkova,
The International Impact of the General Data Protection Regulation 1 (Apr. 23, 2018) (unpublished
chapter), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3167389 [https://perma.cc/EC4J-ZJNT]
(arguing the GDPR’s right to be forgotten, international adequacy standards, and large fines for noncompliant corporations are the most likely provisions to impact nations outside of Europe). See generally LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA PRIVACY LAW: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2014); Paul de Hert
& Vagelis Papakonstantinou, Three Scenarios for International Governance of Data Privacy: Towards an International Data Privacy Organization, Preferably a UN Agency?, 9 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y
FOR INFO. SOC’Y 271 (2013).
2
See Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., The European Union General Data Protection Regulation: What
It Is and What It Means, 28 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 65, 67 (2019) (“[T]he GDPR can be seen as a
data governance framework. The GDPR encourages companies to think carefully about data and have
a plan for the collection, use, and destruction of the data. The GDPR compliance process may cause
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tection regimes that follow the GDPR typically follow what Margot Kaminski
calls a “binary governance” approach that combines individual due process
rights with a collaborative governance approach to follow and protect personal
data to ensure it is always processed fairly. 3 Data protection regimes long predate the GDPR, but the GDPR has had the unexpected effect of turning European-style privacy protection into a global market norm, an example of what Anu
Bradford has termed the “Brussels Effect,” and what Paul Schwartz calls “global
data privacy the EU way.” 4 If you want to do business in the global data trade,
regardless of where you are located, the GDPR sets the tone. Increasingly, this
Brussels Effect is also influencing the conceptual design of privacy laws around
the globe.
The United States, however, has yet to fully embrace the EU’s data protection endeavor. The EU’s omnibus approach to data protection is based on individual rights over data, detailed rules, a default prohibition on data processing,
and a zealous adherence to the fair information practices (FIPs). In contrast, the
patchwork approach of the United States is more permissive, indeterminate, and
based upon people’s vulnerabilities in their commercial relationship with companies. 5 William McGeveran draws upon these differences to distinguish between Europe’s “data protection” and America’s “consumer protection” frameworks for privacy. American and European regulators have, more or less, long
tried to make the best of such differences.
But change is now on America’s doorstep. The modern data industrial
complex is facing a tidal wave of public support for a privacy law revolution. 6
some businesses to increase the use of data in their activities, especially if the companies are not dataintensive, but the GDPR causes them to realize the utility of data.”); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 775
(“‘Data protection’ is the accepted, standard term applied to Europe’s body of law concerning the
processing, collection, and transfer of personal data.”).
3
Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic
Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529, 1552–53 (2019).
4
Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012); Schwartz, supra note 1, at
775; see Greenleaf, supra note 1, at 75 (illustrating Europe’s impacts on non-European data privacy
laws); Bygrave, supra note 1, at 12 (saying that most of the countries that have promulgated data
privacy laws have imitated the European framework); see also ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION,
APEC PRIVACY FRAMEWORK 3 (2005), https://www.apec.org/Publications/2005/12/APEC-PrivacyFramework [https://perma.cc/K8CK-NHKE] (claiming the APEC framework “is consistent with the
core values of the OECD’s 1980 Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Trans-Border Flows of
Personal Data”); Anna von Dietze, Australian Privacy Management Framework Launched, INT’L
ASS’N PRIVACY PROFS. (May 26, 2015), https://iapp.org/news/a/australian-privacy-managementframework-launched [https://perma.cc/3DE8-P4RM] (discussing principles of data protection laws
that exist in many different nations). See generally BYGRAVE, supra note 1; GRAHAM GREENLEAF,
ASIAN DATA PRIVACY LAWS: TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES (2014); de Hert & Papakonstantinou, supra note 1.
5
WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LAW 257–58 (2016).
6
See, e.g., Mark Scott, In 2019, the ‘Techlash’ Will Go from Strength to Strength, POLITICO
(updated Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.politico.eu/article/tech-predictions-2019-facebook-techclash-
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The Financial Times proclaimed that all of 2018 could be summarized by the
word “techlash,” which they defined as “[t]he growing public animosity towards
large Silicon Valley platform technology companies and their Chinese equivalents.” 7
Yet the U.S. Congress has not updated its rules and permissive “notice and
choice” approach to privacy in years. 8 Instead, states have taken the mantle and
have begun creating their own data protection legislation. 9 At least partially as a
result of the Brussels Effect, American state legislatures have started to pass
state-level data protection statutes, such as the California Consumer Protection
europe-united-states-data-misinformation-fake-news/ [https://perma.cc/E5YS-HNA3] (claiming that
public opinion is slowly beginning to turn against large tech companies and Congress is realizing it
may need to enact new privacy laws); Matthew Sheffield, Americans Overwhelmingly Want Congress
to Restrict Sharing of Personal Data, Poll Finds, THE HILL (Dec. 14, 2018), https://thehill.com/hilltv/
what-americas-thinking/421384-opting-out-of-data-sharing-is-what-americans-want-most-from-a
[https://perma.cc/PT7A-CP5B]. Apple CEO Tim Cook and others have used the term “data industrial
complex” to describe the loose net of businesses that profit from data collection and processing or
value personal data as a key aspect of their operations and business model. Natasha Lomas, Apple’s
Tim Cook Makes Blistering Attack on the ‘Data Industrial Complex,’ TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/10/24/apples-tim-cook-makes-blistering-attack-on-the-data-industrialcomplex/ [https://perma.cc/H5WC-HRAF]; see Steve Peace, Data Industrial Complex: We Don’t
Destroy Our Enemies; We Change Them, INDEP. VOTER NEWS (Apr. 12, 2018), https://ivn.us/
posts/data-industrial-complex-we-dont-destroy-our-enemies-we-change-them [https://perma.cc/78V5WXGX] (discussing companies like Facebook and Google and how they have been able to profit from
user data). Julie Cohen, Ben Hayes, and others have discussed the “surveillance-industrial complex”
as “a symbiotic relationship between state surveillance and private-sector producers of surveillance
technologies.” See Julie E. Cohen, The Surveillance-Innovation Complex: The Irony of the Participatory Turn, in THE PARTICIPATORY CONDITION IN THE DIGITAL AGE 207, 208 (Darin Barney et al.
eds., 2016); Ben Hayes, The Surveillance-Industrial Complex, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE STUDIES 167, 167 (Kirstie Ball et al. eds., 2012).
7
Rana Foroohar, Year in a Word: Techlash, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2018), https://www.ft.com/
content/76578fba-fca1-11e8-ac00-57a2a826423e [https://perma.cc/M2LZ-AJRH]; see also Ben Zimmer,
‘Techlash’: Whipping Up Criticism of the Top Tech Companies, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 10, 2019), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/techlash-whipping-up-criticism-of-the-top-tech-companies-11547146279 [https://
perma.cc/N8N7-A8JM] (discussing citizen backlash against large technology companies and calls for
increased regulation of those companies).
8
See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 431, 444 (2016) (“When the FTC first started to regulate privacy in the late 1990s, it
adopted a basic notice and choice regime for businesses that was congruous with many of the FIPs.”).
Under the notice and choice regime, “[a]s long as companies notified people about their information
collection, use, and disclosure practices and gave them a choice to opt out (usually by not using the
service), then companies were free to act in any way consistent with the notice given to consumers.”
Id. Despite numerous critiques of the limitations of this model, it persists in U.S. privacy law proposals. Id. at 444–45.
9
See, e.g., Mitchell Noordyke, US State Comprehensive Privacy Law Comparison, INT’L ASS’N
PRIVACY PROFS. (Apr. 18, 2019), https://iapp.org/resources/article/state-comparison-table/ [https://
perma.cc/4Y4T-VYTB] (discussing an array of new privacy bills at the state level); see also Cameron
F. Kerry, Breaking Down Proposals for Privacy Legislation: How Do They Regulate?, BROOKINGS
(Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/breaking-down-proposals-for-privacy-legislationhow-do-they-regulate/ [https://perma.cc/U9MR-N6MB] (outlining federal bills).
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Act (CCPA). 10 The CCPA applies in California, but because many companies are
either headquartered in or do business in Silicon Valley’s home state, it will have
national consequences when it comes into effect in 2020. 11
Other states like Washington have also begun to consider their own miniGDPRs, and after years of opposition to regulation, big tech companies have
started to call for a baseline privacy law. 12 These calls are often paired with arguments for federal preemption to avoid multiple state data governance regimes,
particularly from more aggressive state regulators. 13 Although preemption advocates often claim that unification will help make U.S. privacy laws adequate in
the eyes of the EU, any omnibus bill that is likely to be passed seems destined to
be a watered-down version of the GDPR, given the trans-Atlantic differences in
rights, cultures, commitments, and regulatory appetites. 14
Congress now finds itself sandwiched between bottom-up momentum from
the states, and top-down influence from emerging international norms and foreign law. At this critical juncture, Congress must now determine the trajectory of
U.S. privacy law: To FIPs or not to FIPs? Preemption or federalism? Individual
rights, governance obligations, or both? Protecting relationships or data? Europe
has already made up its mind. 15 The states have their own ideas. 16 Even if Congress does nothing once again, this convergence of privacy federalism and the
Brussels Effect will define America’s privacy identity. 17 The GDPR has called
the U.S. government’s hand.
Privacy law in America thus faces what we might term a “constitutional
moment.” This is the idea derived from Bruce Ackerman’s We the People that
American constitutional law has been marked by a series of “constitutional moJonathan G. Cedarbaum et al., Privacy Legislation Continues to Move Forward in Many States,
WILMERHALE (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20190430-privacylegislation-continues-to-move-forward-in-many-states [https://perma.cc/Z5V7-RLP7] (surveying state
privacy bills modeled after the CCPA); Noordyke, supra note 9 (same).
11
See Kristen J. Mathews & Courtney M. Bowman, The California Consumer Privacy Act of
2018, PROSKAUER (July 13, 2018), https://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2018/07/articles/data-privacylaws/the-california-consumer-privacy-act-of-2018/ [https://perma.cc/7A8W-LFRA] (noting the CCPA
will affect privacy law around the United States because it applies to companies with California customers, not just those based in California).
12
See Kerry, supra note 9 (detailing a baseline privacy bill proposed by Intel Corporation);
Noordyke, supra note 9 (detailing potential state legislation that share qualities with the GDPR).
13
See Patricia L. Bellia, Federalization in Information Privacy Law, 118 YALE L.J. 868, 890–99
(2009) (presenting an argument for when a federal preemptive privacy statute is preferable to conflicting state regimes).
14
See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151, 1160–62 (2004) (describing the different cultures of privacy found in the United
States and in the EU).
15
See Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) (providing the new GDPR).
16
See Noordyke, supra note 9 (showing proposed state privacy legislation).
17
See Bradford, supra note 4, at 3 (noting “Europe’s unilateral power to regulate global markets,”
including in the privacy law context).
10
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ments”: periods of constitutional transformation marked by intense public deliberation and participation. 18 In Ackerman’s account, most people do not pay
much attention to politics or constitutional law most of the time. But every once
in a while (such as during the New Deal), “We the People” engage in politics in
a way that changes the constitutional arrangements forever. In this Article, we
suggest that something analogous is happening in privacy law in the United
States—after decades of accommodating the internet and digital technologies
into existing and often poorly fitting legal structures, we are on the cusp of a set
of legal changes that will structure our emergent digital society for decades to
come. 19
It might seem at this point like there is not much of a decision to be made
regarding the identity of U.S. privacy law. Although the GDPR and the states’
proposals differ in important ways, each more or less adheres to the FIPs and
seeks transparency and accountability from companies and control for data subjects. But the choice is far more profound than that. Lawmakers are facing pressure to fully enshrine the entire European data protection endeavor. Many of the
proposals being considered, particularly those that seek to preempt state and other federal laws, zealously adhere to the FIPs. But a data protection identity for
U.S. privacy law is not a fait accompli, nor is it the only option. Congress could
do something different than bowing to privacy federalism, preemption, or the
Brussels Effect. Instead, it could embrace a more holistic and nimble approach to
privacy more closely rooted in relationships, power asymmetries, and a broader
vision of human well-being.
This Article is about the fundamental dilemma of data protection in the
United States, as American privacy law enters its constitutional moment. An EUstyle data protection identity for American privacy law might bring interoperability, clarity, and data accountability. But it would entrench a regime designed
for a sovereign with a different culture, structure, and commitments. It would
also ossify rules based on the phenomenon of personal data that has risks and
effects with which we have yet to fully reckon. Even at full strength, the GDPR
and the state and sector-specific rules that embrace the FIPs fail to address significant harms that come from industry and governments’ bottomless appetite for
data. Because data protection regimes focus largely on information and are less
sensitive to power disparities within relationships, they also fail to take advantage of critically important and established legal tools and justifications. Finally, data protection regimes seek to permit more ethical surveillance and data
processing at the expense of foundational questions about whether that surveil18
See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6–7 (1991) (describing “constitutional politics” as a “series of political movements” in which the American people become so heavily
engaged in politics that they are able to transform the Constitution).
19
See infra notes 27–136 and accompanying text.
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lance and processing should be allowed in the first place. Our argument is simple: in the United States, a data protection approach cannot do it all for privacy,
and we are on the precipice of entrenching it as though it can. 20 We can, and we
should do better than a watered-down American version of the GDPR, regardless
of whether that American version comes from market norms, privacy federalism,
or a baseline preemptive federal statute.
We develop our claim in four steps. First, in Part I, we make the case that
U.S. privacy law is in the midst of a “constitutional moment”—a period of unusual public engagement likely to result in a significant and durable settlement of
the issues. 21 We explore how the Brussels Effect of the GDPR has forced American lawmakers to confront the long-deferred question of the identity of U.S. privacy law. And we show how EU law is substantively and fundamentally shaping
U.S. privacy law around the concept of data protection. The GDPR has set global market norms that have created efficiencies for cross-border data flows with
some notion of accountability. In our research we interviewed various highranking privacy officers at large and small companies, who affirmed that the
global data protection movement, led by the GDPR, is driving industry practice
and regulatory progress far more than traditional U.S. privacy law. Indeed, the
lionizing of the FIPs has fundamentally altered the trajectory of U.S. torts, statutes, contracts, and administrative actions. In this Part we also explore how external pressure from Europe, as well as pressure from the states, has created this
constitutional moment for U.S. privacy identity. And we explore the three possible options for U.S. lawmakers: do nothing, enact a preemptive “U.S. GDPR,”
or embrace what we’re calling “the third way”—a more nimble, layered, and
inclusive approach that protects personal data but also looks beyond it to account
for things that data protection often fails to consider: power, relationships, abusive practices, and data externalities.
In Part II, we explore the compelling virtues of embracing an EU-style data
protection identity for U.S. privacy law. 22 Data protection regimes are relatively
refined and sturdy. Frameworks like the GDPR are the product of great wisdom,
effort, and political compromise, and the substantive FIPs at their core have
proven remarkably resilient. Data protection regimes are also formidable and
empowering, at least when done properly. The GDPR has thus accomplished
something quite difficult—motivating European and American companies to
devote significant resources to privacy and creating structures to accommodate
data subjects’ rights. As a result, data protection could help the United States
reclaim some of the moral authority on privacy that it generated in the 1960s and
See infra notes 162–255 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 27–136 and accompanying text.
22
See infra notes 137–160 and accompanying text.
20
21
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1970s but has long since abdicated with a self-regulatory approach centered on
fictional “notice and choice.” Finally, data protection offers conformity and interoperability if the United States assimilates into the global collective. The FIPs
are the closest thing to a universal language of privacy. 23 This kind of efficiency
is critical for a global data ecosystem.
In Part III, however, we make the case that notwithstanding data protection’s virtues, data protection alone is not enough. 24 FIPs regimes conceive of
fair data processing as an eternally virtuous goal, which has the consequence of
normalizing surveillance, processing, and procedural rules at the cost of more
substantive protections. Data protection regimes also fail to account for data externalities such as environmental harm, attention theft, and degradation of social
interaction. This is a problem because we are only just beginning to see the human and societal costs associated with the massive scale of data processing and
platform dominance. In addition to core privacy-related harms associated with
data collection and data use, companies’ insatiable hunger for personal information is negatively affecting our attention and how we spend our time, how we
become educated and informed citizens, and how we relate to each other. Phenomena like “fake news,” “deep fakes,” non-consensual pornography and harassment, “sharenting,” addiction by design, and lives spent staring blankly and
bleakly into our phones are at least partially byproducts of or made worse by the
human data industrial complex. This is to say nothing of the toll inflicted on our
natural environment. We need broader frameworks for human data not just because it is personal to us, but because the incentive to exploit it creeps into nearly every aspect of our technologically mediated lives.
We also argue that data protection regimes are myopic. The fair information
practices are too focused on individuals, control, and consent, and not focused
enough on relationships and power. The control and informational self-determination sought by data protection regimes are essentially impossible in constructed environments where choices are constrained, engineered, and overwhelming. When privacy is thought of solely in terms of control over data, regulators risk becoming blind to the other values served by the broader notion of
privacy and other mechanisms, such as design, that can be used to corrode people’s autonomy. Privacy is about more than atomized decisions. It is about how
power is distributed and wielded. 25
23
Paula Bruening, Fair Information Practice Principles: A Common Language for Privacy in a
Diverse Data Environment, INTEL (Jan. 28, 2016), http://blogs.intel.com/policy/2016/01/28/blah-2/
[https://perma.cc/XBL5-F9F5].
24
See infra notes 161–256 and accompanying text.
25
See, e.g., Lisa M. Austin, Enough About Me: Why Privacy Is About Power, Not Consent (or
Harm), in A WORLD WITHOUT PRIVACY?: WHAT LAW CAN AND SHOULD DO 131, 131–89 (Austin
Sarat ed., 2015) (arguing, as the title suggests, that a focus on power is a better way of understanding
privacy than consent or harm); Julie E. Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIR-
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We end Part III by observing that a U.S. GDPR is doomed to be watered
down and ineffective because, to put it bluntly, the United States is not Europe.
Specifically, the GDPR is powered by the fact that, in Europe, both data protection and privacy are treated as separate fundamental human rights. The United
States does not have the same deep commitment to data protection, which can
lead to diluted rules and placid regulators. The United States also differs regarding its ideological commitment to free expression. Aspects of a fully realized
data protection vision, particularly provisions like the right to be forgotten,
threaten censorship that is inconsistent with basic premises of the American constitutional order, and arguably with some of the fundamental rights protected by
the European constitutional order as well. For these reasons, any version of the
GDPR enacted in the United States in the near future is likely to be a “GDPRlite.”
In Part IV, we develop a comprehensive alternative, a “third way” for U.S.
privacy that both moves beyond notice and choice and addresses the power dynamics ignored by GDPR-style data protection regimes. 26 First, we argue that
U.S. lawmakers should develop their own privacy identity and frameworks built
around four major regulatory landscapes: corporate structure and business incentives, power disparities within relationships, data collection and processing risks,
and data externalities. If you look closely, the foundation for a pluralistic American theory of privacy based upon constraining corporate power and protecting
vulnerable consumers has already been established. We must embrace it. Practically speaking, lawmakers, courts, and companies must embolden the doctrines
and legal tools that advance this agenda. This means strengthening trust-based
torts like the breach of confidence and theories of indirect liability, prohibiting
more data practices outright, and being more skeptical of the role of consent in
validating data practices. It also means both governments and organizations must
leverage the concept of privacy to further the overall well-being of their citizens
and customers.
The other key element in privacy’s “third way” is a shift from focusing
mainly on procedural rules to include substantive restrictions as well. Procedural
requirements like obligations to get peoples’ consent for data practices ultimately
normalize the kinds of data collection and surveillance harms that they are supposed to mitigate. They are a recipe for companies to exploit and manipulate
people in service of ever more data. The substantive shift we call for will require
lawmakers to revisit some basic assumptions about when data collection and
processing is desirable and entertains bolder obligations, such as outright bans
L. 1, 22 (2019) (same); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1426 (2001) (discussing privacy as a power
struggle between humans and the entities that collect and process their data).
26
See infra notes 257–358 and accompanying text.

IES

2020]

Privacy’s Constitutional Moment and the Limits of Data Protection

1697

and moratoria on certain technologies and practices. It also requires legislatures
to be imaginative and go beyond the standard suite of procedural safeguards like
transparency and data subject rights like access to data. Lawmakers have been
remarkably creative in creating rules for other industries. They should leverage
the power to tax, change business incentives, and pierce the corporate veil in
going beyond standard data and consumer protection approaches to confront
modern privacy risks.
We conclude by noting that if the United States is to take the modern privacy dilemma seriously, lawmakers must act urgently and be willing to expend
political capital for effective rules. America’s privacy reckoning is here, but its
identity has yet to be defined. Congress has an opportunity to show leadership by
embracing a comprehensive approach that addresses modern data and privacy
problems, not those of the 1970s. But if it fails to embrace a comprehensive
framework that addresses corporate power, vulnerabilities in information relationships, and data’s externalities, America will be resigned to a weak and myopic approach as its constitutional moment passes. Settling for an American
GDPR-lite would be a tragic ending to a real opportunity to tackle the critical
problems of the information age.
I. THE PRIVACY BILL FINALLY COMES DUE
American privacy law is weird. Unlike other bodies of U.S. law, such as
copyright or securities, American privacy law lacks a comprehensive statute that
forms its core. American privacy law is instead a complicated hodge-podge of
constitutional law, piecemeal federal statutes, state laws, evidentiary privileges,
contract and tort law, and industry guidelines. 27 This weirdness is particularly
striking, given that virtually all other industrialized democracies have a comprehensive overarching privacy statute. The European Union, for example, has had
such laws since the passage of the EU Data Privacy Directive in 1995. 28 And
that regime was recently updated by the comprehensive new GDPR. 29 Canada’s
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) has
been in effect since the turn of the century. 30 Japan also recently passed an om-

27
See generally MCGEVERAN, supra note 5; ANDREW B. SERWIN, INFORMATION SECURITY &
PRIVACY (12th ed. 2018); DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW
(6th ed. 2018).
28
Council Directive 95/46, art. 25, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 45–46 (EC).
29
Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 15.
30
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c 5 (Can.).
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nibus act for the protection of personal information, leading to a mutual adequacy agreement with the EU allowing data sharing. 31
No doubt as a result of its weirdness, leading privacy law scholars have begun to document and explain American privacy law’s frequently surprising features and sources. This body of work has, for example, shown how the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) operates as a de facto regulator of privacy in the United States, 32 how state attorneys general have played important roles as regulators
and norm entrepreneurs, 33 and how privacy lawyers and the designers of technology have attempted (though sometimes failed) to provide “privacy on the
ground” where they were not required by law to comply with “privacy on the
books.” 34
In recent years, European law has come to have a substantial effect on
American privacy law, both on the books as well as on the ground. Before the
GDPR, James Whitman argued provocatively that, based on European ideals of
dignity and American ideals of freedom, there were two distinct “cultures of privacy.” 35 Even if such a distinction were true in the past, America and Europe are
converging on a shared culture of data protection—one imposed directly and
indirectly and based upon European norms rather than American ones.
This Part explains how Europe’s data protection framework has influenced
U.S. law to the point that American privacy law is facing its constitutional moment. Our story has three distinct elements. First, we show how the fair information practices, a fifty-year-old set of privacy rules created by the U.S. government, became the foundation of data protection regimes throughout the
world. 36 Next we show how Europe’s extraterritorial reach, a strong desire for
regulatory harmony and global data flows, and a spate of high profile privacy
scandals have created an inflection point for U.S. privacy law that is forcing regulators to confront America’s privacy identity.37 We end this Part by taking stock
31
Press Release, European Comm’n, European Commission Adopts Adequacy Decision on Japan, Creating the World’s Largest Area of Safe Data Flows (Jan. 23, 2019), https://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-19-421_en.htm [https://perma.cc/8ZRT-PYNJ].
32
CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 73–80
(2016); Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection, 83
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2235–36 (2015); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the
New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 598–606 (2014).
33
Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 747, 748–51 (2016).
34
KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND: DRIVING
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 6–8 (2015); Kenneth A. Bamberger &
Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 249–51 (2011);
Ari Ezra Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 659, 661–62 (2018).
35
Whitman, supra note 14, at 1160–62.
36
See infra notes 41–69 and accompanying text.
37
See infra notes 70–111 and accompanying text.
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of the three basic options on the table for Congress: (1) continue to do nothing
for a “data protection patchwork”; (2) embrace EU-style data protection with
preemptive, omnibus legislation; or (3) do something else. 38 In this Part, and in
the rest of this Article, we build upon the work of Paul Schwartz and other
scholars who have studied Europe’s influence on American privacy law and the
possibility of preemption to scrutinize the entire endeavor of data protection in
the United States. 39
A. The FIPs and the Birth of Data Protection
The story of data protection rules begins with the advent of computers.
Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, American anxiety about computers, privacy, and “data banks” gripped the public, regulators, and the Supreme Court.40
Electric and electronic technologies began to transform society, disrupting settled expectations about surveillance, privacy, and government and corporate
power. Scholars, popular authors, magazines, and news programs focused on the
threats to privacy caused by new eavesdropping technologies and the creation of
government and corporate “data banks,” trying to understand these changes and
calling for legal reform. 41 Courts, too, tried to respond to these new developments, most notably in a series of blockbuster Supreme Court cases holding that
the Constitution protected privacy interests in areas as diverse as police wiretapping, political group membership, contraceptives, abortion rights, and the posSee infra notes 113–136 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 904–05 (2009) (explaining that a “broad coalition” of actors in the United States wants U.S. privacy regulation to align
with the European Union’s, but arguing against such overarching laws because they would preempt
local decision making).
40
A data bank is a “data repository accessible by local and remote users.” Telecomm. Indus.
Assoc., Data Bank, TELECOM GLOSSARY, https://standards.tiaonline.org/resources/telecom-glossary
[https://perma.cc/QW44-A2BT].
41
See, e.g., MYRON BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 85–109 (1964) (discussing telephone
wiretapping in the context of monitoring employees and corporate espionage); ARTHUR R. MILLER,
THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 54–89 (1971) (describing
massive data collection efforts by the government and the private credit industry); VANCE PACKARD,
THE NAKED SOCIETY 29–43 (1964) (decrying new electronic surveillance technologies and memory
banks); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 69–89 (1967) (arguing for the importance of privacy protections against the rise of information collection by governments and corporations); ALAN F.
WESTIN & MICHAEL A. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY: COMPUTERS, RECORD-KEEPING
AND PRIVACY 29–214 (1972) (discussing the creation of databanks by government entities at all levels, business corporations, and nonprofit organizations); Kenneth L. Karst, “The Files”: Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 342,
342–43 (1966) (contending that the rise of computers has made it far quicker and easier to access
others’ personal data); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (highlighting
the development of four types of privacy invasions recognized by tort law). See generally Symposium, Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REV. 211 (1968); Symposium,
Privacy, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 251 (1966).
38
39
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session of obscene pornography. 42 The U.S. Congress reacted to these developments with important privacy legislation, including the Wiretap Act of 1968,
which regulated public and private surveillance of telephone conversations. 43
Perhaps the most important development from this period, however, was
not a law but a report issued by a special advisory committee to the Secretary of
the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) in 1973. 44 Entitled “Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens,” the report proposed
something called “the Fair Information Practices”—a set of “fundamental principles of fair information practice” meant to guide the protection of privacy in
record-keeping systems, 45 and possibly influenced by a similar report commissioned by the British government a few years before. 46 As formulated by the
HEW Report, the original Fair Information Practices protected a set of six substantive and procedural bedrock principles. First, they included a prohibition on
secret databases (“There must be no personal data record-keeping systems
whose very existence is secret.”). 47 Second, they provided for notice of recordkeeping (“There must be a way for an individual to find out what information
about him is in a record and how it is used.”). 48 Third, they gave rights to prevent data used for one purpose being used for another without consent (“There
must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him that was obSee generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
43
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. 3, 82 Stat. 197,
211 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (2018)).
44
SEC’Y ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC. &
WELFARE, DHEW PUBL’N NO. (OS) 73-94, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS
(1973).
45
ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES: A BASIC HISTORY 2–5 (2019), https://bob
gellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPshistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/TJ7E-SYLF].
46
Although the dominant narrative is that the FIPs first appeared in the HEW Report, Chris
Hoofnagle has argued that the HEW Report Chairman, Willis Ware, might have been influenced by
Britain’s Younger Committee for the handling of “information” by computers. Chris Jay Hoofnagle,
Archive of the Meetings of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems
(SACAPDS), BERKELEY L. (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/research/bclt/research/
privacy-at-bclt/archive-of-the-meetings-of-the-secretarys-advisory-committee-on-automated-personaldata-systems-sacapds/ [https://perma.cc/7Y7P-UZ9J] (“Ware’s personal archive includes a memorandum that summarizes the Younger Committee report which was issued in June 1972; Ware appears to
have been strongly influenced by it, and by principles underlying of the Freedom of Information
Act.”); see COMM. ON PRIVACY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY, 1972, HMSO, Cmnd.
5012, at 499 (UK) (“[I]ndividuals should have a legally enforceable right of access to the information
held about them by credit rating agencies . . . .”); see also Robert Gellman, Willis Ware’s Lasting
Contribution to Privacy: Fair Information Practices, INST. ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS
SECURITY & PRIVACY, July–Aug. 2014, at 51, 52 (suggesting the Ware committee and Younger
committee may have influenced each other).
47
SEC’Y ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., supra note 44, at xx.
48
Id.
42
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tained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes
without his consent.”). 49 Fourth, they contemplated rights of data access and
correction (“There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record
of identifiable information about him.”). 50 Finally, they provided for protections
of data reliability and against data misuse (“Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of identifiable personal data must assure
the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.”). 51
The Fair Information Practices have been highly influential and are now
typically referred to just as the “FIPs.” Beginning in the 1970s, the FIPs enshrined in the HEW report spread throughout the world. The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) revised the FIPs in 1980. After that, they became the building blocks for data protection laws around the
world. 52 The FIPs did not, however, inspire the first data protection statute—the
German Province of Hesse had passed a data protection statute in 1970 that influenced Germany’s Federal German Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, or BDSG) of 1977, for example.53 And the global FIPs evolved over time
from the 1970s formulation by the United States government. In 2013, the
OECD once again revised the FIPs to take into account the extent to which the
“profound change of scale in terms of the role of personal data in our economies,
societies, and daily lives” has changed the need for the FIPs since the 1970s and
1980s. 54 Nevertheless, the FIPs-based data protection model has been the foundation of a series of data protection laws around the world. For example, they are
enshrined in privacy laws as far apart in time and space as Sweden’s privacy law
of 1973, the EU Data Privacy Directive of 1995, and the new Japanese privacy
standards of 2018. 55
Europe’s new GDPR further refines the FIPs model, providing for new data
protection rights such as the “right to be forgotten” and the “right to an explana-

49

Id.
Id.
51
Id. at xxi.
52
See GELLMAN, supra note 45, at 1–11 (documenting how the FIPs serve as the basis for many
national privacy laws and tracing their development from the HEW committee and through the OECD
guidelines).
53
Schwartz, supra note 39, at 908–09.
54
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., THE OECD PRIVACY FRAMEWORK 3 (2013), https://
www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/RPT3-MPVZ].
55
See GELLMAN, supra note 45, at 8–13 (documenting the global influence of the FIPs); Kensaku
Takase, GDPR Matchup: Japan’s Act on the Protection of Personal Information, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PROFS. (Aug. 29, 2017), https://iapp.org/news/a/gdpr-matchup-japans-act-on-the-protection-ofpersonal-information/ [https://perma.cc/PJH3-BMYY] (highlighting key provisions of Japan’s new
privacy law, many of which reflect principles found in the FIPs).
50
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tion.” 56 As we explain further below, the GDPR represents the fullest embodiment of the FIPs in a sovereign privacy law, the extraterritorial effect of which is
having a substantial regulatory effect in the United States. Today, it is fair to say
that the FIPs model of privacy regulation has been adopted by virtually every
country in the world that has decided to take data protection seriously. The FIPs
have certainly not been without their critics (including the authors of this paper). 57 But for privacy lawyers and scholars around the world, “the FIPs have
been with us so long that in many ways they have become synonymous with
privacy.” 58
Yet despite their global development and influence, the FIPs and the data
protection model of privacy regulation they represent have been far less influential in the United States than in the rest of the developed world. The United
56
Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 15, at 12, 43–44, 46 (EU). The right to be forgotten gives individuals the right to have their data “erased and no longer processed.” Id. at 12. The
right to an explanation refers to the rights of individuals to receive an explanation of and “meaningful
information about the logic involved” in automated decision making. Id. at 14, 41–43.
57
See Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 341, 341–42 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006) (characterizing FIPs-based regimes as difficult to enforce and as failures in practice); Omer Tene, Privacy Law’s
Midlife Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the Second Wave of Global Privacy Laws, 74 OHIO ST. L.J.
1217, 1218–19 (2013) (arguing that the updated version of the FIPs “fails to update the definition of
personal data,” exacerbates the problematic “central role of consent,” “remains rooted on a linear
approach to [data] processing,” and problematically continues to view information as “residing” in a
jurisdiction); see also DANIEL J. WEITZNER ET AL., MASS. INST. OF TECH., INFORMATION ACCOUNTABILITY 1–2 (2007) (arguing that the current online privacy paradigm is inadequate); Austin, supra
note 25, at 132–33; Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and Externalities, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 425, 489 (2011) (noting the FTC’s difficulties with
enforcing the FIPs); Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S.
Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 499–500 (1995) (“[I]nstead of minimizing the manipulation of
citizens and their thinking through unfettered flows of information, the private sector has established a
‘smoke screen’ that in effect enables subtle, yet significant, manipulation of citizens through hidden
control of personal information.”). But see Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 12–17 (defending the
FIPs); Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy
Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 743, 745 (“I propose an approach to
Internet privacy centered around fair information practices (FIPs), which are rules for the fair treatment of personal information.”); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND.
L. REV. 1609, 1670–71 (1999) (praising the FIPs for their flexibility and enforceability); Paula
Bruening, Rethink Privacy 2.0 and Fair Information Practice Principles: A Common Language for
Privacy, INTEL (Oct. 19, 2014), http://blogs.intel.com/policy/2014/10/19/rethink-privacy-2-0-fairinformation-practice-principles-common-language-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/8Y5Q-92NZ] (commenting on the FIPs’ international acceptance, their ability to “measure compliance,” and their enforceability).
58
Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV.
952, 953 (2017); see GREENLEAF, supra note 4, at 6–7 (documenting the expansion of FIPs-based
privacy laws since Sweden passed the first one in 1973 to today when 101 countries have them). See
generally CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW: CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
AND REGULATION (2d ed. 2007).
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States occasionally flirted with the idea of taking data protection seriously, but it
has never fully enshrined the FIPs in a robust, omnibus framework. 59 Paul
Schwartz has opined that the best explanations for why the United States and the
EU struck different paths with respect to data protection are “(1) initial choices
followed by path dependency, and (2) the usefulness of omnibus laws in multination systems that wish to harmonize their regulations.” 60 As a result, the United States abdicated the moral authority on privacy and left massive gaps in the
U.S. framework, ripe to be filled by others. 61 Specifically, Schwartz focuses on
the road not taken by Congress in 1974 with Senate Bill 3418, which would have
regulated public and private databases but was eventually scaled back to what
we now know as the Privacy Act, which only regulates federal agencies. 62
To be fair to U.S. policymakers, Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting
Act of 1970 and, following the Richard Nixon surveillance tapes scandal, the
Privacy Act of 1974 applied a version of the FIPs to personal data held by the
U.S. government. 63 Yet even though the U.S. federal government helped develop
59
See GELLMAN, supra note 45, at 13 (“The HEW Advisory Committee’s recommendation for a
federal privacy statute resulted in the first statutory implementation of FIPs anywhere in the world.
The Privacy Act of 1974 applies FIPs to federal agencies in the United States. Massachusetts enacted
a Fair Information Practices chapter to its general laws in 1975. Minnesota enacted a Minnesota Government Data Practices Act implementing fair information practices in 1974. It was not until 2002 that
the U.S. Congress first formally referenced FIPs in a statute. In establishing a privacy office at the
Department of Homeland Security, the Congress assigned the office responsibility for ‘assuring that
personal information contained in Privacy Act systems of records is handled in full compliance with
fair information practices as set out in the Privacy Act of 1974.’” (footnotes omitted)).
60
Schwartz, supra note 39, at 912.
61
See id. (stating that while the United States has continued to lack an omnibus privacy law bill,
European nations have developed their own omnibus frameworks and then built law off of those
foundations).
62
See id. at 911 (discussing the proposed Senate bill). Schwartz wrote:

S. 3418 would have required public and private entities to “collect, maintain, use, and
disseminate only personal information necessary to accomplish a proper purpose of the
organization.” . . . The bill would also have required organizations to “maintain information in the system with accuracy, completeness, timeliness, and pertinence as necessary to assure fairness in determinations relating to a data subject”—a data quality requirement. As a final example, the bill would have placed restrictions on onward transfers. . . . In other words, the organization transferring personal data would be obliged to
determine that the entity receiving the information followed FIPs, including drawing a
line against further transfers.
From a contemporary perspective, one of the most interesting aspects of the proposed bill from 1974 is that it would have conditioned international transfers of information on either subject consent or equivalent protections abroad for the personal data.
This proposed requirement of “equivalency” would have exceeded the protections later
found in the European Data Protection Directive . . . .
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting S. 3418, 93d Cong. § 201(a)(1), (a)(4) (1974)).
63
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018); Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681 (2018); see Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Con-
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the first version of the FIPs, it has never fully applied them to the data in its control or in interstate commerce over which it possesses regulatory power under
the Constitution. As Robert Gellman put the point succinctly in 2017, before the
effective date of the GDPR, “[i]n the United States, occasional laws require
some elements of FIPs for specific classes of record keepers or categories of
records. Otherwise, private sector compliance with FIPs’ principles, while increasing, is mostly voluntary and sporadic.” 64 Despite the introduction of countless pieces of proposed legislation, Congress has failed since the mid-1990s to
pass a law governing the personal information traded in internet-based commerce, much less a commercial privacy law of general applicability. 65 Outside of
the few sectoral federal FIPs-based laws such as the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (health privacy), Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act (FERPA) (educational records), and the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA) (credit reports), federal privacy law in the United States often requires little more than (1) not engaging in unfair or deceptive trade practices as
defined by the FTC; (2) not causing substantial harm to consumers; and (3) following a very thin version of the FIPs known as “notice and choice.” 66 As we
have argued elsewhere, under this permissive version of the Fair Information
Principles, “notice” often means little more than burying data practices in the
fine print of a dense privacy policy, while “choice” means choosing to use a service with its non-negotiable data practices as a take-it-or-leave-it option. 67 Indeed, even though the FTC has become the default privacy regulator in the United States, during the critical period of internet development in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, the FTC adhered to this thin version of the FIPs, a fact that the FTC
appeared to concede in a preliminary 2010 report.68 Still, this concession was not
present in its final issued report. 69
stitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1164–69 (2002) (noting the timing of the Privacy Act’s passage and
how the FIPs made their way into the legislation).
64
GELLMAN, supra note 45, at 22–23 (citations omitted).
65
Robert Gellman, The Long and Difficult Road to a U.S. Privacy Law: Part 1, INT’L ASS’N
PRIVACY PROFS. (Aug. 3, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/the-long-and-difficult-road-to-a-u-s-privacylaw-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/5Z3H-JNZR] (discussing failed attempts at a comprehensive commercial
privacy law and describing how only a hodgepodge of narrower privacy laws currently exist).
66
See WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT 15 (2018) (describing most privacy laws
today as having three basic commands: “follow the Fair Information Practices, do not lie, and do not
harm”); see also Peter C. Ormerod, A Private Enforcement Remedy for Information Misuse, 60 B.C.
L. REV. 1893, 1899–1900 (2019) (highlighting other sectoral federal laws, including the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Rule, the Privacy Act of 1974, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986, and others).
67
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 8, at 434; Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2019).
68
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 8–10 (2010) (acknowledging that in
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This, then, is the cruel irony of the FIPs: the most generally accepted mechanism for regulating and protecting personal data in the world was significantly
developed by the U.S. government, but the FIPs have been more influential outside the United States than inside its borders. The U.S. government sketched the
blueprint for our international privacy regime, but then failed to build the structure it had planned. That structure has been built, but it has been built by others.
And in the United States, just a thin remnant of the FIPs remains as a minimal
basis for general commercial privacy protection.
B. The Internal and External Pressures for Action
Congress, it seems, is finally feeling the heat to act decisively on privacy.70
In any given day in 2019, if you tuned into the news, you were likely to come
across a story about a congressional privacy hearing, a new privacy failure
demonstrating the ineffectiveness of our rules, or even industry asking to be regulated in the style of the EU. 71 From 2018 to 2019 alone, a series of privacy bills
were introduced into Congress, and more are on the way. 72 In this Part, we describe how Congress is facing two separate pressures for action on privacy. First,
there is an external pressure from the EU and all similarly styled data protection
regimes around the world, and second, an internal pressure from the states, industry, privacy advocates, and the voting populace.
As noted above, the FIPs have had a profound influence around the world,
particularly in Europe. These guidelines were highly influential in Europe’s first
major attempt at a data protection framework, which began the export of EU
the early 2000s, the FTC had to shift from its notice-and-choice FIPs approach and develop a more
harm-based approach).
69
See GELLMAN, supra note 45, at 23–24 (documenting the FTC’s inconsistent track record with
the FIPs).
70
See Cameron F. Kerry, Will This New Congress Be the One to Pass Data Privacy Legislation?,
BROOKINGS (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/01/07/will-this-newcongress-be-the-one-to-pass-data-privacy-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/YH37-B6PH] (discussing
stakeholder engagement with Congress on issues of privacy and major events—such as the Cambridge
Analytica scandal—that have placed privacy on Congress’s radar).
71
See Kerry, supra note 9 (discussing Senate privacy hearings, draft privacy legislation from
corporations such as Intel, and flaws in the current U.S. privacy law framework).
72
See Jeffrey Atteberry, A Survey of Proposed Federal Privacy Legislation and the Year Ahead,
LAW.COM (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2019/02/04/a-survey-of-proposed-federalprivacy-legislation-and-the-year-ahead/?slreturn=20190402095708 [https://perma.cc/H5UY-6K9Z]
(detailing a slew of congressional privacy proposals from 2018); Jerry Barbanel, A Look at the Proposed Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PROFS. (Apr. 29, 2019), https://
iapp.org/news/a/a-look-at-the-proposed-algorithmic-accountability-act-of-2019/ [https://perma.cc/
J87Y-Z4XS]; Taylor Hatmaker, Proposed Bill Would Forbid Big Tech Platforms from Using Dark
Pattern Design, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 9, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/04/09/dark-pattern-billsenate-warner-detour/ [https://perma.cc/TN3U-KNP6] (highlighting the introduction of the Deceptive
Experiences to Online Users Reduction (DETOUR) Act in 2019).
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privacy norms across the world. In 1995, the EU adopted “Directive 95/46/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data.” 73 Perhaps the most important law in the global spread
of privacy norms, the European Union’s Data Protection Directive (“Directive”)
made FIPs the governing legal standard for all data in the European Union and
required each member state to enact a national law based on the FIPs for virtually all personal information in Europe. 74
The Directive applied from 1998 until it was superseded by the similar but
more robust GDPR in 2018. The Directive sought to operationalize Article 8 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on
the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.
3. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected
concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.
4. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority. 75
To accomplish this goal, the Directive laid out prescriptive rules regarding
the processing—including collection, storage, use, and disclosure—of all personal data. 76 The EU enacted the Directive in large part to harmonize its member
states’ laws to permit the free transfer of personal data among member states
while also ensuring that each member state protected that data at similar levels.
The first hint of Europe’s intentions to apply its data protection regime extraterritorially can be found in its refusal to allow data to be exported and processed to places that did not offer the level of protection offered in Europe. The
Directive generally prohibited the export of personal information outside the EU,
subject to a series of exceptions, the most important of which is where the nonEU country had been determined to ensure an “adequate level of protection.” 77
Council Directive 95/46, supra note 28.
See GELLMAN, supra note 45, at 13 (claiming the Directive promoted the dispersion of FIPs all
over Europe).
75
Christopher Wolf, Delusions of Adequacy? Examining the Case for Finding the United States
Adequate for Cross-Border E.U.-U.S. Data Transfers, 43 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 227, 231–32
(2013); see Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2012/C 326/02, art. 8, 2012 O.J. (C
326) 391, 397 (EU), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT
&from=EN [https://perma.cc/T35A-3NY9].
76
Council Directive 95/46, supra note 28, at 38.
77
Id. at 45–46.
73
74
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This framework caused a number of countries outside the EU to directly adopt
the FIPs that lie at the foundation of the Directive. 78
The U.S. Congress, of course, refused to pass any general data protection
law, whether in the style of the FIPs or otherwise. But there remained a vital
commercial pressure to allow EU data into the United States for processing. Articles 25 and 26 of the Directive required that the personal data of Europeans
could not be sent to foreign countries (like the United States), unless that country
ensured an “adequate level of data protection,” or the transaction satisfied another exception to the rule. 79 Because there was no general privacy law on par with
the Directive in the United States, there was little to no chance that European
regulators would declare U.S. law “adequate.” This rule was a huge problem for
American tech companies like Google who wanted to process Europeans’ data
(for example to deliver email, generate personalized web search results, or provide mapping services) in the United States (where their servers were). It was
also a problem for traditional multinationals headquartered in the United States
who wished to continue processing the human resources data of their foreign
employees at their head offices. To resolve this problem, the EU and U.S. governments negotiated the “Safe Harbor Agreement” of 2000. 80 Under the “Safe
Harbor,” a U.S. company wishing to import European personal data merely had
to self-certify to the Department of Commerce that it had complied with the seven FIPs principles considered to represent the essence of the Directive’s “adequacy” requirement: essentially a modified version of the FIPs. 81 They required
the companies to process the data of Europeans with (1) notice; (2) choice; (3)
compliance with the Safe Harbor Principles for any onward transfer of data to
other entities; (4) data security; (5) data integrity, meaning that the data must be
relevant and reliable for the purposes it was collected for; (6) access to individuals of their data; and (7) effective enforcement of these promises. 82 In practice,
this meant that (at least for data about Europeans) the United States companies
agreed to abide by the fundamental requirements of European data protection
law. 83 Violations of certifications were policed by the FTC under its unfair and
deceptive trade practice authority. 84 The entire system, under which hundreds of
GELLMAN, supra note 45, at 13; see, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 39, at 933 (claiming that Canada’s new data privacy law was partly motivated by the EU’s “adequacy” requirement).
79
Council Directive 95/46, supra note 28, at 45–46.
80
Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7 (EC).
81
Id. at 15.
82
Id. at 11–12.
83
See Federal Trade Commission Enforcement of the U.S.-E.U. and U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor
Frameworks, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/
guidance/federal-trade-commission-enforcement-us-eu-us-swiss-safe-harbor [https://perma.cc/3GY7HDCH].
84
Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, supra note 80, at 7.
78
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U.S. companies had to declare that they were complying with the essence of European law, had a significant effect on “privacy on the ground” at U.S. companies. 85 In many instances, the emerging cadre of privacy professionals in the
United States who facilitated the compliance regime sought to build the requirements of EU law into the internal governance structures of their own,
American-based companies. 86
Elements of these cross-border rules became encoded into United States
domestic law. For example, because both the Safe Harbor and Privacy Shield
were explicitly enforceable against participating U.S. companies by the FTC, the
requirements of the EU’s FIPs became enforceable under U.S. privacy law.
Thus, when Google launched its ill-fated Buzz social network by signing up
Gmail users automatically and without their consent, the FTC charged Google
with violating not only the FTC’s statutory authority over deceptive trade practices, but also for violating the Safe Harbor, of which Google was a participant. 87
Google settled the case, agreeing to a 2011 consent decree with the United States
government that continues to bind it to both U.S. and EU privacy principles to
this day. 88 In this way, FTC jurisdiction was asserted to enforce the violation of a
foreign legal standard, and to extend the scope of that standard going forward.
Similarly, some companies chose to satisfy the requirements of Article 25 by
enacting standard EU-approved contracts or more stringent “binding corporate
rules” whose terms required that data sent to the United States for processing
would be handled according to the Directive and then the GDPR. 89 In these additional ways, substantive EU privacy law came to have direct application in the
U.S.
But European data protection norms were not finished with the United
States. In the now-famous 2015 case Schrems v. Data Protection Commission,
85
See, e.g., Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 34, at 261–62 (chronicling the creation of the role
of corporate chief privacy officer (CPO) as one privacy change “on the ground,” and how “companies’ motivations for creating CPO positions” included “smoothing interactions with European regulators under the Safe Harbor Agreement”).
86
See id. at 295 (explaining how the emergence of the FTC and rise of privacy professionals
within U.S. companies have increased corporate focus on privacy for customers); see also Ari Ezra
Waldman, Privacy Law’s False Promise, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 773, 784–85 (2020) (noting the creation of internal privacy policies by company employees).
87
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in Googles
Rollout of Its Buzz Social Network (Mar. 30, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2011/03/ftc-charges-deceptive-privacy-practices-googles-rollout-its-buzz [https://perma.cc/C52PSA95] (discussing the “U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor,” problems with Google’s Buzz project, and the resulting consent agreement between Google and the FTC).
88
Id.
89
See Kimberly A. Houser & W. Gregory Voss, GDPR: The End of Google and Facebook or a
New Paradigm in Data Privacy?, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. 1, 2018, at 101–03 (discussing “model
contract clauses” and “binding corporate rules” as alternative ways of meeting the EU’s adequacy
standards).
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the Court of Justice for the European Union (CJEU) invalidated the Safe Harbor
Agreement because it did not conform with the Data Protection Directive in light
of the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights, particularly given the allegations
by Edward Snowden about the National Security Agency’s access to personal
data held by U.S. tech companies. 90 The Safe Harbor was replaced by a second,
allegedly stronger FIPs-based certification regime known as the “Privacy
Shield,” whose legal future remains uncertain and dependent on the outcome of
another ruling by the CJEU. 91
In addition to the external Brussels Effect of EU privacy imperialism, U.S.
law at the national level is being affected by an internal force of state privacy
regulation. State governments have of course regulated privacy for many years,
whether through common law, statutory or state constitutional law rules, or the
regulatory entrepreneurship of state attorneys general. 92 But there is a new trend
in state privacy regulation occasioned by our great privacy awakening of 2018.
Tech companies have been approaching a privacy reckoning for years, driven on
by data breaches, the Snowden revelations, and untrustworthy data practices in
general. But the final straw appears to be the debacle involving Facebook and
the disgraced data firm Cambridge Analytica, which illicitly gathered personal
data on millions of American Facebook users to be deployed for manipulation of
their votes and other electoral meddling. 93 This is to say nothing of the ceaseless
run of stories about a high-profile data breach or concern about a “creepy” new
technology or data practice. The cumulative effect is that people have grown
wearier and more skeptical of digital tech, and social media in particular. John
Gramlich of the Pew Research Center wrote:
A little over half of adult Facebook users in the U.S. (54%) have adjusted their privacy settings in the past 12 months, according to a separate Center survey conducted in May-June 2018. The survey followed revelations that former consulting firm Cambridge Analytica
Case C‑362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’n, 2015 E.C.R. I-650 ¶¶ 30, 104–06.
See Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’n v. Facebook Ire. Ltd. & Schrems, 2019 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 1145 ¶¶ 33–38 (Dec. 19, 2019); The Schrems Saga Continues: Schrems II Case
Heard Before the CJEU, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH (July 10, 2019), https://www.huntonprivacy
blog.com/2019/07/10/the-schrems-saga-continues-schrems-ii-case-heard-before-the-cjeu/ [https://
perma.cc/CBX5-6RLL] (detailing the facts of the case that will decide the validity of the “Privacy
Shield”). In full disclosure, one of the authors of this paper (Richards) served as an independent expert
in this case retained by the Irish Data Protection Commissioner.
92
See, e.g., Citron, supra note 33, at 748–49 (discussing the efforts of state attorneys general to
regulate privacy); Solove & Hartzog, supra note 32, at 587 (mentioning state constitutions and statutes as well as state tort law).
93
See Issie Lapowsky, How Cambridge Analytica Sparked the Great Privacy Awakening, WIRED
(Mar. 17, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/cambridge-analytica-facebook-privacy-awakening/
[https://perma.cc/52CH-836M] (detailing the Cambridge Analytica scandal and how it is now spurring
state and federal regulation).
90
91
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had collected data on tens of millions of Facebook users without their
knowledge or permission.
About four-in-ten adult Facebook users (42%) have taken a break
from checking the platform for several weeks or more, and about a
quarter (26%) have deleted the app from their phone at some point in
the past year. Combined, 74% of adult Facebook users say they have
taken at least one of these three actions. 94
Even though Congress has yet to meaningfully act on the public’s general unease
with personal data and surveillance ecosystems, states, particularly California,
have taken up the banner. 95 This is the other major pressure on Congress in addition to the Brussels Effect. State governments have started to impose privacy
regulations with national effects from the bottom up. 96
Apparently, the rising tide of states’ privacy efforts started with a casual
conversation over dinner. 97 Alastair Mactaggart, a successful California real estate developer and investor, had some friends over for the evening, including a
software developer at Google. 98 Nicholas Confessore of The New York Times
wrote:
As evening settled in, Mactaggart asked his friend, half-seriously, if
he should be worried about everything Google knew about him. “I
expected one of those answers you get from airline pilots about plane
crashes,” Mactaggart recalled recently. “You know—‘Oh, there’s
nothing to worry about.’’’ Instead, his friend told him there was plenty
John Gramlich, 10 Facts About Americans and Facebook, PEW RES. CTR. (May 16, 2019), https://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/02/01/facts-about-americans-and-facebook [https://perma.cc/
XFP3-RHDQ]; see Andrew Perrin, Americans Are Changing Their Relationship with Facebook, PEW
RES. CTR. (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/05/americans-are-changingtheir-relationship-with-facebook [https://perma.cc/WNU2-RKU4] (providing the same data and a
similar quote); One Year After Cambridge Analytica, Survey Reveals Strong Consumer Privacy Fears
Remain, SLICKTEXT (2019), https://www.slicktext.com/blog/2019/02/survey-consumer-privacy-fearsafter-cambridge-analytica [https://perma.cc/3TPY-E57W] (summarizing survey results following the
Cambridge Analytica scandal indicating that most consumers are worried about how large companies
use their data).
95
Low income populations in particular generally express greater concern about industry and
government surveillance and data practices. JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., UNIV. PA., DIVIDED WE FEEL:
PARTISAN POLITICS DRIVE AMERICANS’ EMOTIONS REGARDING SURVEILLANCE OF LOW-INCOME
POPULATIONS 6–7 (2018), https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1563&context=
asc_papers [https://perma.cc/69KN-BT35].
96
See Mathews & Bowman, supra note 11 (showing the CCPA’s potential to have effects outside
of California).
97
Nicholas Confessore, The Unlikely Activists Who Took on Silicon Valley—and Won, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/magazine/facebook-googleprivacy-data.html [https://perma.cc/7VTK-4D59].
98
Id.
94
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to worry about. If people really knew what we had on them, the
Google engineer said, they would flip out. 99
Mactaggart subsequently became passionate about improving California’s privacy rules and devoted time and resources to getting a privacy initiative put forth
as a ballot measure for California voters that ultimately met the requirements for
a vote. 100 He devoted substantial resources to the initiative, and Californians
were open to legal reform in the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal.101
After working with industry and government, Mactaggart agreed to withdraw
the measure if California passed and signed similarly effective legislation. The
result is the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA). 102
The CCPA in its current form has many similarities with the GDPR, but it
would be inaccurate to call it merely a GDPR clone. 103 Kristen Mathews and
Courtney Bowman have described the act as revolving around four basic rights
for Californians involving their personal information:
1. the right to know, through a general privacy policy and with more
specifics available upon request, what personal information a business has collected about them, where it was sourced from, what it
is being used for, whether it is being disclosed or sold, and to
whom it is being disclosed or sold;
2. the right to “opt out” of allowing a business to sell their personal
information to third parties (or, for consumers who are under 16
years old, the right not to have their personal information sold absent their, or their parent’s, opt-in);
3. the right to have a business delete their personal information, with
some exceptions; and
4. the right to receive equal service and pricing from a business, even
if they exercise their privacy rights under the Act. 104
Although the CCPA certainly obligates businesses, it is relatively limited in
scope compared to the GDPR. 105 It largely targets third-party advertisers and
99

Id.
Id.
101
Id. (“[I]t was suddenly easy to get people to sign the ballot petition. After the Cambridge Analytica scandal, all we had to say was ‘data privacy,’ [Rick Arney, who helped draft the measure,] told
me.”) (internal quotations omitted).
102
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.199 (West 2020).
103
See, e.g., Anupam Chander et al., Catalyzing Privacy Law, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2020), SCHOLARSHIP @ GEO. L. 4 (Feb. 6, 2020), https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=3208&context=facpub [https://perma.cc/92CQ-N3PD] (arguing, upon a close look
at both laws, that the CCPA and GDPR differ in significant ways).
104
Mathews & Bowman, supra note 11.
105
Id.
100
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other data brokers and imposes some but not all of the traditional “data subject
rights” outlined in FIPs-based regimes like the GDPR. 106 Although the act purportedly aimed to move away from the dominant U.S. “notice and choice” model, the rights granted to Californians still center around industry transparency and
individual notions of consent, control, and choice. 107 The act does not change the
default status of data processing in California, nor does it tackle thorny data
practices beyond sales, such as algorithmic accountability. 108 But the act is certain to have a national effect because many technology companies covered by
the act are either headquartered in or do business in California and thus fall within its scope. 109 Following the CCPA, at least eighteen states have passed or introduced similarly styled data protection bills. 110 Although not all of these bills
will be successful, it seems as though this trend will continue, particularly as the
CCPA itself becomes refined and entrenched. 111
C. Data Protection Three Ways
Given pressures from Europe, the states, the tech industry, and the American public, what options does Congress now have? The way we see it, Congress
can react to this constitutional moment in three general ways: do nothing, attempt a national data protection law, or attempt a more creative third way for
privacy. 112
Option one would thus be to do nothing, a regulatory skill that Congress
has been honing for decades. But even if Congress does nothing on privacy,
America’s privacy identity is about to be set regardless of whether Congress
acts. 113 This is because many states seem keen to pursue FIPs-style data protection regimes as long as Congress remains inert.114 The CCPA has energized state
legislatures across the United States.115 As other states introduce privacy legislaSee id. (focusing on the act’s provisions regarding selling data to third parties and noting that
the GDPR contains more rights for data subjects).
107
See Chander et al., supra note 103, at 20 (arguing that the CCPA still focuses on transparency
rather than adopting the more substantive requirements that the GDPR has imposed).
108
See id. at 19–21 (noting the CCPA’s permissive stance toward data processing and arguing
that it takes a less holistic regulatory approach than the GDPR does, including on the issue of algorithmic accountability).
109
See Mathews & Bowman, supra note 11 (discussing the CCPA’s broad impact because it
applies to all companies with California customers, regardless of whether or not they are based there).
110
Noordyke, supra note 9.
111
See id. (updating over time as additional states propose bills similar to the CCPA).
112
See infra notes 113–136 and accompanying text.
113
See Bradford, supra note 4, at 3 (arguing that the EU has the ability to set global market rules
regarding privacy).
114
See Noordyke, supra note 9 (claiming the appetite for comprehensive state privacy laws to
protect consumers has reached a high point, with many proposed bills containing the FIPs).
115
Id.
106
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tion, they are likely to seek at least some kind of conformity with it, as creating
conflicting state privacy rules is more likely to cause Congress to pass a national
law that preempts state law. 116 So even the first and easiest option for Congress,
doing nothing, will mean an inevitable march toward transparency, consent, and
control mandated from the outside by the increasing creep of the GDPR and
from the inside by state laws with national effect. If Congress does not act, states
are likely to follow the CCPA’s lead and pass mini-GDPRs at the state level. 117
Mitchell Noordyke recently analyzed twenty-four of the most recent state privacy bills (or enacted laws). 118 He found sixteen common privacy provisions, all of
which are based on the FIPs and reflected EU-style data protection regimes. 119
These include data subject rights of access, rights against solely automated decision making, rights to rectification, deletion, data portability, restriction of processing, and a right to opt out of the sale of personal information. 120 These bills
and laws also commonly include standard GDPR-like business obligations, such
as notice and transparency requirements, data breach notifications, mandated
risk assessments, purpose and processing limitations, and prohibitions on discrimination against a consumer for exercising a right. 121 So if Congress does
nothing, we will likely get a flood of state mini-GDPRs.
Option number two would be to pursue a U.S. GDPR. In its fullest form,
this approach would entail an omnibus data protection law that would entrench
the FIPs as the dominant identity for American privacy law. This is certainly a
popular option. Federal and state law and policymakers have argued in favor of a
U.S. version of the GDPR. 122 So have privacy advocates and the press. 123 Even
large, powerful tech companies like Apple, Cisco, Facebook, and Brave have
requested to be regulated by a U.S. version of the GDPR. 124 Many of the bills
See Chander et al., supra note 103, at 41–43 (putting forth theories as to why state legislatures
are following California’s example on privacy regulation).
117
See Noordyke, supra note 9 (documenting the introduction of many state bills similar to the
CCPA after its passage).
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
See Savia Lobo, GAO Recommends for a U.S. Version of the GDPR Privacy Laws, PACKT
(Feb. 18, 2019), https://hub.packtpub.com/gao-recommends-for-a-us-version-of-the-gdpr-privacylaws/ [https://perma.cc/E6JP-7U59]; Casey Newton, Congress Just Showed Us What Comprehensive
Regulation of Facebook Would Look Like, THE VERGE (July 31, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/
2018/7/31/17632858/facebook-regulation-mark-warner-policy-paper-congress [https://perma.cc/
4D5Y-Q6Q4] (detailing a U.S. Senator’s call for a U.S. version of the GDPR).
123
See Editorial, Facebook Is Not the Problem. Lax Privacy Rules Are., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/01/opinion/facebook-lax-privacy-rules.html [https://perma.
cc/ZR6F-4G44] (calling for GDPR-like rules to be established in the United States).
124
Ellen Daniel, Could the US Adopt Its Own Version of GDPR?, THE VERDICT (Jan. 3, 2019),
https://www.verdict.co.uk/us-gdpr-laws-facebook/ [https://perma.cc/8GMZ-66EQ]; Johnny Ryan, Bren116
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and frameworks proposed in the past few years by lawmakers, industry, and civil
society seem to mimic aspects of the GDPR. 125 For example, most of these proposals involve some combination of transparency, choice, and consent obligations with purpose limitations and data subject rights.
But as we will explore in Part III, it is not as though the United States will
be able to simply cut and paste the GDPR into a bill. 126 The question here is
what a U.S. version of an omnibus data protection law would likely turn out to
be as enacted. There are reasons to be concerned, and it is likely that any U.S.
version of the GDPR would be significantly weaker than its European counterpart. Any movement towards a preemptive national omnibus bill is likely to be
seen as an opportunity for industry to lower the floor of privacy protections by
watering down key provisions. Alvaro Bedoya, formerly chief counsel to the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law, noted:
[L]obbyists paid by Facebook are working with Illinois lawmakers
backed by Facebook to gut the state’s face recognition privacy law,
the strongest in the nation.
This should make us very skeptical about any calls for a broad, European-style privacy law that would apply across technologies and
platforms. We cannot underestimate the tech sector’s power in Congress and in state legislatures. If the United States tries to pass broad
rules for personal data, that effort may well be co-opted by Silicon
Valley, and we’ll miss our best shot at meaningful privacy protections. 127

dan Eich Writes to the US Senate: We Need a GDPR for the United States, BRAVE (Oct. 1, 2018),
https://brave.com/us-gdpr-senate/ [https://perma.cc/7YZR-RU7C]; Andreas Sandre, Mark Zuckerberg
and Europe’s GDPR, HACKER NOON (Apr. 11, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/mark-zuckerberg-andeuropes-gdpr-9b76adebf8bd [https://perma.cc/V5WM-NLP4]; Elena Souris & Hollie Russon Gilman,
Data Rights Are Civic Rights: A Participatory Framework for GDPR in the US?, VOX (Apr. 12,
2018), https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2018/4/12/17229354/data-rights-civic-rights-gdpr [https://
perma.cc/WWW6-XUYE]; Mark Wyciślik-Wilson, Cisco Joins Apple in Calling for a US Version of
GDPR Data Protection and Privacy Laws, BETANEWS (Feb. 4, 2019), https://betanews.com/2019/02/
04/cisco-us-gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/5JQJ-4B5M].
125
See Kerry, supra note 9 (highlighting recent draft legislation proposed by many different actors, some of which shares key characteristics with the GDPR).
126
See infra notes 161–256 and accompanying text.
127
Alvaro M. Bedoya, Why Silicon Valley Lobbyists Love Big, Broad Privacy Bills, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/opinion/silicon-valley-lobbyists-privacy.html
[https://perma.cc/B63N-7DAK]; see also Louise Matsakis, As Zuckerberg Smiles to Congress, Facebook
Fights State Privacy Laws, WIRED (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/despite-zuckerbergpledge-facebook-fights-state-privacy-laws/ [https://perma.cc/4AHQ-8GTY] (explaining Facebook and
other large technology companies’ extensive lobbying and campaign donation efforts to weaken state
privacy laws).

2020]

Privacy’s Constitutional Moment and the Limits of Data Protection

1715

Cameron Kerry, who led the Obama administration’s drafting of legislation
based on its Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, lamented how after he left the
government, “draft Obama administration legislation was diluted in an unsuccessful effort to broaden business support, lost civil society support in the process, and so fell flat when it was released publicly.” 128 The dilution of privacy
laws in the U.S. political process has a long history, including the rejection of an
omnibus FIPs-based bill in 1974 when the Privacy Act was limited to federal
databases and not the privacy sector, and the repeated failure by two decades of
Congresses to pass a general internet privacy bill despite dozens of opportunities
to do so. 129 Indeed, at the time of writing, there are similar efforts afoot in California to water down the CCPA through legislative amendment. 130
In other words, given different systems, value commitments, and political
realities, it seems likely that any version of a U.S. GDPR will, in effect, be a
GDPR-lite. Although preemptive federal legislation could, in theory, be more
robust than state laws, it would be a risky proposition. 131 Therefore, in this paper,
our criticisms of data protection are largely based on what form we believe such
a regime would take in the United States. We do not specifically take issue in
this Article with Europe’s commitment to privacy or data protection except insofar as we argue that all FIPs-based regimes have built-in limitations.
The third option, an inclusive and layered privacy law that goes beyond the
FIPs, is going to require two key things: imagination and forbearance. First, legislators, regulators, and judges will need to be more creative when tackling privacy problems by being willing to look beyond the FIPs and the standard data
protection playbook. As we will explain in Part III, legislators and policymakers
will need to look to relationships and power differentials, design and externalities, and manipulation and market power. 132 We have already seen flashes of this
legislative imagination in a few pending bills. The Data Care Act of 2018 introduced by Senator Brian Schatz looks to relational duties of care, loyalty, and

Kerry, supra note 70.
See GELLMAN, supra note 45, at 13, 22–23 (noting that the 1974 act only applied to federal
agencies and that today the United States has no complete FIPs-based regime that requires compliance
from companies collecting data).
130
See, e.g., Kartikay Mehrotra et al., Google and Other Tech Firms Seek to Weaken Landmark
California Data-Privacy Law, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/
2019-09-04/google-and-other-tech-companies-attempt-to-water-down-privacy-law [https://perma.
cc/KP7U-R5AG] (documenting large tech companies’ efforts to push amendments to the CCPA to
create new exemptions that cover their activities).
131
See Cameron F. Kerry, A Federal Privacy Law Could Do Better than California’s, BROOKINGS (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/04/29/a-federal-privacy-lawcould-do-better-than-californias/ [https://perma.cc/YEE6-YV5J] (claiming that a federal law could
protect privacy better than the CCPA).
132
See infra notes 161–256 and accompanying text.
128
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confidentiality. 133 A discussion draft of the Consumer Data Protection Act circulated by Senator Ron Wyden looks to tackle automated decision systems and
hold executives personally liable for certain privacy lapses. 134 The Deceptive
Experiences to Online Users Reduction (DETOUR) Act introduced by Senators
Mark Warner and Deb Fischer targets so-called “dark patterns”: user interfaces
that attempt to manipulate users into making decisions they would not otherwise
do or are in ways adverse to their interests.135 Although we are under no illusions
of the likelihood that any of these bills will be passed given the sorry history of
congressional privacy regulation, or not watered down given the power of the
tech sector, they remain a good start in directing us towards the kind of third way
we propose here.
The third way we envision would also require Congress to largely avoid
preemption. There are of course many different ways Congress might preempt
some but not all areas of privacy law while maintaining a flexible and layered
approach to privacy federalism, but generally, limited or no preemption will be
the key to an inclusive and adaptive regime. Other scholars have explored the
virtues and vices of privacy preemption, and our purpose here is merely to note
that this third approach should be built to resist ossification of privacy rules and
to accommodate a broad range of privacy concerns beyond data by virtue of its
personal nature. 136
If we make no other contribution in this paper, we hope to convey that regardless of the merits of EU-style data protection regimes, now is the time for
lawmakers, industry, advocates, and the public to rethink the trajectory of America’s privacy identity. We must not proceed as though FIPs-style data protection
regimes are the only way. Privacy’s current constitutional moment might be our
last meaningful opportunity to collectively interrogate and modify our first principle privacy values, goals, and strategy without a revolution. Our inevitable
next step should be made bravely and carefully rather than merely following the
path of least resistance.

Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. (2018). In the interest of full disclosure, both
authors of this Article provided feedback on drafts of the bill.
134
Consumer Data Protection Act, SIL18B29, 115th Cong. (2018) (discussion draft).
135
Deceptive Experiences to Online Users Reduction Act, S. 1084, 116th Cong. (2019).
136
For more detailed explorations on the role of preemption and federalism in American privacy
law, see generally Bellia, supra note 13; Citron, supra note 33; Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 57 (2013); Bilyana Petkova,
The Safeguards of Privacy Federalism, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 595 (2016); Ira S. Rubinstein,
Privacy Localism, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1961 (2018); Schwartz, supra note 39.
133
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II. THE VIRTUES OF DATA PROTECTION
There are of course many advantages to lawmakers taking the path of least
resistance and fully assimilating the European vision for data protection. Adopting the FIPs would build upon a refined and remarkably sturdy tradition that is
formidable and empowering (in a sense) to data subjects while also offering industry efficiency benefits gained through conformity and interoperability of international regimes. In this Part, we highlight these advantages in order to help
better illuminate the calculus facing lawmakers. 137
A. Refined and Sturdy
EU-style data protection was not a rush job. It is the fruit of decades of
careful thought based upon actual experience. The GDPR is the product of
mountains of collective wisdom, negotiation, and experience, including twenty
years of experience with the Directive, and twenty years of the development of
the FIPs before that. 138 The GDPR itself took years to formulate. 139 As one recent study explains:
European policy makers started a process that involved a multitude of
expert consultation and deep sophistication about how information
practices can be manipulated to evade regulatory goals.
Consultation began in 2009 and the European Commission published a proposal text in 2012. Two years later, the European Parliament adopted a compromise text, based on almost 4,000 proposed
amendments. The Council of the European Union published its proposal for the GDPR in 2015, to start negotiations with the European
Parliament. In December 2015, the Parliament and Council reached
agreement on the text of the GDPR. The GDPR was officially adopted in May 2016, and [went into effect in] May 2018. 140
This steady and careful process helped make the GDPR internationally attractive
as a model because as a refined extension of many elements of the Directive, it
was relatively time-tested. Paul Schwartz explains that “[b]eyond the force of
EU market power and its negotiating prowess, the widespread influence of EU
data protection reflects a success in the marketplace of regulatory ideas.” 141
As a result, one reason an EU-style FIPs regime might be attractive for
lawmakers is that much of the heavy lifting has already been done. Concepts
See infra notes 140–160 and accompanying text.
Hoofnagle et al., supra note 2, at 70–71.
139
See id. at 71 (detailing the process of drafting and passing the GDPR).
140
Id. (citations omitted).
141
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 774–75.
137
138

1718

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 61:1687

from the GDPR like “data controllers,” “data processors,” and “legitimate interests” are being constantly refined through a kind of international crowdsourcing.
The longer this goes on, the sturdier FIPs-based regimes around the world will
become. If U.S. lawmakers do not follow the rest of the world on privacy, they
will lose some of the collective wisdom that could help quickly refine the rough
parts of any new laws.
Margot Kaminski has held the GDPR up as a model for modern tech regulation because it balances both individual rights and industry accountability
through what she refers to as “binary governance.” 142 Kaminski argues that the
“GDPR is both a system of individual rights and a complex compliance regime
that, when applied to the private sector, is constituted through collaborative governance. The GDPR relies on both formal and informal tactics to create publicprivate partnerships in governing algorithmic decision-making.”143 This kind of
collaborative approach is essential to ensure regulatory regimes are grounded in
and informed by multiple perspectives. 144
B. Conformity and Interoperability
It is remarkable that a concept as vague, contested, and culturally dependent as privacy has any meaningful areas of consensus. Yet, amazingly, the FIPs
represent what Paul Bruening has called the “common language for privacy.” 145
The global dominance of the FIPs now means that the European Union, Canada,
Australia, Japan, Singapore, and many other Asian countries all speak substantially similar languages when it comes to data protection. 146 Even in “FIPs-lite”
countries like the United States, the FIPs provide a starting point for finding
common ground. 147

Kaminski, supra note 3, at 1537 (calling the GDPR’s approach “binary”).
Id. at 1583.
144
See also William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 1025
(2016) (discussing the idea of “responsive regulation” in which public agencies work collaboratively
with private actors to create a more effective compliance regime for privacy and data protection).
145
Bruening, supra note 57; see also Bruening, supra note 23.
146
See generally GELLMAN, supra note 45; GREENLEAF, supra note 4. A related version of the
FIPs was incorporated into the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Framework. See
GREENLEAF, supra note 4, at 33–37 (outlining the main principles contained in the APEC framework
and relating them to the principles articulated by the EU).
147
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 & 42 U.S.C.) (relying on the FIPs
to govern privacy law for health information); DIV. OF FIN. PRACTICES, FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE 1 (2000),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practiceselectronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000text.pdf [https://perma.cc/59TM7S3Y] (calling for more regulation to ensure the FIPS govern online data and privacy).
142
143
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This international conformity opens up all kinds of benefits. For example, it
enables diplomatic solutions like Japan and Europe’s mutual adequacy decision
and the EU-United States Privacy Shield. 148 A common language of privacy was
key in the creation of the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation’s (APEC) crossborder privacy rules. 149 Even in federalist regimes like the United States, the
common language helps avoid conflicting language and obligations among
states and the federal government. 150 As one of this Article’s authors wrote elsewhere: “[A] common language of privacy provides interoperability, relative
harmony, and incremental change. It helps avoid lurches that deviate too far
from established understandings of privacy. Without the FIPs, countries and
states would risk talking past each other every time they needed to cooperate on
privacy issues.” 151
C. Formidable and Empowering
The United States has lost the moral thread in the privacy debate. The
GDPR has claimed the moral authority in privacy abdicated by U.S. lawmakers’
continued deference to notice and choice, self-regulation, and a sectoral approach to privacy regulation in which some sectors of the economy have privacy
statutes but others do not. For example, under the GDPR (or an equivalent omnibus data protection law) all health data would be protected because all personal
data would be protected. But in the United States, only personal health information held by specific parties—like “covered entities” and “business associates”—is protected by HIPAA. 152 In an interview for this Article, the eminent
FIPs scholar Robert Gellman had this to say to the question of whether Europe’s
approach to privacy clashed with the American approach to privacy:
If we look at privacy alone, then the answer must be that the EU approach is not consistent with what we do here. We don’t have an approach. The sectoral approach is not a policy or a plan. It’s just a de-

148

See Federal Trade Commission Enforcement of the U.S.-E.U. and U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor
Frameworks, supra note 83 (discussing the new Privacy Shield); see also Press Release, supra note 31
(discussing Europe’s mutual adequacy decision for Japan).
149
See GREENLEAF, supra note 4, at 537 (recognizing that APEC’s Cross Border Privacy Rules
System’s mandate that corporations meet basic standards related to the notions of “‘harm,’ ‘consent,’
and ‘accountability’” that are also found in the FIPs).
150
See Citron, supra note 33, at 749 (noting that “[i]n the 1990s, while the Federal Trade Commission . . . was emphasizing self-regulation, state attorneys general were arguing that consumer protection laws required the adoption of Fair Information Practice Principles”).
151
Hartzog, supra note 58, at 960–61.
152
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2019); see Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.
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scription. Power over privacy policy and law is so spread out that
there is no central driver here as there is in the EU. 153
Quite simply, the United States has not taken privacy seriously, despite its industry giving rise to the personal data universe.
Although the GDPR is not perfect, one undeniable virtue of the law is that
it has compelled companies to pay attention to it and, as a result, take a deep assessment of their own data practices. One study found:
The GDPR awakened [U.S.] lawyers and the business community because it calls for minimum 8-figure fines and creates both internal and
external mechanisms to bolster enforcement efforts.
As a result, the GDPR is the most consequential regulatory development in information policy in a generation. The GDPR brings personal data into a complex and protective regulatory regime. 154
In an interview for this Article, one scholar posited that one of the greatest virtues of the GDPR is that it caused many U.S. companies to take privacy seriously for the first time. 155 Consumers received a “barrage of updated privacy notices” in May 2018, but while that effect of the GDPR may have been the most visible, it was not the most important. 156 Although companies in a GDPR compliance cycle must always update their privacy policy, the key effect of the GDPR
is “under the hood.” 157 GDPR compliance thus requires privacy lawyers to:
• Perform a data mapping
• Identify a legal basis for possessing the data in the mapping, including how
the firm minimizes the retention of data
• Review all vendor contracts to ensure that downstream data uses are consistent with the legal basis, meaning that downstream processors who were
using the data to monetize it all of a sudden can no longer do so without
becoming a co-controller
• Think through cross-border and data export issues (i.e., Privacy Shield)
• Develop process flows for data subject rights (these may be manual for
companies that do not anticipate many requests)
• Develop procedures for breach notification
153
E-mail from Robert Gellman to Woodrow Hartzog, Professor of Law & Comput. Sci., Northeastern Univ. (Aug. 14, 2018, 08:17 EST) (on file with authors).
154
Hoofnagle et al., supra note 2, at 66.
155
E-mail from Chris Hoofnagle, Adjunct Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, to Woodrow
Hartzog, Professor of Law & Comput. Sci., Northeastern Univ. (Aug. 12, 2018, 12:17 EST) (on file
with authors).
156
Id.
157
Id.
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• Figure out if one needs a DPIA; if one is needed, implement risk-mitigation
procedures
• Figure out the DPO issue, and many companies need a DPO because behavioral advertising is “high risk”
• Start employee training
• Register with a lead European DPA
• Implement “state of the art” security 158
These steps cumulatively force companies to balance people’s privacy with
firms’ interests, with, according to our research, “a thumb on the scale for consumers. The result is at least a more considered approach.” 159
The data protection model that undergirds the GDPR thus has many virtues
as a model for comprehensive privacy regulation. It is the product of many years
of thought and it has proven resilient in the face of technological change up to
this point. It forms the basis of a global system of personal data regulation that
allows information to flow across national borders and remain protected at the
same time. And it forces companies to take their internal governance structures
for personal data seriously, while attempting to protect individual rights to empower humans in the control of their data. When done well, as in the GDPR, data
protection is an effective model for the regulation of personal data. But as we
will explore in the next Part, data protection law, particularly the kind of data
protection law we might expect in the United States, has serious defects as
well. 160
III. WHY AMERICAN DATA PROTECTION WILL NOT BE ENOUGH
Although an EU-style data protection regime has many virtues, federal
lawmakers should pause before adopting a European-style privacy identity for
the United States. Even though the United States could end up with a European
approach to privacy through federal inaction or through federal preemption, an
EU-style data protection regime is not an inevitability for the United States.
American lawmakers have a moral and strategic decision to make about the future direction and future identity of U.S. privacy law.
In this Part, we argue that U.S. lawmakers should resist the easy path of an
EU-style data protection identity for America. 161 Even data processing that is fair
to an individual is not always a good thing for the individual or for society.162
Industry and governments’ appetite for data has many costs that data protection
158

Id.
Id.
160
See infra notes 161–256 and accompanying text.
161
See infra notes 166–256 and accompanying text.
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See infra notes 167–191 and accompanying text.
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regimes based on the FIPs cannot comprehend or counteract. In our emergent
personal data-driven society, privacy involves structural questions about relationships and power differentials that the FIPs do not and cannot answer.163
Moreover, even if the FIPs could answer some of these questions, what works
well in Europe is unlikely to work as effectively in the United States. 164 It is
highly probable that under any kind of U.S. GDPR likely to be enacted, data protection will get watered back down to the level of mere notice and choice because unlike the EU, the United States lacks a commitment to data protection as
a distinct right, and because data protection regimes in the United States are likely to raise both spurious and real First Amendment objections from regulated
industries. If Congress were to embrace omnibus, preemptive EU-style data protection, it would almost certainly wind up with a model that would fail to foster a
full account of privacy and human well-being as well as fall short of its espoused
protection and fair processing goals. 165 We thus should not blindly copy Europe
and adopt the weak and myopic data protection model we are terming “GDPRlite.”
A. FIPs Assume Data Processing Is Always a Worthy Goal
The goal of data protection regimes like the GDPR has always been to encourage fair data processing and balance competing interests, rather than to prevent data processing entirely. 166 In other words, the entire endeavor of modern
FIPs-based data protection is built around the idea that as long as data processing
is fair to the data subject, the law should not just regulate it, but rather create a
legal structure to enable it. The EU Data Protection Directive, for example, had
the dual goals of providing for personal data rights as well as allowing for data to
“flow freely” across the EU. 167 Similarly, although the GDPR is designed to advance “economic and social progress,” bring EU economies closer together, and
improve people’s well-being, the function of the GDPR is to create a system that
facilitates fair data processing at an unprecedented scale. 168 One of the three objectives announced by Article 1 of the GDPR is to ensure that “the free movement of personal data within the Union shall be neither restricted nor prohibited

See Austin, supra note 25, at 131 (saying that privacy encompasses power dynamics); Cohen,
supra note 25, at 22 (same).
164
See infra notes 192–219 and accompanying text.
165
See infra notes 220–256 and accompanying text.
166
See, e.g., Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 15, at 2 (“The right to the protection
of personal data is not an absolute right; it must be considered in relation to its function in society and
be balanced against other fundamental rights, in accordance with the principle of proportionality.”).
167
Council Directive 95/46, supra note 28, at 31.
168
Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 15.
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for reasons connected with the protection of natural persons with regard to the
processing of personal data.” 169
Critics have long observed that the FIPs have their limitations. In the 1980s
as they became widely adopted, James Rule and his colleagues criticized the
FIPs because they posed no major obstacle to surveillance systems.170 They conceived of the FIPs as “efficiency” principles that endeavored to improve information systems to operate better for both data controllers and data subjects, instead of substantively limiting data collection against the interests of data controllers. 171
Rule and his colleagues were critical of this FIPs efficiency goal because it
legitimized surveillance systems and also gave them moral privacy cover. They
wrote that under the FIPs’ criteria, “organisations can claim to protect the privacy of those with whom they deal, even as they demand more and more data from
them, and accumulate ever more power over their lives.” 172 Graham Greenleaf
noted that this fundamental tension in the FIPs remains today, with lawmakers
rarely asking “to what extent do and should data privacy principles and laws go
beyond attempting to ensure the ‘efficiency’ of personal information systems,
and provide means to limit and control the expansion of surveillance systems?” 173
The GDPR is already facilitating surveillance, rather than stopping it. The
Danish privacy regulator recently approved the deployment of facial recognition
as an exception to the GDPR’s provisions because in some circumstances it is in
the public interest. 174 Greenleaf’s question highlights the fundamental limitations
of the FIPs and also reveals what Julie Cohen refers to as the overdetermined
institutional failures of modern privacy protection. 175 Cohen explains that:
Data harvesting and processing are one of the principal business models of informational capitalism, so there is little motivation either to
devise more effective methods of privacy regulation or to implement
existing methods more rigorously. Instead, the cultural and political
Id. at 32.
GREENLEAF, supra note 4, at 60–61 (citing JAMES RULE ET AL., THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY 93
(1980)).
171
Id. (citing RULE ET AL., supra note 170, at 93).
172
Id. (citing RULE ET AL., supra note 170); see also Claudia Diaz et al., Hero or Villain: The
Data Controller in Privacy Law and Technologies, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 923, 924–25 (2013) (“The notion
of the data controller as a trusted party is ill at ease with the anti-surveillance gist of constitutional
privacy and [privacy enhancing technologies].”).
173
GREENLEAF, supra note 4, at 61.
174
IT-Political Ass’n of Den., Danish DPA Approves Automated Facial Recognition, EDRI (June
19, 2019), https://edri.org/danish-dpa-approves-automated-facial-recognition/ [https://perma.cc/EGG7GXL6].
175
Cohen, supra note 25, at 11.
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discourses that have emerged around data centered “innovation” work
to position such activities as virtuous and productive, and therefore
ideally exempted from state control. 176
Data protection advances fair processing rules at the same time as it conditions
us to a world and society in which data processing is inevitable—and inevitably
good. The FIPs set the preconditions for processing, but ultimately, they fail to
question the implications of the processing itself.
One notable exception to this trend is the GDPR’s requirement that companies have a “legitimate interest” in processing data. 177 This balancing approach
as a basis for legitimizing processing in theory incorporates larger societal interests. 178 Yet this provision seems to be largely focused on the business and operational interests of the data processor and the rights of and fairness to the data
subject. 179 In the absence of more substantive protections, data protection regimes normalize an advertising-based culture that forces itself upon our time,
attention, and cognitive faculties so that we must watch ads when we could be
doing better things.
Additionally, because data protection regimes seek to regulate across the
economy, they tend to treat the entities that control the processing of data the
same. The GDPR applies, after all, to the data processing of both Facebook and
your local sandwich shop. But in treating these entities the same, data protection
regimes ignore how there may be significant differences of scale and power between large and small entities. In this way, data protection regimes are, in a certain sense, agnostic to the realities of market and informational power.
Cohen has argued that our information rules must provide the kinds of
structural support that allow private and privacy-valuing subjects to flourish. 180
To that end, she has noted the limits of FIPs-based regimes and argued that “efId. at 8.
Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 15, at 36.
178
CTR. FOR INFO. POLICY LEADERSHIP, HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
IMPLEMENTING TRANSPARENCY, CONSENT AND LEGITIMATE INTEREST UNDER THE GDPR 2 (May 17,
2017), https://www.informationpolicycentre.com/uploads/5/7/1/0/57104281/cipl_recommendations_
on_transparency_consent_and_legitimate_interest_under_the_gdpr_-19_may_2017-c.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3H5R-QHPD] (“Legitimate interest may be the most accountable ground for processing in
many contexts, as it requires an assessment and balancing of the risks and benefits of processing for
organisations, individuals and society. . . . The legitimate interests to be considered may include the
interests of the controller, other controller(s), groups of individuals and society as a whole.”).
179
See CTR. FOR INFO. POLICY LEADERSHIP, HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, EXAMPLES OF LEGITIMATE INTEREST GROUNDS FOR PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA 1 (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.
informationpolicycentre.com/uploads/5/7/1/0/57104281/final_cipl_examples_of_legitimate_interest_
grounds_for_processing_of_personal_data_16_march_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/KNB7-X2HW]
(legitimate interest data processing “enables responsible uses of personal data, while effectively protecting data privacy rights of individuals”).
180
Cohen, supra note 25, at 3.
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fective protection of breathing room for self-development requires more than
just data protection.” 181 We agree completely. We believe that if the United
States is to chart a meaningful privacy law identity, it must actively go beyond
GDPR-lite and embrace rules aimed at relationships, power, and a broader vision
of how personal data affects people and society—the kinds of rules that FIPs
regimes cannot deploy aimed at the kinds of harms such regimes cannot envision. 182
Privacy is not just about notice, choice, and control.183 It is more fundamentally about human and social well-being. But data protection regimes too often
fail to account for the human and social externalities of the data industrial complex. We are only beginning to assess the human and social costs of platform
dominance and massive-scale data processing. In addition to core privacyrelated harms associated with data collection and data use, companies’ demand
for personal information is negatively affecting our attention and how we spend
our time, how we become informed citizens, and how we relate to each other.184
Phenomena like “fake news,” “deep fakes,” non-consensual pornography and
harassment, teenage mental illness, texting and driving, oversharing on social
media, addiction by design, and lives spent staring bleakly into our phones are at
least partially attributable to or made worse by the personal data industrial complex. 185 We need broader frameworks for personal data not just because information is personal to us, but because the incentive to exploit it creeps into nearly
every aspect of our technologically mediated lives. 186
For example, data protection regimes do little to mitigate many of the problems of technologies that are designed to be addictive to maximize interaction
and data collection. For example, the average person spends four hours staring at

Id. at 23.
See id. at 22 (agreeing that privacy is not only about consent and choice, but also power dynamics within relationships).
183
Id.
184
See, e.g., NICHOLAS CARR, THE GLASS CAGE: AUTOMATION AND US 63, 181–82 (2014) (lamenting a reduction in human skills and less meaningful personal relationships as a result of the growing prominence of machines in daily life).
185
See, e.g., BRETT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 5 (2018)
(examining “addiction by design”); Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1874 (2019)
(highlighting the problems of coerced or hidden pornography and “deep fake” videos); Neil M. Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 GEO. L.J. 689, 691 (2013) (noting how social media gives
people the ability to easily share everything about their lives).
186
See FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 185, at 4–6 (putting forth a theory of “techno-social
engineering” that is happening today in nearly all facets of human life); SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE
OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 14–15 (2019) (describing the idea of “surveillance capitalism” and the exploitation of personal data
by platforms to attempt to predict and control human behavior).
181
182
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their phones every day. 187 Our compulsive use of technology is wreaking havoc
on our emotional and mental well-being, particularly for young people. 188 Indeed, medical professionals are coming to a consensus that screen time adversely affects the healthy development of small children. 189
In addition to our attention getting wheedled, manipulated, swindled, or
outright taken from us, the appetite for data is producing reduced cognitive
skills, reduced personal intimacy and offline interactions, and a corrosion of democracy. 190 More broadly, companies’ appetite for data is also helping destroy
the environment (through gadget garbage and energy drain) and overcrowd our
roads (with GPS algorithms “optimizing” traffic patterns as if time to destination
is the only relevant variable in our transport system). 191 If the United States embraces a narrow view of data protection, it will remain agnostic to these costs at
this pivotal moment and instantiate a system that seeks for maximum exposure
(and profit) with little thought to collateral harm and social good.

187
Melanie Curtin, Are You on Your Phone Too Much? The Average Person Spends This Many
Hours on It Every Day, INC.COM (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.inc.com/melanie-curtin/are-you-onyour-phone-too-much-average-person-spends-this-many-hours-on-it-every-day.html [https://perma.
cc/4H5P-FCFU].
188
See Catherine Price, Putting Down Your Phone May Help You Live Longer, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/well/mind/putting-down-your-phone-may-help-youlive-longer.html [https://perma.cc/88FK-KXVW] (discussing how smart phones contribute to increased stress and higher levels of cortisol in the body that can be detrimental to human health); see
also Stephen Marche, The Crisis of Intimacy in the Age of Digital Connectivity, L.A. REV. BOOKS
(Oct. 15, 2018), https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/crisis-intimacy-age-digital-connectivity/#! [https://
perma.cc/7JYN-RA82] (positing that new technologies are straining the development of interpersonal
relationships).
189
Emily S. Rueb, W.H.O. Says Limited or No Screen Time for Children Under 5, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/health/screen-time-kids.html [https://perma.cc/
X4UR-D4E5].
190
See, e.g., CARR, supra note 184, at 63, 181–82 (decrying the deterioration of cognitive skills
and weakened personal relationships as a result of the rise of technology use in our lives); NICHOLAS
CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET IS DOING TO OUR BRAINS 34–35 (2011) (exploring
how technology use can rewire human brains and lead to the weakening of some mental abilities).
191
Ingrid Burrington, The Environmental Toll of a Netflix Binge, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 16, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/12/there-are-no-clean-clouds/420744/ [https://
perma.cc/NKZ4-GJVY]; A.J. Dellinger, The Environmental Impact of Data Storage Is More than You
Think—and It’s Only Getting Worse, MIC (June 12, 2019), https://www.mic.com/p/the-environmentalimpact-of-data-storage-is-more-than-you-think-its-only-getting-worse-18017662 [https://perma.cc/
NYG6-BBJY]; Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber and Lyft Finally Admit They’re Making Traffic Congestion
Worse in Cities, THE VERGE (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/6/20756945/uber-lyfttnc-vmt-traffic-congestion-study-fehr-peers [https://perma.cc/ZS9L-33MT]; Joe Jacob, Data Centers:
A Latent Environmental Threat, DUKE GREEN CLASSROOM (Mar. 8, 2017), https://sites.duke.edu/
lit290s-1_02_s2017/2017/03/08/data-centers-a-latent-environmental-threat/ [https://perma.cc/G6PWNJ2Q]; Alexis C. Madrigal, The Perfect Selfishness of Mapping Apps, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 15, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/03/mapping-apps-and-the-price-of-anarchy/555
551/ [https://perma.cc/Q75S-SY9W].
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B. The United States Is Not Europe
A second reason to be wary of a GDPR-lite solution for the United States is
that the United States and the EU have very different legal structures and cultures. This is particularly true at the constitutional level, in which there are two
important differences—Europe’s recognition of fundamental human rights to
privacy and data protection, and America’s deep-seated commitment to the free
expression guarantee under the First Amendment.
1. Data Protection as a Human Right
The American constitutional system has no explicit constitutional right to
privacy. American constitutional law protects privacy against the government
implicitly in a few areas, including the First Amendment’s right to anonymous
expression, the Third Amendment’s protection against the quartering of soldiers
in private homes during peacetime, the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” against government searches and seizures, and the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments’ substantive due process rights to information privacy
and decisional autonomy. 192 Yet the American system of fundamental rights is
characterized by negative rights against the state. There are very few constitutional rights that apply to private actors, and none approaching a general constitutional right to privacy, much less data protection.
The status of privacy as a fundamental right in Europe is very different. The
European Convention on Human Rights has long been held to protect a right to
privacy, albeit one phrased as the “right to respect for private and family life.”193
The newer Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union not only protects a right to “respect for private and family life” in Article 7, but also has an
express right of “protection of personal data” in Article 8. 194 There are two additional features of European fundamental human rights law that are distinct from
the United States. First, European fundamental rights are, by definition, subject
to the concept of proportionality—fundamental rights can be explicitly balanced
with each other, and must also be balanced against the legitimate needs of a
See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600 (1977) (suggesting that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects a constitutional right of information privacy); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357–59 (1967) (extending the Fourth Amendment’s unreasonable search and seizure protection
to wiretapping and introducing the notion of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” as the lodestar of
Fourth Amendment protection); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (holding that individuals’ rights “to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in so
doing” implicated Fourteenth Amendment protections against a state law mandating a private organization to disclose its membership list).
193
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 8.
194
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 75, at 397.
192
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democratic society. 195 Second, European fundamental rights are subject to the
doctrine of “horizontal effect”—if a member state fails to protect a person’s fundamental right against other members of society, the fundamental right has nevertheless been violated. 196
These constitutional differences are particularly important when privacy
rules sit on top of them. In Europe, the GDPR is best understood as a vindication
of fundamental human rights in privacy and data protection against other members of society, both natural persons and corporations. If a corporation (for example, Google) fails to protect the fundamental rights of privacy and data protection (for example, by allowing its search engine to access outdated but true
information about a person), it has violated European law (in this case, whatever
positive law instrument like the Directive or the GDPR implements that fundamental right). 197 Legal rules like the GDPR matter significantly because they are
regulations enforcing fundamental rights.
By contrast, in the United States, consumer privacy rules implement public
policy, but they do not enforce fundamental rights of privacy. Something like the
GDPR would seem to be required by European law to vindicate fundamental
rights, but American consumer-law protections like the FTC Act’s prohibition on
unfair and deceptive trade practices are not compelled by the U.S. Constitution. 198 Congress could repeal or shrink the FTC Act tomorrow without any constitutional problems because there is no constitutional right of consumer privacy
or data protection in the U.S. system. The consumer privacy stakes are seen as
lower in the American system, and privacy is just one of many interests to be
traded off against one another in policy discussions, rather than a fixed constitutional limitation.
By contrast, as noted above, there is a right of privacy in the United States
against government searches or seizures (including warrantless wiretapping).199
Thus, if Congress were to repeal the federal Wiretap Act’s requirement that government wiretapping requires a warrant, the government would still have to get a
Id. at 406.
See Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L. REV.
387, 395, 397 (2003) (describing the European horizontal effect doctrine as “impos[ing] constitutional
duties on private actors as well as on government”).
197
See C-131/12, Google Spain SL & Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos &
Mario Costeja González, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 317, ¶¶ 89–99 (imposing a “right to be forgotten” derived from the EU Directive against Google under the European Charter of Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms).
198
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2018) (outlawing “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” through a statutory decree of Congress).
199
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Katz, 389 U.S. at 349–51 (ruling that placing a listening device
on a public phone booth was an unconstitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment when done without a proper warrant).
195
196
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warrant to wiretap a telephone. 200 But because there is nothing like the horizontal effect doctrine in American constitutional law, Congress could repeal the
Wiretap Act’s prohibition on private wiretapping. 201
What this means is that European consumer privacy law is built upon a
foundation of fundamental human rights that are protected against both governments and private actors; American consumer privacy law is not. Something like
the GDPR or the Directive is a logical and necessary implication of the structure
of the EU Constitution, but something like the GDPR is not mandated by the
U.S. Constitution or any other principle of American law. Something like the
GDPR could perhaps be mandated by a properly ratified international treaty,202
but it is instructive in this regard that the United States has not yet joined Convention 108+, the only international convention on the protection of personal
data. 203
Practically speaking, although something like the GDPR-lite would be incompatible with EU constitutionalism, an American GDPR-lite would be perfectly legal; indeed, it would probably offer more protection than the current
American regime of notice and choice backed up by the FTC’s unfair and deceptive trade practices power. The upshot is that the absence of a constitutional
foundation in the United States would mean that any attempts to enact something
like the GDPR would be relatively easy for opponents to water down into something like GDPR-lite.
2. Spurious and Real First Amendment Objections
A second significant difference between the United States and Europe is the
regulatory role played by the fundamental right of free expression. In Europe,
200
See generally Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. 3,
82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (2018)).
201
See Gardbaum, supra note 196, at 388 (explaining how U.S. constitutional rights almost exclusively bind governmental but not private actors).
202
Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433–35 (1920) (suggesting that properly ratified international treaties cannot be challenged under the Tenth Amendment). For further exploration of this
point, see Neil M. Richards, Missouri v. Holland, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES 312 (David S. Tanenhaus ed., 2008).
203
See Convention 108+: The Modernised Version of a Landmark Instrument, COUNCIL EUR. (May
18, 2018), https://www.coe.int/en/web/data-protection/-/modernisation-of-convention-108 [https://
perma.cc/8YVR-38FG] (calling Convention 108+ the only legally enforceable international protection
of personal information); see also Council of Europe Privacy Convention, ELECTION PRIVACY INFO.
CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/intl/coeconvention/#modernconvention [https://perma.cc/H4RL-3JSR]
(noting that advocacy groups have lobbied for the United States to join Convention 108+); Jennifer
Baker, What Does the Newly Signed ‘Convention 108+’ Mean for UK Adequacy?, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PROFS. (Oct. 30, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/what-does-the-newly-signed-convention-108mean-for-u-k-adequacy/ [https://perma.cc/84FA-F8EB] (indicating that the United States has not
signed Convention 108+).
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free expression is safeguarded by Article 10 of the European Convention and
Article 11 of the EU Charter. 204 Like other European fundamental rights, these
provisions are subject to proportionality analysis—where they conflict with another fundamental right such as the right to privacy or to data protection, courts
must balance the rights on an equal footing. 205
By contrast, in the United States, the fundamental right of free expression
protected by the First Amendment is not subject to proportionality analysis—if a
court finds that there is a First Amendment right, then the First Amendment applies to the state action, and strict scrutiny normally applies. 206 In practice, this
means that in the United States, privacy protections that restrict the dissemination of true matters (particularly those found to be of legitimate public concern)
can run into serious constitutional problems. For example, restrictions on the
dissemination by the press of the names of rape victims have repeatedly been
held to violate the First Amendment. 207
By contrast, restrictions of this sort would not appear to create a problem
under European law. In the context of data protection, it is likely that the broad
right to be forgotten protected in Europe under both the Directive and the
GDPR 208 would run into serious constitutional problems if enacted in the United
States. 209 As we have argued elsewhere, it is possible to make too much of this
difference—most regulations of commercial data in the United States do not
raise any First Amendment problems, 210 a fact that the Supreme Court has itself

204
See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note
193, art. 10 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.”); see also Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, supra note 75, at 398 (same).
205
See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note
193, art. 10 (stating that right to freedom of expression is to be balanced against interests including
“national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing
the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality
of the judiciary”); see also Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 75, at
406–07 (providing that limitations on any rights provided in the charter are “[s]ubject to the principle
of proportionality” and “may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of
general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others”).
206
See Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV.
1149, 1172 (2005) (providing an example of government regulation of speech’s content that would
receive strict scrutiny analysis).
207
E.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526, 532 (1989) (ruling unconstitutional Florida’s imposition of civil penalties on a newspaper that printed the name of a sexual assault victim).
208
Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 15, at 43–44.
209
NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL
AGE 73–94 (2015); Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1501, 1532–33 (2015).
210
Richards, supra note 209, at 1505.
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recognized. 211 Nevertheless, the First Amendment would raise some real obstacles to the adoption of something like the GDPR in the United States, at least
with respect to some of its more controversial provisions.
Beyond these real but limited First Amendment difficulties, we are more
broadly concerned about spurious First Amendment objections derailing policy
discussions and being used as further ammunition to weaken any privacy rules
introduced before Congress. 212 Arguments that “data is speech” and thus data
protection rules are censorship have rhetorical appeal, even though they break
down completely under serious analysis. We worry further that the trend in federal judicial appointments under the current administration may be more receptive to these kinds of arguments, and usher in the further use of the First Amendment as a kind of radically deregulatory digital Lochner v. New York, in which
the Supreme Court in 1905 infamously invalidated a New York statute attempting to regulate working conditions.213 Either way, the nature of First Amendment
discourse and jurisprudence in the United States would likely cause a GDPR-lite
to be further weakened, and still sit uneasily on its legal footing after being enacted.
3. Spurious and Real Standing Objections
Another constitutional difference that a U.S. GDPR might face is the doctrine of standing inferred by federal courts from Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 214 This doctrine requires that private litigants suing to enforce their rights
must show, as a jurisdictional matter, that they have (1) suffered an injury in fact
that was (2) caused by the defendant and that would be (3) redressed by a favorable judgment. 215 Privacy claims in particular have been at the forefront of
211
See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011) (distinguishing First Amendment
free speech protections from restrictions on economic activity and commercial regulations that incidentally burden expression).
212
See Richards, supra note 206, at 1210–21 (arguing that applying heightened First Amendment
scrutiny to ordinary data privacy law is both unsupported by First Amendment jurisprudence and may
be misused to usher in a new Lochner-type era to invalidate important economic regulations).
213
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905); see, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives:
Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1408–16 (2000) (offering an
alternative to market-based, Lochner-like understandings of free speech); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in
Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 538–60
(1998) (arguing that economists’ pure “market-based model” of information markets is fundamentally
flawed and akin to the logical fallacies that led to the Lochner era); Jeremy K. Kessler & David E.
Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1959–60 (2018)
(lamenting the Supreme Court’s recent “Lochnerian” approach to the First Amendment and its use
against legitimate regulation).
214
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (noting that Article III’s standing requirements limit the types of cases that federal courts may hear).
215
Id. at 409.
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standing doctrine developments in recent years, as courts have often refused to
take privacy law’s dignitary, psychological, or procedural harms seriously.216
Two Supreme Court decisions are particularly important in this trend. In Clapper
v. Amnesty International USA, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs challenging
amendments to federal surveillance law could not bring a claim because their
fears were “highly speculative” in nature and because “allegations of possible
future injury are not sufficient.” 217 More significantly, in Spokeo v. Robins, involving a claim that a data broker had failed to follow the procedures laid down
by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Court held not only that private litigants
had to show that they had suffered “concrete” harm as a legal matter, but also
that “a bare procedural violation” would be insufficient to show concreteness,
and thus standing and jurisdiction over the claim. 218 Such developments show a
hostility in the federal judiciary towards legal claims that are abstract, focused
on violations of procedures laid down by law, and that tend towards the prevention of future injury. Of course, these are precisely the hallmarks of data protection regimes, which prescribe procedures to forestall future harms that are violations of the abstract right of privacy. To be clear, we do not mean to suggest that
privacy claims cannot be enforced in American courts (they clearly can be), but
rather that data protection-style claims can face particular standing problems that
make it more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain relief than is the case in Europe.
This conclusion, in fact, was recently reached by the Data Protection Commissioner of Ireland in the high-profile 2017 case Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, and sustained by the Irish High Court and Irish Supreme Court.219
Thus, a U.S. GDPR that sought to use private rights of action to enforce privacy
rights (like the European GDPR does) would face additional constitutional hurdles stemming from U.S. standing doctrine that could further limit its effectiveness and scope.
More generally, the different constitutional footing of privacy rights in the
United States would make implementation of a faithful U.S. GDPR difficult, and
would further push regulators towards what we are calling “GDPR-lite.”

216
MCGEVERAN, supra note 5, at 199 (“Developments in privacy law, particularly standing doctrine, have also increased the obstacles to private suits, including class actions.”).
217
568 U.S. at 409–10.
218
136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548–50 (2016). See generally Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15
U.S.C. § 1681.
219
Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ire. Ltd. & Schrems [2017] IEHC 545, 70, 197 (H. Ct.) (Ir.),
aff’d, [2019] IESC 46 (SC) (Ir.). The case is currently before the European Court of Justice for resolution of substantive points of European law.
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C. Data Protection Is Myopic
FIPs-based regimes were relatively well-equipped for the initial wave of
personal computing in the 1960s and 1970s. 220 Electronic data was relatively
costly, scarce, and manageable. Computers had yet to become ingrained in our
daily lives and the internet had yet to be democratized. Because data processing
seemed revolutionary, lawmakers embraced fairness as a goal that could balance
people’s privacy and well-being with innovation and efficiency. 221
That was fifty years ago—a time of network television, rotary dial phones,
and slow computers that filled entire rooms. Today’s lawmakers need to update
both the goals and the tools of our data regulation model. 222 Automated technologies and substantially greater amounts of data have pushed FIPs principles like
“data minimization, transparency, choice, and access to the limit.”223 Progress in
robotics, genomics, “biometrics, and algorithmic decision-making” are putting
pressure on rules meant to ensure fair aggregation of personal information in
databases. 224
Although the FIPs can probably continue to be a necessary component of
any federal data privacy framework, they are not sufficient for several reasons. 225 First, the FIPs contain “several blind spots.” 226 They are largely concerned with data aggregation by companies. 227 They do not meaningfully address human vulnerabilities to each other on platforms like social media, human
susceptibility to manipulation, or issues of platform power and competition policy. 228 Robots and artificial intelligence (AI) that act like humans, tools that
measure brain activity, and advances in genomics raise problems related to how
people respond to anthropomorphic technologies, how people might one day be
unable to hide thoughts, harm that comes from forecasting of things that have
not even happened yet, and protecting “personal” DNA data that is shared with
family members as a function of elementary biology.

Hartzog, supra note 58, at 953.
See SEC’Y ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., supra note 44, at xx–xxi
(suggesting standards of fair information practice in light of the new effects of “computerization” on
society).
222
See GELLMAN, supra note 45, at 43 (noting criticism of the FIPs for failing to maintain “pace
with information technology”).
223
Hartzog, supra note 58, at 953.
224
Id.
225
GELLMAN, supra note 45, at 1.
226
Hartzog, supra note 58, at 954.
227
Id.
228
Id.
220
221
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The state of privacy protection is also bad and getting worse. For years, the
rate and scale of privacy failures has grown exponentially. 229 The fragile wall
that policymakers constructed half a century ago to mitigate the risks of discrete
databases is cracking. The time-honored response to any privacy issue from government and industry has been to give users more control. 230 From social media
to biometric information, proposed solutions include some combination of “privacy self-management” concepts like control, informed consent, transparency,
notice, and choice. 231 Even the GDPR speaks to the idea that “natural persons
should have control of their own personal data.” 232
These concepts are attractive because they seem empowering. But in basing
policy principles for data protection on notice and choice, privacy frameworks
are asking too much from a concept that works best when preserved, optimized,
and deployed in remarkably limited doses. People only have so much time and
so many cognitive resources to allocate. Even under ideal circumstances, our
consent is far too precious and finite to meaningfully scale.
The problem with notice and choice models is that they create incentives
for companies to hide the risks in their data practices though manipulative design, vague abstractions, and complex words as the companies also shift risk
onto data subjects. As we have explained in detail elsewhere, the notice and
choice “approach has been a spectacular failure.” 233
Bert-Jaap Koops has argued that European data protection law is based on
the delusion that it can give people control over their data, which it cannot. 234
We agree. Even the idealized, perfected transparency and control model contemplated by these frameworks is impossible to achieve in mediated environments.
There are several reasons why. First, the control that companies promise people
is an illusion. Engineers design their technologies to produce particular results. 235 Human choices are constrained by the design of the tools they use.236
See, e.g., Lapowsky, supra note 93 (highlighting the monumental Cambridge Analytica privacy scandal).
230
See, e.g., Mathews & Bowman, supra note 11 (indicating that the intent driving the CCPA is
to give people more control over their personal data).
231
See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1880, 1880–81 (2013) (explaining how policies based around these concepts have driven privacy regulation since the 1970s).
232
Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 15, at 2.
233
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 67, at 1498–99.
234
See generally Bert-Jaap Koops, The Trouble with European Data Protection Law, 4 INT’L
DATA PRIVACY L. 250 (2014). See also generally Shannon Togawa Mercer, The Limitations of European Data Protection as a Model for Global Privacy Regulation, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 20
(2020), https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/885BD6110E4AF
6C9F7412AE3F2C481F0/S2398772319000837a.pdf/limitations_of_european_data_protection_as_a_
model_for_global_privacy_regulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3HM-3JFD].
235
See Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns 3 (Univ. of
Chi., Working Paper No. 719, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3431205
229
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Companies decide the kind of boxes people get to check, buttons they press,
switches they activate and deactivate, and other settings they get to fiddle
with. 237 By presenting limited choices as “more options” for users, companies
can instill in users a false sense of control by obscuring who is really in control
of the interaction. 238
Data collectors also have incentives to use the power of design to manufacture our consent. Deploying the insights of behavioral economics, companies
create manipulative interfaces that “exploit our built-in tendencies to prefer
shiny, colorful buttons and ignore dull, grey ones.” 239 They may also shame us
into feeling bad about withholding data or declining options. 240 Many times,
companies make the ability to exercise control possible but costly through forced
work, subtle misdirection, and incentive tethering. 241 Sometimes platforms design online services to wheedle people into oversharing through gamification,
such as keeping a “streak” going or nudging people to share old posts or congratulate others on Facebook. 242 Companies know how impulsive sharing can be
and therefore implement an entire system to make it easy. 243
Second, notice and choice regimes are overwhelming. They simply do not
scale because they conceive of control and transparency as something people can
never get enough of. 244 Human users are presented with a dizzying array of
switches, delete buttons, and privacy settings. 245 We are told that all is revealed
in a company’s privacy policy, if only we would read it. 246 When privacy harms
happen, companies promise more and better controls. And if they happen again,
the diagnosis is often that companies simply must have not added enough or improved dials and checkboxes. 247
Control over personal information is attractive in the abstract, but in practice it is often an overwhelming obligation. Mobile apps can ask users for over
[https://perma.cc/SXX9-26VS] (arguing that corporations build their tech interfaces to unwittingly
force users into certain choices).
236
Id.
237
Woodrow Hartzog, Opinion, The Case Against Idealising Control, 4 EUR. DATA PROTECTION
L. REV. 423, 426 (2018).
238
Id.
239
Id. at 427.
240
Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 235, at 10 (describing this practice of “confirmshaming”).
241
For more information on the concept of dark patterns, see generally DARK PATTERNS, http://
www.darkpatterns.org [https://perma.cc/QA4H-R8JD].
242
Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 235 at 10 (highlighting this practice of “gamification”).
243
See Richards, supra note 185, at 691 (discussing “frictionless sharing”).
244
Hartzog, supra note 58, at 974–75.
245
Id. at 975.
246
See id. at 974–75 (noting it is practically impossible for everyone to read all the privacy policies they see).
247
See id. at 974 (criticizing the notion that any privacy problem can be fixed with more user
control).
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two hundred permissions and even the average app asks for about five. 248 As the
authors of this Article have put it elsewhere, “[t]he problem with thinking of privacy as control is that if we are given our wish for more privacy, it means we are
given so much control that we choke on it.” 249
Even if the law were to require that privacy protective choices were the default option, companies could still repeatedly ask us to flip the publicity
switch. 250 People that have turned off notifications on their mobile apps can attest to the persistent, grinding requests to turn them back on almost every time
they open the app. And even if a company were to somehow deliver perfect information and provide meaningful choices, it would not solve the limited bandwidth we have as human beings limited to one brain. Every piece of information
meant to inform us is a demand on our time and resources. Right now, every
company gets to make those demands whenever they want. The result is a thousand voices all crying out simultaneously asking us to make decisions. People
have no real way to filter those requests. Instead, users become burdened, overwhelmed, and resigned to the path of least resistance. As Brett Frischmann and
Evan Selinger have explored, our consent has been manufactured, so we just
click “agree.” 251
There are ways to balance data exploitation and protecting people, but it requires human protection and not just data protection. It requires a framework
that reimagines the relationships between people and the companies they interact
with. It also requires that we place trust at the center of our approach to digital
consumer protection. As we have argued in other articles, being trustworthy in
the digital age means companies must be discreet with our data, honest about the
risk of data practices, protective of our personal information and, above all, loyal
to us—the data subjects and customers. 252 As we describe below, our privacy
MICHELLE ATKINSON, PEW RESEARCH CTR., APPS PERMISSIONS IN THE GOOGLE PLAY
STORE 4 (2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/11/10/apps-permissions-in-the-googleplay-store/ [https://perma.cc/924C-8HNQ].
249
Hartzog, supra note 237, at 429.
250
See Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 15, at 48 (mandating that companies, by
default, ensure a level of data privacy in the European Union); see also id. at 15 (suggesting the
same).
251
See FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 185, at 5 (arguing that simply hitting “I agree” to
unread terms and conditions is a result of “addiction by design”).
252
For more information on taking trust seriously in privacy law, see generally DANIEL J.
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 102–04
(2004); ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION
AGE (2018); Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1183 (2016); Ian Kerr, Personal Relationships in the Year 2000: Me and My ISP, in PERSONAL
RELATIONSHIPS OF DEPENDENCE AND INDEPENDENCE 78 (Law Comm’n of Can. ed., 2002); Neil
Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap: A Review, 126 YALE L.J. 1180 (2017); Richards
& Hartzog, supra note 8.
248
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frameworks should be built to encourage and ensure this kind of trustworthy
conduct. 253
Traditional data protection frameworks are so focused on the data of each
individual that they overlook important social and civil rights implications of
collecting and processing personal data. Marginalized communities, particularly
communities of color, shoulder a disproportionate burden from privacy abuses. 254 U.S. lawmakers should embrace a privacy identity that goes beyond narrow and individualized conceptions of privacy to incorporate more societal and
group-based concerns as well as civil rights-based protections.
Finally, lawmakers must always remember that privacy is inevitably about
the distribution and exercise of power. Scholars including Lisa Austin, Julie Cohen, and Dan Solove have noted that privacy rules will only be effective if they
meaningfully address the disparities of power between people and those collecting and using our information. 255 This means crafting rules and frameworks that
target the structure of organizations and re-allocate power among the stakeholders in the digital ecosystem. Regardless of which choice lawmakers make, without structural support, resources, and a strong political mandate for enforcement,
any privacy framework will merely be a pretext for exploitation. Whether legislation creates a new data privacy agency or emboldens existing federal agencies,
regulators must have broad grants of authority, including rulemaking provisions
where necessary, robust civil penalty authority, and the ability to seek injunctions
quickly to stop illegal practices. Regulation should also include private causes of
action and rights for data subjects, so long as these do not become the sole privacy enforcement mechanisms.
The modern data ecosystem is something of a runaway train. Trust rules
can help, but they too will not be enough. Some data practices might be so dangerous that they should be taken off the table entirely. Others might be harmful
to society in ways that do not implicate a violation of any trust. To be fully responsive to modern data problems, a meaningful U.S. privacy framework needs
to embrace substantive boundaries for data collection and use. In the next Part,
we propose a new regulatory framework to solidify America’s privacy identity as
inclusive and responsive to how companies obtain and yield the power related to
the collection and use of personal information—one that goes beyond the limits
of the data protection model. 256

See infra notes 287–236 and accompanying text.
Group Letter to Congress on Civil Rights in Privacy Legislation 2 (Feb. 13, 2019), http://
civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/policy/letters/2019/Roundtable-Letter-on-CRBig-Data-Privacy.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GMS5-83P7].
255
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
256
See infra notes 257–358 and accompanying text.
253
254

1738

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 61:1687

IV. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR AMERICAN PRIVACY
So now what? As we seek a governance framework for our data-driven society, there is a lot we can learn from constitutional law. A constitution is a
framework, a blueprint, and a design for governance. The U.S. Constitution, for
example, is first and foremost a design blueprint for government, creating the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and allocating them among the three
branches of a federal government of limited and enumerated powers and the
state governments of broader but inferior powers. 257 This was the ratified Constitution of 1788, to which the substantive protections of the Bill of Rights were
added shortly thereafter, substantive rights thought to be a necessary safeguard to
procedural protections. 258
In this constitutional moment for privacy policy, we need to think carefully
about the structures we will use to govern the flow of human information that is
reshaping our society. We need a new framework for privacy that is sensible,
practical, and durable. To be clear, we are not calling for the constitutionalizing
of privacy, but rather drawing an analogy to constitutional law, and making an
argument for a new frame of governance for privacy. Like the U.S. Constitution,
this blueprint would operate at several different levels. At the level of procedure,
this blueprint should prescribe fair and ethical procedures for the processing of
human information, just like the data protection model does.259 Analogous to the
unamended Constitution of 1788, it would prescribe processes that would regulate and regularize data processing. But the blueprint would also operate at the
level of substance. Just as the drafters of the 1788 Constitution realized that procedural rules alone are susceptible to abuse by those who wield their powers, our
blueprint would also place restrictions on certain kinds of data practices. 260 This
is akin to the strategy of the Bill of Rights, which takes certain dangerous government practices (censorship, a state church, abolition of jury trials, cruel and
unusual punishments) off the table. 261
The GDPR and the data protection project represent a procedural move like
the 1788 Constitution—allocation of authority and responsibility, and prescrip-

257
See U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III (dividing the federal government into three distinct branches,
each with different powers).
258
See id. amends. I–X (constituting the Bill of Rights).
259
See Chander et al., supra note 103, at 14 (noting the FIPs are foundational to the GDPR).
260
See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 27–34 (1999) (noting that AntiFederalists, including Thomas Jefferson, believed a majority-driven government could abuse its power
if a bill of rights were not added to the Constitution).
261
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting the establishment of a state church or the abridgment of
free speech); id. amend. VI (securing the right to jury trials); id. amend. VIII (prohibiting cruel and
unusual punishments).
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tion of ordinary procedures. 262 But procedural requirements are little protection
without substantive limitations to back them up. In its constitutional moment,
American privacy policy has confronted the same problem faced by America’s
founding generation in its own constitutional moment—the need for substantive
rules to shore up well-meaning but ultimately insufficient procedural ones.
This is perhaps not as radical a step as it might seem at first glance. Privacy
lawyers already talk in constitutional terms with respect to data governance
frameworks. 263 What are binding corporate rules but a data constitution? We
should bring a similar blueprint-like approach to privacy law. The endeavor to
restrain corporate power can learn a lot from the governance project of the eighteenth century for government power. But the line between procedure and substance is famously blurry. Indeed, even in the U.S. Constitution, the procedural
strategy includes structural protections and the substantive strategy includes procedural protections. 264 As we reckon with privacy law’s constitutional moment,
we think it is more helpful to identify areas that should be targeted by any multilayered strategy to draft a new U.S. privacy framework. We do so with an eye
towards crafting rules and structural mandates that create incentives and business
models that not only protect people as individuals, society as a whole, and our
natural resources, but also nurture safe and sustainable information relationships
and technological developments that benefit everybody.
Every law or regulatory regime has a landscape on which it is focused, that
is, a particular area or dynamic that is to be affected. For example, data is the
locus of the GDPR. All of the rules that constitute the GDPR revolve around it—
how it is collected, processed, and shared. 265 But as we have explained in this
Article, one of the key limitations of the GDPR is that there is much more to the
personal data industrial complex than the collection and processing of data. If we
are concerned with how the power created and distributed by personal data is
obtained and exploited, then we think a layered procedural, substantive, and
structural approach to privacy law can be reflected in four overlapping areas,
only one of which is data as data. We argue that all four focal points of privacy
must be addressed if a governing framework for our human information is to be
See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 2, at 85–88 (describing some of the GDPR’s procedural requirements for data collectors).
263
See, e.g., Chander et al., supra note 103, at 12–13 (arguing that the new GDPR in Europe is a
natural outgrowth of the European constitutional documents that recognize data protection as a “fundamental human right”).
264
See, e.g., Todd David Peterson, Procedural Checks: How the Constitution (and Congress)
Control the Power of the Three Branches, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 230 (2017) (arguing that the Constitution’s “case or controversy” procedural requirement imposed on Article III
courts actually limits those courts’ ability to exercise their substantive power).
265
See Mathews & Bowman, supra note 11 (saying the GDPR covers disclosures made to data
subjects, procedures for data breach notification, data security, international data transfers, and more).
262
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complete: (1) corporate matters; (2) trustworthy relationships; (3) data collection
and processing; and (4) personal data’s externalities.
We envision these four landscapes for privacy regulation as related and
overlapping:

Each landscape invokes a different set of rules, structural changes, and dynamics. For example, laws targeting corporal matters would seek to address not only
the amount of power corporate entities have in the marketplace (and how they
wield it), but also any law aimed at how organizations use the corporate form
and how that form might be relevant to people’s privacy. Corporal privacy rules
would include structural questions regarding the corporate form and piercing the
corporate veil, corporate licensing and registration requirements, and taxation
issues. 266 Meanwhile, Relational privacy rules would look to the relative power
disparities within information relationships and the vulnerabilities of those who
expose themselves to data collectors. 267 Informational protection rules focus on
data like the fair processing requirements of the GDPR that follow the data regardless of corporal form or the nature of relationships between parties. 268 The
final tier of laws would target External consequences—the external costs (what
an economist would call “externalities”) imposed on society by the personal data
See infra notes 279–286 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 287–327 and accompanying text.
268
See infra notes 328–337 and accompanying text.
266
267
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industrial complex, including environmental pollution, corrosion of democratic
self-governance, and reduced well-being through the hijacking of attention. 269
Thinking about privacy law in terms of landscape areas rather than solely
through the lens of data protection has some distinct advantages. It allows lawmakers to see the big picture, then to focus rules with an eye towards directly
addressing the root of a problem rather than clumsily using data rules to deal
with issues that data rules can address in only an indirect way at best. For example, data protection rules often require companies to obtain the consent of users
before engaging in risky practices. 270 But the harm to be avoided is not necessarily a lack of autonomy in decision making, but rather some other harm such
as manipulation, overexposure, chilling effects, loss of opportunity, or some other harm that results from a data collector’s recklessness, indiscretion, and disloyalty, or from the power effects in a relationship. This is an issue regarding the
relationship between the data subject and the data collection, and it is better addressed directly with trust-enforcing rules like duties of confidence, care, and
loyalty. 271
Conceptualizing the problem of privacy regulation in this way allows for a
more careful, nuanced, and directed approach. It allows regulators to target power more directly, treating specific pathologies that arise in one area (i.e., relationships) but not others (i.e., data), and to treat companies differently according to
their power, size, and relationships to the data collector. 272 It would allow lawmakers to address a broader range of privacy harms without having to create one
omnibus law to rule them all like the GDPR. 273 A landscape approach to an
overarching privacy framework could also guide lawmakers in adjacent areas
like antitrust, environmental law, health law, and consumer protection law without any formal intervention or regulatory commingling. Having an approach to
privacy rules that is also compatible with other areas implicated by the personal
data industrial complex would allow lawmakers and regulators to foment support for meaningful rules across the board that more directly responds to problems of power, relationships, data, and externalities in a consistent way.

See infra notes 339–358 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Mathews & Bowman, supra note 11 (discussing GDPR provisions that require companies to get customers’ consent before they sell customers’ data).
271
See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries in the Digital Age, BALKANIZATION (Mar. 5,
2014, 4:50 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/information-fiduciaries-in-digital-age.html
[https://perma.cc/6BUG-JUJY] (arguing that online services that collect personal data from individuals should be treated as “information fiduciaries”).
272
Cf. id. (suggesting that treating all online companies the same when imposing fiduciary duties
onto them would be a mistake because all companies are different).
273
See Mathews & Bowman, supra note 11 (calling the GDPR “an omnibus law”).
269
270
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Some scholars and lawmakers are skeptical that a layered approach to privacy regulation will work. 274 Some see the best answer as a monolithic, omnibus
approach that works as a clearinghouse or one-stop-shop for all privacy-related
matters. 275 Others fear that relational approaches like fiduciary trust rules are
either antithetical to structural approaches like competition law or will devour
the political clout or resources necessary to pursue other ends. 276 Nevertheless,
the history of regulation in the United States demonstrates that not only is a layered approach possible, but that it might be the only way to effectively accomplish rule creation and enforcement. The FTC enforces many different privacy
laws in addition to Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair and deceptive trade practices. 277 The FTC itself shares privacy regulatory authority with
Health and Human Services, the Federal Communications Commission, and
state attorneys general. 278 This is to say nothing of the complex web of rules
stemming from private tort and contract law as well as constitutional law. Lawmakers, courts, and regulators regularly balance conflicting interests and loyalties, issuing targeted rules that address some, but not all, privacy problems.
America’s privacy identity need not reside in one omnibus framework or one
regulatory agency as in Europe, but rather in a demonstrated (but wholesale)
commitment to addressing power and vulnerability in substance, structure, and
procedure in all relevant areas.
A. Corporal
If privacy is about power, then the center of power lies with corporate
structure and affordances. 279 Corporate entities amass market power, use structure to dilute and deflect responsibility, and act based on financial incentives that
affect the other three privacy dynamics of relationships, data, and externalities. 280 Any meaningful privacy framework should directly address corporate
matters like misused market power, dangerous corporate structure, and corrosive
business incentives.
See Schwartz, supra note 39, at 923–27 (presenting the common arguments in favor of an
omnibus privacy law as opposed to fragmented ones).
275
Id.
276
See, e.g., Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133
HARV. L. REV. 497, 528 (2019) (arguing that a privacy law regime focused on establishing fiduciary
responsibilities without addressing larger problems, such as “market structure or political-economic
influence,” is fundamentally flawed).
277
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2018).
278
Hartzog & Solove, supra note 32, at 2236, 2256.
279
See Austin, supra note 25, at 131 (suggesting that privacy relationships are mostly about power).
280
See, e.g., Khan & Pozen, supra note 276, at 527–28 (discussing the large market share tech
giants have accumulated, the market structure within which they operate, and how it all puts private
data at risk).
274
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1. Competition
Competition law has been underutilized as a privacy regulatory tool, but
there is a groundswell of support to change that. 281 Thanks to personal data and
the interactive nature of digital technologies, platforms have unique incentives,
affordances, and market power unlike anything regulators have ever seen before.
Competition and antitrust law are the traditional tools to directly address such
dangerous accumulations of power. As Lina Khan and David Pozen argue in
calling for a focus on platform dominance instead of relational privacy protections:
The relevant inquiry for legal reformers, we submit, should be not just
how a firm such as Google or Facebook exercises its power over end
users, but whether it ought to enjoy that kind of power in the first
place. Limiting the dominance of some of these firms may well have
salutary effects for consumer privacy, both by facilitating competition
on privacy protection and by reducing the likelihood that any single
data-security failure will cascade into a much broader harm. 282
Pozen and Khan are correct that a focus solely on data protection or trust might
distract from antitrust approaches to platform regulation, but we see no need to
make a stark choice between antitrust and what we are calling here relational
trust. Our frameworks of privacy regulation need not ignore information relationships to focus on platform dominance, as we argue in this Article. But to ignore legal tools designed to address platform power would leave privacy law
incomplete.

See, e.g., MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY
335 (2016) (urging government competition officials to acknowledge data’s potential to have anticompetitive effects); TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 3
(2018) (noting that antitrust laws should be updated to deal with new challenges presented by large
tech companies); Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 792–97 (2017)
(calling for new antitrust laws that account for the ways in which companies can use data for anticompetitive purposes); Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
973, 980–82 (2019) (promoting “structural separations,” a type of antitrust remedy, for large online
operators); Khan & Pozen, supra note 276, at 528 (arguing that antitrust enforcement against large
tech companies will reduce the threat they pose to data privacy); Robert Walters et al., Personal Data
Law and Competition Law—Where Is It Heading?, 39 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 505, 505 (2018)
(noting the increased demands on antitrust officials to examine the anticompetitive effects of possessing personal data); Gabriela Zanfir-Fortuna & Sinziana Ianc, Data Protection and Competition
Law: The Dawn of ‘Uberprotection’ (Working Paper, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3290824 [https://perma.cc/SXX9-26VS] (discussing the emergence of competition law in
the context of data privacy).
282
Khan & Pozen, supra note 276, at 528.
281
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2. Corporate Structure
Privacy law should be concerned with a number of corporate matters, including limiting how the corporate form is used to shield bad actors from personal liability. One major issue surrounding the FTC’s complaint against Facebook in the Cambridge Analytica scandal was whether Facebook founder and
CEO Mark Zuckerberg would be held personally responsible for overseeing unfair and deceptive trade practices. 283 Such personal liability is common in other
areas of the law, such as securities violations. 284 Some have even proposed the
prospect of criminal punishment for executives guilty of egregious privacy violations. 285 Given what is at stake when large online platforms abuse their power,
liability of this sort in certain instances seems warranted.
Other structural corporate approaches might include empowering chief privacy officers and other ombudsman-like employees with meaningful decisionmaking abilities and insulation from executive pushback when their decisions
might impose costs on a company’s business model. Lawmakers could also provide statutory protection for whistleblowers that call out corporate malfeasance
and chicanery regarding personal information. More fundamentally, lawmakers
could mitigate or alter the primacy of shareholders for platforms with dominant
power regarding personal information. In the least, lawmakers could explore
backing away from maximizing shareholder value on a quarterly basis as a way
to encourage more long-term sustainable relationships with users. 286
Let us be clear about what we are suggesting here. We are not calling for
the upending of corporate law or rampant and unconstrained piercing of the corporate veil. Instead, we are trying to highlight that corporate law rules can act as
regulatory levers over platforms and other tech companies in ways that traditional privacy law tools might not. The digital revolution has upended many settled
expectations in our society, including those of regulation. It would be naïve to
expect that the new powers that information capitalism has brought would not
require an adjustment to the toolkit used to regulate companies to prevent harm
Aarti Shahani & Avie Schneider, FTC to Hold Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg Liable for
Any Future Privacy Violations, NPR (July 24, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/24/741282397/
facebook-to-pay-5-billion-to-settle-ftc-privacy-case [https://perma.cc/J69P-RATQ].
284
See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237,
241–42 (2009) (noting personal civil liability for officers and directors for material misstatements in a
company’s SEC registration statement).
285
See Albert Fox Cahn, Prison Time Is the Answer to Tech’s Privacy Crisis, MEDIUM (July 22,
2019), https://onezero.medium.com/prison-time-is-the-answer-to-techs-privacy-crisis-53da1559124f
[https://perma.cc/MK9J-SQUZ] (arguing that criminal penalties will provide more effective deterrence against privacy violations than even large corporate fines).
286
See Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value of Systems Theory for
Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 605 (2018) (noting that maximizing shareholder value has
been the paradigmatic purpose for corporate law for nearly thirty years).
283
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and nudge them in socially beneficial directions. Appropriate use of corporate
law’s regulatory tools, then, would seem a logical response to the privacy problems stemming from corporate informational power.
B. Relational
The most important privacy-relevant relationships in the modern age are
those between data subjects and data collectors—between humans and the companies that collect and process their information. Much of the personal data
about U.S. internet users stems from relationships with either their internet and
mobile service providers, with websites and apps they use, or with major tech
platforms like Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft. 287 This means
that many, if not most, privacy concerns are rooted in a relationship characterized by extreme information and power asymmetries. 288
In these relationships, users are vulnerable, and platforms have all the power because they design the environment that dictates the interaction. 289 These
companies also are much more knowledgeable about the risks that come with
people sharing their data. They also know much more about us (and what makes
us tick) than we know about them. They know our likes and dislikes, how long
our mouse hovers over particular links, what our friends are doing (and saying
behind our backs), and they have the machinery to exploit it all. 290 And all we
know is that we have fifteen minutes to check Instagram, send that email, or order that printer toner before our lunch break is over, so who has time to engage
in threat modeling or read terms of use?
The extreme vulnerability of people to companies in information relationships means we should have much better rules for and recognition of a trustworthy relationship. 291 In previous research, we and other scholars, including Ari
Waldman, have called for lawmakers to turn away from the ineffective notice
and choice model toward rules designed to protect the trust that users place in
companies when they share their personal information. 292 Our proposals have

287
See Khan & Pozen, supra note 276, at 498 (noting that online businesses, especially large ones
like Google and Facebook, gather “enormous” amounts of data on their users).
288
See id. at 520 (arguing that relationships between users and large online platforms such as
Facebook are marked by an “unusually stark asymmetry of information”).
289
See id. (claiming that most people do not understand the basic operations of digital businesses
and that companies impose their control on users).
290
See id. (noting that Facebook accumulates data to discern users’ interests, traits, political preferences, and consumer desires).
291
See id. (positing that large online service providers, like Facebook, create “an elaborate system
of social control”).
292
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 252, 1213–24; Richards & Hartzog, supra note 8, at 434–35;
Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Trusting Big Data Research, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 579, 590
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similarities to the movement to treat data collectors as “information fiduciaries”
and to impose stringent duties of confidentiality, care, and loyalty on those who
collect and process personal information.293 This movement is reflected in Senator Brian Schatz’s proposed Data Care Act of 2018. 294 Nevertheless, the trust
rules we are calling for have a broader application beyond the formalized
framework of information fiduciaries. Trust rules are certainly relational in nature, but are not necessarily dependent upon formal relationships to function,
much less on the complete framework of fiduciary duties. In other words, lawmakers certainly can and should establish duties owed by specific entrustees to
those who make themselves vulnerable through exposure, but they might also
create rules and frameworks generally aimed at creating and preserving trustworthy relationships or rules simply justified by the vulnerability of users to the platforms with which they interact.
As we have argued elsewhere, trustworthy entities have four features that
the law should promote—discretion, honesty, protection, and loyalty.
1. Discretion
One of the most fundamental and oldest privacy protections is the duty of
confidentiality. 295 The obligation to keep a confidence was once formidable and
a key component of certain relationships in the Anglo-American common law.
Nevertheless, in the United States, with the advent of Prosser’s four privacy
torts, the tort cause of action for breach of confidence stalled. 296 As contract law
gradually favored boilerplate language, confidentiality agreements became less
of a focus for those individuals sharing information with others, 297 though the
growth of the non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) has continued in recent years
outside the consumer context.
(2017); see also WALDMAN, supra note 252, at 77–146 (providing a framework for trust-driven privacy law).
293
See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1183, 1221–30 (2016) (calling for these fiduciary duties to be attached to online service providers); Balkin, supra note 271 (same); see also SOLOVE, supra note 252, at 213–14 (drawing on confidential relationships protected by law—such as those in the realm of doctor-patient relationships and
the law of evidence—to be applied to privacy).
294
Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. (2018).
295
See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 133–35 (2007) (exploring long-standing commitments to confidentiality
in Anglo-American law).
296
See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF.
L. REV. 1887, 1888–90 (2010) (demonstrating how Prosser’s rigid conceptualization of tort privacy
separated it from confidentiality and limited its ability to evolve).
297
See Woodrow Hartzog, Reviving Implied Confidentiality, 89 IND. L.J. 763, 764 & n.2, 781
(2014) (noting the rise of boilerplate online contracts lacking explicitly negotiated confidentiality
provisions).
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Lawmakers looking for ways to embolden American privacy law could
start by revitalizing the tort of confidentiality by expanding it to cover new kinds
of information relationships typified by asymmetrical power and vulnerabilities. 298 They could broaden secondary liability doctrines like “inducement to
breach confidentiality” and “interference with confidential relationships” that
could be applied to reckless platforms that encourage breaches of confidence
through design. For example, there are obvious applications of such doctrines to
websites that solicit non-consensual pornography from former partners or lovers.299 Judges and lawmakers both could revive the doctrine of implied confidentiality to apply to user interfaces as well as face-to-face interactions. 300 And finally, courts, lawmakers, and regulators could evolve private law and statutory
frameworks to foster a kind of “chain-link confidentiality” that would follow
information as it moved downstream from one confidant to the next, empowering the trusting party every step of the way. 301
Trust, however, involves more than just confidentiality and nondisclosure.
As we have explained in other research, “[t]here are ways other than rigid nondisclosure that entrustees can protect trustors. They can limit to whom they disclose information, they can limit what they share with others, and they can control how they share information to make sure they preserve the trust placed in
them.” 302 Lawmakers could also create frameworks that facilitate limited disclosure to particular parties or in deidentified and obfuscated ways. 303 This would
allow trustees to act discreetly while still sharing certain information with others.
But the basic point is that discretion is a foundation of trust, and the law should
promote trust in information relationships by creating incentives, and where appropriate duties, to be discreet.
2. Honesty
Paradoxically, openness is a foundational principle of privacy and data protection law, at least when it comes to openness about data practices. The idea is
See Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1670 (2011)
(arguing that courts should broaden their contract analysis of interactive websites in order to find
elements of contracts, including promises to protect privacy, within website designs themselves).
299
For similar proposals, see DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 167–81
(2014) (proposing legislative reforms to address the problem of non-consensual pornography); Citron,
supra note 185, at 1944–53 (same).
300
Hartzog, supra note 297, at 765.
301
Woodrow Hartzog, Chain-Link Confidentiality, 46 GA. L. REV. 657, 659–60 (2012).
302
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 8, at 460.
303
See Ira S. Rubinstein & Woodrow Hartzog, Anonymization and Risk, 91 WASH. L. REV. 703,
708–09 (2016) (calling for a new legal framework for data protection that is “process-based,” rather
than solely concerned with harm, so that data can be shared with others while still safeguarding privacy).
298
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if companies are transparent, people will be on notice of the risks of exposure
and interaction in the digital world. But of course, this ethos is too often used in
dense privacy policies as a fiction to exploit people under a thin veneer of compliance in a way that does little to keep them safe or on actual notice. 304 If companies are to keep the trust they have been given, it is not enough to be merely
passively “open” or “transparent.” Trust “requires an affirmative obligation of
honesty to correct misinterpretations and to actively dispel notions of mistaken
trust.” 305
A focus on honesty flips the focus of transparency from formal disclosure
requirements to a focus on the reasonable expectations of entrustees. Being honest means lawmakers should create rules that balance honesty with notions of
safety, as with products liability law. For example, companies that make dangerous products are not at fault if the dangerous aspects of a tool can be reasonably
avoided with a warning. 306 But if no warning would be reasonably effective, the
product must simply be made safer. 307 Honesty also means exploring the full
range of design and information dissemination techniques beyond just words.
Ryan Calo, for example, has called for new strategies of “visceral” notice:
Unlike traditional notice that relies upon text or symbols to convey information, emerging strategies of “visceral” notice leverage a consumer’s very experience of a product or service to warn or inform. A
regulation might require that a cell phone camera make a shutter
sound so people know their photo is being taken. Or a law could incentivize websites to be more formal (as opposed to casual) wherever
they collect personal information, as formality tends to place people
on greater guard about what they disclose. 308
Other scholars in the field of human computer interaction have researched ways
to create design spaces for effective privacy notices by focusing on timing,
channel, modality, and control. 309
304
See Richards & Hartzog, supra note 67, at 1498–99 (arguing that transparency is an insufficient goal, and that a focus on mere transparency has led to “a sea of ‘I agree’ buttons, drop-down
menus, and switches that [people] are unable to navigate”).
305
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 8, at 462.
306
See David G. Owen, The Puzzle of Comment j, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1377, 1381 (2004) (pointing
to general tort law that says products are not found to be defective or unreasonably dangerous if they
bear warnings which make the product safe to use when followed).
307
See id. at 1393 (acknowledging that no matter how clear or numerous product warnings are,
companies are still liable for manufacture and design defects).
308
M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1027, 1027 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
309
Florian Schaub et al., A Design Space for Effective Privacy Notices, SYMP. USABLE PRIVACY
& SECURITY, 2015, at 1, 6–10, https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/soups2015/soups15paper-schaub.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZGW7-F2MP].
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Paul Ohm has recently called for “forthright code,” explaining that “[e]ven
when software isn’t deceptive, far too often it still is not as honest as it could be,
giving rise to consumer harm, power imbalances, and a worrisome restructuring
of society. With increasing and troubling frequency, software hides the full truth
in order to control or manipulate us.” 310 Ohm argues that regulators should mandate “forthrightness from our code,” that “would impose an affirmative obligation to warn rather than a passive obligation to inform.” 311 According to Ohm:
A forthright company will anticipate what a consumer does not understand because of cognitive biases, information overload, or other
mechanisms that interfere with information comprehension, and will
be obligated to communicate important information in a way that
overcomes these barriers. . . .
We could begin to assess not only what a company said but also
what a company concealed. It might become illegal to exploit a user’s
known biases and vulnerabilities. 312
Such arguments are consistent with the call for honesty as a foundational element of trust that we call for here, as in other work.
3. Protection
It seems that a major company suffers a major data breach almost every
week. These are, among other things, data security failures. Almost all FIPsbased regimes have data security obligations, with language usually along the
lines of “[p]ersonal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards
against such risks as loss or unauthorised access, destruction, use, modification
or disclosure of data.” 313 As we have explained elsewhere, “[p]olicymakers have
tended to interpret security requirements in terms of the process data holders
must take to protect against attackers. This mainly consists of regularly auditing
data assets and risk, minimizing data, implementing technical, physical, and administrative safeguards, and creating and following a data breach response
plan.” 314 But if we want to be serious about safeguarding trust, more entities
need to be responsible for security, while the law must recognize broader theories of harm, such as increased risk and anxiety and the costs of reasonable pre-

Paul Ohm, Forthright Code, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 471, 472 (2018).
Id. at 472–73.
312
Id. at 473.
313
See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., supra note 54, at 15 (containing the “security
safeguards principle,” part of the OECD’s 2013 Privacy Framework that was based on the FIPs).
314
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 8, at 465–66 (footnotes omitted).
310
311
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ventative measures. 315 Trust violations resulting from a failure to protect users
carry with them the right for those harmed users to bring suit against the entrustees who have failed them.
4. Loyalty
Above all, humans trusting entities with their personal data should be able
to demand loyalty from those entrustees. The duty of loyalty is a hallmark of
fiduciary relationships that requires a strict commitment to refrain from selfdealing and a firm prioritization of the trustors’ interests over the interests of the
entrustee. 316 Although trust rules for data collectors can be modeled on such firm
duties of loyalty, they need not be so uniformly robust. 317 In this respect we depart from some readings of the information fiduciaries movement.318 Lawmakers
might consider imposing a duty of reasonable loyalty on data collectors that
would restrict only unreasonable self-dealing. Alternatively, lawmakers could
create rules and frameworks targeted at specific kinds of activities that are, in
practice, disloyal. That is, those practices that serve the interests of the entrustee
at the expense of the trusting and vulnerable party.
A good example of disloyal behavior by trusted companies are so-called
“dark patterns” in software user interfaces. 319 Dark patterns are “user interfaces
whose designers knowingly confuse users, make it difficult for users to express
their actual preferences, or manipulate users into taking certain actions.”320
Common examples include unnecessary multiple checkboxes and extra clicks
required to unsubscribe from marketing emails; prominently featured “I
AGREE” buttons placed next to small, hidden, and blended-in “no thanks” buttons; and options to decline framed in such a way as to shame the user into
agreeing to certain proposals (“no thanks, I hate free stuff!”), a practice known
as “confirmshaming.” 321 Such acts are disloyal because they are intentional attempts to use both design and the insights of behavioral economics to privilege a
315
See Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 739 (2018) (arguing that courts in data breach cases have focused too
heavily on a narrow conception of harm that does not include risk and anxiety to the plaintiffs, even in
cases where defendants’ fault is clear).
316
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 8, at 468.
317
See id. at 458 (recognizing that imposing full fiduciary duties onto information relationships
could be “burdensome”).
318
See id. (suggesting that it is a mistake to believe that legal rules must either choose to protect
data subjects with fiduciaries or choose not to protect them at all).
319
See DARK PATTERNS, supra note 241 (describing dark patterns as “tricks used in websites and
apps that make [people] do things that [they] didn’t mean to”).
320
Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 235, at 3.
321
Id. at 6–9; see TYPES OF DARK PATTERN, https://www.darkpatterns.org/types-of-dark-pattern
[https://perma.cc/57AW-QCMH] (discussing “confirmshaming”).
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company’s interests in data collection and attention harvesting over the user’s
autonomy and privacy interests.
Lawmakers could discourage disloyal behavior several different ways. For
example, Congress could modify Section 5 of the FTC Act to include a prohibition against abusive trade practices. The notion of abusive design already exists
elsewhere in consumer protection law, most prominently from the relatively new
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. 322 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act authorized the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection to prohibit any “abusive” act or practice that:
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a
term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of—
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service;
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or service;
or
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to
act in the interests of the consumer. 323
This language squarely targets practices that elevate a company’s financial interests over the interests of a vulnerable trustor and adversely affects the trusting
party.
Lawmakers could also create legislation that targets dark patterns; indeed,
several already have. The proposed DETOUR Act, introduced by Senators
Warner and Fischer, would make it unlawful for any large online operator:
(A) to design, modify, or manipulate a user interface with the purpose
or substantial effect of obscuring, subverting, or impairing user autonomy, decision-making, or choice to obtain consent or user data;
(B) to subdivide or segment consumers of online services into groups
for the purposes of behavioral or psychological experiments or studies, except with the informed consent of each user involved; or (C) to
design, modify, or manipulate a user interface on a website or online
service, or portion thereof, that is directed to an individual under the
age of 13, with the purpose or substantial effect of cultivating comSee 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (2018) (defining abusive practices “in connection with the provision
of a consumer financial product or service”); see also id. § 5491(a) (establishing the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection to “regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial products or
services under the Federal consumer financial laws”).
323
Id. § 5531(d) (emphasis added).
322
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pulsive usage, including video auto-play functions initiated without
the consent of a user. 324
Senator Hawley has also introduced a similar piece of legislation prohibiting
manipulative design aimed at children and video game players. 325 Senator
Schatz’s Data Care Act, in addition to a duty of care and a duty of confidentiality, would impose an explicit duty of loyalty on data collectors. 326 The duty of
loyalty in the act would require that:
An online service provider may not use individual identifying data, or
data derived from individual identifying data, in any way that—(A)
will benefit the online service provider to the detriment of an end user; and (B) (i) will result in reasonably foreseeable and material physical or financial harm to an end user; or (ii) would be unexpected and
highly offensive to a reasonable end user. 327
C. Informational
As we explained in Part II, despite being incomplete, the data protection
approach embodied in the GDPR has many virtues. 328 Many of its limitations
would be eliminated by a comprehensive strategy of the sort we are calling for
here. As part of such a strategy, U.S. privacy law should build upon the wisdom
of the GDPR, which facilitates fair data processing with a greater willingness to
prohibit certain problematic kinds of collection and processing outright.329 Data
subject rights, procedural requirements like data protection and algorithmic impact assessments, and structural requirements, such as requiring a data protection
officer, should be incorporated into U.S. data protection law in ways similar to
Deceptive Experiences to Online Users Reduction Act, S. 1084, 116th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (2019).
Press Release, Josh Hawley, U.S. Senator for Mo., Senator Hawley to Introduce Legislation
Banning Manipulative Video Game Features Aimed at Children (May 8, 2019), https://www.hawley.
senate.gov/senator-hawley-introduce-legislation-banning-manipulative-video-game-features-aimedchildren [https://perma.cc/CKY4-LMPK].
326
Press Release, Brian Schatz, U.S. Senator for Haw., Schatz Leads Group of 15 Senators in
Introducing New Bill to Help Protect People’s Personal Data Online (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.
schatz.senate.gov/press-releases/schatz-leads-group-of-15-senators-in-introducing-new-bill-to-helpprotect-peoples-personal-data-online [https://perma.cc/VTQ4-6V5Z]. We must disclose at this point
that this bill was in part influenced by our other academic work, and we consulted with Capitol Hill
staff before this bill was enrolled.
327
Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744; see also Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, It’s Time to Try
Something Different on Internet Privacy, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/its-time-to-try-something-different-on-internet-privacy/2018/12/20/bc1d71c0-031511e9-9122-82e98f91ee6f_story.html [https://perma.cc/NAG8-WA8S] (discussing Senator Schatz’s
bill and its proposed duty of loyalty).
328
See supra notes 137–159 and accompanying text.
329
See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 2, at 76 (laying out the four criteria that must be met under the
GDPR before data collectors may legally process data).
324
325
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the GDPR (making appropriate allowances for American free speech and standing doctrines). 330 A strong data protection framework may not be sufficient to
regulate the digital economy, but it is necessary.
Lawmakers might improve upon the conventional wisdom regarding data
protection in several different ways. First, they can get serious about limiting
collection in the first place. 331 Some scholars have argued that since the internet’s creation, the restrictions on data collection are equally (and sometimes
more) important than rules surrounding data use. 332 Data that does not exist cannot be exposed, shared, breached, or misused. FIPs-based data protection regimes are resistant to outright and inflexible collection limits because the FIPs
are designed to facilitate, not restrict processing. The FIPs, after all, usually cash
out in procedural rather than substantive rights. But data distributes power to
collectors. Limiting collection could help restore balance. Pointedly, though, if
lawmakers are to meaningfully limit collection, they will have to accept and be
clear about the financial costs of so doing, and prepare to make the case that
such costs are necessary for the kind of innovation that is both sustainable and
actually advances human values and human flourishing. 333
Lawmakers could also consider more rigid mandatory deletion requirements instead of flexible, context-sensitive ones. In harmony with the spirit of
deletion, lawmakers committed to privacy should also ignore calls for mandatory
data retention periods, a practice that Europe finds constitutionally repugnant on
330
See id. at 85–89 (noting the data subject rights, data protection requirements, and obligation
for corporations to have data protection officers, all contained within the GDPR).
331
See id. at 76 (stating that data collection and processing are almost always allowed under U.S.
laws).
332
See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is for, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1919 (2013) (decrying “unfettered information collection and processing”); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1538–39 (2000) (criticizing privacy laws that have relatively strong rules
regarding data use but still allow too much data collection); Bruce Schneier, Helen Nissenbaum on
Regulating Data Collection and Use, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Apr. 20, 2016, 6:27 AM), https://
www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/04/helen_nissenbau.html [https://perma.cc/8SGU-ZJ4E] (discussing a proposal to continue to focus on collection regulation).
333
The work of Julie Cohen is instructive on this point. Cohen wrote:

[T]here is reason to worry when privacy is squeezed to the margins and when the pathways of serendipity are disrupted and rearranged to serve more linear, commercial imperatives. Environments that disfavor critical independence of mind and that discourage
the kinds of tinkering and behavioral variation out of which innovation emerges will,
over time, predictably and systematically disfavor innovation of all types. Environments designed to promote consumptive and profit-maximizing choices will systematically disfavor innovations designed to promote other values. The modulated society is
dedicated to prediction but not necessarily to understanding or to advancing human material, intellectual, and political well-being. Data processing offers important benefits,
but so does privacy. A healthy society needs both.
Cohen, supra note 332, at 1927.
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multiple grounds. 334 Finally, lawmakers could create rules and duties that respect
the value of data obscurity. Obscurity exists when it is hard to find or understand
data about people (compare, for example, a library card catalog to a Google
search), and obscure data is relatively safe. 335 We rely upon our obscurity every
day when making choices about how much, when, and where we expose ourselves. For example, you might purchase sensitive or embarrassing products
with cash in a publicly accessible drug store where anyone can see you, but the
likelihood of anyone noticing or tracking you is quite low. Obscurity such as this
has been a natural feature of human life that we have relied upon since time immemorial, but one that the law too rarely takes into consideration.
Lawmakers seeking a holistic approach to privacy should create rules that
help create and protect our obscurity and our ability to manage it. The practice of
deidentification of data has long been a feature of privacy law, and although
deidentification is rarely perfect, it is often adequately obscure to do the work
required of it. 336 This could take the form of design rules that prevent obscurity
lurches (like unilaterally changing people’s privacy settings on social networks
to maximum exposure) or it might consist of outright bans on uniquely dangerous technologies like facial recognition tools. The cities of San Francisco and
Oakland in California and Somerville in Massachusetts, for example, have recently passed legislation banning government use of facial recognition.337 And as
more of our immutable genetic data is sequenced by physicians and direct-toconsumer genomic testing companies, we should seriously consider obscurity
protections for such data before we inadvertently create a national genetic database ripe for abuse.

See Joined Cases C‑293/12 & C‑594/12, Dig. Rights Ir. Ltd. v. Minister, 2014 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 238, ¶ 69 (Apr. 8, 2014) (finding that data retention requirements placed in publicly
available electronic communications services violate Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union).
335
Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Surveillance as Loss of Obscurity, 72 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1343, 1358 (2015); see, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 44 (2013) (claiming that “[o]nline information that is not searchable,
accessible, or understandable poses less of a threat to a user’s privacy”); see also Woodrow Hartzog &
Frederic Stutzman, Obscurity by Design, 88 WASH. L. REV. 385, 397 (2013) (calling for methods of
obscurity to be built into online social interactions so that users can protect their own privacy).
336
See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1735 (2010) (showing how recent developments making reidentification easier have made deidentification efforts less effective).
337
Charlie Osborne, Oakland Follows San Francisco’s Lead in Banning Facial Recognition
Tech, ZDNET (July 19, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/oakland-city-follows-san-franciscoslead-in-banning-facial-recognition-tech/ [https://perma.cc/DBJ6-3MB5]; Sarah Wu, Somerville City
Council Passes Facial Recognition Ban, BOS. GLOBE (June 27, 2019), https://www.bostonglobe.com/
metro/2019/06/27/somerville-city-council-passes-facial-recognition-ban/SfaqQ7mG3DGulXonBHS
CYK/story.html [https://perma.cc/Y2GC-E4JX].
334
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D. External
Industry’s appetite for data does not just affect our autonomy, dignity, and
privacy. The personal data industrial complex also imposes significant externalities onto society and our environment that have little to do with data, information
relationships, or corporate matters. If our privacy and human information
framework is to be complete, lawmakers must also deal with personal data externalities in this constitutional moment. They vividly illustrate how the European data protection approach rooted in the FIPs cannot possibly address the full
range of problems caused by data collection and processing.
To be clear, we are not arguing that lawmakers need to tackle all privacy,
democracy, and environmental sustainability issues within one omnibus law.
Such matters are far too vast, complex, and important to be handled within one
framework. This is precisely why we are suggesting here that a legislative approach to regulating the digital economy will be incomplete unless it contemplates and attempts to reasonably mitigate the costs imposed by industry’s appetite for personal data. This might involve creating rules that require companies to
consider these externalities in their decision-making processes or for regulators
and judges to consider these externalities when adjudicating issues of responsibility, fault, foreseeability, and harm. But it could also involve a series of concurrent initiatives that modify existing rules (inside and outside traditional privacy
law) and perhaps entirely new laws that may or may not be tethered to privacy
regulatory regimes.
1. Environmental Protection
From an existential perspective, protecting the environment is as important
as any other goal of privacy law. Civil society cannot exist without a safe and
sustainable environment. For all of its talk of the virtues of innovation, Silicon
Valley is producing technologies that are ravaging our planet at an unprecedented rate. 338 Researchers have hypothesized that training a single AI model can
emit as much carbon as five cars over their entire lifetimes. 339 Tech companies’
strategy of “planned obsolescence”—creating phones and computers that expire
after a few years in order to get us to buy more phones and computers—is deSee supra note 191 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Karen Hao, Training a Single AI Model Can Emit as Much Carbon as Five Cars in
Their Lifetimes, MIT TECH. REV. (June 6, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613630/traininga-single-ai-model-can-emit-as-much-carbon-as-five-cars-in-their-lifetimes/ [https://perma.cc/8DMWA97F]; see also James Temple, Bitcoin Mining May Be Pumping Out as Much CO2 Per Year as Kansas City, MIT TECH. REV. (June 12, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613658/bitcoinmining-may-be-pumping-out-as-much-cosub2-sub-per-year-as-kansas-city/ [https://perma.cc/R3TFKW4C] (documenting further deleterious effects of technology on the environment).
338
339
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pleting our metal reserves and creating massive amounts of electronic waste.340
Many people just throw their tech in the trash, or export it to create mountains of
waste in the developing world. This waste is a direct and foreseeable consequence of the importance of technologies fueled by industry’s desire for information.
Again, to be clear, we are not arguing that environmental law is part of privacy law and should be swallowed up by it. Rather, we are arguing that rules that
protect our privacy also protect our environment, adding justification to these
rules. Thinking too narrowly about privacy means we fail to appreciate the true
nature and scale of the problems created by our digital transformation. These
problems cannot be solved discretely, but must be solved holistically.
2. Mental Health
Our phones and computers are designed to be addictive. 341 That is because
tech companies have powerful financial incentives to make sure you never put
down your phone or log off your computer. The data spigot must keep flowing.
Shoshana Zuboff calls this phenomenon “surveillance capitalism,” and it is ruining us. 342 Our addiction to technology is harming our mental well-being, our
social relationships, and even the very nature of what it means to be a human in
our modern world. 343
In an insightful piece, Nellie Bowles has noted how the proliferation of
screens has turned human contact into a luxury good. Bowles explains:
Life for anyone but the very rich—the physical experience of learning, living and dying—is increasingly mediated by screens. Not only
are screens themselves cheap to make, but they also make things
340
Julianne Tveten, Who Will Clean Up Silicon Valley’s E-Wasteland?, FAST COMPANY (July 24,
2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40443695/who-will-clean-up-silicon-valleys-e-wasteland [https://
perma.cc/JF25-ZJ75].
341
See, e.g., NIR EYAL & RYAN HOOVER, HOOKED: HOW TO BUILD HABIT-FORMING PRODUCTS
2–3 (2014); Tristan Harris, How Technology Is Hijacking Your Mind from a Magician and Google
Design Ethicist, MEDIUM (May 18, 2016), https://medium.com/thrive-global/how-technology-hijackspeoples-minds-from-a-magician-and-google-s-design-ethicist-56d62ef5edf3 [https://perma.cc/LEG8UAMC].
342
See ZUBOFF, supra note 186, at 9 (defining “surveillance capitalism” in highly pejorative
terms).
343
See, e.g., CARR, supra note 184, at 63, 181–82 (describing “an erosion of skills, a dulling of
perceptions, and a slowing of reactions” as a result of human dependence on machines, as well as
social media’s degradation of social relationships); CARR, supra note 190, at 16 (suggesting the internet is changing humans to be more machine-like); FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 185, at 10
(warning that technology has caused less developed memory, social relationships, and abilities to
make decisions); SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER: WHY WE EXPECT MORE FROM TECHNOLOGY
AND LESS FROM EACH OTHER 35–36 (2011) (documenting how machines replace people and social
interactions between them).
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cheaper. Any place that can fit a screen in (classrooms, hospitals, airports, restaurants) can cut costs. And any activity that can happen on a
screen becomes cheaper. The texture of life, the tactile experience, is
becoming smooth glass. 344
The problem is that to break our addiction, we have to have the means and capacity to do so. It is very difficult to rely upon simple willpower. 345 Bowles illustrates this point by explaining:
The rich do not live like this. The rich have grown afraid of screens.
They want their children to play with blocks, and tech-free private
schools are booming. Humans are more expensive, and rich people
are willing and able to pay for them. Conspicuous human interaction—living without a phone for a day, quitting social networks and
not answering email—has become a status symbol. 346
All this means that any comprehensive approach to privacy must also reckon
with how industry’s insatiable appetite for data contributed to the corrosion of
our mental wellness and social fabric and created a new dimension to the longrecognized “digital divide” between rich and poor. 347 One start might be to target
the manipulative tech designs that are meant to draw people in, similar to the
legislation proposed by Senator Hawley. 348 Perhaps tech companies could be
required to be loyal to users in a way that was mindful of mitigating harmful
addictive behaviors and a more holistic view of users’ well-being. Legislation
could also include support and educational initiatives and mandates regarding
healthy and limited engagement with screens and devices as well as targeting
business models and the incentives companies have in the first place to extract
every bit of personal information they can from every user. But any serious and

344
Nellie Bowles, Human Contact Is Now a Luxury Good, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/03/23/sunday-review/human-contact-luxury-screens.html [https://perma.cc/
86L4-3RL8].
345
See Jia Tolentino, What It Takes to Put Your Phone Away, NEW YORKER (Apr. 22, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/04/29/what-it-takes-to-put-your-phone-away [https://
perma.cc/A8ZT-63HF] (suggesting that a lifestyle change, rather than mere willpower, is necessary to
keep technologies from dominating our lives).
346
Bowles, supra note 344.
347
See, e.g., Jakob Nielsen, Digital Divide: The 3 Stages, NIELSEN NORMAN GROUP (Nov. 19,
2006), https://www.nngroup.com/articles/digital-divide-the-three-stages/ [https://perma.cc/HU5LDZS9] (discussing the “digital divide” between those who can afford technology and those who cannot, those who know how to use it and those who do not, and those who are empowered to take advantage of it and those who are not). Individuals who are unable to or unsure of how to fully utilize
technology “remain at the mercy of other people’s decisions.” Id.
348
See Press Release, supra note 325 (announcing a bill to curb addictive design of children’s
video games).
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comprehensive approach to dealing with problems of privacy or the personal
information industrial complex must consider mental health.
3. Digital Civil Rights
The internet makes speaking easy and anonymous. And in their quest for
more data and greater interactions, social media platforms have sought to make
it entirely “frictionless”: so easy and costless we share intuitively and with almost no reflection. 349 And when speech becomes costless and consequence-free
through anonymity, then harassment, bile, and abuse follow, largely against
women, people of color, and other marginalized and vulnerable populations.
This means that any holistic and layered approach must also reckon with the fact
that when platforms optimize their data spigots by making interaction cost- and
consequence-free, they facilitate harassment and abuse in ways that jeopardize
what Danielle Citron has called our “cyber civil rights.” 350
Data-driven companies also threaten peoples’ due process rights as algorithms make decisions about people’s health, finances, jobs, ability to travel, and
other essential life activities. Citron has argued for a “technological due process”
that is ensured in these systems. 351 The modern discourse around this topic has
centered around algorithmic fairness, transparency, and accountability. Any approach to data privacy that does not incorporate algorithmic accountability will
be incomplete. Some early attempts at this kind of regulation have already been
made. As Margot Kaminski and Andrew Selbst wrote, “[t]he bill, called the Algorithmic Accountability Act and introduced last month by Senator Ron Wyden,
Senator Cory Booker and Representative Yvette D. Clarke, is a good start, but it
may not be robust enough to hold tech companies accountable.”352 According to
Kaminski and Selbst:

349
See, e.g., Richards, supra note 185, at 691 (discussing “frictionless sharing” and social media’s capacity to allow users to automatically share virtually all of their activities online); see also
William McGeveran, The Law of Friction, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 15, 15–16 (same).
350
See CITRON, supra note 299, at 56–72 (explaining the ways in which the internet promotes
cyber-harassment and abuse, including the ease with which information is spread); Danielle Keats
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 65–66 (2009) (arguing that a majority of online harassment and attacks are aimed at women, racial and religious minorities, and gays and lesbians, in
violation of their civil rights); see also Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Increasing the Transaction Costs for Harassment, 95 B.U. L. REV. ANNEX 47, 47–51 (2015), http://www.bu.edu/bulaw
review/files/2015/11/HARTZOG.pdf [https://perma.cc/AYB2-VEJT] (arguing that online harassment
and abuse is simply too easy and that companies should take steps to increase transaction costs for
communicating online).
351
Danielle Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1258 (2007).
352
Margot E. Kaminski & Andrew D. Selbst, The Legislation That Targets the Racist Impacts of
Tech, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/opinion/tech-racism-algorithms.
html [https://perma.cc/8SWL-Z9Y5].
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The proposed bill would be a significant step forward toward ensuring
that algorithms are fair and nondiscriminatory. It requires certain
businesses that use “high-risk automated decision systems” (such as
those that predict a person’s work performance, financial situation, or
health) to conduct algorithmic impact assessments. This means they
must, as Mr. Booker put it, “regularly evaluate their tools for accuracy, fairness, bias and discrimination.” 353
Nevertheless, the scholars argue the bill is lacking in enforcement provisions,
missing meaningful public input, and does not mandate enough transparency to
the public. 354
4. Democracy
When the internet entered the public consciousness in the mid-1990s, it was
touted as promising revolutionary empowerment of citizens and a new, more
responsive democracy. Two decades later, we can see that some of those revolutionary promises were naïve at best. Digital technologies have certainly improved some dimensions of our democracy, but they have threatened others.355
Although digital communications technologies have enabled anyone with access
to the internet to speak directly to the world, they have also enabled new forms
of electoral interference, voter suppression, and demagoguery. 356 Personal data
can be used to drive friendly voters to the polls, to nudge unfriendly ones to stay
home, or to influence voters in others ways, whether by the Obama campaign’s
data scientists in 2012, or by Cambridge Analytica to influence the outcome of
the Brexit Referendum and the 2016 Presidential Election. 357 Naturally, this is a
complex problem, and important First, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment
considerations come into play when discussing electoral regulation. As we comprehensively confront the costs as well as the benefits of largely unregulated innovation around the exploitation of personal data, we must, however, always
353

Id.
Id.
355
See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 259–62 (2018) (arguing that the internet can boost political accountability as well as help citizens
to learn information and absorb a wide variety of political opinions, but that it also can brew polarization and easily spread fake information).
356
See Danielle Keats Citron & Neil M. Richards, Four Principles for Digital Expression (You
Won’t Believe #3!), 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1376–77 (2018) (discussing how the internet and
social media allowed for foreign money and fake news to have an impact on the 2016 U.S. presidential election).
357
See Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393,
428 (2014) (discussing the Obama campaign’s use of big data to help in its fundraising and get-outthe-vote activities in 2012); Lapowsky, supra note 93 (documenting the role of Cambridge Analytica
in the 2016 U.S. presidential election).
354
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consider the risks and costs those technologies have imposed on our democratic
practices and structures and seek to mitigate them in a way that is consistent with
our constitutional traditions of democratic and republican self-government. 358
This is why we conceive of the four privacy law dynamics (corporal, relational, informational, and external) as overlapping. Rules can affect multiple dynamics at the same time and one dynamic can be used to help justify rules focused on another. If privacy is important because it is necessary for human flourishing, our privacy-relevant rules should include a conceptualization for human
flourishing that goes beyond autonomy and dignity derived from control over
data and includes mental and social well-being as we interact and expose ourselves and our information to the world.
CONCLUSION
Privacy’s constitutional moment is upon us, which means the legal, technical, and social structures governing the processing of human information are
up for grabs. There is no avoiding the decision facing our society and our regulators; for the reasons we have explained in this Article, even a decision to do
nothing at that national level will be consequential. In facing this constitutional
moment, we must choose wisely as a society, but we fear that both the default
option of GDPR-lite through national inaction but state action and the easy option of GDPR-lite through national action would be a mistake. America needs
more than a watered-down version of the GDPR. In fact, it needs more than
what all the existing models of data protection can give on their own. The advent
of the constitutional moment means that right now the window is open for Congress to claim its identity. But it will not be open for much longer. We argue that
a comprehensive model is the best path forward. This would include fundamental elements of data protection, such as default prohibitions on data processing
and data subject rights, but it would not purely be defined by the limited data
protection model. Instead, the comprehensive model could incorporate relational
rules built around loyalty and care, and could be more layered and compartmentalized so that certain kinds of practices would be prohibited outright. The
comprehensive model would address data externalities and not consider data
processing to be an eternally virtuous goal.
To be sure, the comprehensive model we call for here is less refined, less
compatible with international regimes, and less certain than the off-the-shelf default option of watered-down European-style data protection. But the comprehensive model responds to the problems at hand with tools that American lawCf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 355, at 258–59 (arguing that the United States must figure out how
to regulate speech—and by extension, the availability of information to the public while still maintaining its commitment to free expression and democratic self-government).
358
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makers, regulators, and courts have regularly used. At the dawn of the industrial
revolution, we had no idea what negligence, products liability, environmental
protection, unfair and deceptive trade practices, or workplace safety was either.
We will need to develop new and analogous but similarly imaginative and responsive concepts for the information age. We have bodies of doctrine, principles, and factors to guide us. As we confront privacy’s constitutional moment,
America’s privacy policy should reflect that protecting privacy requires more
than just protecting data. We need to protect people as well.

A DUTY OF LOYALTY
FOR PRIVACY LAW
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ABSTRACT
Data privacy law fails to stop companies from engaging in self-serving,
opportunistic behavior at the expense of those who trust them with their
data. This is a problem. Modern tech companies are so entrenched in our
lives and have so much control over what we see and click that the selfdealing exploitation of people has become a major element of the internet’s
business model.
Academics and policymakers have recently proposed a possible
solution: require those entrusted with people’s data and online experiences
to be loyal to those who trust them. But many have concerns about a duty of
loyalty. What, exactly, would such a duty of loyalty require? What are the
goals and limits of such a duty? Should loyalty mean obedience or a pledge
to make decisions in people’s best interests? What would the substance of
the rules implementing the duty look like? And what would its limits be?
This Article suggests a duty of loyalty for personal information that
answers these objections and represents a promising way forward for
privacy law. We offer a theory of loyalty based upon the risks of digital
opportunism in information relationships that draws upon existing—and in
some cases ancient—precedent in other areas of American law. Data
collectors bound by this duty of loyalty would be obligated to act in the best
interests of people exposing their data and online experiences, up to the
extent of their exposure. They would be prohibited from designing digital
tools and processing data in a way that conflicts with trusting parties’ best
interests. We explain how such a duty could be used to set rebuttable
presumptions of disloyal activity and to act as an interpretive guide for
other duties. And we answer a series of objections to our proposed duty,
including that it would be vague, be too narrow, entrench surveillance
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capitalism, create a problem of conflicting duties, and spell the end of
surveillance-based “targeted advertising.” The duty of loyalty we envision
would certainly be a revolution in data privacy law. But that is exactly what
is needed to break the cycle of self-dealing and manipulation ingrained in
both the current internet and our society as a whole. This Article offers one
pathway for us to get there.
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INTRODUCTION
It wasn’t supposed to be like this. When the internet emerged in the mid1990s, it was heralded as an unprecedented technology of human
empowerment, creating a place where human beings could meet, learn, and
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express themselves, transforming our society for the better.1 It was also
hailed as a realm of privacy, in which those empowered humans could read,
connect, and communicate on their own terms, safely cocooned in bubbles
of anonymity where, as the famous New Yorker cartoon put it, “no one
knows you are a dog.”2
Of course, a quarter of a century on, it hasn’t quite worked out that way.
The internet of the 2020s certainly provides many helpful services, but it
has also become the greatest assemblage of corporate and government
surveillance in human history. The internet allows unprecedented
expression, but it is also plagued by hate speech, misinformation, and
electoral manipulation. And where the internet promised human
empowerment, all too often the tools of data science and behavioral science
have been used to nudge behavior and to manufacture consent to boilerplate
terms that no one reads. Far too frequently, corporate promises of
empowerment have instead delivered manipulation, disempowerment, and
distrust.3
This paper offers and examines one potential solution to some of these
problems: imposing a duty of loyalty on companies that collect and process
human information. Duties of loyalty are used in other areas of law as
obligations to refrain from self-dealing. They are typically placed on trusted
parties such as lawyers and other professionals, agents, guardians, and
corporate directors.4 But they have not yet been imposed as part of privacy
law. In articles in 2016 and 2017, we suggested that loyalty is the key
component in generating trust in modern “information relationships,” ones
in which human information changes hands, often as part of the delivery of
a service such as search engine results.5 Other scholars have proposed

1.
See generally FRED TURNER, FROM COUNTERCULTURE TO CYBERCULTURE (2006).
2.
See Michael Canva, ‘NOBODY KNOWS YOU’RE A DOG’: As Iconic Internet Cartoon Turns
20, Creator Peter Steiner Knows the Joke Rings as Relevant as Ever, WASH. POST (July 31, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/comic-riffs/post/nobody-knows-youre-a-dog-as-iconicinternet-cartoon-turns-20-creator-peter-steiner-knows-the-joke-rings-as-relevant-asever/2013/07/31/73372600-f98d-11e2-8e84-c56731a202fb_blog.html [https://perma.cc/GE7T-P2A4].
3.
See JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 89 (2019); SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE
CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019); MARGARET
JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012);
YOCHAI BENKLER, ROBERT FARIS & HAL ROBERTS, NETWORK PROPAGANDA (2018); DANIELLE KEATS
CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014).
4.
See generally The OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 796 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B.
Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019) [hereinafter THE OXFORD HANDBOOK].
5.
Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 431, 451–56 (2016) [hereinafter Taking Trust Seriously]; Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog,
Privacy’s Trust Gap: A Review, 126 YALE L.J. 1180, 1185 (2017) [hereinafter Privacy’s Trust Gap].
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treating data collectors as “information fiduciaries.”6 This academic work
has influenced lawmakers to the extent that a duty of loyalty has now
become a serious option for national privacy reform. Leading federal
privacy bills pending before Congress from both parties include proposed
duties of loyalty, though they vary significantly in scope, specificity, and
justification.7
All this work is both promising and important, but it fails to answer one
critical question: what, exactly, would a duty of loyalty in privacy law
require from those entrusted with our personal information? This is a

6.
See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1183, 1186 (2016); Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies
Trustworthy,
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
3,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346/
[https://perma.cc/AF89-PM2M]; Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 5, at 457; Privacy’s Trust Gap,
supra note 5, at 1198; Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, Trusting Big Data Research, 66 DEPAUL L.
REV. 579, 582 (2017); ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN
INFORMATION AGE 8 (2018); Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy As Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a
Networked World, 69 U. MIA. L. REV. 559, 591 (2015); Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust:
The Facebook Study, 67 CASE W. RSRV. U. L. REV. 193, 193 (2016); Christopher W. Savage, Managing
the Ambient Trust Commons: The Economics of Online Consumer Information Privacy, 22 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 95, 113 (2019); Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 339–40
(2014); Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information
Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (2019); Ariel Dobkin, Information Fiduciaries in
Practice: Data Privacy and User Expectations, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 1 (2018); Cameron F. Kerry,
Why Protecting Privacy Is a Losing Game Today—and How to Change the Game, BROOKINGS (July 12,
2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-protecting-privacy-is-a-losing-game-today-and-howto-change-the-game/ [https://perma.cc/2V6T-DPDY]; Ian Kerr, The Legal Relationship Between Online
Service Providers and Users, 35 CAN. BUS. L.J. 419, 446 (2001); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL
PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 102–04 (2006); Richard S. Whitt, Old
School Goes Online: Exploring Fiduciary Obligations of Loyalty and Care in the Digital Platforms Era,
36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 75, 75 (2019); Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment
Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 611–12 (2015); Lauren Henry Scholz, Fiduciary Boilerplate:
Locating Fiduciary Relationships in Information Age Consumer Transactions, J. CORP. L. 144, 144
(2020). But see Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133
HARV. L. REV. 497, 498 (2019).
7.
See Data Care Act of 2019, S. 2961, 116th Cong. § 3(b)(2) (2019) (“Duty of Loyalty.—An
online service provider may not use individual identifying data, or data derived from individual
identifying data, in any way that—(A) will benefit the online service provider to the detriment of an end
user; and (B)(i) will result in reasonably foreseeable and material physical or financial harm to an end
user; or (ii) would be unexpected and highly offensive to a reasonable end user.”); Consumer Online
Privacy Rights Act, S. 2968, 116th Cong. § 101 (2019) (“Duty of Loyalty: (a) In General.—A covered
entity shall not—(1) engage in a deceptive data practice or a harmful data practice; or (2) process or
transfer covered data in a manner that violates any provision of this Act”); New York Privacy Act, S.
5642, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (“Every legal entity, or any affiliate of such entity, and every controller
and data broker, which collects, sells or licenses personal information of consumers, shall exercise the
duty of care, loyalty and confidentiality expected of a fiduciary with respect to securing the personal
data of a consumer against a privacy risk; and shall act in the best interests of the consumer, without
regard to the interests of the entity, controller or data broker, in a manner expected by a reasonable
consumer under the circumstances.”); SAFE DATA Act, S. 4626, 116th Cong. tit. II (including a host
of loyalty-like specific protections, including provisions for algorithmic bias detection, data broker
registration, filter bubble transparency, and, critically, abusive trade practices stemming from
manipulative interface design).
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crucially important question because without a sense of what a duty of
loyalty would require, it will be impossible to evaluate whether one is a
good idea, much less to implement a duty of loyalty in privacy law. To date,
no scholarship has sufficiently answered this question—a question with
challenging descriptive and normative dimensions. Thus, any account of a
duty of loyalty must offer normative reasons for having the duty in the first
place, specifying the values served by imposing such a duty of loyalty on
companies in the context of what we have elsewhere called “information
relationships.”8
Lawmakers imposing a duty of loyalty must also make a separate
normative decision about how robust these rules should be. Traditional
fiduciary duties can be very demanding. Duties of this kind would offer
maximum protection to data subjects in information relationships. But they
could also make a company’s ability to collect and use that data quite costly,
particularly at scale. It is possible to imagine other kinds of loyalty duties
that are simultaneously substantial but also less demanding than a full
fiduciary obligation. This raises the question of whether robust fiduciary
duties should apply to all data collectors or only the most powerful ones.
How might the duty of loyalty be crafted to balance the well-being of people
and the benefits of safe and sustainable information exchanges?
A satisfying account of duty of loyalty must also describe the boundaries
of what the duty covers. For descriptive help, some lessons can be drawn
from both the existing law of fiduciaries and the other relationships of trust
that compel a duty of loyalty. But the relationship between people and their
doctors, guardians, and financial advisors is quite different from the
relationships between people and Facebook, Google, and TikTok.9
In this Article, we propose a duty of loyalty for privacy law that answers
each of these normative and descriptive questions. We offer a theory based
on the risks of opportunism that arise when people trust others with their
personal information and online experiences. Put simply, under our
approach, loyalty would manifest itself primarily as a prohibition on
designing digital tools and processing data in a way that conflicts with a
trusting party’s best interests. Data collectors bound by such a duty of
loyalty would be obligated to act in the best interests of the people exposing
their data and engaging in online experiences, but only to the extent of their
exposure.
Our basic claim is simple: a duty of loyalty framed in terms of the best
interests of digital consumers is coherent and desirable and should become
8.
For example, like those between technology companies such as social networks, cloud
providers, and platforms. See Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 5, at 433.
9.
Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 498; see also Claudia Haupt, Platforms As Trustees:
Information Fiduciaries and the Value of Analogy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 34, 35 (2020).
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a basic element of U.S. data privacy law. Such a duty of loyalty would
compel loyal acts and also constrain conflicted, self-dealing behavior by
companies. It would shift the default legal presumptions surrounding a
number of common design and data processing practices. It would also act
as an interpretive guide for government actors and data collectors to resolve
ambiguities inherent in other privacy rules. A duty of loyalty, in effect,
would enliven almost the entire patchwork of U.S. data privacy laws. And
it would do it in a way that is consistent with U.S. free expression goals and
other civil liberties. A duty of loyalty along the lines we suggest might seem
like a radical step for American privacy law, but we think it would be a
necessary and important one if our digital transformation is to live up to its
great but unfulfilled promises of human well-being and flourishing.
Our Article proceeds in five parts. Part I briefly describes the problem.
We explain how the failures of American privacy law have enabled
corporate opportunism and manipulation of consumers using human
information. This has been a particular problem in the context of
“personalized” technologies that promise to know us so that they can better
satisfy our needs and wants. Insufficiently constrained by the law,
companies can deploy a potent cocktail of techniques derived from
cognitive and behavioral science to “nudge” or otherwise influence the
choices we make. But these highly capitalized tech companies have not
acted like the benevolent “choice architects”10 some had hoped they might
become. Technologies—and choice architecture—advertised as serving
consumers have instead become weaponized, serving commodified
consumers up to the companies and their commercial and political
advertiser clients.
Part II justifies a duty of loyalty for privacy law. We explain how and
why the existing American framework regulating trafficking in human
information fails to comprehend—much less effectively regulate—the
problems of profiling, sorting, nudging, and manipulation that plague the
digital environment. Put simply, a legal model grounded in “notice and
choice” cannot prevent data-based manipulation when notice is fictional,
when choice can be manufactured by the tools of data and behavioral
science, and when rules for individuals are used to regulate a problem with
social dimensions. Part III offers a theory with which to understand and
solve these problems: a duty of loyalty for data collectors. Duties of loyalty
in American Law have typically taken one of two forms. When there is a
relatively sophisticated trusting party who can communicate their wants and
desires with an expert counselor, loyalty means obedience. Obedience
10.
RICHARD THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008) (coining the phrase and advocating for it).
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typically means follow the instructions of the trusting party, regardless of
the likely consequences. Lawyers, doctors, and financial managers are good
examples of this kind of duty of loyalty. Lawyers, for example, advise their
clients but they are ultimately required to follow their clients’ wishes, even
when those clients are making what objectively appear to be mistakes. In
other cases, however, where trusting parties are more vulnerable, or their
instructions are harder to discern, loyalty means promoting the best interests
of the vulnerable trusting party. Thus, the trustee of a teenage orphan or
young adult can disregard the young person’s wishes to spend trust money
on sports cars and sneakers in favor of investing the money in housing or
education. Each approach has its virtues and vices, but given the nature of
the digital landscape, the relative unsophistication of most digital
consumers, and the technical, legal, and economic power differentials
between consumers and platforms, we suggest that the “best interests” form
of loyalty is best suited to protect digital consumers. The best-interests
approach would have the additional benefit of ridding trusting consumers
of the burdens of privacy self-management and other “privacy work.”11 Part
III also builds out the substance of what a best-interests duty of loyalty
might entail. The core mandate of such a duty would be a prohibition on
designing technologies and processing data that conflicts with the trusting
parties’ best interests, up to the limits of the relationship between the parties.
We also explain how the duty of loyalty can be manifested in three different
ways: as rules governing behavior, as default presumptions against
particular potentially harmful actions, and as an interpretive guide for other
duties.
Part IV tackles the problem of practical implementation. We explain how
and why a properly crafted duty of loyalty can do important work toward
mitigating opportunism, filling critical gaps in the United States’ regulation
of tech companies, and emboldening a relational approach to privacy law.
First, we explore when a duty of loyalty should arise. We argue that it should
apply when three factors are met: (1) when trust is invited within the context
of an information relationship; (2) by one with control over the
disadvantaged party’s mediated experiences and data; and (3) the weaker
party exposes their vulnerabilities, trusting they will not be harmed. Second,
we explore possible frameworks for such a duty of loyalty, including a
general duty of loyalty for all activities of certain large and powerful data
processors, some context-specific ad hoc duties of loyalty, and specific rules
to encourage loyal behavior in practice.

11.
See ALICE MARWICK, THE PRIVATE IS POLITICAL: NETWORKED PRIVACY AND
MARGINALIZATION (forthcoming); Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the
Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1879, 1880 (2013).
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In Part V, we anticipate and confront a series of objections to our
proposed duty, including that it would be vague, be too narrow, entrench
surveillance capitalism, create a problem of conflicting duties, and spell the
end of surveillance-based “targeted advertising.” While we note that these
objections are certainly worth addressing head-on in law and policy, we
draw inspiration from how the law has handled similar objections in related
areas to deal with these issues.
I. CORPORATE DATA OPPORTUNISM
Trust is the key to modern social, economic, and political life, but it is
nearly impossible without loyalty. As we have argued in prior work, the
essence of trust is the willingness to accept vulnerability to the actions of
others.12 Such exposure is necessary to participate in a digital networked
society in which our finances; our communications; our secrets; and indeed
our personal, social, economic, and political lives are mediated by entities
that we have no real choice but to expose ourselves to. But while these
relationships have become essential to basic participation in our society,
they raise the spectre of betrayal based upon misplaced trust. How then, can
we resolve the paradox of practically needing to trust but also rationally
fearing to trust?
Loyalty is the key to enabling meaningful trust; it allows the trusting
party to live their life without worrying that the trusted party will take
advantage of their exposed vulnerabilities.13 It allows the people in our
society to trust their lawyers and search engines, their taxi and Lyft drivers,
and their airlines and newspapers. Loyalty allows human social and
economic relationships to flourish because it is about building the
conditions necessary for exposure and reliance. As such, it is about much
more than merely avoiding harm. Loyalty thus has a moral dimension as
well as a purely utilitarian one. James Penner has explained that “[t]o wrong
is bad, but to wrong someone by taking advantage of their vulnerability, a
vulnerability you were entrusted to protect, is worse.”14 This moral
justification is the heart of the reason we should consider loyalty obligations
for companies we entrust with our data and our online experiences. At base,
loyalty is about preventing opportunistic behavior, which is both harmful
from a utilitarian perspective and wrong from a moral one. Tech companies
have many opportunities to exploit the human information with which they

12.
Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 5, at 433; Privacy’s Trust Gap, supra note 5, at 1213.
13.
Privacy’s Trust Gap, supra note 5, at 1213.
14.
James Penner, Fiduciary Law and Moral Norms, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 4,
at 781, 796.
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are entrusted. And some have run amok with it, using data received by
trusting customers to sort, nudge, and even manipulate them.15
American privacy law has failed to address the problem of informationbased exploitation of consumers. For decades, its dominant approach to
regulating human information has been one of “notice and choice.”16 Under
this regime, companies are largely free to exploit human information as long
as they disclose their intentions somewhere in a privacy “notice” and give
consumers some “choice” about whether they wish to share their data.17 We
will have more to say about this part of the law below in Part II, but it
suffices to note here that privacy law does not place substantive duties such
as loyalty on companies that collect or exploit human information. This
allows companies to invite consumers to trust them with one hand, while
the companies insist that there is an arms-length transaction to regulators
with the other.18 What is more, there are substantial market and profit
incentives to exploit human information; indeed, for most venture-funded
and all publicly traded companies, these goals may be mandated by contract
and corporate law.19
In short, companies are currently engaging in self-serving exploitative
behavior that has yet to be appreciated by the general public, and that
behavior is being encouraged by both the law and the market. This Part
briefly lays out three distinct kinds of this self-serving exploitation of
humans and their information: (1) profiling and sorting, (2) nudging, and
(3) manipulation. It does so to survey the gap that we think a duty of loyalty
for data collectors might fill.
A. Profiling and Sorting
Scholars across the disciplines of law, sociology, science and technology
studies, surveillance studies, and history have extensively documented the
ways that companies and governments use human information to profile and
sort humans. Historian Sarah Igo has carefully illustrated how privacy
disputes throughout modern American history have usually been struggles
over the social, economic, and political power that human information
15.
For a deeper exploration into the corrosive effect of the platform business models of
“informational capitalism,” see COHEN, supra note 3, at 89.
16.
Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment and the Limits of Data
Protection, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1691 (2020).
17.
Id.
18.
See generally RADIN, supra note 3; NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND
RAMIFICATIONS (2013).
19.
Jennifer Cobbe & Elettra Bietti, Rethinking Digital Platforms for the Post-COVID-19 Era,
CTR.
FOR
INT’L
GOVERNANCE
INNOVATION
(May
12,
2020),
https://www.cigionline.org/articles/rethinking-digital-platforms-post-covid-19-era
[https://perma.cc/36MA-KFAP].
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confers.20 The Panoptic Sort, sociologist Oscar Gandy’s classic sociological
study of consumer profiling from the early 1990s, similarly showed how
companies well before the internet were eagerly seeking human information
to identify potential marketing targets.21 Gandy explained that companies
used panoptic surveillance techniques to discriminate between customers to
identify “high-quality targets of opportunity.”22 A quarter of a century on,
Surveillance Studies pioneer David Lyon explained how the use of
advanced techniques of consumer sorting demonstrated how human
information had become central to the development and reproduction of
economic power.23 For corporations, the internet represented yet another
marketplace, one in which they could deploy and refine their techniques of
consumer profiling. This commercial surveillance had become so deeply
instantiated in the commercial internet that Lyon noted, “younger readers
may have to be persuaded that there was once a time when no advertising
appeared on the Internet!”24 Legal scholar Daniel Solove has described how
early internet databases were deployed to create a “digital person,” which
was profiled and sorted into categories, for more efficient deployment of
market power in the form of targeted advertising.25 Some of these
surveillance-based sorting categories exploited obvious vulnerabilities in
disturbing ways, such as marketing to rape survivors, emotionally-disturbed
teenagers, or the parents of deceased children.26 Such cases are
appropriately shocking, but the mere act of classification to more effectively
drive purchasing habits is itself an exploitation of data-derived
vulnerabilities.
As technology and business practices advanced into the digital sphere,
companies began to realize that the internet could become so much more
20.
SARAH E. IGO, THE KNOWN CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF PRIVACY IN MODERN AMERICA 368
(2018).
21.
OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL
INFORMATION (1993).
22.
Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Coming to Terms with the Panoptic Sort, in COMPUTERS,
SURVEILLANCE, AND PRIVACY 132, 151–52 (D. Lyon & E. Zureik eds., 1996).
23.
DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 42 (2007).
24.
Id.
25.
SOLOVE, supra note 6, at 1–2.
26.
E.g., What Information Do Data Brokers Have on Consumers, and How Do They Use It?:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Pamela Dixon,
Executive
Director,
World
Privacy
Forum),
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/E290BD4E-66E4-42AD-94C5FCD4F9987781[https://perma.cc/QDP8-7BNW] (rape victims); Olivia Solon, ‘This Oversteps a
Boundary’: Teenagers Perturbed by Facebook Surveillance, GUARDIAN (May 2, 2017, 11:20 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/02/facebook-surveillance-tech-ethics
[https://perma.cc/N2L3-CF9S] (teenagers); Ryan Calo, OfficeMax Letter to ‘Daughter Killed in Car
Crash’ Could Be Privacy’s Whale Song, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2014, 4:09 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ryancalo/2014/01/19/officemax-letter-to-daughter-in-car-crash-could-beprivacys-whale-song/?sh=739ffdd83fb8 [https://perma.cc/WH89-Z2WS].
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than just another marketplace; it could become a realm of greater and more
persistent surveillance of human beings, unlike anything else ever created.27
Shoshana Zuboff explains how early engineers at Google noticed that their
interactions with customers using their search engine produced significant
amounts of information about customer behavior, a phenomenon sometimes
referred to as a “data exhaust.”28 The engineers discovered that rather than
discarding the data, they could use it to improve the quality of their services
to benefit the human customers. Later engineers discovered that this data—
what Zuboff terms “behavioral surplus”—has other uses as well, ones that
did not necessarily benefit the customers who were generating it.29 As
venture capitalists impatiently sought a return on their investment in
Google, and the company anxiously searched for assets to “monetize,”
Google seized upon “behavioral surplus” as a means to serve targeted
advertisements.30 “Advertising,” Zuboff explains, “had always been a
guessing game” of hunches, “art, relationships, conventional wisdom, [and]
standard practice, but never ‘science.’ The idea of being able to deliver a
particular message to a particular person at just the moment when it might
have a high probability of actually influencing their behavior was, and
always had been, the holy grail of advertising.”31
The new ads targeted by “behavioral surplus” were both far more
effective at changing behavior and far more lucrative for Google. As a
result, Google transformed from a search engine company into the pioneer
of surveillance capitalism, claiming “human experience as free raw material
for hidden commercial practices of extraction, prediction, and sales . . . [t]he
foundational framework of a surveillance economy.”32
Zuboff’s framework of surveillance capitalism has many ramifications
for our understanding of the digital economy, but one in particular is critical
for the duty of loyalty. Surveillance capitalism represents a shift in the way
companies perceive human information produced by digital activities.
Previously, such information was used primarily for the consumer’s benefit,
to improve the quality of services. That changed when it is understood as
“behavioral surplus” because it started to be used to predict and increasingly
to influence those consumers in ways designed to benefit the company.
From this perspective, people are no longer the party to be served, but rather
become grist for the mills of behavior and attention. Human customers who
trust tech companies become transformed into sources of the raw material
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

NEIL RICHARDS, WHY PRIVACY MATTERS (2021).
ZUBOFF, supra note 3, at 67–69.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 71–75.
Id. at 77–78.
Id. at vii.
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of behavioral surplus, which is then used to manipulate those same
customers, for the benefit of the surveillance capitalist platform and its real
customers, the advertisers. Zuboff’s account reveals how much of the digital
economy, particularly for companies offering “free” services, rests on a
business model with significant natural incentives (to say the least) for
opportunistic exploitation of human customers.
B. Nudging
If the technical tools of data science represented one way in which
companies could exploit consumer vulnerability, the use of new behavioral
science tools, developed by psychologists and economists, represented
another. Beginning in the late 1960s with the pioneering work of Israeli
psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, the emerging field of
“behavioral economics” documented numerous ways in which the human
brain diverges from the assumption of rationality at the core of classical
microeconomics.33 The economist Richard Thaler draws a helpful
distinction between “econs,” the assumed rational actor in economic models
that says human beings are motivated by self-interest, and “humans,” actual
human beings as the experimental evidence reveals them to be.34 Humans,
it turns out, do not always act like the econs the rational actor model
assumes. Instead, our brains are, as psychologist Dan Ariely puts it,
“predictably irrational.”35 Experimental evidence has revealed humans to be
bad at estimating probability, prone to reasoning with emotion over facts,
and tending to prefer the status quo over some objectively superior
alternatives (“status quo bias”).36 Furthermore, evidence has proved that
humans find it hurts more to lose something they already own than the thing
is worth (“the endowment effect”).37 These characteristics dictate how
humans make decisions and persist systematically across differences in
intelligence, wealth, and other factors.38 They are not defects so much as
they are consequences of the way the human brain has evolved to function.39

33.
See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011); MICHAEL LEWIS,
THE UNDOING PROJECT: A FRIENDSHIP THAT CHANGED OUR MINDS (2016).
34.
RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 4–5
(2015).
35.
DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS, at xx (2008).
36.
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 673–76 (1999).
37.
Id.
38.
For examples of these phenomena, see id. at 643–87; see also ARIELY, supra note 35, at xx.
39.
Thaler and Judge Richard Posner, the godfather of the modern law and economics rational
actor model in the legal academy, apparently clashed over this very point at an infamous workshop at
the University of Chicago Law School in the mid-1990s. See THALER, supra note 34, at 261.
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And critically, they can be demonstrated repeatedly across populations. We
humans “systematically behave in nonrational ways.”40
The findings of behavioral science were popularized by Thaler and Cass
Sunstein in their 2008 book Nudge.41 Nudge describes how governments,
companies, and ordinary people can use techniques derived from cognitive
and behavioral science to ensure that they (or others) make better choices.42
Their key finding is that entities who can control how choices are structured
can also control, at least at the margins, what decisions humans make. This
is accomplished by harnessing behavioral science to do things like set
defaults, which tend to be sticky due to the way humans perceive things like
status quo bias and the endowment effect. “Choice architecture,” they
argued, was tremendously powerful, but in order to be ethical, it needed to
be accompanied by the substantive constraint of “liberal paternalism.”43
Choice architects needed to (a) set nudges up in ways that would benefit the
humans being nudged and (b) give humans the option to freely choose
something other than the default. As a good economist, Thaler recognized
that this was a crucial assumption, and he later confessed, “Whenever I’m
asked to autograph a copy of ‘Nudge,’ . . . I sign it, ‘Nudge for good.’
Unfortunately, that is meant as a plea, not an expectation.”44
Thaler realized that nudges (like all forms of applied behavioral
economics) confer power and are merely tools that can be used for good,
for evil, or to advance the goals of whomever wields the tool. Companies
realized this as well, and they were spurred on by competitive markets,
which created an incentive for them to get consumers to do what they
wanted them to do (most frequently, buying lots of their products). Thus,
Jon Hanson and Doug Kysar argued in 1999 that not only could companies
use behavioral science to manipulate consumers by exploiting their known
irrationalities but crucially that market incentives would effectively require
companies to do it.45 They called this phenomenon “market manipulation,”
and in a companion article, they provided impressive early empirical
evidence that this was exactly what was happening in practice.46
Perhaps the best examples of disloyal behavior by trusted companies are
so-called “dark patterns” in software user interfaces. Dark patterns are “user

40.
Hanson & Kysar, supra note 36, at 635.
41.
See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 10.
42.
Id. at 4–8.
43.
Id. at 11–13.
44.
Richard H. Thaler, The Power of Nudges, for Good and Bad, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/upshot/the-power-of-nudges-for-good-and-bad.html
[https://perma.cc/79EM-BUXX].
45.
Hanson & Kysar, supra note 36, at 743.
46.
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of
Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1505–24 (1999).

2021]

A DUTY OF LOYALTY FOR PRIVACY LAW

975

interfaces whose designers knowingly confuse users, make it difficult for
users to express their actual preferences, or manipulate users into taking
certain actions.”47 Common examples include unnecessary multiple
checkboxes and extra clicks required to unsubscribe from marketing emails;
prominently featured “I AGREE” buttons placed next to small, hidden “no
thanks” buttons; and options to decline framed in such a way that shames
the user into agreeing to certain proposals (“no thanks, I hate free stuff!”),
a practice known as “confirmshaming.”48 Then there are the “free” mobile
games that offer addictive gameplay at the start, followed by a slow crawl
of progression in the game due to attention-sapping advertisements and the
need to purchase premium currencies to progress.49 They rely on the
endowment effect of the time already invested in the game to induce these
levies on consumer time, money, and attention. In these ways, companies
can weaponize the insights of Nudge and behavioral science to engage in
opportunistic behavior adverse to the interests of trusting human customers.
Companies use choice architecture to nudge not for good and not to promote
trust but for their own financial interests. This unmasks choice architecture
for what it truly is: a cookbook for the control of human choices.
C. Manipulation
By themselves, the tools of surveillance-based sorting and behavioral
science are examples of how opportunistic behavior can manifest. But new
vistas of opportunity for manipulation become possible when they are put
together. Tech companies quickly realized not only that they could reap
dividends in the digital environment through market manipulation but that
47.
Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns, 13 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 43, 43; see also Arvind Narayanan, Arunesh Mathur, Marshini Chetty & Mihir Kshirsagar,
Dark Patterns: Past, Present, and Future, ACM QUEUE 67 (Mar.–Apr. 2020); Arunesh Mathur et al.,
Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings from a Crawl of 11k Shopping Websites, 3 PROC. ACM HUM.COMPUT. INTERACTION CSCW 81:1 (2019); Colin M. Gray, Yubo Kou, Bryan Battles, Joseph Hoggatt
& Austin L. Toombs, The Dark (Patterns) Side of UX Design, CHI ‘18: PROC. 2018 CHI CONF. ON HUM.
FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS., Apr 2018; Linda Di Geronimo, Larissa Braz, Enrico Fregnan, Fabio
Palomba & Alberto Bacchelli, UI Dark Patterns and Where to Find Them: A Study on Mobile
Applications and User Perception, CHI ’20: PROC. 2020 CHI CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING
SYS., Apr 2020; Midas Nouwens, Ilaria Liccardi, Michael Veale, David Karger & Lalana Kagal, Dark
Patterns After the GDPR: Scraping Consent Pop-ups and Demonstrating Their Influence, CHI ’20:
PROC. 2020 CHI CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS., Apr 2020; Christoph Bösch, Benjamin
Erb, Frank Kargl, Henning Kopp & Stefan Pfattheicher, Tales from the Dark Side: Privacy Dark
Strategies and Privacy Dark Patterns, PROC. ON PRIV. ENHANCING TECHS., Jul. 2016, at 237–54.
48.
See
Harry
Brignull,
Types
of
Dark
Pattern,
DARK
PATTERNS,
https://www.darkpatterns.org/types-of-dark-pattern
[https://perma.cc/A6RD-YAFB]
(discussing
“confirmshaming”).
49.
Monetary
Dark
Patterns,
DARK
PATTERN
GAMES,
https://www.darkpattern.games/pattern/2/monetary-dark-patterns.html
[https://perma.cc/CKL2T5UV].
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the power to manipulate was even greater for companies who possessed
more human information and could also design every aspect of their
interactions with consumers. As Ryan Calo explains, “[S]ociety is only
beginning to understand how vast asymmetries of information coupled with
the unilateral power to design the legal and visual terms of the transaction
could alter the consumer landscape.”50 Calo calls this phenomenon “digital
market manipulation,” or, more bluntly, “nudging for profit.”51
Though she does not discuss their work, Zuboff’s account illustrates how
Hanson and Kysar’s and Calo’s predictions bore inevitable fruit in the later
stages of the development of surveillance capitalism. As the relentless
pressures of the market and the demands of advertisers led companies to
acquire ever-more detailed and granular data, they refined their methods.
First they did this to serve better ads; then to better predict behavior for more
effective marketing; and finally to try to control consumer behavior through
(1) choice architecture; (2) ever-more granular targeting; and (3) other datadriven, social science-informed methods of persuasion.52 Ultimately,
Zuboff argues, the processes of surveillance capitalism moves through three
stages: from extraction of data, to prediction of consumer behavior, and to
control.53
By simultaneously absorbing the insights of behavioral economics and
relaxing the assumption of liberal paternalism, social science can be
deployed to control consumer behavior. Think of this not as a benevolently
paternalistic nudge of the kind envisioned by Thaler and Sunstein but as an
evil nudge. Thus, rather than serving the needs of consumers, those same
consumers have become served up for consumption. After all, what better
way is there to improve advertising than predicting (and knowing) what a
consumer wants, and what better way is there to ensure the effectiveness of
an ad than to control consumer behavior? Beyond ever-more-refined
mechanisms to produce perfectly timed and perfectly messaged advertising
delivery, these techniques have been proven and used for the manipulation
of both human customers and their voting practices, as revealed by the
Cambridge Analytica scandal, in which the tools of commercial control
were applied to political behavior.54
50.
Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1006 (2014).
51.
Id. at 1001.
52.
Cf. ZUBOFF, supra note 3, at 8–12 (explaining the processes of “surveillance capitalism”).
53.
Id. at 18–21.
54.
See, e.g., Adam D.I. Kramer, Jamie E. Guillory & Jeffrey T. Hancock, Experimental
Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion Through Social Networks, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCIENCES, 8788–90 (2014) (emotional contagion); Robert M. Bond et al., A 61-Million-Person
Experiment in Social Influence and Political Mobilization, 489 NATURE 295–98 (2012) (political
mobilization); Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Confessore & Carole Cadwalladr, How Trump
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***
This, then, is the nature of the problem: companies can collect human
data and use it to profile, nudge, and manipulate consumers using the tools
of behavioral and data science. What is more, not only does privacy law not
sufficiently constrain this behavior but corporate law and market forces
actively encourage it in ways that are highly profitable for companies at the
expense of not just their trusting customers but our democracy itself.
II. THE NEED FOR A DUTY OF LOYALTY IN PRIVACY LAW
At this point you might be wondering why privacy law does not deal
with the problem we have just identified. After all, there are many privacy
laws, and American law schools train many privacy lawyers to interpret
them—whether they are the Federal Trade Commission’s prohibitions on
unfair and deceptive trade practices;55 Europe’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR);56 or new U.S. state laws, like those enacted in
California, Virginia, and Colorado.57 In this Part, we explain how and why
current data privacy law is not up to the task of confronting opportunism.
It is not just one or two statutes in the U.S. patchwork of privacy rules
that need to be changed. The entire approach and value system of U.S. data
privacy does not even comprehend the problems of opportunism at the scale
presented by modern tech companies. Lawmakers have set their sights on
giving people as much transparency about companies’ data practices and as
much control over their personal information as possible.58 But the kind of
control they are seeking is impossible in mediated environments.59 What is
more, giving people control over information will not protect against

Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html
[https://perma.cc/MY9P-MGET] (Cambridge Analytica); Scott Detrow, What Did Cambridge Analytica
Do During the 2016 Election?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 20, 2018, 7:22 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/03/20/595338116/what-did-cambridge-analytica-do-during-the-2016election [https://perma.cc/Q26D-UW8T] (same).
55.
15 U.S.C. § 45.
56.
Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement
of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L
119) 1 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR].
57.
California Consumer Privacy Act/Privacy Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.1001798.199.100 (West 2018); Virginia Consumer Data Protecton Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-571–59.1581 (West 2021), https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?212+ful+CHAP0035; Colorado Privacy
Rights
Act,
COLO.
REV.
STAT.
§
6-1-1301–6-1-110
(WEST
2021),
https://legiscan.com/CO/drafts/SB190/2021.
58.
See generally Woodrow Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control, 4 EUR. DATA PROT.
L. REV. 423 (2018).
59.
Id.
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manipulation, discrimination, and the erosion of our attention and our public
institutions. We need an entirely new framework.
A. Privacy Law Misses Opportunism
Data privacy law, used here to broadly describe both the American and
European approaches to regulating how human information is collected,
used, and shared, protects against a litany of abuses. But the two major
regulatory approaches to information privacy, “consumer protection” and
“data protection,”60 have overlooked how companies who interact with
people in online environments exploit their structural and informational
superiority over the people trusting them with their data and online
experiences.
In the United States, as we have elsewhere described, there are three
basic principles of American privacy law. They are (1) Do Not Lie, (2) Do
Not Harm, and (3) Follow the Fair Information Practices.61 The first two of
these principles come from consumer protection law,62 which is the
predominant American approach to consumer privacy law. This approach
grants “expansively defined individual rights in the context of commercial
transactions.”63 As many scholars and practitioners have recognized, the
most important privacy rule in practice is Section Five of the Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1914, which prohibits unfair or deceptive trade
practices in commerce.64
The principle of Do Not Lie is embodied in Section Five’s prohibition
on deceptive trade practices.65 Although Section Five does not require
companies to create privacy policies, most companies in the internet era
have posted privacy policies to their web sites as a consequence of market
norms and compliance with other state, federal, and international laws.66
The FTC has aggressively policed deceptive claims in privacy policies to
make sure that corporate privacy behavior in practice does not differ from

60.
Cf. WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LAW 165–66, 225–58 (2016).
61.
See WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN
OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 15 (2018) (describing American privacy law today as having three basic
commands: “follow the Fair Information Practices, do not lie, and do not harm”).
62.
Id.
63.
MCGEVERAN, supra note 60, at 165.
64.
See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (prohibiting “unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce”). See generally CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION: PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY (2016); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and
the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014).
65.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
66.
See generally Mike Hintze, In Defense of the Long Privacy Statement, 76 MD. L. REV. 1044
(2017).

2021]

A DUTY OF LOYALTY FOR PRIVACY LAW

979

what their privacy policies state.67 But the Do Not Lie principle in Section
Five does not effectively protect against opportunism. Privacy policy
mandates require that companies disclose general statements of practice, but
they do not have the rigor, for example, of the disclosure requirements in
federal securities law. Companies can choose to be vague or confusingly
technical when describing opportunistic data practices, or they can hide selfserving revelations under catch-alls like processing to “improve” service or
provide “personalized” experiences.68 Even if privacy policies were
sufficiently nuanced and descriptive, no reasonable consumer would have
the time required to read all of the privacy policies they encounter.
Consequently, most people do not read privacy policies anyway.69 There is
thus no deeper moral principle embedded in the Do Not Lie ethic that would
seek to mitigate opportunistic behavior so long as a company’s fine print
resembles reality.
Section Five also illustrates the second basic principle of American
privacy law, Do Not Harm, through its regulation of unfair practices.70 The
idea of harm is central to American privacy law, and it is on the (in)ability
to prove harm that the law frequently turns.71 Section Five’s prohibition on
unfair trade practices does not provide any legal recourse for many wrongs
that flow from opportunistic behavior in a relationship, because such
wrongs do not always result in the narrow kind of concrete harm to
consumers envisioned by tort and consumer protection regimes. The FTC
Act defines an “unfair” practice as one that “causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition.”72 Thus, companies are free under Section
Five to cause a substantial injury to consumers, at least as long as the harm

67.
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 64; HOOFNAGLE, supra note 64; Paul Ohm, Broken
Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701
(2010).
68.
See,
e.g.,
Privacy
Notice,
AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201909010
[https://perma.cc/KMM7-XQ7V]; Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/policy.php
[https://perma.cc/5VKX-3DN4].
69.
See Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4
I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 553 (2008); Caroline Cakebread, You're Not Alone, No One
Reads Terms of Service Agreements, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017, 6:30 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/deloitte-study-91-percent-agree-terms-of-service-without-reading2017-11 [https://perma.cc/BMX3-9QH4].
70.
15 U.S.C. § 45(m).
71.
See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) (tightening the requirement that an
injury be “concrete” to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement in Article III standing doctrine); Danielle
Keats Citron & Daniel J. Solove, Privavcy Harms, 102 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at
3–5); see generally M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131 (2011).
72.
15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
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was reasonably avoidable, beneficial to other consumers, or beneficial to
competition.
By fixating on harm and deception, the consumer protection approach
fails to properly deal with opportunism. The consumer protection approach
misses all kinds of self-dealing behavior because it looks specifically for
outright deception or concrete harm, often in the form of financial injury or
extreme emotional suffering. But disloyal behavior does not always result
in these kinds of extreme harms. For example, nudging does not usually deal
with outright falsehoods. Rather, it involves leveraging people’s own
cognitive and resource limitations against them. While these harms might
be consistent with an intuitive understanding of unfairness, the FTC’s
regulation of unfair practices is limited through legislation and agency
restraint. Thus, unfairness requires a showing of harm that is not present
when companies use nondeceptive tactics to wheedle and cajole information
out of us. However, categorizing people by characteristics for marketing
purposes creates all kinds of vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, the structural
harm it causes is only a pre-cursor to the kind of harm typically recognized
by consumer protection law.
The other dominant approach to privacy protection is the data protection
law approach.73 As William McGeveran has helpfully explained, the data
protection model differs from the consumer protection model in four
separate respects. First, data protection law stems from the idea that
consumers have the right to control how data about them is used, which in
Europe is treated as a fundamental human right. This differs from consumer
protection law, which looks to protect consumers from injury. Second, data
protection law has the opposite default rule from consumer protection.
Whereas the consumer protection approach assumes data processing is
lawful and restricts it only in cases of harm, data protection assumes
processing is restricted and allows it only where (sometimes very broad)
exceptions apply. Third, because most data protection regimes derive from
codes of fair information practice principles, they frequently give
consumers affirmative rights to access, correct, delete, or otherwise
participate in deciding how their information is processed. Fourth, data
protection approaches tend to be specific and rule-based, while consumer
protection obligations tend to be standards-based.74
United States data protection law supplies the third basic principle of
privacy law—a weak push to “follow the Fair Information Practices.” There
are some sector-specific data protection regimes, such as those governing
consumer credit data, video rental data, and health and financial
73.
74.

MCGEVERAN, supra note 60, at 165, 257–58.
Id. at 257–58.
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information.75 But the overarching rule established as a baseline by the FTC
is that companies processing consumer data need to apply a watered-down
version of the Fair Information Practices known as “notice and choice.”76 In
theory, this regime represents the gold standard of informed consent to data
processing, in which consumers are made aware of how their data is being
used and are given meaningful choices to control how it is processed.
However, in reality, things are very different. “Notice” in practice is usually
no more than a dense set of legal terms buried in a privacy policy, while
“choice” is little more than the choice of whether or not to participate in
modern, networked life.77 This baseline rule fails to protect privacy and is
even worse at dealing with opportunism.
Of course, constructive notice plus illusory choice is not the only way to
set up a data protection regime. Several U.S. laws provide somewhat greater
data protection rights than the low bar of baseline “notice and choice.”78
Moreover, many believe that Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation,
an EU-wide instantiation of robust data protection rights, represents a
superior way of dealing with the problems of data processing. The GDPR,
for instance, requires a “lawful basis” for data processing. 79 This can
certainly include consent (though GDPR consent is closer to the gold
standard of knowing and voluntary than the often fictional consent that
suffices under U.S. law).80 Alternatively, a “lawful basis” can be achieved
under other means, including the catch-all “legitimate interest” basis for
processing.81 The legitimate interest standard requires an additional
balancing of the need for processing against the data subject’s fundamental
right of data protection.82 These rules are backed up by stiff penalties;
protective defaults for processing and design; a rigorous set of compliance
standards; and robust data subject rights, such as the right to deletion and to
stop processing.83
75.
HARTZOG, supra note 61, at 15; see also Woodrow Hartzog, The Invaluable, Inadequate Fair
Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV. 952 (2017).
76.
Hartzog & Richards, supra note 16, at 1691.
77.
Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 5, at 434; Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The
Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2019).
78.
See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s; Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a; California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100–1798.199.100 (West
2020); Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15 (West 2008).
79.
GDPR, supra note 56, at art. 6(1).
80.
See id. at art. 4(11) (defining consent as “any freely given, specific, informed and
unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear
affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her”); art.
6(1)(a) (allowing consent as a lawful basis for processing); art. 7 (explicating consent as requiring, inter
alia, clear requests for consent and the ability for consent to be revocable after it has been given).
81.
Id. at art. 6(1)(f).
82.
Id.
83.
Id. at art. 7, 12–23, 77–84.
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One might be tempted to think that the GDPR and similar data protection
regimes around the world might be enough to keep companies from acting
opportunistically. But data protection regimes can actually facilitate
opportunistic behavior because the GDPR and its ilk are focused on data
and not the disparities within information relationships. Data protection
models focus on identifiable personal data and how to process it legitimately
rather than on power dynamics in relationships. This is a primarily
procedural focus because it specifies what is needed to process data
(whether consent or notification is needed, etc.), rather than placing
substantive limits on kinds or purposes of processing. As a result, data
protection models can miss abuses that do not involve personal data
processing, like dark patterns for nudging or the use of knowledge gleaned
from aggregated data from other people to manipulate us.
The procedural aspects of the data protection regimes that emphasize
informational self-determination do not protect against self-dealing. In fact,
the machinery is built in such a way as to encourage it. “Consent” requests
are ground zero for disloyal behavior online. They serve as little more than
window dressing—a “privacy theater”84 that gives companies permission to
engage in any manner of manipulation to wheedle and extract information
and slice and dice the data of our lives in a million different ways. When
companies secure people’s “consent” against their own interest for dubious
practices, they show how watered-down and ineffective this approach to
data privacy has become, particularly in the United States.
Even substantive limitations within stronger data protection regimes like
the GDPR fail to mitigate opportunism. One common restriction in these
regimes is known as the “purpose limitation” or “secondary use limitation,”
which dictates that companies may not use data they collect for one purpose
for a different, secondary purpose.85 Relatedly, “data minimization” dictates
that controllers should identify the minimum amount of personal data
needed to fulfill a stated purpose and hold that much information and no
more.86 These are theoretically robust protections, but in practice they can
be diluted through vague language and hindered by the focus on how the
data will be put to use. They also typically have exceptions for consent, and
in the United States in particular, consent is often presumed, deeply
pathological, and rarely an effective limitation.87
84.
For an early discussion of “privacy theater,” see Chris Soghoian, An End to Privacy Theater:
Exposing and Discouraging Corporate Disclosure of User Data to the Government, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 191 (2010).
85.
See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 56, at art. 5(1)(b).
86.
Principle (c): Data Minimisation, INFO. COMM’R’S OFF., https://ico.org.uk/fororganisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulationgdpr/principles/data-minimisation/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
87.
See generally Richards & Hartzog, supra note 77.
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The mischief of nudging and sorting does not always stem from the
purpose for which data is processed. Benign purposes like “personalization”
are sometimes useful, but they can easily blur into corrosive targeting
practices that unreasonably exclude people from opportunities, extract their
attention and financial resources, and expose them to misinformation.88
Moreover, harmful nudging is usually a byproduct of user interface
affordances and constraints.89 Our personal data usually only indirectly
shapes these interfaces.
The GDPR’s concept of “legitimate interests” might also in theory help
limit opportunistic abuses by data collectors. This concept generally
provides that data processing can be justified if:
[P]rocessing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests
pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such
interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and
freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal
data, in particular where the data subject is a child.90
The theory here is that determining whether there is a legitimate interest for
processing requires a balancing of interests to reduce the risks of processing.
In practice, as one industry-supported think tank concludes, “organisations
are in the best position to undertake a risk/benefits analysis and to devise
appropriate mitigations, and individuals should not be overburdened with
making these assessments and informed choices for all digital interactions
and processing of their personal data.”91
Unfortunately, even this concept, which requires a balancing of
substantive interests, is porous enough to accommodate many kinds of
disloyal behavior.92 A company privately “balancing” its own interests
against those of its human customer would be highly unlikely to put the
customer first when its data practices are not being scrutinized. Moreover,
such a balancing standard would generally not aid in the interpretation of
other duties, set substantive limits on the design of information
88.
89.
90.
91.

See generally COHEN, supra note 3.
See generally HARTZOG, supra note 61.
GDPR, supra note 56, at art. 6(f)
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP: CTR. FOR INFO. POL’Y LEADERSHIP, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
IMPLEMENTING TRANSPARENCY, CONSENT AND LEGITIMATE INTEREST UNDER THE GDPR 3 (May 19,
2017),
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/28/2017/06/cipl_
recommendations_on_transparency_consent_and_legitimate_interest_under_the_gdpr_19_may_2017-c.pdf [https://perma.cc/EF8T-B8NB].
92.
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP: CTR. FOR INFO. POLICY LEADERSHIP, CIPL EXAMPLES OF
LEGITIMATE INTEREST GROUNDS FOR PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA (Apr. 27, 2017),
https://www.informationpolicycentre.com/uploads/5/7/1/0/57104281/final_cipl_
examples_of_legitimate_interest_grounds_for_processing_of_personal_data_27_april_2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QV4Q-8RUV].
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technologies, or otherwise limit self-dealing so long as the basis for personal
data processing was sound.
In sum, data protection regimes (even robust ones) fail to properly deal
with opportunism due to their focus on process over outright substantive
prohibitions, on data over relationships, and on informational selfdetermination over a broader vision for human flourishing. They are
fundamentally procedural rules focused on the data, whose key substantive
limitation is the consent of the data subject.93 Particularly in digital
environments where interface design is entirely constructed, and when
consent can be manufactured or presumed, the limitation of “consent” can
be a very weak one indeed.94
B. A Duty of Care Is Not Enough
One promising response to tech company opportunism that some
lawmakers have proposed would be to impose a duty of care on data
collectors. These proposals have taken a few different forms, but they share
a general idea of extending negligence law principles to companies to
ensure that they do not cause unreasonable harm to data subjects.95
Duties of care have a lot of appeal. Negligence was, of course, AngloAmerican law’s great response to the industrial revolution and all the new
risks that its technical progress created for ordinary people.96 Every firstyear law student is familiar with these cases, involving train crossings, car
accidents, medical malpractice, and dangerous products, and one infamous
case of exploding packages on a railway platform.97 Then there is the
famous Carroll Towing case, involving a tug boat causing an industrial
barge to sink in New York harbor and establishing the classic test for

93.
The centrality of consent varies across data protection regimes. Meg Jones and Margot
Kaminski have taken great care to demonstrate how concepts of consent and control are not the sole
animating values of the GDPR. See generally Meg Leta Jones & Margot E. Kaminski, An American’s
Guide to the GDPR, 98 DENV. L. REV. 93 (2020).
94.
Cf. Lisa M. Austin, Enough About Me; Why Privacy is About Power, Not Consent (or Harm),
in A WORLD WITHOUT PRIVACY?: WHAT LAW CAN AND SHOULD DO 158, 158–59 (Austin Sarat ed.,
2014) (making a similar point).
95.
See supra note 7. Almost all bills proposing a duty of loyalty do so in combination with a
duty of care.
96.
See Donald G. Gifford, Technological Triggers to Tort Revolutions: Steam Locomotives,
Autonomous Vehicles, and Accident Compensation, 11 J. TORT L. 71, 71 (2018) (“Following the
Industrial Revolution, for example, machines, no longer humans and animals, powered production. With
greater force, locomotives and other machines inflicted far more severe injuries. These dramatic
technological changes prompted the replacement of the preexisting strict liability tort standard with the
negligence regime.”).
97.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); Boyce v. Brown, 77 P.2d 455
(Ariz. 1938); Cordas v. Peerless Transp. Co., 27 N.Y.S.2d 198, (City Ct. 1941); Martin v. Herzog, 126
N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920); United Novelty Co. v. Daniels, 42 So. 2d 395 (Miss. 1949).
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negligence.98 Negligence responded well to these cases of physical harm; it
also allowed industrial activity to prosper, protecting against significant
injuries but giving diffuse or de minimis injuries a free pass.
Negligence law adapted well to the problems of the industrial age, and it
remains a necessary component of privacy law in the information age. In
cases of data breach, for example, where companies have been negligent in
their security practices, negligence principles have helped to establish a duty
of data security.99 But negligence in the form of a duty of data care has real
limitations. Even in the context of data security, where harm is clear,
causation remains a problem in many cases. Even when negligent data
security is beyond question, courts struggle with connecting a known breach
to an actual case of identity theft by an unknown third party hacker.100 As
more of us become victims of data breach, tying an individual breach as the
factual and proximate cause of an individual harm will become even more
challenging, simply because defendants can argue that someone else’s
negligent breach could have been the actual cause of the injury.
Negligence has also failed to handle privacy issues well because of its
intense focus on harm rather than relationships. A company that causes
small injuries to millions of its customers can argue that each injury is de
minimis, even though its vast market capitalization is the aggregate of
billions of even tinier transactions. Although toxic torts have faced down
similar issues admirably, the ethereal nature of privacy seems to have
stymied courts.101
The narrowness of a legally cognizable privacy harm is also an important
limitation in privacy litigation. In virtually all of these cases, companies
have pushed back heavily on what constitutes a legal harm or injury
throughout privacy law, with courts often agreeing to narrow theories of
harm.102
Recent developments in Article III standing doctrine in privacy cases
have turned pushback on privacy harm into a growing jurisdictional bar. In
the Spokeo decision, for example, the Court required that plaintiffs alleging
“intangible” injuries like privacy claims must now as a constitutional matter
show the additional requirement of a “concrete” injury in fact (i.e., more
than what the Court terms a “bare procedural violation”).103 In order to show
that intangible claims are legally “concrete,” plaintiffs must now
98.
United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
99.
See William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1135, 1196 (2019).
100. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 751, 762 (2018).
101. See Danielle Keats Citron & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Harms, 102 B.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming Mar. 2022) (manuscript at 7, 12–14).
102. See id.
103. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016).
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demonstrate either that Congress has identified a new harm that meets
constitutional requirements (though the correctness of Congress’s judgment
on this question is itself subject to judicial review) or that “an alleged
intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been
regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American
courts.”104 This limitation on the theories of harm is a constitutional one,
which means that private litigants in private cases must satisfy Spokeo’s
concreteness test or they will be unable to raise the claim in federal court.
As many scholars have documented, the tightening of standing doctrine in
recent years has made privacy claims more difficult to prosecute, possibly
distorting standing doctrine in the process.105 And the Court’s recent
decision in TransUnion v. Ramirez seems to have tightened these
requirements even further, suggesting that Congress’s ability to recognize
new legal wrongs is limited and that new causes of action have to have “a
close relationship to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for
a lawsuit in American courts.”106 Such a limitation would appear to cast
doubt on Congress’s ability to craft novel remedies to new kinds of privacy
wrongs, at least if the remedy is a private cause of action.107
In any event, not even a robust private cause of action can contain the
rise of an informational capitalism that is under-regulated. It is a good thing,
overall, to require tech companies to be careful and not cause unreasonable
harm, but this industrial-age solution alone is woefully insufficient to deal
with the problems of data-based opportunism. As Zuboff puts it well:
“These developments are all the more dangerous because they cannot be
reduced to known harms—monopoly, privacy—and therefore do not easily
yield to known forms of combat.”108 A new—or at least a different—tool is
needed for the job.
III. A THEORY OF LOYALTY FOR INFORMATION RELATIONSHIPS
Loyalty, like much else in the law, is about power. In relationships of
trust, the trusting party makes themselves vulnerable to the power of the
entrustee. In the particular case of an information relationship, power is
conferred through the exposure of personal information and submission of
104. Id. (citation omitted).
105. See Citron & Solove, supra note 101; see also Thomas Haley, Data Protection in Disarray,
95 WASH. L. REV. 1193 (2020); Solove & Citron, supra note 100, at 744 (2018); Julie E. Cohen,
Information Privacy Litigation as Bellwether for Institutional Change, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 535, 548
(2017); Felix T. Wu, How Privacy Distorted Standing Law, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 439, 439 (2017).
106. TransUnion L.L.C. v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2213 (2021) (quotations omitted).
107. Ramirez explains that Congress’s ability to vest enforcement authority in federal agencies is
unaffected by the limitations in standing doctrine because federal agency enforcement power vests in
Article II of the Constitution rather than Article III. See id. at 2207.
108. ZUBOFF, supra note 3, at 54.
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agency. This power is increased when the parties deal with each other in
technologically mediated environments such as app interfaces, telephoneanswering AI decision trees, or social networks. The power given to
entrustees allows them to make decisions that will affect the well-being of
the trusting party. Inevitably, profit-seeking entrustees risk acting in their
own self-interest in ways that disadvantage trusting parties. This is another
example of what we have been calling opportunism.
Loyalty is the antidote to opportunism. Duties of loyalty are meant to
protect against precisely this kind of exploitation. Loyalty shifts the legal
duty from self-serving to other-serving. It has a morality broader than the
profit-maximization of neoliberal capitalism. And it has deep roots in our
law.109 But there is more than just abstract ethics and notions of honor to the
duty of loyalty. Loyalty compels firm legal duties and prohibitions that,
when breached, give rise to legal liability on grounds of conflicts of interest
or of duty.110
The core idea animating a duty of loyalty is that trusted parties must
make their own interests subservient to those made vulnerable through the
extension of trust. 111 This sounds appealing in the abstract, but of course
important ambiguities must be resolved if loyalty is to do any major work.
What is the purpose of the relationship? In what way is the trusting party
vulnerable? What is the purpose or mission of a duty of loyalty—is it about
obedience or protection? What are the boundaries of the duty? This Part
offers a theory of loyalty for data collectors that seeks to answer these
important questions.
A. Existing Loyalty Proposals
The idea of subjecting data collectors to a duty of loyalty is not entirely
new. The concept has been circulating for some time in a variety of forms
and levels of specificity. At the turn of the millennium, Ian Kerr suggested
looking to the law of fiduciaries (and its duties of care and loyalty) to govern
Internet Service Providers.112 Daniel Solove made a similar proposal to
109. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975);
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1009, 1101–03 (1997) (suggesting a moral guidance function for loyalty rules); Gregory S. Alexander,
A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 767 (2000).
110. Andrew Gold, The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at
385, 386.
111. Id.
112. Kerr, supra note 6; Ian Kerr, Personal Relationships in the Year 2000: Me and My ISP, in
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS OF DEPENDENCE AND INTERDEPENDENCE IN LAW 78, 102, 109 (Law
Comm’n of Can. ed., 2002) (“The word ‘trust’ connotes a state of dependence and the correlative duty
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govern data brokers and other businesses that collect personal information
in his book The Digital Person.113 Jack Balkin prominently proposed
treating data collectors as “information fiduciaries” subject to strict duties
of care, loyalty, and confidentiality, a call that Jonathan Zittrain
subsequently joined.114 Balkin and Zittrain’s proposal is itself the primary
target of Lina Khan and David Pozen’s critique of information fiduciaries,
which expresses skepticism about the concept’s efficacy and harmony with
other laws.115 Still, other scholars such as Lindsey Barrett, Lauren Scholz,
and Kiel Brennan-Marquez have continued to advocate for and develop the
concept in various contexts.116
Duties of loyalty have also been proposed and explored by scholars
advocating a closer relationship between privacy and trust. While in
harmony with the call to treat data collectors as information fiduciaries,
these scholars also explore non-fiduciary frameworks and doctrines
designed to keep entrusted parties discreet, honest, and protective. Ari
Waldman developed a theory of privacy as trust in a monograph and series

of loyalty arises from the level of trust and dependence that is evident in the relationship. The type of
disclosure that routinely occurs in [people’s relationships with ISPs] results in the trusted party’s
acquiring influence that is equivalent to a discretion or power to affect the trusting party’s legal or
practical interests. . . . [T]he idea that some ISPs might be held to owe their users a duty of loyalty with
respect to the care and control of user information is an increasingly important consideration. In fact, the
idea of ISP-as-fiduciary might become even more plausible as network technology (NT) becomes more
advanced.”); see also Helen Nissenbaum, Securing Trust Online: Wisdom or Oxymoron?, 81 B.U. L.
REV. 635 (2001).
113. SOLOVE, supra note 6, at 103 (“I posit that the law should hold that companies collecting and
using our personal information stand in a fiduciary relationship with us.”).
114. Balkin first developed his idea on his blog in 2014. Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries
in
the
Digital
Age,
BALKINIZATION
(Mar.
5,
2014,
4:50
PM),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/information-fiduciaries-in-digital-age.html
[https://perma.cc/2A6V-E5D3]. He followed up with a more thorough treatment in scholarly journals.
See Balkin, supra note 6; see also Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data,
Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1160–63 (2018);
Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech Is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2047–54 (2018); Balkin &
Zittrain, supra note 6; JACK M. BALKIN, AEGIS SER. PAPER NO. 1814, A HOOVER INSTITUTION ESSAY:
FIXING
SOCIAL
MEDIA'S
GRAND
BARGAIN
11–15
(2018),
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/balkin_webreadypdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ES3X-E7FQ]. Professor Jonathan Zittrain has also prominently advocated for
information-fiduciary frameworks. Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election Without
Anyone
Ever
Finding
Out,
NEW
REPUBLIC
(June
1,
2014),
https://newrepublic.com/article/117878/information-fiduciary-solution-facebook-digitalgerrymandering [https://perma.cc/AX6R-P7XG]; Jonathan Zittrain, How to Exercise the Power You
Didn't Ask For, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 19, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/09/how-to-exercise-the-poweryou-didnt-ask-for [https://perma.cc/9V3H-K4CL]; Jonathan Zittrain, Mark Zuckerberg Can Still Fix
This Mess, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION (Apr. 7, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2EsJ0La [https://perma.cc/XM4HHVV6].
115. Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 498.
116. See generally Barrett, supra note 6; Scholz, supra note 6; Brennan-Marquez, supra note 6;
Dobkin, supra note 6, at 1; Whitt, supra note 6.
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of articles.117 We have also explored the relationship between privacy and
trust extensively in our previous research, including proposing a duty of
loyalty for data collectors.118
All of this scholarship is important, but what it lacks with respect to
loyalty is detail. Many have called for fiduciary, trust, or loyalty obligations
for data collectors in general, but significant work remains to explain how
the duty of loyalty would apply in practice and how it is separate from and
interacts with other obligations, such as duties of care and confidentiality.
The literature thus lacks a fully theorized duty of loyalty, something that is
essential before fiduciary or non-fiduciary duties can be properly
implemented in statutory and case law.
In this Part, we seek to fill that void. We offer a full-blown theory of
loyalty for privacy law, including an explanation of loyalty’s mission and
its substance. A good theory also leads to specific rules and implementations
and explains how they serve the goal of loyalty in information relationships.
This Part details what we believe to be such a theoretically informed and
practically useful approach.
B. The Mission of a Duty of Loyalty for Privacy
What should be the goal of a data collector’s loyalty? Other kinds of
special legal relationships for power differentials reflect particular concerns
that influence what the duty of loyalty in those relationships looks like. For
example, the law of trusts looks to wealth preservation and giving effect to
donative intent.119 Corporate fiduciaries are concerned with shareholder
wealth maximization.120 Agency law looks to keep agents obedient to a
principal’s instructions.121 Guardianship law is concerned with making
decisions on behalf of a vulnerable ward that is also consistent with the
ward’s instructions, values, and wishes.122 Each of these contexts shape the
117. See generally WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN
INFORMATION AGE, supra note 6; Waldman, Privacy As Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a
Networked World, supra note 6, at 560; Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust: The Facebook Study,
supra note 6; Ari Ezra Waldman, A Breach of Trust: Fighting Nonconsensual Pornography, 102 IOWA
L. REV. 709 (2017); Ari Ezra Waldman, Manipulating Trust on Facebook, 29 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
175 (2016).
118. Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 5; Privacy’s Trust Gap, supra note 5, at 1122–23; Hartzog
& Richards, supra note 6; Hartzog & Richards, supra note 16.
119. See Gold, supra note 110, at 388 (citing Robert H. Sitkoff, Fiduciary Principles in Trust
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 41–42); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78
(AM. L. INST. 2007)).
120. Id. (citing Julian Velasco, Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK,
supra note 4, at 61).
121. Id. (citing Deborah A. Demott, Fiduciary Principles in Agency Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 25).
122. Id. (citing Nina A. Kohn, Fiduciary Principles in Surrogate Decision-Making, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 255).
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contours of what the duty of loyalty demands. Specifically, factors like the
purpose of the relationship, including the reason trust is given; what
specifically is entrusted; the goals of the trusting party; and the discretion
and power of the entrustee all dictate what it means to be loyal in a given
context.
Given data protection law’s focus on informational self-determination,
loyalty could mean primarily seeking to effectuate the information-related
instructions of the trusting party and advancing the goal of informational
self-determination. This would be consistent with duties of loyalty in some
other contexts.123 On the other hand, we know from a quarter of a century
of experience that it is rare for internet consumers to adequately understand
the technologies they are using, the legal terms being offered, or the
consequences of many technologically mediated actions.124
Two options therefore lie before us.125 Should loyal data collectors act
obediently? Or should they act in the best interests of the trusting parties?
Answering this question requires us to unpack each of the models and, in
particular, the assumptions about the nature, goals, and inherent
vulnerability of the relationship that each model contains.
The first option is the obedience model, which has the virtue of consumer
empowerment. It resonates with notions of control and autonomy that have
been the core of data protection law since its inception in the 1970s. It also
resolves many easy cases. For example, a trusting party’s instructions,
preferences, and purposes are frequently clear, such as when people press
the “delete” button on user interfaces or share their location for the purpose
of GPS mapping. Here, it would be disloyal to secretly preserve the
“deleted” data for company use because it would be disobedient (i.e.,
contrary to a trusting party’s clear instructions).126 It would also be disloyal
to use location data to send the customer the long way around to please an

123. Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513,
558 (2015) (“One could, for example, adopt an agency model according to which loyalty is tied to
obedience or compliance with the instructions of one’s principal. On this view, loyalty may be
understood as entailing adherence to a beneficiary’s instructions or present preferences. Alternatively,
loyalty may be a function of the fiduciary’s adherence to a beneficiary’s specified purposes.”).
124. This is the notion of “unwitting consent,” which we explore in Richards & Hartzog, supra
note 16, at 1478–86.
125. Miller & Gold, supra note 123, at 561 (“[P]rescriptive accounts of loyalty to persons can
involve much more than conduct in the best interests of another. Loyalty may involve obedience to the
commands or instructions of others, fidelity to their preferences, or allegiance to their purposes.”). We
note that there is actually an even more strict standard for loyalty in trust law—the “sole interest” rule,
which requires that fiduciaries have a completely undivided loyalty to beneficiaries, enforced by a “not
further inquiry” rule. However, we are not yet ready to propose such complete fealty for large companies
with billions of users at scale. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Fiduciary Principles in Trust Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 45.
126. See In re Snapchat, Inc., 2014 FTC LEXIS 313 (F.T.C. December 23, 2014).
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advertiser or improve the algorithm.127 Such uses conflict with a person’s
intent in sharing data. In those instances, obedience is probably the right
conceptualization of loyalty.
The vice of obedience, though, is that it assumes too much about the
ability of ordinary internet consumers to convey their wishes, desires, and
intentions. Obedience theories of loyalty tend to be present when the
principal is a sophisticated actor with access to good information and
nuanced legal advice. This is why obedience is a good fit, for example, in
the case of agency law’s duty of loyalty. But the sophisticated actors of the
agency model fit poorly for the typical internet consumer trying to clear out
her inbox or drive her car to a new location. Instead, the model presumes
too much about the abilities and resources of internet users, a phenomenon
Paul Ohm has called “the Myth of the Superuser.”128 When dealing with
ordinary consumers in the privacy context, the obedience approach risks
exposing relatively unwitting consumers to avoidable harm. Thus, while a
“best interests” approach would still send a consumer on the most direct
route, it might cache deleted emails for a short period of time, just in case
the consumer (as we have all done) had hit “delete” in error or immediately
regrets the decision. Moreover, while privacy-as-control has an undeniable
rhetorical appeal, its vices have been well-documented in the literature since
important work by Paul Schwartz in the 1990s.129
More recently, we have argued elsewhere that privacy-as-choice suffers
from three overpowering defects in the contemporary digital environment.
First, control can be overwhelming, in that vast numbers of choices become
vast amounts of “privacy work” delegated to already overworked
consumers, resulting in resignation, psychic numbing, and an acceptance of
default settings designed to maximize data collection.130 Second, privacy as
control is insufficient because it treats privacy as a purely individual good
that can be bartered away freely without any concern for the social values
that privacy serves.131 Finally, when it comes to privacy, control is an
127. Balkin and Zittrain gave some vivid examples of disloyalty along these lines: “At the very
least, digital businesses may not act like con men—inducing trust in end users and then actively working
against their interests. Google Maps shouldn’t recommend a drive past an IHOP as the ‘best route’ on
your way to a meeting from an airport simply because IHOP gave it $20. And if Mark Zuckerberg
supports the Democrat in a particular election, Facebook shouldn’t be able to use its data analysis to
remind its Democratic users that it’s election day—while neglecting to remind, or actively discouraging,
people it thinks will vote for Republicans.” Balkin & Zittrain, supra note 6.
128. Paul Ohm, The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1327, 1327–28 (2008).
129. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1658
(1999).
130. RICHARDS, WHY PRIVACY MATTERS, supra note 27, at Ch. 3. For “privacy work,” see
MARWICK, supra note 11. For “psychic numbing,” see ZUBOFF, supra note 3.
131. RICHARDS, WHY PRIVACY MATTERS, supra note 27, at Ch. 3.
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illusion because choice-architected interfaces and default settings are
designed to maximize data collection by default, and also because
meaningful privacy choices such as “no surveillance-based advertising” are
rarely given to consumers.132 Because American law lacks substantive rules
barring manipulative data practices, this leads us straight back to the
insufficient regime of “notice and choice” with which we began.
The second option for a duty of loyalty is a best-interests approach. The
virtue of this approach is that it puts the customers’ well-being first, even
when they do not understand the technology, the legal terms to which they
agree, or the full consequences or risks of their actions.133 This approach
would ensure that the protections of loyalty are always on by default for
human customers, looking to protect them and put them first. Obedience is
often impossible when it comes to the basic design of systems, which must
have defaults by their nature. A best interests standard informing default
choices would put human values first and ensure that the design of systems
in practice lives up to the empowering promises made by the marketing
department. It also places the burden of acting safely and appropriately on
the data collector, who is in a vastly superior position to understand the risks
of data processing and the interface design.
Like obedience, however, a best-interests approach has its own
undeniable vices. It eliminates the ability for people to opt out of certain
defaults where their preferences diverge from the mainstream with respect
to “best interests” or default risk tolerance. Some people, after all, might
want “more relevant ads,” even where “relevance” is based upon
surveillance.134
More fundamentally, a “best interests” standard of the sort we see in
child custody cases could be seen as infantilizing to users, treating all users
of a service to a standard of relative unsophistication that would not apply
to all, and undermining the data protection model’s goal of empowered
informational self-determination. It is also subject to charges of paternalism.
But loyalty is not primarily about informational self-determination or even
autonomy. Loyalty is about vulnerability, and thus every duty of loyalty has

132. Id.
133. Cf. Richards & Hartzog, supra note 16, at 1478–86 (exploring the idea of “unwitting
consent”).
134. America’s
Views
on
Surveillance
Advertising,
ACCOUNTABLETECH,
https://accountabletech.org/research/surveillance-advertising/ [https://perma.cc/4LGL-2VNJ].
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some measure of paternalism built into it.135 As Miller and Gold explain in
this context:
[A] fiduciary should act in what she believes are the beneficiary’s
best interests, even if the beneficiary might prefer a different course
of action. A paternalistic form of fiduciary loyalty is arguably
prominent in trust law, in which trustees have independent discretion
to make choices that beneficiaries may disagree with. It is also
arguably evident in corporate law, which provides that directors may
act contrary to their shareholders’ known desires when executing
their [fiduciary] mandate.136
For digital information relationships, conflicts between informed
manifested intent and best interests are likely to be rare because a person’s
specific intent and purpose is typically unclear. People do not think through
all the possible hopes, dreams, and purposes for their data. Digital
consumers are also vulnerable to a host of dangers, including secret
surveillance, data extraction, manipulation, and data breach. Together, these
risks have led to the failure of “notice and choice.” We might wish that
digital consumers might be like the rational creatures that Thaler calls
“econs,” but in reality, they are humans. They are subject to the predictable
irrationality demonstrated by the experimental evidence in behavioral
science and able to be manipulated by the power of data science in designed,
constructed digital environments. Digital consumers have little choice but
to trust companies to not to leverage user interfaces, the design of tools, and
their own data against them. They have few meaningful alternatives short
of going “off the grid,” and so they hope their exposure will not come back
to haunt them, however forlorn that hope may turn out to be in reality.
A duty of loyalty would represent a real difference from the stated
purpose of most models of data protection law, which is generally to leave
the determination of how data is processed to the data subject. In the U.S.,
this notion has become entangled with the law of online contracts, because
so much of the rules that apply between people and online services are
dictated by terms of use and privacy policies.137 This is not just a matter of
contract law—these boilerplate documents are still the single most
important privacy regulatory instrument for the FTC and state attorneys
135. See Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing Ex Post: The Non-Contractual Basis of
Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 209, 217 (2014).
136. Miller & Gold, supra note 123, at 559.
137. Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design As Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1641 (2011) (“As
websites became ubiquitous, so did terms of use. As a result, an overwhelming amount of online activity
is not governed by default law but rather through agreement between the parties.”) [hereinafter Hartzog,
Website Design As Contract]; Woodrow Hartzog, The New Price to Play: Are Passive Online Media
Users Bound by Terms of Use?, 15 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 405 (2010).
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general. Not only have they been deemed largely adequate to fulfill the
transparency mandate of privacy and data protection laws but they also are
used to obtain people’s consent to data practices, the other dominant
regulatory apparatus in privacy law. But data privacy law should not be
largely an extension of online contracting law, where dense and nonnegotiable legalese is used by online services to place the risk of loss on
people under the auspices of “consent.”138 Yet we treat most consumers
under the fiction that they are sophisticated parties to bilateral arm’s-length
transactions.
In this respect, a best-interests standard could have some appeal to tech
companies, at least those interested in long-term sustainable (and profitable)
relationships rather than one-time cash grabs. The digital information
relationships that leave us the most vulnerable are not one-time discrete
transactions but long-term relationships with providers of email services,
cloud services, operating systems, and hardware.139 They are more like a
relationship with a trustee or bailee than a one-time purchase of a hamburger
on vacation (we note that even the hamburger transaction is regulated for
safety and cleanliness). This is perhaps the largest change from nondigital
transactions or the old-school software model of one-time purchases of
licenses. Modern information relationships are long-term and characterized
by trust through exposure and confidence. Both the trusting party and
entrustees should favor a safe and sustainable state of affairs.
We believe that in most circumstances, a duty of loyalty should mean
that data collectors are obligated to pursue the “best interests” of the trusting
party with respect to what is exposed and entrusted. And while obedience
to a trusting party might occasionally be in the trusting party’s best interest,
an overriding obedience approach to loyalty leaves too much room for
mischief and abuse, including the manufacturing of “consent.”140 And what
is typically entrusted by people when they interact with data collectors? It
is not just personal data. People also trust companies with their time,
attention, experience, emotions, reputation, interpersonal relationships,
vulnerabilities, and financial security. Companies that control people’s
mediated environments and collect their personal data have substantial

138. See generally RADIN, supra note 3; KIM, supra note 18; Scholz, supra note 6; Allyson W.
Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control over Personal Information?, 111 PENN ST.
L. REV. 587 (2007); Hartzog, Website Design As Contract, supra note 139, at 1636; Hartzog, supra note
139; Richards & Hartzog, supra note 16.
139. For insight into the potential distinctions between “discrete” contracts and “relational” or
“intertwined” ones, see generally IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO
MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory as Sociology:
A Reply to Professors Lindenberg and de Vos, 143 J. INST’L & THEORETICAL ECON. 272, 275–76 (1987).
140. See generally Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96
WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2019).
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discretion over whether those people will flourish in that environment and
whether their welfare will be preserved. Companies can manipulate
people’s buying habits, emotions, political commitments, and even their
voting habits.141 In short, when people enter into information relationships
with companies online, they trust those companies with their well-being.
Of course, a duty of loyalty cannot be unlimited. Because it is relational,
it should be limited to the scope of the relationship. Thus, subject to the
narrow obedience exception, we propose that those bound by a duty of
loyalty should be bound to act in the best interests of the trusting party only
to the extent of their exposure. So, for example, a company that designs
dating apps should be bound to seek to maximize user well-being with
respect to the choices they make using the service, the relationships they
hope to create using the service, and the data that the service collects. But
such a company would not be bound to seek to maximize a trusting party’s
well-being outside the scope of exposure to the service by, say, making sure
that all their users brush their teeth every night, select healthy food options
on dates, or remember to make their car payments. By contrast, a wellness
app could well suggest healthy food choices and give reminders about toothbrushing but still have little to say about potential dates or car payments.
And a financial planning app could remind about car payments, but not need
to encourage toothbrushing or a high-fiber diet.
As we explore below, acting loyally in practice will generally mean
avoiding conflicts of interest and conflicts of duty. But a duty of loyalty
could also serve as a polestar for several different default rules and
procedural mechanisms to breathe life and purpose into U.S. data privacy
law.
C. The Substance of a Duty of Loyalty for Privacy
Once lawmakers establish that the primary mission of the duty of data
loyalty should be to act in the best interests of the trusting party to the extent
of their exposure, the next step is to detail the substance and form of how
the duty will be manifested in our rules. Robert Sitkoff helpfully explains
that “[t]he duties of loyalty and care, which we might call the primary
fiduciary duties, are typically structured as broad, open-ended standards that
speak generally.”142 However, as he also notes, “the other fiduciary duties,
which we might call the subsidiary or implementing fiduciary duties, are

141. See generally HARTZOG, supra note 61; Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 47; Zittrain, supra
note 6.
142. Robert H. Sitkoff, Other Fiduciary Duties: Implementing Loyalty and Care, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 419, 419.
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typically structured as rules or at least more specific standards that speak
with greater specificity.”143
While lawmakers and scholars seem to pay most attention to the rules
meant to compel or constrain behavior, a duty of loyalty could also act as
an interpretive guide for other rules and duties. Simply put, it could be a
sorely needed mechanism for setting default rebuttable presumptions
against many kinds of questionable behavior.
1. Rules to Compel or Constrain Behavior
There are two main ways to conceptualize rules meant to effectuate a
duty of loyalty: proscriptive and prescriptive.144 Proscriptive approaches to
loyalty focus on the kinds of activities from which loyal fiduciaries are
prevented from engaging. By contrast, prescriptive approaches focus on
affirmative duties to act in certain ways that demonstrate loyalty.145 The
proscriptive account of loyalty is typified by “no conflict” rules, like not
using data about human customers for the company’s own purposes or to
manipulate those customers.146 But other rules can also compel or constrain
behavior, such as disclosure requirements and the invalidation of attempts
to waive certain obligations or liability. We propose a combination of these
accounts for privacy law in the form of no conflict rules, attempted waiver
prohibitions, and disclosure and nondisclosure obligations.
a. No Conflicted Design or Processing
If a duty of loyalty placed on companies collecting and using human data
is to accomplish anything, it should prohibit the conflicted design of digital
tools and data processing. Avoiding conflicts is loyalty’s core mandate and
the logical starting point for lawmakers, judges, industry, and civil
society.147 A general rule against conflicted design and data processing
could serve as the foundation for a host of regulatory regimes, selfregulatory efforts, and guidance to the public to encourage and nurture their
trust.
Because no-conflict rules are already at the heart of fiduciary obligations
of loyalty, lawmakers could borrow from established frameworks when
creating rules for data collectors. Thus loyal fiduciaries, generally speaking,
must follow two basic no-conflict rules. The first is a “conflict of interest
rule”: a mandate to avoid conflicts between the fiduciary’s duty to act in the
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Miller & Gold, supra note 123, at 556–57.
Id.
Gold, supra note 110.
Id.
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beneficiary’s best interest and the fiduciary’s own self-interest. The second
is the “conflict of duty rule”: a mandate that the fiduciary avoid conflicts
between the duty of loyalty to the beneficiary and other duties the fiduciary
may have.148 Rules of this sort do not require any particular course of action
on the part of the fiduciary. Instead, (as one account has helpfully explained)
they are “thought to establish boundaries within which the fiduciary may
reasonably be expected to act loyally, at least to the extent that the rules
isolate biasing factors that might induce the fiduciary to subjugate the
interests of beneficiaries to the interests of others.”149
Loyalty can vary according to the kinds of parties involved. For example,
in corporate law, loyalty requires fiduciaries to put the interests of the
corporation before personal interests that may be at odds with the
corporation. One court described this duty as follows: “The concept of
loyalty, of constant, unqualified fidelity, has a definite and precise meaning.
The fiduciary must subordinate his individual and private interests to his
duty to the corporation whenever the two conflict.”150 Some scenarios in
which a fiduciary’s interests may be at odds with those of the corporation
include: sale of property from a fiduciary to the corporation; purchase of
property or pursuit of a contract by a fiduciary that may also be in the
interests of the corporation to purchase or pursue itself; when a fiduciary is
a director and involved in setting executive compensation; and wherever a
fiduciary is connected to shareholder litigation, insider litigation, and the
protection of control.151
In the case of data collectors, loyalty would mean not attempting to (1)
collect or process data and (2) design tools and mediated environments that
would conflict with the duty to act in the interest of the well-being of the
trusting party. This obligation could manifest in several ways. One of the
most obvious ways would be strict and robust rules limiting what data can
be collected, how long it could be kept, and for what it could be used. In this
way, a duty of loyalty could impose data minimization and purpose
limitations that are keyed to the objective, stated purpose for which data was
collected, such as fraud prevention or direct marketing, offering more
contextual specificity than the blunt data minimization principles we see in
data protection law. But such a duty could also be shaped by the subjective
motives of the trustee and the best interests of the trusting party outside of a
cost/benefit analysis, like with a “legitimate interest” inquiry. The logic of

148. Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 6 MCGILL L.J. 235, 256–57 (2011).
149. Miller & Gold, supra note 123, at 557.
150. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
151. See Julian Velasco, Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK,
supra note 4, at 61, 66–68.
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a robust data minimization rule is that data that does not exist cannot form
the basis of self-dealing activity.
b. Invalidation of Attempted Waivers
One of the core failures of U.S. data privacy law is the ease with which
companies can extract waivers for duties. Mountains of otherwise
prohibited actions involving data collection, use, and disclosure are
routinely validated by the “I agree” button, by dense, confusing terms of
service, and by the deployment of choice architecture to manufacture
consent at the margins. This parody of knowing and voluntary consent has
undermined the entire endeavor of digital consent.
One function of a duty of loyalty could be to invalidate waivers that
attempt to relieve entrustees of obligations to avoid conflicted design or
processing. In other words, a duty of loyalty could mandate a non-waivable
baseline level of care, discretion, honesty, and protection for people. In this
way, duties of loyalty would align with Anita Allen’s proposal for coercive
privacy mandates that prohibit waiver.152
The notion that certain attempts to waive the duty of loyalty should be
legally invalid is already a key component of many fiduciary relationships,
including trusts153 and fact-based fiduciary relationships.154 Even in
corporate law, when statutes provide for the exculpation of certain fiduciary
responsibilities, they usually explicitly exclude the duty of loyalty from
waiver provisions.155 Julian Velasco concludes that this pattern “seem[s] to
suggest that the duty of loyalty (and good faith) is not subject to waiver,
which would be consistent with the common belief that the duty of loyalty
should be mandatory.”156 In trust law, for example, even exculpation clauses
in trusts “cannot exculpate bad faith, reckless indifference [to the interests
152. ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE?, at xii (2011) (“[I]n an
egalitarian liberal democracy, particularly if justified on broadly dignitarian grounds, legal policy
makers (1) must create strong privacy rights, of course; but, moreover, (2) must be open, in principle, to
coercive privacy mandates that impose unpopular privacies on intended targets and beneficiaries.”).
153. See Sitkoff, supra note 125, at 56.
154. See, e.g., Daniel B. Kelly, Fiduciary Principles in Fact-Based Fiduciary Relationships, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 3, 18 (“For fact-based fiduciaries, it appears that courts have
identified (or at least assumed) there are certain fiduciary principles that are mandatory, that is, that
cannot be waived or modified by agreement of the parties.”); Gold, supra note 110, at 393 (“Fiduciary
duties will sometimes trump contract obligations, often on the theory that the contract would be an
improper limitation on the fiduciary’s responsibilities to look out for her beneficiary’s best interests. In
that case, loyalty is not only a potential source of liability for the fiduciary, it is a limit on the existence
of what would ordinarily be third-party contact rights.”) (citing Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC
Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del. 1993) (“To the extent that a contract, or a provision thereof, purports
to require a board to act or not act in such a fashion as to limit the exercise of fiduciary duties, it is
invalid and unenforceable.”)).
155. See Velasco, supra note 151, at 61, 73.
156. Id.
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of the beneficiaries or to the terms and purposes of the trust], or intentional
or willful neglect by the trustee.”157
The key here is to ensure that farcical notions of “consent” combined
with the misguided trajectory of boilerplate contract law are not used to
vitiate the duty of loyalty. Judges can play a role with this, of course, taking
a cue from loyalty in other contexts. But even more useful would be a
statutory prohibition on waiver. For example, Senator Schatz’s “Data Care
Act” provides that with respect to its proposed duties of loyalty, “[t]he rights
and remedies provided under this Act may not be waived or limited by
contract or otherwise.”158
c. Disclosure and Nondisclosure Requirements
One common aspect of loyalty duties in fiduciary law is mandated
disclosure, often conceptualized in ways like the “duty to inform” and the
“duty to account,”159 and other methods of obligatory transparency and
notice.160 While mandated disclosure obligations are often conceptualized
as an obligation under the duty of care, when a failure to disclose something
conflicts with the best interests of the trusting party (with respect to their
exposure), it is probably better understood as disloyal behavior.
In our previous work on trust and privacy law, we have advocated for a
“duty of honesty” as an affirmative, super-charged version of the notice and
transparency notions built into the fair information practices and data
protection regimes around the world.161 We suggested that “the goal of
honesty-based disclosure . . . is broader than just informing. While notice
rules are horrible at informing people, they can be very good at generating
the skepticism necessary to avoid a misplaced trust.”162 Duties of honesty
are more substantive and have a stronger moral underpinning than mere
constructive notice requirements. This is because they (1) counsel entrustees
to disclose the things thatmatter most to the trusting party, particularly when
the disclosed information is something the entrustee would rather not see

157. See Sitkoff, supra note 125, at 56 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96 cmt. C
(AM. L. INST. 2012)).
158. Data Care Act of 2019, S. 2961, 116th Cong. § 5 (2019).
159. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82 (AM. L. INST. 2007).
160. Gold, supra note 110, at 391 (“A duty of disclosure is not always considered to be a loyalty
duty, but . . . it is sometimes understood in that way. Duties to share information, and to share it
accurately, are central to fiduciary law, and in certain cases they constitute loyalty obligations . . . .”).
161. Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 5, at 463–64; Privacy’s Trust Gap, supra note 5, at 2015;
Hartzog & Richards, supra note 6; Hartzog & Richards, supra note 16.
162. Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 5, at 463–64 (“Information practices that are secret or
shrouded in secrecy are inherently untrustworthy. Faced with such practices, skeptics act more
judiciously or refrain entirely from accepting risk, even if they aren’t entirely sure of what they are
avoiding or how likely an undesired action or effect is.”).
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the light of day, and also because (2) they place the burden of understanding
on the corporate speaker rather than on the human listener.
In this way the duty of loyalty could effectuate what Paul Ohm has
termed “forthright code.”163 Under Ohm’s proposal:
Forthrightness would obligate companies to be completely honest,
direct, and candid. Importantly, forthrightness would impose an
affirmative obligation to warn rather than a passive obligation to
inform. A forthright company will anticipate what a consumer does
not understand because of cognitive biases, information overload, or
other mechanisms that interfere with information comprehension,
and will be obligated to communicate important information in a way
that overcomes these barriers.164
Ohm notes the close relationship between loyalty and forthrightness,
explaining how although “[f]orthrightness and loyalty overlap quite a bit[,]
. . . my project supplements rather than diverges from loyalty.”165 While
Ohm ultimately concludes that loyalty “seems like an incomplete fit for the
casual, shifting, memetic, information ecosystem in which we find
ourselves these days,”166 we believe that a duty to be forthright is one of the
main ways in which a duty to be loyal could be conceptualized.
In addition to mandated disclosure obligations, the duty of loyalty could
dictate nondisclosure rules, as it does in other areas of fiduciary law. For
example, agents are not allowed to use or communicate confidential
information of the principle for their own (or anyone else’s) purposes if
disclosure would not be in the best interests of the trusting party.167 In
previous works we have advocated for a “duty of discretion,” which would
mean in certain contexts a duty of confidentiality.168 A duty of loyalty would
combine with the duty of care to prevent not just reckless and unreasonable
disclosures of personal information but also disclosures in conflict with the
best interests of the trusting party with respect to their exposure.
163. Paul Ohm, Forthright Code, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 471, 473 (2018).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 485. Ohm also noted the overlap between our own conceptualization of honesty and
his notion of forthrightness but distinguished the two, saying that forthrightness “suggests a higher
obligation to identify and share discreditable information than mere honesty” and that “honesty is such
a commonplace word with a broad range of shadings and connotations that I worry that it will be
misconstrued or manipulated to mean something less robust than Hartzog and Richards have proposed.
Forthrightness, being a narrower and less common word, is less susceptible to this kind of treatment.”
Id. at 487. While we think honesty and forthrightness are more synonymous in this context than Ohm
does, that possibly semantic debate is outside the scope of this Article.
166. Id. at 485.
167. See Deborah DeMott, Fiduciary Principles in Agency Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK,
supra note 4, at 23, 31–32.
168. Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 5, at 459; Privacy’s Trust Gap, supra note 5, at 1188,
2015; Hartzog & Richards, supra note 6, at 585; Hartzog & Richards, supra note 16, at 1747.
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2. Rebuttable Presumptions of Disloyal Activities
Another central weakness of the U.S. approach to data privacy is that, by
default, anything goes.169 Unlike most other data protection regimes around
the globe, the U.S. always allows data processing unless it is specifically
prohibited.170 A duty of loyalty could change that. In addition to substantive
prescriptive and proscriptive rules, a duty of loyalty could also be deployed
procedurally to shift the default status of certain design choices and data
processing activities into a rebuttable presumption of disloyalty.
Under this model, several different practices could be presumptively
conflicted and, thus, invalid. However, borrowing from the example of
corporate law, these conflicting actions might be allowed upon proof that
the behavior was justified. For example, perhaps a data protecton authority
or other disinterested ombuds or Internal Rreview Board-style board could
approve the actions of the entrustee. Or perhaps the presumption could be
left to litigation, where courts can apply the “entire fairness” test, with the
burden on the defendant to demonstrate fairness.171 Under this test, the
analysis is a comprehensive inquiry, incorporating multiple considerations
such as the costs and benefit to the trusting party, the benefit conferred to
the trustee, the expectations and foreseeability of risk, externalities, and
structural and relative power differentials, with no one factor being
decisive.172
Such a model is not foreign to American law; in fact, it is the basic model
taken for health privacy under the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Like our loyalty
framework, HIPAA is primarily relationship-based rather than data-based,
applying only to data disclosed to a “covered entity” as part of a health care
transaction.173 HIPAA also presumes consent for data use that is necessary
for the transaction—so called, “treatment, payment, or health care system
operations data.”174 Such uses are either in the best interests of the patient
(treatment) or necessary for the operation of the health care system that
provides such treatment (payment and operations). Any data uses beyond
those purposes require an exceptional consent that must satisfy a high bar
to be legally valid. HIPAA’s main problem is that it does not apply to a
broad enough category of relationships. Thus, it does not protect disclosed

169. MCGEVERAN, supra note 60, at 257.
170. William McGeveran has noted that the U.S. and E.U. approaches to data privacy “start from
converse assumptions about which data practices are permissible.” Id.
171. Gold, supra note 110, at 388.
172. See id.
173. See Woodrow Hartzog, Chain-Link Confidentiality, 46 GA. L. REV. 657, 676–77 (2012).
174. HIPAA Privacy Rules, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.506, 164.508.
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data outside of “covered entities” or their “business associates.”175
Nevertheless, HIPAA represents an excellent example of a loyalty-style
model working effectively in American law. We could do worse than to
look to it for guidance.
3. Guidance and Support for Other Duties
U.S. data privacy law often feels morally unmoored. As we have seen,
the fair information practices of notice, choice, consent, access, etc., which
famously undergird the entire data protection endeavor, frequently reduce
privacy frameworks into mere procedural exercises. Data privacy laws tend
to lack a clear sense of which intrinsic and instrumental values should be
guiding the interpretation and implementation of these frameworks.176 One
of the most important ways loyalty could contribute to data privacy law
would be to provide interpretive guidance for other data privacy rules. A
duty of loyalty could even help guarantee the due performance of every
other data privacy rule.177 Loyalty could be a backstop to help protect
against the dilution of all U.S. data privacy rules that govern information
relationships. In other words, privacy law would be better as a whole if we
asked less “have the procedures for data processing been followed” and
asked instead “does this data processing actually promote the best interests
of the human user?”
This is how loyalty works elsewhere in fiduciary law. Andrew Gold
explains that in jurisdictions that see various duties of care as “nonfiduciary,” duties of loyalty “may be understood as prophylactic duties,
designed to ensure a proper compliance with other, non-fiduciary duties.”178
The duty of loyalty can thus play “a distinct role in changing a fiduciary’s
incentives with respect to breaches of other obligations.”179 Most notably,
loyalty can be used to bolster the duty of care. The duty of care owed by a
fiduciary is different (and more robust in some ways) than the standard duty
of care owed in tort law.180

175. See Kirk Nahra, A Public Service Announcement About the HIPAA Privacy Rule, IAPP (June
18,
2021),
https://iapp.org/news/a/a-public-service-announcement-about-the-hipaa-privacy-rule/
[https://perma.cc/227R-J7S5].
176. See generally Hartzog & Richards, supra note 16; Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate,
Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV. 952 (2017); see also Bert-Jaap Koops, The
Trouble with European Data Protection Law, 4 INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 250 (2014).
177. See MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY: PROTECTING THE DUE PERFORMANCE OF
NON-FIDUCIARY DUTIES 62 (2010).
178. Gold, supra note 110, at 392.
179. Id.
180. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Fiduciary Duty of Care, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra
note 4, at 405, 407–08.
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As a check on and boost for other duties, a duty of loyalty could be used
to change business models by removing incentives for companies to act,
which is seen by many (including us) as a key cog in meaningful reform in
data privacy law. For companies, a duty of loyalty could also help
companies prioritize who they should be caring for first. In the past few
years, many of us have likely heard the saying “if you’re not paying for the
product, you are the product.”181 The pathologies of informational
capitalism drive this result. But a duty of loyalty would resolve the
ambiguity of who is supposed to be primarily cared for by those who traffic
personal information: people, not ad brokers or governments. Thus, loyalty
will help set the priority of duties, in addition to shaping their contours. The
question of who to be loyal to can be resolved with a simple maxim: When
in doubt, be loyal to those who trusted you with their exposure. This means,
for example, putting the interests of human consumers over those of
advertising clients.
IV. IMPLEMENTING A DUTY OF LOYALTY IN PRIVACY LAW
How, then, should a duty of loyalty be implemented and what activities,
specifically, should it apply to? In this Part we attempt to put some meat on
the bones of the theory of loyalty we articulated above. First, we articulate
four threshold conditions for a robust duty of loyalty to apply. Second, we
explore several different possible frameworks for implementing a duty of
loyalty in data privacy law.
A. When the Duty of Loyalty Should Arise
The duty of loyalty should arise whenever a person is susceptible to
exploitation within an information relationship where trust was invited and
given. Generally speaking, such a conclusion is the culmination of several
different factors, including the power one party has over another, the ability
for the party to resist that power to avoid harm or improve their situation,
the incentives for opportunistic behavior, the communication between the
parties, and the degree of exposure and reliance on trustworthy behavior.182
181. See Will Oremus, Are You Really the Product?, SLATE (Apr. 28, 2018, 5:55 AM),
https://slate.com/technology/2018/04/are-you-really-facebooks-product-the-history-of-a-dangerousidea.html [https://perma.cc/C8QE-DTR7].
182. See Paul B. Miller, The Identification of Fiduciary Relationships, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 367, 374) (identifying various factors implicating fiduciary responsibility,
including “the possession and exercise of legal authority and/or power by one person relative to another;
inequality in material position, power, strength or influence between the parties; the dependence and/or
vulnerability of one person upon another; a more specific susceptibility to harm, as where one’s assets
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Drawing from lessons of fiduciary and confidentiality law, we identify
four conditions that, when present, should give rise to a duty of loyalty.
Loyalty should be required (1) when trust is invited, (2) from people made
vulnerable by exposure, (3) when the trustee has control over people’s
online experiences and data processing, and (4) when people trust data
collectors with their exposure.183
1. When Trust Is Invited
One of the key components for determining whether a fiduciary owes
duties of care and loyalty is whether the alleged fiduciary invited a person
to trust them with their assets or well-being in a manner that would make
them vulnerable to the actions of the fiduciary.184
Companies offering online services are constantly inviting consumers to
trust them. They do so explicitly and implicitly through words, design, and
context. In previous work, we have called these invitations “trust
indicators”; those signals given off by companies through their words and
the design of their digital services.185 Ari Waldman has also noted that
invitations of trust are not merely explicit. Such invitations are shaped by
the relative experience of the parties, explicit and implicit social cues, and
other indicia inviting a voluntary vulnerability through exposure.186
Informational capitalism demands your personal data and your attention.
Consequently, companies do everything within their power to make you feel
safe to expose yourself online. They plaster their websites with privacy and
trust seals, aspirational and encouraging language, padlock icons, and
enough privacy settings to spend a lifetime fiddling with in order to make

or person is placed at risk of conversion or exploitation; the exchange of confidential or private
information; a repose of trust and/or confidence; the legal or actual incapacity of a party and/or a
complete or situational inability to engage in monitoring, reporting, or other forms of self-protection;
the reliance of one person upon another; or, one person’s expectation of goodwill, altruism, loyalty or
competent or considered advice or judgement from another”).
183. Generally speaking, courts find that one ought to be bound by a duty of care and loyalty when
there is “(1) [a] dependence or vulnerability by one party on the other, that (2) results in power being
conferred on the other, (3) such that the entrusting party is not able to protect itself effectively, . . . and
(4) this entrustment has been solicited or accepted by the party on which the fiduciary obligation is
imposed.” Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. PromisesBetrayed. Metaphor, Analog, and the New
Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 922.
184. See Kelly, supra note 154, at 7.
185. Woodrow Hartzog, Reviving Implied Confidentiality, 89 IND. L.J. 763, 795 (2014); see
generally HARTZOG, supra note 61; Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 5.
186. WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE, supra
note 6, at 72.
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you feel comfortable exposing yourself.187 Privacy policies predictably start
with comforting language meant to reassure the reader they are safe, like
“Here at Tech Company we take your privacy seriously” or “Your privacy
is our top priority.” Social media companies promise ephemerality (even
when it is not true)188 and make bold (and often false) statements, sometimes
explicitly promising that certain services are the “safest place on the
Internet.”189
Because the modern business model for technology companies is to
extract as much labor, attention, and data from people as possible,
convincing people to expose themselves online is an existential matter for
companies. While it can be difficult at times to isolate invitations of trust
from puffery and the general functionality of an online service, courts have
identified various factors that, when considered in their totality, constitute
an invitation of trust.190 These include the nature of the relationship between
the parties, whether particular kinds of exposure were solicited through
words or design, the nature of the exposure or sensitivity of the disclosure,
the relative vulnerability or sophistication of the parties, the room for
negotiation, the nature of the signals given off, and how context shapes their
likely interpretation.191 But most of the time, for most websites, apps, and
other digital services, trust will be invited within the meaning of this test.
2. From People Made Vulnerable by Exposure
The degree of a trusting party’s vulnerability is the second important
consideration when it comes to the existence of fiduciary duties like loyalty.
This factor focuses on just how dangerous it can be for people to expose
themselves online. The relevant inquiry here is not just how much
information a trusting party shares with a company but also the nature of
the information revealed and the utility of that data to third parties. The more
information that is exposed and the more attractive it is to companies, the
more precarious people’s situations become. This is particularly true for
sensitive information, which can be used to shame, embarrass, harass,
blackmail, and manipulate. But even seemingly anodyne information can be
used to deny people employment opportunities, increase their insurance,
187. See generally HARTZOG, supra note 61; Woodrow Hartzog, Promises and Privacy:
Promissory Estoppel and Confidential Disclosure in Online Communities, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 891 (2009);
Hartzog, Website Design As Contract, supra note 139; Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman,
Obscurity by Design, 88 WASH. L. REV. 385 (2013).
188. Complaint, In re Snapchat, Inc., 2014 FTC LEXIS 313 (Fed. Trade Comm’n, Dec. 23, 2014).
189. Drew Harwell, Secret-sharing App Whisper Left Users’ Locations, Fetishes Exposed on the
Web, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/03/10/secretsharing-app-whisper-left-users-locations-fetishes-exposed-web/.
190. Hartzog, supra note 185, at 775–76.
191. Id. at 777–94.
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disadvantage them in their dealings with others, harm their reputation, and
leverage their identity to defraud others.192 This is to say nothing of the
slow-but-steady creep of surveillance that threatens to chill behavior in
accretive ways.193
A duty of loyalty would be sensitive to people’s vulnerabilities due to
their exposure. The more vulnerable people become due to invited trusts,
the greater loyalty the law would demand from trusted parties. Looking to
vulnerabilities focuses on potential outcomes for the weaker party in
modern information relationships.
The collection and processing of personal data is just one of many ways
people are made vulnerable. For example, when consumers enter a digitally
mediated environment, they by definition relinquish a certain amount of
agency. The constraints of interacting in an app interface or web page mean
that consumers can only choose from the options that are presented to them.
They can only click on the buttons, drop down menus, and settings that
companies want them to have. They can only view that which is preconstructed and selected for them. This leaves them susceptible to, among
other things, manipulation.194 People are targeted, nudged, wheedled,
cajoled, shamed, denied, confirmed, and worn down until they act in the
precise way a company wants. Anyone who has mindlessly clicked on the
shiny “I agree” button or relented in the face of countless requests from
mobile apps to “turn on notifications” has experienced this kind of mediated
interface-driven manipulation.
There is more. When consumers trust their data and experiences to
companies, they become largely helpless to the decisions those companies
make about them and for them. Companies use artificial intelligence to
predict consumers’ actions, which shapes what they see, for how long they
see it, and who else on the internet sees them. Companies extract human
attention and limit our knowledge of the world using ranking algorithms and
predictive analytics that offer up only “relevant content.” Our individual
192. See generally Citron & Solove, supra note 102; Solove & Citron, supra note 105; Calo, supra
note 105; Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735 (2015); CITRON, supra note 3. See
also Ignacio N. Cofone & Adriana Z. Robertson, Privacy Harms, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (2018); Joel
R. Reidenberg, N. Cameron Russell, Alexander J. Callen, Sophia Qasir & Thomas B. Norton, Privacy
Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and Choice Framework, 11 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y
485 (2015); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2008).
193. See NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY (2015); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of
Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935 (2013); Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Surveillance
As Loss of Obscurity, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1343, 1376–77 (2015); Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling
Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full-Disclosure Future, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1153
(2011); David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 69
(2013).
194. See HARTZOG, supra note 61; Calo, supra note 50; Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen
Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 2
(2019); Ido Kilovaty, Legally Cognizable Manipulation, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 449, 461–78 (2019).
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capacity to contribute to the democratic endeavor of self-governance is to a
significant degree in the hands of such “unaccountable, transnational
authority.”195 Loyalty, however, can protect us and ensure that we do not
trust only at our peril. For if our vulnerability in mediated environments is
connected to a duty of loyalty, there is more assurance that the “relevant”
content is relevant to us, rather than to companies and their paying advertiser
customers.
The key lies in companies’ abilities to collect so many kinds of
information and shape our experiences. As one of us has written elsewhere:
Design is power. Design is political. Design is everywhere.196 Companies
leverage the design of information technologies to extract our consent to
information collection and processing, then subsequently collect that
information to gain prescient knowledge about what makes us tick, then use
that knowledge to extract more data about us and harvest our attention, and
then the cycle continues. Loyalty places limits on the power that information
and design confer, preventing risks of opportunism and promoting properly
placed trust.
3. And When Trust Is Given
In fiduciary law, courts are more likely to recognize a duty of loyalty
when trust and confidence are actually placed in the entrusted.197 Trust can
can be manifested explicitly but also implicitly through actions as people
acquiesce to the constraints, terms, and environment.198
We have little choice these days but to place our well-being in the hands
of companies who seek such exposure and have such control over us.
Jennifer Cobbe and Elettra Bietti wrote that in the wake of the COVID-19
pandemic:
Daily life—including friendships, relationships, family connections,
education, employment, healthcare, finances and much more—will
be mediated by platform companies such as Google and Facebook
that see our human interactions and relationships as content to be
moderated, and as sources of data to be monetized. Amazon is
already becoming a primary source of supplies, delivering food and
other goods to our door. We are coming to rely increasingly on
platforms for our every social and material need.199

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Cobbe & Bietti, supra note 19.
See HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT, supra note 61, at 279.
See Kelly, supra note 154, at 7.
See generally Hartzog, supra note 185.
Cobbe & Bietti, supra note 19.
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To pretend that our relationship with companies that offer online services
is an arm’s-length transaction, as though they were street-corner hot dog
vendors, makes a mockery of legal structures put in place precisely in
recognition that some relationships are far more dangerous than others. In
such situations, only loyalty is specifically tailored to prevent the full range
of opportunistic behavior that stems from such a steep power imbalance and
deep exposure of ourselves to the whims of those who would otherwise strip
us for parts.
B. Possible Loyalty Frameworks
So where, exactly, does the rubber meet the road for a duty of loyalty in
privacy law? We believe that loyalty rules could and should manifest in a
variety of ways, from general and ad hoc relational duties, to rules designed
to discourage disloyal behavior, and to equitable remedies. We argue that
loyalty should be implemented or recognized in statutes, administrative
action and regulations, the common law, and even in constitutional
protections.
We propose that the best way to think about loyalty frameworks is in
tiers. First, all major data players should be bound (ideally by statute) by a
relational duty of loyalty to those whose data they hold. Courts and
regulators could also look to specific promises of loyalty and care regarding
people’s exposure to impose ad hoc loyalty obligations. This would be the
most robust form of a duty of loyalty in privacy law. Second, we propose
lawmakers and regulators create rules and frameworks to mitigate, prohibit,
or create incentives against disloyal actions in specific contexts. This could
be thought of as a loyalty agenda or loyalty rules outside of the confines of
relational duties. Finally, we explore remedies for breaches of loyalty and
how loyalty might affect the developing law of standing.
1. General and Ad-Hoc Relational Duties
One of the most important traits of U.S. data privacy law and data
protection regimes around the world is that they rarely differentiate between
large, powerful organizations and small, weaker ones. Section Five of the
FTC Act applies more or less equally to Amazon as it does to your
neighborhood pizza shop. The same goes for the GDPR in the E.U. Big or
small, you are prohibited from lying or harming people and obligated to
follow the fair information practices. Universality is certainly useful if you
want broad applicability. But there is a world of difference between
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Facebook and your local coffee shop. Privacy law is about power,200 and
privacy law should be sensitive to the contexts in which that power is
amassed and used.201
In other words, the obligations of loyalty owed by companies should be
roughly proportional to the amount of power they have over people.202 This
could be measured using several different metrics, including market power,
time spent using the service, amount of data collected, the nature of the data
collected, degree of vulnerability, and the function of the service offered
(e.g., core, multi-purpose, entertainment, etc.). The businesses in the top
tier—those with the most power over people using their services due to their
exposure and, consequently, the highest risk for opportunism—should be
subjected to the most robust version of a duty of loyalty in privacy law.
Specifically, they should be bound by a general relational duty of loyalty
owed to those who entrust these companies with their data and online
experiences. As described above, this would include specific prohibitions
on conflicted design and data processing, invalidation of attempted waivers,
disclosure requirements, and the full suite of rebuttable presumptions
against specific kinds of disloyal activities and guidance for shaping other
obligations.
The big five tech companies (Apple, Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and
Facebook) would fit in this tier. But so too would many businesses
commonly referred to as “platforms,” like Uber; social media companies,
like Twitter; and large credit and data brokers. But this tier could include
more. Regulators might even want to create a bright line associated with
large amounts of data collection and the pathologies of informational
capitalism. One idea could be to look to whether a company requires a user
to create an account and log in to use its service. This would be evidence of
looking to create a more lasting information relationship than a single
transaction.
Other companies that could be made subject to general relational duties
of loyalty would be those deploying artificial intelligence technologies to
make significant decisions about people who use their services. Consider
the language of a bill introduced in Washington State in 2020, which
required that: “[a] person may not use artificial intelligence-enabled
profiling to make decisions that produce legal effects or similarly significant
200.
201.

RICHARDS, WHY PRIVACY MATTERS, supra note 27.
Cf. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, PRIVACY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 6 (2010) (arguing that expectations and thus privacy rules should vary
depending upon the social understandings of particular contexts).
202. This is, of course, the entire function of distinguishing fiduciary versus arm’s-length
relationships. But in the information ecosystem, a little more nuance is necessary given the diversity of
relationships and services, the unprecedented power of platforms, and the exceptional nature of modern
mediated experiences generally.
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effects concerning consumers.”203 The bill clarified that “[d]ecisions that
include legal effects or similarly significant effects concerning consumers
include, without limitation, denial or degradation of consequential services
or support, such as financial or lending services, housing, insurance,
educational enrollment, criminal justice, employment opportunities, health
care services, and access to basic necessities, such as food and water.”204
Tech companies amass power not just through the ability to collect personal
data but also because they control the environment in which people expose
themselves. General relational duties of loyalty could mitigate some of the
most egregious self-dealing and opportunism inherent in modern design of
digital tools and data processing.
Beyond general duties of loyalty for certain kinds of relationships,
lawmakers and judges should also consider the imposition of duties of
loyalty based not on a party’s relational status but on the particular facts of
a case. Even full fiduciary obligations can be imposed on these grounds.205
The triggers for such ad hoc responsibilities that are most consistent with
existing fiduciary law are the four criteria identified above. These criteria
are also consistent with the factors relevant to judges when finding implied
obligations of confidentiality.206
2. Rules Encouraging Loyal Behavior
In addition to obligating a duty of loyalty within information
relationships, lawmakers could also embrace a loyalty agenda. This would
mean crating rules and frameworks designed to prospectively encourage
fidelity prescriptively and to discourage opportunistic behavior regardless
of whether a company owes specific obligations within specific
relationships. Such an approach might be particularly useful for frameworks
meant to apply to specific industries, such as ad tech, or to mitigate specific
practices, such as negative option marketing and billing.207
One specific example where loyalty-inspired rules (as opposed to
relational duties) might be effective is in the area of abusive design. We
have explained elsewhere how “[abusive] design interferes with our ability
to understand what we perceive or intentionally exploits our willpower to
203. H.R.
Res.
2644,
66th
Leg.,
H-3930.2
(Wash.
2020),
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2019-20/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/2644.pdf
[https://perma.cc/47ZF-F6FV].
204. Id.
205. Kelly, supra note 154.
206. See Hartzog, supra note 185, at 776–77.
207. See FTC, NEGATIVE OPTIONS: A REPORT BY THE STAFF OF THE FTC’S DIVISION OF
ENFORCEMENT (Jan. 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/negative-optionsfederal-trade-commission-workshop-analyzing-negative-option-marketing-reportstaff/p064202negativeoptionreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/YLC8-QZGL].
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resist sharing and data extraction.”208 Sometimes design lies to us outright,
like a “click to cancel” button that actually does somethine else. However,
abusive design is more subtle; it uses our own internal limitations against
us.
The notion of abusive design can be found in consumer protection law,
which aims to protect authentic consumer choice. The most prominent
prohibition on abusive practices in the United States comes from the
relatively new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act authorized the
CFPB to prohibit any “abusive” act or practice that:
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand
a term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of—
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service;
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the
consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or
service; or
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to
act in the interests of the consumer.209
Rules against abusive trade practices are designed precisely to prevent
opportunistic behavior by those with the ability to exploit our entrusted
vulnerabilities. The elements of this prohibition essentially mirror the
criteria for ad hoc fiduciary relationships. Lawmakers and judges should set
standards to prohibit design that unreasonably exploits our cognitive
limitations, biases, and predictable errors to undermine autonomous
decisionmaking. By doing so, they will be creating rules to discourage
disloyal behavior.

208. HARTZOG, supra note 61.
209. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5531(d) (West 2010) (emphasis added) (“The Bureau shall have no authority
under this section to declare an act or practice abusive in connection with the provision of a consumer
financial product or service, unless the act or practice–(1) materially interferes with the ability of a
consumer to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or (2) takes
unreasonable advantage of–(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the material risks,
costs, or conditions of the product or service; (B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of
the consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or service; or (C) the reasonable reliance
by the consumer on a covered person to act in the interests of the consumer.”).
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3. Remedies
Loyalty frameworks would also have real virtues in providing remedies
to consumers. A breach of a duty of loyalty would be a per se legal injury
that could solve the standing problem that has plagued privacy litigation,
particularly since the Spokeo case. Recall that Spokeo and Ramirez require
a concrete legal injury, such as “an alleged intangible harm [that] has a close
relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a
basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”210 Breaches of a duty of
loyalty have been recognized by English and American courts in the
fiduciary context for hundreds of years,211 so an alleged breach of a duty of
loyalty would satisfy the Spokeo/Ramirez test under its express terms.
Moreover, the injury caused by a breach of the duty of loyalty is the harm
to the trust in the relationship rather than a pecuniary or emotional injury.
Given the intense scrutiny in standing doctrine over whether certain
disclosures cause “concrete” harm, we anticipate that loyalty litigation
would have real advantages over tort claims that focus on the more
intangible consequences of privacy invasions.212
V. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
There are, of course, several potential objections to the duty of loyalty in
privacy law that we propose in this Article. Many of these objections are
based on efficacy concerns. Would such a duty accomplish its ostensible
goals given potential legal conflicts and the realities of how power is
amassed and used? Others are based upon concerns about the costs such a
duty would impose on companies. No proposal is free from externalities and
unintended consequences. While these concerns are duly noted, we believe
that the costs and risks of a duty of loyalty are morally and pragmatically
justified and that the duty can be made to be consistent with potentially
adverse frameworks and values. The law has already provided multiple
blueprints for success. A duty of loyalty can work for U.S. data privacy law.
But it will take political will and a commitment to move beyond the
traditional approach of privacy as control over data.

210. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016); see also TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141
S. Ct. 2190, 2200 (2021).
211. See Joshua Getzler, Fiduciary Principles in English Common Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 471, 471–473.
212. We expand on this point in Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, The Surprising Virtues of
Data Loyalty, 71 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2022).
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A. Loyalty Is Too Vague
Even with some nuanced and subsidiary duties, a duty of loyalty in
privacy law will be to some extent vague or, in the language of the law,
indeterminate. Companies will likely object in ways that echo their
dissatisfaction with the spaciousness of the FTC’s unfairness standard,
which broadly applies to all commercial activity that unavoidably harms
consumers.213 But there are three important points to make about the
vagueness of a duty of loyalty. The first is that loyalty, like all standards in
the law (i.e. negligence) will produce clarity over time. The objections to
the indeterminacy of loyalty are virtually identical to those of negligence.
Yet with negligence, we consider its indeterminacy—its flexibility—to be
as much a strength as a weakness. What companies label as indeterminate,
we label as adaptable over time in the face of rapid technological change.
Indeterminate standards like those in negligence, the Fourth Amendment,
and the FTC’s unfairness framework have ensured that it can apply to new
technologies like the automobile, handheld cameras, and heat sensors and
new phenomena, like negative-option marketing and micro-influencers.
Second, some vagueness can be a virtue, and not just because standards
have broad applicability. Indeterminate obligations help mitigate against
companies gaming the system. When companies are not told exactly what
they need to do to comply, they are likely to err on the side of caution and
exercise more restraint than just getting “right up to the creepy line and not
cross[ing] it.” 214 A judicious level of indeterminacy helps protect against
companies adopting a threadbare and disingenuous compliance mentality,
whereby nominal checks of a box offer a pretense of loyalty while doing
little in practice to discourage opportunism and abuse.215
Third, flexible standards can evolve with the times. While some critics
of a duty of loyalty might argue that it is too vague,216 other critics argue
that law cannot keep pace with technology.217 One undeniable virtue of a
standards-based approach to law is that the specific can be traded off for
213. See generally Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data
Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2237–39 (2015).
214. Nick Saint, Eric Schmidt: Google’s Policy Is to “Get Right Up to the Creepy Line and Not
Cross It,” BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 1, 2010, 1:44 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/eric-schmidtgoogles-policy-is-to-get-right-up-to-the-creepy-line-and-not-cross-it-2010-10 [https://perma.cc/7LB224PT].
215. For evidence that such a mentality is endemic in the tech industry, see ARI EZRA WALDMAN,
INDUSTRY UNBOUND: THE INSIDE STORY OF PRIVACY, DATA, AND CORPORATE POWER (2021).
216. See Julie E. Cohen, Scaling Trust and Other Fictions, LPE PROJECT (May 29, 2019),
https://lpeproject.org/blog/scaling-trust-and-other-fictions/ [https://perma.cc/7746-6ZJT]; Pozen &
Khan, supra note 6; James Grimmelman, When All You Have Is a Fiduciary, LPE PROJECT (May 30,
2019), https://lpeproject.org/blog/when-all-you-have-is-a-fiduciary/ [https://perma.cc/M8VN-5DED].
217. For a critique of the perceived “pacing problem” in the law, see generally JOSH A. T.
FAIRFIELD, RUNAWAY TECHNOLOGY: CAN LAW KEEP UP? (2020).
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flexibility and the ability to evolve over time. Thus, it should be no surprise
that the two most important privacy rules in the United States are not just
flexible standards but very old ones—the 1789 Fourth Amendment standard
of “unreasonable searches and seizures” and the 1938 FTC standard of
“unfair and deceptive acts or practices”—that predate the computer but
which have remained relevant in the age of mobile phones, cloud
computing, social networking, and GPS trackers.218
Moreover, even indeterminate standards can solidify into rules over time
through the natural accretive process of the common law. Robert Sitkoff has
argued that this has reduced the “uncertainty and decision costs inherent to
the standards-based nature of the primary duties of loyalty and care.”219 One
of the main ways to bring clarity to loyalty is through subsidiary duties
similar to those we have proposed above. Sitkoff argues further that a
layered approach incorporating the wisdom of voluminous and diffuse
interpretations of a rule helps provide clarity “by specifying how the duties
of loyalty and care should be applied to recurring circumstances.”220 Over
time, the natural accretive process of the law might result in subsidiary
duties in specific recurring contexts.221 By allowing the natural accretive
process of law to run its course, society can benefit from organically formed
and nuanced rules in specific contexts, like guidance on whether and when
microtargeting is disloyal or when manipulative interfaces conflict with
trusting parties’ best interests.
B. The Problems of Conflicting Loyalties
In their critique of the information fiduciaries model and its duty of
loyalty, Lina Khan and David Posen raise the issue of crosscutting
loyalties—that is, the conflict that can occur when a large company like
Facebook owes a duty of loyalty to both people who use Facebook as well
as the company’s shareholders.222 The idea is that the obligation to
maximize the wealth of the shareholders might conflict with an obligation
of fidelity to people who trust the company with their data.223
This worry seems misplaced or surmountable, at least with respect to the
kind of loyalty duties we propose here. Khan and Pozen note that one
argument to resolve multiple loyalties might be to simply subordinate a
director’s duties to stockholders to their duties to users when the two

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 15 U.S.C. § 45.
Sitkoff, supra note 142, at 425.
Id.
Id.
Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 534.
Id.

2021]

A DUTY OF LOYALTY FOR PRIVACY LAW

1015

collide.224 In fact, fiduciary law has adapted to regularly resolve conflicting
loyalties.225 Khan and Pozen themselves note this argument is similar to how
“a law firm partner’s duties to her fellow partners must sometimes give way
to her duties to clients.”226 But you do not even have to leave the law of
corporate fiduciaries for a blueprint on how to deal with loyalty owed to
more than one party or in pursuit or more than one interest. Andrew Gold
explains that corporate fiduciary relationships are often specifically
designed to serve multiple people.227 Even shareholders inevitably have
interests that diverge from each other.228 Gold noted, “In some cases, the
response to these challenges is to develop a hierarchy of obligations.”229
We argue that trusting, vulnerable people should take primacy over
shareholders. Sometimes, Gold wrote,
conflicts among best interests obligations are unavoidable. Where
such conflicts exist, one answer is to find that loyalty must manifest
itself as fairness and reasonableness. Another answer is to impose a
duty of impartiality. In that case, it may be enough to show due regard
to the beneficiaries’ respective interests.230
Alternately, Gold noted, “one might emphasize the rule of law, or focus on
. . . conscientiousness. Quite possibly, the fiduciary should need to
demonstrate that she has shown a genuine commitment to the ends of her
beneficiary; this is different from acting for a beneficiary’s exclusive
benefit.”231
Khan and Pozen make a descriptive point in response to the idea that the
law should prioritize a company’s loyalty to people who expose themselves
over shareholders in the event of a conflict: “it runs counter to the prevailing
understanding of Delaware doctrine—which, according to the Chief Justice
of the Delaware Supreme Court, ‘could not have been more clear’ since the
mid-1980s ‘that directors of a for-profit corporation must at all times pursue
the best interests of the corporation's stockholders.’”232 But a duty of loyalty
in privacy law would be cashed out in prescriptions and proscriptions
similar to every other law that imposes costs but still allows for-profit
224. Id. at 508.
225. See Andrew F. Tuch, A General Defense of Information Fiduciaries, 98 WASH. U. L. REV.
1898, 1908–11 (2021).
226. Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 508.
227. Gold, supra note 110, at 398.
228. Id. Gold noted, “Moreover, each new issuance of stock will result in new fiduciary
obligations that potentially are in tension with the obligations owed to the existing shareholders.
Bankruptcy law offers an especially salient instance of potentially conflicting duties.” Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 508.
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corporations to maximize wealth for stockholders. The law of negligence,
implied obligations of confidentiality, the GDPR, the FTC’s prohibition on
unfair and deceptive trade practices, and countless other rules impose costs
on companies that cause them to obtain less wealth off the backs of users
than they might otherwise get were they free to do anything they wished.
And of course, to the extent a duty of loyalty might be imposed through a
federal law justified by the Commerce Clause, such a federal obligation
would be supreme over conflicting state law rules the same way that the
federal minimum wage is.
A duty of loyalty in privacy law would not require companies to serve
every best interest of their users in all aspects of their lives—only to the
extent of their entrusted exposure with respect to the design of their tools
and the processing of personal data. And to the extent Delaware law blocks
a hierarchy of loyalties where wealth maximization is subservient, we repeat
our argument from previous work that privacy law is not just about
protecting data. It is also about, among other things, restructuring corporate
organization and incentives.233 Khan and Pozen argue that “informationfiduciary advocates generally appear to endorse a . . . strategy for managing
conflicts between stockholders and users, which is to cabin any fiduciary
duties afforded to users so that they do not seriously threaten firm value.”234
But our proposal would provide no such shield, even if it required the kind
of “heavy-handed government intervention” of which Khan, Pozen, and
others seem skeptical.235 After all, the relentless pursuit of maximizing
wealth by taking advantage of people’s levels of exposure is exactly what
got us into this mess.236
C. The Problem Is Broader than Just Data Collectors
One obvious limitation to a relational duty of loyalty is that many actors
in our digital ecosystem would not be bound by it. Data brokers,
surveillance companies, and a host of others would be free to exploit our

233. See Hartzog & Richards, supra note 114.
234. Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 509.
235. Id. at 504 (quoting Jonathan Zittrain, How to Exercise the Power You Didn’t Ask For, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Sept. 19, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/09/how-to-exercise-the-power-you-didnt-ask-for
[https://perma.cc/23UM-2GCS]).
236. Khan and Pozen correctly note, “[l]ike other corporations with comparable business models,
Facebook therefore has a strong economic incentive to maximize the amount of time users spend on the
site and to collect and commodify as much user data as possible. By and large, addictive user behavior
is good for business. Divisive and inflammatory content is good for business. Deterioration of privacy
and confidentiality norms is good for business. Reforms to make the site less addictive, to deemphasize
sensationalistic material, and to enhance personal privacy would arguably be in the best interests of
users. Yet each of these reforms would also pose a threat to Facebook’s bottom line and therefore to the
interests of shareholders.” Id. at 505–06.
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data without having to consider what is best for the data subject. This
concern traces all the way back to Warren and Brandeis, who fretted that
confidentiality is of limited use against the prying eyes of strangers.237 But
we think there are two factors that mitigate this concern.
First, we are not advocating for a duty of loyalty in privacy law in place
of a robust data protection regime. We are arguing for a duty of loyalty in
addition to it. One of the hallmarks of the GDPR is that the obligations
regarding collection and processing follow the data downstream.238 So,
while loyalty might only apply within the confines of a relationship, data
protection rules apply to everyone that touches the data. In this way, the
powerful but incomplete protections of both a data protection and a data
loyalty approach can complement each other nicely.
Additionally, a duty of loyalty could be implemented in such a way as to
make most of the data players faithful by implementing protection at the
source of data collection and requiring that protections follow past initial
disclosure. In previous research, we have argued in favor of a “chain link”
approach to relational privacy rules.239 Under this approach, lawmakers
would directly or through the use of mandated terms in contracts link the
disclosure of personal information to obligations of loyalty to protect
information as it is disclosed downstream. To create the chain of protection,
contracts would be used to link each new recipient of information to a
previous recipient who wished to disclose the information.
These contracts would contain at least three kinds of terms:
(1) obligations and restrictions on the use of the disclosed
information, (2) requirements to bind future recipients to the same
obligations and restrictions, and (3) requirements to perpetuate the
contractual chain—i.e., to contractually obligate future recipients to
continue the chain of contractual obligation if they wish to further
disclose the information.240
HIPAA and data security law already impose chain-link protections on
those who share information with “business associates,” and the GDPR
requires something similar on EU companies that transfer data to the US or
other jurisdictions whose privacy laws are not up to the European
standard.241 If lawmakers so wished, they could emulate this model and

237.
(1890).
238.
239.
240.
241.

See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
See Jones & Kaminski, supra note 93, at 96.
Woodrow Hartzog, Chain-Link Confidentiality, 46 GA. L. REV. 657, 659 (2012).
Id. at 683.
HIPAA Privacy Rules, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.310, 164.504(e); GDPR, supra note 56, at art. 45.
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mandate specific prohibitions and rules in the contracts between entrustees
and those with whom they share information.
D. Fiduciary Models Risk Entrenching the Status Quo
Khan and Pozen in particular worry that broadly applicable duties of
care, loyalty, and confidentiality, “if pursued with any real vigor, would
tend to cannibalize rather than complement procompetition reforms.”242
Their argument seems to paint the regulatory picture as a choice between
competing options. From this perspective, regulators who choose to get
serious about competition law will lack the political capital for privacy law
reform. While this may be possible, we think it is ultimately a false choice.
Competition law and privacy law are not in conflict and they are certainly
not mutually exclusive. Quite the opposite. Even loyal companies might
need to be broken up. Even small companies with little market power can
be disloyal.
We have argued elsewhere that we will not have comprehensive privacy
reform until we solve corporal/competitive issues, relational issues, data
issues, and the externalities imposed by the personal information industrial
complex.243 Even before a duty of loyalty was seriously considered by
lawmakers, reform anywhere was hard to come by. Lawmakers are in for a
fight no matter which path they take. Competition law itself could use a
boost, as privacy law has not been the only regime enfeebled by decades of
deregulatory zeal. A more cohesive approach to tech policy reform might
be the rising tide that can lift all boats.
More fundamentally, Khan and Pozen argue that duties of loyalty and
care that target “con artist[ry]” will invite the dominant tech firms to “shun
a small set of behaviors and then claim the mantle of trustworthiness, both
narrowing the scope of public debate and normalizing the basic operations
of surveillance capitalism.”244 We do not think that is the correct
conceptualization of how a duty of loyalty should or would operate, nor is
it the likely outcome of a duty of loyalty if paired with a robust and holistic
approach to data privacy with strong enforcement mechanisms. As we have
argued in this Article, taken seriously, loyalty obligations would reinterpret
people as precious and authoritative, not products to be exploited. Such a
reorganization of priorities is built to resist the core pathologies of
informational capitalism, taking it head-on and bringing it to heel.
We are not asserting that any of the information capitalists are too big to
fail. Similarly, we do not believe a duty of loyalty would ratify their business
242.
243.
244.

Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 537.
Hartzog & Richards, supra note 16, at 1739–40.
Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 540.
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model. But critically, neither are we saying we want to burn the entire digital
ecosystem to the ground. What we are saying is that if companies want to
do business by inviting our exposure, there should be ground rules, and the
first and foremost of these should be loyalty. When the law guarantees
loyalty, there can be trust, and through trust lies sustainability, something
that is good for everyone.
E. The End of Targeted Ads?
It is possible that a duty of loyalty could mean the de facto end of some
business models and practices. Lawmakers might significantly affect the
future of advertising, particularly ads that are targeted based upon
surveillance. Would a loyalty approach spell the end of targeted ads? Under
our approach, targeted ads could not continue in their current form but might
continue if they are pursued in a transparent and loyal manner. For the last
two decades, surveillance-based advertising (whether first- or third-party)
has been justified either based on economic necessity or on the basis that
“more relevant ads” are “better” ads.245 As the internet advertising industry
is fond of quipping, “who would want less relevant ads?”246 But this rhetoric
intentionally obscures the multiple meanings of “relevance.” If “more
relevant” is truly in the best interests and wishes of exposed parties, then
targeted ads of economic necessity to the company can be loyal. But when
“more relevant” comes to mean (as it too often does on the contemporary
internet) “more of the things that we think we can sell the consumers to
please our advertisers,” then it is disloyal. A duty of loyalty to consumers
means putting customers first over advertisers. If this means the end of twosided advertising markets, so be it. If this jeopardizes the current corrosive
practices of microtargeting in general, then we will all be better off for it.247
The internet was justified as a vehicle for human connection, empowerment,
and commerce.248 While advertising may be a necessary evil to achieve
some of those purposes, it should not become an end in itself.

245. See generally ZUBOFF, supra note 3.
246. See, e.g., Dawn C. Chmielewski, Mark Zuckerberg Says “We Didn’t Take a Broad Enough
View Of Our Responsibility” As He Faces Senate Questions, DEADLINE (Apr. 10, 2018, 4:09 PM),
https://deadline.com/2018/04/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-testimony-senate-hearing-1202361762/
[https://perma.cc/P9FT-F7ME] (quoting Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg testifying that “Even
though some people do not like ads, people do not want ads that are irrelevant. . . . The overwhelming
feedback we get from our community [is that] people would rather have relevant content than not.”).
247. Representative Eshoo’s proposed ban on political microtargeting could be seen as a bright
line approach prohibiting disloyal behavior. See Press Release, Congresswoman Anna G. Eshoo, Rep.
Eshoo Introduces Bill to Ban Microtargeted Political Ads (May 26, 2020),
https://eshoo.house.gov/media/press-releases/rep-eshoo-introduces-bill-ban-microtargeted-politicalads [https://perma.cc/T5FL-6ABW].
248. See generally TURNER, supra note 1.
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CONCLUSION
A duty of loyalty for privacy has the potential to change how platforms
do business. It could also build trust in our digital society in ways that
existing models of privacy protection have failed to achieve. It is worth
noting, as we conclude, that though we are privacy scholars, we lack the
hubris to suggest that privacy law alone can solve all the problems of our
digital transformation. We have argued elsewhere that if we want to build a
digital future that is just, fair, and promotes human flourishing, many bodies
of law must be brought to bear, and where necessary, transformed.249
Corporate law, environmental law, civil rights law, consumer protection
law, competition law, and First Amendment law, among others, must all be
enlisted in the task. But privacy law must play a special role in these efforts
for two important reasons. First, privacy and data protection law are the set
of tools that the Western world has been using for the last few decades to
deal with these problems. Issues of the ethical processing of human data
have typically been thought of in terms of privacy/data protection, and this
model has done a good job on the whole, though like many academic models
it has succeeded better at offering understanding than meaningful reform.
Second, regulation along these lines is very much on the current legislative
agenda and actually stands a good chance of success. As we noted at the
outset, both the Cantwell and Schatz bills call for some version of a duty of
loyalty. As we have argued, we think that a duty of loyalty framed along the
lines we suggest can do good work. This paper is thus offered both in the
spirit of pointing the way for law reform as well as in the broader mode of
privacy theory.
If, however, after reading our proposal, you leave feeling that it would
dramatically change digital business models, and also issue a stern charge
to judges and lawmakers to remain vigilant, then you would be right. A duty
of loyalty would be a revolution in privacy law. But we believe it would be
a revolution we can live with. It would fit alongside robust duties of care,
extant data protection regimes, antitrust law, and other privacy-relevant
legal frameworks. It would provide substantial and flexible protection to
consumers and also encourage the development of long-term sustainable
business relationships that hold out the promise of equally long-term
profitability. A sea of change is exactly what is needed to deal with the
unprecedented power and incentives for self-dealing in our modern digital
world. A duty of loyalty would certainly disrupt the surveillance-based
advertising model, but Internet companies have long touted the virtues of
disruption. Indeed, the digital ad model itself disrupted advertising by
249.

See Hartzog & Richards,, supra note 16.
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newspapers, a disruption that has itself endangered the sustainability of a
free press. But, fundamentally, the promise of the Internet with which we
began this article was neither surveillance nor was it “more relevant ads.”
The promise of the internet was human flourishing—putting people first,
promoting democracy, and protecting people from exploitation and
vulnerability. A duty of loyalty for privacy law would be an important step
back in that direction.
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INTRODUCTION
Lawmakers in the United States and Europe are now seriously considering
imposing a duty of loyalty on companies that process human information.1 Such
1
See, e.g., Data Care Act of 2019, S. 2961, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019) (“Duty of Loyalty: An online service
provider may not use individual identifying data, or data derived from individual identifying data, in any way
that—(A) will benefit the online service provider to the detriment of an end user; and (B)(i) will result in
reasonably foreseeable and material physical or financial harm to an end user; or (ii) would be unexpected and
highly offensive to a reasonable end user.”); Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2968, 116th Cong. § 101
(2019) (“Duty of Loyalty: (a) In General.—A covered entity shall not—(1) engage in a deceptive data practice
or a harmful data practice; or (2) process or transfer covered data in a manner that violates any provision of this
Act.”); New York Privacy Act, S. 5642, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1102 (N.Y. 2019) (“Every legal entity . . .
which collects, sells or licenses personal information of consumers, shall exercise the duty of care, loyalty and
confidentiality expected of a fiduciary with respect to securing the personal data of a consumer against a privacy
risk; and shall act in the best interests of the consumer, without regard to the interests of the entity, controller or
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duties of loyalty represent both an alternative to the failed “notice and choice”
regime in the United States and a supplement to the more robust General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) model in the EU.2 Scholars have proposed duties
of loyalty—in a variety of forms, including loyalty duties for data collectors,
“information fiduciaries,” design rules, and fiduciary boilerplates—in part
because loyalty represents a substantive check on the ability of companies to use
human data to nudge, influence, coerce, and amass vast profits from the
exploitation of human information and experiences.3 Loyalty, thus, holds the
potential to be a powerful response to what Julie Cohen calls “informational
capitalism” and Shoshana Zuboff calls “surveillance capitalism”: the claiming
of “human experience as free raw material for hidden commercial practices of
extraction, prediction, and sales.”4
Yet, all is not well with the duty of loyalty, as it faces myriad critiques from
regulators, companies, and even otherwise sympathetic academics. These critics
assert that loyalty does little to deal with the structural pathologies of platform
capitalism, and that backward-looking fiduciary models would fall apart at the
massive scale at which platforms operate.5 They argue that a duty of loyalty is
unnecessary because it would do little that existing consumer protection rules,
data protection models, and duties of care do not already accomplish, and

data broker, in a manner expected by a reasonable consumer under the circumstances.”); Commission Proposal
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Data Governance, at 18, COM
(2020) 767 final (Nov. 25, 2020); Data Protection Act 2018, c. 12, § 123(1) (Eng.); An Act to Provide Facial
Recognition Accountability and Comprehensive Enforcement, H. 117, 2021 Leg., 192d Gen. Ct. Mass., § 2(a)
(Mass. 2021) (“A covered entity shall be prohibited from taking any actions with respect to processing facial
recognition data or designing facial recognition technologies that conflict with an end user’s best interests.”).
2
See infra note 12; infra Part II.D.
3
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 11, 11 (2020)
[hereinafter Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy]; Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First
Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1186–87 (2016) [hereinafter Balkin, Information Fiduciaries]; Neil
Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law, 99 WASH. U. L. REV. 961, 964–65 (2021);
Lauren Henry Scholz, Fiduciary Boilerplate: Locating Fiduciary Relationships in Information Age Consumer
Transactions, 46 J. CORP. L. 143, 144–45 (2020); see also ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST:
INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE 79–92 (2018) (exploring the relationship between privacy
and trust); Claudia E. Haupt, Platforms as Trustees: Information Fiduciaries and the Value of Analogy, 134
HARV. L. REV. F. 34, 35 (2020) (exploring the different possible fiduciary analogies in the information context).
4
JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL
CAPITALISM 6 (2019); SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN
FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019) (providing a definition for “surveillance capitalism” on a page
titled “The Definition,” prior to the introduction).
5
E.g., Julie E. Cohen, Scaling Trust and Other Fictions, LPE PROJECT (May 29, 2019), https://
lpeproject.org/blog/scaling-trust-and-other-fictions/ [hereinafter Cohen, Scaling Trust and Other Fictions];
JULIE E. COHEN, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST., HOW (NOT) TO WRITE A PRIVACY LAW 2, 8 (2021), https://s3.
amazonaws.com/kfai-documents/documents/306f33954a/3.23.2021-Cohen.pdf [hereinafter COHEN, HOW (NOT) TO
WRITE A PRIVACY LAW].
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imposing a duty of loyalty might foreclose other approaches to platform
regulation.6 They charge that it is unworkable because corporations cannot
simultaneously owe duties both to their shareholders and to their customers.7
They claim that it is redundant because privacy laws modeled on Europe’s
GDPR already require a lawful basis for processing.8 These laws demand
consideration of data subjects’ rights and place substantive duties on data
processors.9 Finally, and most frequently, critics of a duty of loyalty assert that
it is vague—too burdensome, too likely to get watered down to empty
formalities through the process of compliance, and inevitably too unclear about
what it would actually require.10
Such critiques must be taken seriously. At first blush, their number and
variety might leave data loyalty advocates feeling a little bit like Goldilocks
holding her proverbial bowl of porridge: What’s in the bowl is likely too hot or
too cold, and in any event, is undoubtedly a bowl of mush. Well-intentioned but
potentially devastating criticisms of this sort require thoughtful consideration
and a comprehensive response. This essay represents that reflection and
response. In our own work, we have articulated a duty of loyalty for privacy law
as the duty of data collectors to act in the best interests of those whose data they
collect.11 While we borrow from fiduciary law and work on “information
fiduciaries,” we have advocated for new relational frameworks tailored to the
unique power imbalances between people and platforms.12 We agree with the
critics that a duty of loyalty for privacy law is neither perfect nor a tool for all
tasks. However, when the criticisms of loyalty are taken seriously—when they
are considered, evaluated, and responded to on the merits—loyalty reveals some
surprising virtues as a relational approach that collectively prioritizes trusting
parties’ best interests.
Loyalty, it turns out, places the focus for information-age problems where it
belongs: not primarily on the data, but on the human relationships that data can
6
Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV.
497, 534–36 (2019).
7
Id. at 504.
8
COHEN, HOW (NOT) TO WRITE A PRIVACY LAW, supra note 5, at 5–6.
9
Id. at 12.
10
See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, When All You Have Is a Fiduciary, LPE PROJECT (May 30, 2019),
https://lpeproject.org/blog/when-all-you-have-is-a-fiduciary/; COHEN, HOW (NOT) TO WRITE A PRIVACY LAW,
supra note 5, at 10–11.
11
See, e.g., Richards & Hartzog, supra note 3 (manuscript at 6–7); Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards,
Privacy’s Constitutional Moment and the Limits of Data Protection, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1741 (2020)
[hereinafter Hartzog & Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment].
12
See generally Richards & Hartzog, supra note 3 (manuscript at 4, 6–7) (advocating for a trust-focused
approach to privacy rules).
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affect; not just on procedural requirements for data processing but also on
substantive rules restricting dangerous applications; and not merely on the
interests of individuals but also on the interests of groups with the same
relational vulnerabilities. Loyalty can thus be a powerful state of mind with real
analytical and political consequences. Even loyalty’s supposed fatal flaw—its
indeterminate vagueness13—is actually a great strength of flexibility and
adaptability across contexts, cultures, and time. Simply put, loyalty as a
relational approach allows us to deal substantively with the problem of platforms
and human information at both a systemic and an individual level.
Our argument in this paper is ultimately a simple one: the concept of data
loyalty has surprising virtues, including checking power and limiting systemic
abuse. The critics of loyalty have provided the valuable service that generous
and constructive criticisms of an idea often perform. They allow loyalty to be
presented in a clearer, more refined, more detailed, and more realistic manner—
one that is better suited to addressing some (but not all) of the many problems
of information policy that cry out for solutions. Loyalty can thus be a key policy
tool with which to take on the related problems of information capitalism,
platform power, and the use of personal data to manufacture consent to
objectional data practices. In fact, it may well be the critical piece of the
regulatory toolkit for privacy.
We develop our argument across four parts, each of which responds to one
of the principal critiques of loyalty and each of which, in assessing those
critiques carefully, identifies one of loyalty’s surprising virtues. In Part I, we
consider the critique that relational protections, like a duty of loyalty, would not
solve the right problems for privacy law—specifically, that they would not be a
meaningful check on the excesses of informational capitalism and would not
address the root causes of corporate abuses of power facilitated by use of our
data. We conclude that the relationships between people and platforms are a key
element of these problems. One of the main virtues of a duty of loyalty is that it
remedies the misguided approach by lawmakers and judges that treats all
interactions between people and companies that offer online services as armslength relationships. The power imbalances in these relationships, made worse
by the remarkable power that digital technologies confer, are simply too great to
ignore. A duty of loyalty could usher in privacy’s relational turn.

13
See, e.g., Grimmelmann, supra note 10 (explaining why the duty of loyalty’s ambiguity can be
problematic); cf. COHEN, HOW (NOT) TO WRITE A PRIVACY LAW, supra note 5, at 10–11 (discussing the
difficulties of applying traditional fiduciary values to a digital context).
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In Part II, we consider the claim that a duty of loyalty would be unnecessary,
whether because it would be coextensive with a duty of care or consumer
protection law or because a European-style approach to data protection, modeled
on the GDPR, would be equally protective. We consider these objections and
make the case that data loyalty has several special virtues, including having its
own distinct purpose and also being able to fulfill a necessary supportive
function for data protection frameworks. Not only does a duty of loyalty offer
substantive protections that a GDPR-style approach does not but that loyalty can
also offer political and moral salience to rules that restrain the uses of human
information that European data protection terms like “data minimization” and
“legitimate interest” simply cannot. In this way, loyalty can be seen not just as a
state of mind, but as one with potentially powerful rhetorical and political
meaning that paves the way to a fruitful approach to technology regulation. A
duty of loyalty could thus be the key ingredient in the regulatory recipe for data
privacy.
In Part III, we address the critique that a duty of loyalty is unworkable, either
because it conflicts with a corporation’s fiduciary obligation to prioritize
shareholder interests over those of human customers or because of the potential
clash of individual interests between multiple parties all trusting the same entity.
We conclude that these potential conflicts are not only resolvable by lawmakers
but also that a turn to relational protections—instead of deferring to
informational self-determination14—would facilitate a substantive embrace of a
broad array of human values over privacy law’s reflexive deference to individual
choice, consent, and control. Data loyalty would also allow lawmakers to create
a uniform definition of “best interests” and thereby prioritize a collective,
systemic understanding of this concept over individual, idiosyncratic ones. In
this way, a duty of loyalty could be highly functional and consistent with other
legal rules across a host of areas.
Finally, in Part IV, we address the most frequent critique of a duty of loyalty
for privacy law—that it is too vague. There are three different versions of what
we might call the vagueness critique. The first is that if the duty of loyalty is
interpreted too broadly, then it could prove unduly burdensome and costly to
businesses. The second is that the indeterminacy of a duty of loyalty creates
14
By “informational self-determination,” we refer to the basic idea underlying data protection regimes
(particularly in Europe) rooted in the Fair Information Practices—that human autonomy and dignity are
advanced by giving people control over how their information is processed through the exercise of individual
data rights like choice, access, correction, deletion, etc. For an early discussion of this concept in the U.S. context,
see Paul Schwartz, The Computer in German and American Constitutional Law: Towards an American Right of
Informational Self-Determination, 37 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 675 (1989).
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room for companies to interpret their obligations in their weakest possible form,
watering them down to mere compliance exercises that provide little protection
for people and little hope for changing the incentives of abuse. The final version
of this argument is simply that if a duty of loyalty is not clarified, companies
might be left with no clue about what kinds of conduct are prohibited and what
data practices and design choices are permissible.
We believe that all three versions of the vagueness critique can be
meaningfully addressed with a properly articulated duty of loyalty. In fact, the
novelty of data loyalty and the method by which relational duties become
contoured to a relationship’s unique vulnerabilities opens the door for clear rules
targeting systemic abuses while preserving flexibility for the future. The fact
that a duty of loyalty can be applied broadly across contexts is actually a virtue,
as it is within other flexible, standards-based frameworks like negligence,
reasonableness, unfairness, and legitimate interests.
Our response begins with a survey of our law’s rich and long-standing
experience with loyalty duties in other areas—such as guardians, trusts,
professionals, and corporate shareholders—to show how lawmakers and judges
have refined the duty to make it clearer and easier to implement in certain
contexts while retaining its breadth and flexibility. Lawmakers use a two-step
process to implement loyalty obligations in a fair and just way. First, they
articulate a primary, general duty of loyalty for a group of actors. Next, courts
and lawmakers go about the task of creating and refining what has been referred
to as “subsidiary” duties that are more specific and sensitive to context. These
subsidiary duties target the most opportunistic contexts for self-dealing and
typically result in a mix of overlapping, open-ended rules, maxims, detailed
standards, and highly specific rules.15
Using the two-step model from fiduciary law, we suggest certain subsidiary
data loyalty rules targeting the five most likely areas ripe for disloyal and
harmful self-dealing. These vulnerable areas include the following: First, there
is Collection, the act of collecting, recording, and deciding to keep data about a
person. Second, there is Personalization, the act of treating people differently
based upon personal information or characteristics. Third, there is Gatekeeping,
the extent to which trusted entities allow third parties to access people and their
data. The fourth context is Influence, where companies leverage technologies to
exert sway over people to achieve results. Finally, there is Mediation, which

15
For a more detailed examination of this two-step process, and an explanation of how it could apply in
the data loyalty context, see generally Richards & Hartzog, supra note 3.
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concerns the way that organizations design their platforms to facilitate people
interacting with each other. Within these five contexts, we explore problems
such as discriminatory and harmful microtargeting, design that facilitates online
harassment, corrosive amplification of particular behavior, and abusive dark
patterns. We propose possible subsidiary loyalty rules and standards to mitigate
these kinds of disloyal behaviors. In this way, though it would not solve all
problems of data and platform power, a duty of loyalty could be both broad
enough to engage with many of those problems and specific enough to solve
each of them effectively.
We conclude that clarifying the duty of loyalty is, in fact, the single most
important factor enabling its potential as a key cog in a meaningful data privacy
framework. Critics of a duty of loyalty have rightfully identified that the power
of modern platforms is unprecedented and will require multiple new approaches
to disrupt it. Lawmakers and scholars have been moving privacy law towards a
particular relational focal point for a while now.16 It is time we give it a name:
loyalty.
I.

LOYALTY FOCUSES ON RELATIONSHIPS

From the beginning, U.S. privacy law has glossed over the ways that power
imbalances in relationships jeopardize our privacy. Lawmakers and judges have
largely ignored how relationships can be a key point of intervention. Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis’s foundational article The Right to Privacy rejected
relational protections such as breach of confidence and contracts because the
target of their proposed tort was complete strangers (particularly the new tabloid
Yellow Press).17 Courts recognizing the tort under the common law similarly
rejected relational approaches that followed Warren and Brandeis’s lead and
started focusing on privacy duties owed “to the world” via tort law, similar to
negligence.18 Today, with a few exceptions such as HIPAA and a handful of

16
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 1; 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2018); Complaint for Permanent Injunction
and Other Equitable Relief at 20, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Age of Learning, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-07996 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 1, 2020); Elisa Jillson, Aiming for Truth, Fairness, and Equity in Your Company’s Use of AI, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2021/04/aiming-truth-fairnessequity-your-companys-use-ai.
17
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 211 (1890)
(“Thus, the courts, in searching for some principle upon which the publication of private letters could be
enjoined, naturally came upon the ideas of a breach of confidence, and of an implied contract; but it required
little consideration to discern that this doctrine could not afford all the protection required, since it would not
support the court in granting a remedy against a stranger . . . .”).
18
See, e.g., Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 152 (2007) (“[T]he four torts [William] Prosser identified became widely
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other confidentiality-based regimes, privacy and data protection law is generally
agnostic to the power imbalances within relationships or even whether a
relationship exists between people at all.19 The current U.S. approach to privacy
flattens the power dynamics within relationships with a giant caveat emptor sign.
Lawmakers permitted the failed “notice and choice” approach to privacy to
flourish in the wake of the decay of contract law protecting consumers against
boilerplate.20 On this shaky foundation, the thin veneer of fair information
practices that lacquered over this fault causes the law to ignore how companies
betray the people who trust them with their data and online experiences every
day.21
Even if it might have been rational for lawmakers and judges to ignore
information relationships in the past, our modern ongoing involvement with the
companies providing the apps and websites we use every day demands more
scrutiny. Is the person-platform relationship akin to the ones we have with
ordinary merchants like automobile or furniture dealers? Or is it more akin to
our intimate relationships with people that we trust with deeply personal
experiences and information, as well as our personal safety?22 The answer to this
question will affect what our rules for these relationships should be.
Julie Cohen worries that relational privacy duties of loyalty, care, and
confidentiality that have been proposed by some scholars fail to contend with
the “speed, immanence, automation, and scale” of the affordances of the
platform-consumer relationship.23 We agree that the affordances of modern
platforms and the business models motivated by them should be central to
lawmakers’ and judges’ approach to modern privacy problems. Yet, we would
suggest that one of the key virtues of data loyalty is that it accurately reflects
known as tort law’s way of protecting privacy. Breach of confidentiality was left out of the picture.”).
19
See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Chain-Link Confidentiality, 46 GA. L. REV. 657, 659 (2012); Woodrow
Hartzog, Reviving Implied Confidentiality, 89 IND. L.J. 763, 764 (2014); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A
Relational Turn for Data Protection Law?, 6 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 492, 493, 495 (2020).
20
Hartzog & Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment, supra note 11, at 1690–91 n.6; Woodrow
Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV. 952, 979 (2017).
21
MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW
17 (2013); NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 5 (2013); Scholz, supra note
3, at 149–50; Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control over Personal
Information?, 111 PENN STATE L. REV. 587, 623 (2007); Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60
AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1643, 1645 (2011) [hereinafter Hartzog, Website Design as Contract]; Woodrow Hartzog,
The New Price to Play: Are Passive Online Media Users Bound by Terms of Use?, 15 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y
405, 415–16 (2010) [hereinafter Hartzog, The New Price to Play]; Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The
Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2019).
22
See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1874 (2019) (discussing the
importance of sexual privacy to “sexual agency, intimacy, and equality”).
23
Cohen, Scaling Trust and Other Fictions, supra note 5.
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how the remarkable affordances of digital technologies result in wildly
imbalanced relationships. These relationships go far beyond the standard
merchant-customer dealings. They are a part of people’s everyday lives and have
an outsized impact on their well-being. When lawmakers treat all interaction
between people and companies that offer online services as arms-length
relationships, they ignore how the power of structure and scale create relational
vulnerabilities.
A. Arms-Length Relationships vs. Relationships of Trust
Arms-length relationships are typically those where parties with relatively
equal bargaining power act in service of their own self-interests in dealing with
each other.24 While the default presumption in market transactions is that parties
are operating at arms-length, when one party has significant power over the other
and an incentive to abuse that power, lawmakers often create duties and
restraints within these imbalanced relationships to protect vulnerable parties.25
These power imbalances can manifest in several ways, including large
disparities in information or knowledge, reliance on expertise or promises, and
discretion and control over the thing entrusted to one party in the relationship.26
A duty of loyalty won’t solve our modern data dilemma by itself, but our
next generation of privacy rules will never be complete until they recognize that
24
See, e.g., Gen. Assurance of Am., Inc. v. Overby-Seawell Co., 893 F. Supp. 2d 761, 780–81 (E.D. Va.
2012), aff’d, 533 F. App’x 200 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[A] fiduciary relationship is not created ‘between mutually
interdependent businesses with equal bargaining positions who dealt at arms-length.’ . . . Indeed, ‘[o]nly when
one party figuratively holds all the cards—all the financial power or technical information, for example—have
North Carolina courts found that the special circumstance of a fiduciary relationship has arisen.’” (quoting first
Cardiovascular Diagnostics Inc. v. Boehringer Mannheim Corp., 985 F. Supp. 615, 619–20 (E.D.N.C. 1997);
then S.N.R. Mgmt. Corp. v. Danube Partners 141, LLC, 659 S.E.2d 442 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008))); WEST’S TAX L.
DICTIONARY Arms Length § A2960 (2021) (“Status of a transaction by unrelated parties, each acting in its own
self interest. The term means a transaction made in good faith by parties with independent interests.”); 4C LARY
LAWRENCE, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2A-108:31 (3d ed. 2021) (“The comparative
bargaining power of the lessor and lessee is significant in determining whether the contract made by them is
unconscionable. . . . When a contract is negotiated at arm’s length in good faith between parties of equal
bargaining power and contains no unusual provisions, the contract will not be regarded as unconscionable merely
because one of the parties is disappointed with it.”); N. Shipping Funds I, LLC v. Icon Cap. Corp., 921 F. Supp.
2d 94, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Generally, no fiduciary duties arise where parties deal at arm’s length in
conventional business transactions.” (quoting Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am.
Sec., LLC, 592 F. Supp. 2d 608, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 2009))).
25
See Daniel B. Kelly, Fiduciary Principles in Fact-Based Fiduciary Relationships, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 3, 9 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019).
26
See, e.g., id. (“With regard to the ‘principal’ or beneficiary, a court is more likely to conclude that a
relationship is ‘fiduciary’ if a principal places confidence and trust in the agent; if a principal lacks expertise,
knowledge, sophistication, or experience; or if a principal depends or relies heavily upon the agent’s advice or
judgment.”).
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information relationships are imbalanced and susceptible to great abuse by the
dominant party. This is one of the main privacy problems addressed by a duty
of loyalty. Rather than treating all kinds of information relationships as equal
and fungible, it would increase obligations and restrictions on dominant parties
as they amass power. The more power a company has in a relationship, the more
protective and loyal it must be. A duty of loyalty would add an additional layer
to data privacy law. Privacy would no longer be primarily about the data;
instead, it would have to consider the relationships between people and the
companies to which they are exposed.27
Although the ongoing interactions between people and platforms might not
seem like a meaningful “relationship” in the traditional sense of the word, these
relationships give rise to the same relational dynamics and abuses that trust rules
are meant to address. At the outset, the interactions between people and
platforms are firmly established as legal relationships. Courts consistently bind
people who use websites and apps to the terms of use agreements imposed by
companies.28 Yet, technologically-mediated relationships between people and
companies are more than mere legal formalities, even if they are different from
the meaningful relationships we have with our friends, advisors, and employers.
Julie Cohen has argued that “[t]he mere fact of an ongoing service relationship
signifies relatively little in an era when relationships have been redefined as
mass-market products and are mediated by standardized interfaces designed for
large-scale, networked interconnection.”29 That may be true, but we think these
relationships also involve far more interplay, exposure, and personalization than
standard commercial services and widgets. In critiquing applying design and
consumer protection obligations in the language of trust, Cohen suggests that
although in a sense she trusts her desk chair not to collapse when she sits in it,
“it is far more useful to be able to speak concretely about such matters as material
tolerances and manufacturing specifications—and to be able to invoke
corresponding tort and regulatory frameworks—than it is to talk in airy
generalities about the nature of my relationship to the chair manufacturer.”30
We also agree with Cohen about the need to be more specific with the rules
for tech companies, which we address below. But the relationships that people
have with chair manufacturers, or even brick-and-mortar merchants and
27
See, e.g., Richards & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 497 (imagining a future in which privacy focuses
“directly on power imbalances in relationships rather than indirectly through data rules”).
28
Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, supra note 21, at 1644–45; Hartzog, The New Price to Play,
supra note 21, at 417.
29
COHEN, HOW (NOT) TO WRITE A PRIVACY LAW, supra note 5, at 10.
30
Id.
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providers of services in a pre-platform era, bear almost no resemblance to the
relationship between people and platforms. Critics of a duty of loyalty have
pointed out that treating platforms the same as a medical doctor, for example,
strips away the affordances of the platform and the realities of scale.31 But it is
the precise affordances of hardware and software that make the relationship
between people and platforms highly imbalanced and unique in ways that
compel relational rules, such as the duty of loyalty.
B. Key Traits of Modern Information Relationships
The relationship between people and platforms has at least five traits that,
when combined, make it highly imbalanced and worthy of intervention at the
relational level: the relationship (1) is ongoing, (2) is high frequency, (3) occurs
within an interactive environment, (4) operates within an environment
completely constructed for the individual, and (5) operates within an
environment that is responsive to the individual by the dominant party.32 Let’s
break these traits apart.
1. Ongoing
When people buy chairs, or ages ago, when they bought CD-ROMs
containing software in stores, such transactions are what we might think of as
discrete. Although Office Depot or Adobe hoped customers would return,
barring returns or malfunctions, the relationship between customer and
manufacturer or software developer typically had some distance and downtime.
Those days are long gone.33 Platforms leveraging browsers, apps, and cloud
computing have obliterated the concept of discrete one-time interactions.34

31
See, e.g., Cohen, Scaling Trust and Other Fictions, supra note 5 (“The information fiduciaries proposal
abstracts speed, immanence, automaticity, and scale away from that encounter and then assumes they never
mattered in the first place. In the process, it both sacrifices the fiduciary arrangement’s most essential
characteristics and fails to reckon adequately with the characteristics of the platform-consumer relationship that
are most problematic.”); Khan & Pozen, supra note 7, at 514 (imagining a doctor who relies on third-party
marketing for her income).
32
For an interesting approach to how laws might accommodate duties of loyalty and care in parties that
demand high degrees of trust but are not traditionally recognized as fiduciaries, see Ethan J. Leib, Friends as
Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665, 691 (2009) (“[F]iduciary law is about signaling to fiduciaries that they
ought not to be self-interested in transactions with and for their beneficiaries; it is generative of trust where costs
of distrust are especially high.”).
33
See Scholz, supra note 3, at 198 (“The ideal of the one-off consumer transaction is dead. Instead of
selling or licensing goods and services to consumers, firms today seek to build ongoing, evolving relationships
with consumers based on constant contact. This trend is likely to continue, as the always-on devices that
comprise the Internet of Things proliferate and cover an increasing number of everyday objects.”).
34
See id. at 151–54 (explaining that platforms track and collect customers’ information).
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Virtually every interaction requires an account creation with an intention of an
always-evolving delivery of services, often accompanied by email, app, or
operating system notifications. A platform’s ideal scenario is that once a person
signs up for a platform, they regularly visit and never leave. Systems are, to use
the parlance of Silicon Valley, “optimized for engagement.” Data and attention
continue to be given by consumers, and patches and updates continue to be
delivered by developers with no planned end date.35 Such a never-ending story
warrants rules matched to the nature of the relationship and ideally designed to
foster long term, sustainable, profitable relationships between people and
platforms.
2. Frequent
In addition to wanting to be with you forever, platforms want to be with you
constantly. People may go shopping in physical stores at most once or a few
times a week. They might take occasional advantage of an offline service like
babysitting or dry cleaning. But, on average, people interact with apps and
websites nearly a hundred times every day.36 Popular apps often get checked
multiple times within the same hour or minute.37 While we may commonly use
the same tool tens or hundreds of times a day (think how often you pick up a
pen, sit in a chair, or drink from a cup), we might think it strange to browse the
aisles of a store or call our financial advisor ten times a day, every day, for years
on end. But how many times have you checked your phone today? For
Facebook, Amazon, Google, Twitter, and a host of other dominant platforms,
failure to check in regularly is seen as a problem, and constant interaction from
the user is a rewarded metric. Here, too, the practice of notifications pushed to
the customer allow the frequency of interactions to be maintained. People can
be engaged in ongoing relationships without having to interact with them all the
time, but platforms ideally want both a long duration and a high frequency of
35
See, e.g., Alex Heath, Facebook’s Lost Generation, VERGE (Oct. 25, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.
theverge.com/22743744/facebook-teen-usage-decline-frances-haugen-leaks.
36
Americans Check Their Phones 96 Times a Day, ASURION (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.asurion.com/
about/press-releases/americans-check-their-phones-96-times-a-day/; Gabrielle Pickard-Whitehead, 66% of
Americans Check Phone 160 Times a Day, Here’s How Your Business Can Benefit, SMALL BUS. TRENDS
(Mar. 3, 2020), https://smallbiztrends.com/2020/03/2020-mobile-phone-usage-statistics.html; see also LEE
RAINIE & KATHRYN ZICKUHR, PEW RSCH. CTR., AMERICANS’ VIEWS ON MOBILE ETIQUETTE 12 (2015),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/08/26/chapter-1-always-on-connectivity/ (noting a high number of
smartphone users check their phone apps “continuously”); Average Time Spent Daily on Social Media (Latest
2022 Data), BROADBAND SEARCH, https://www.broadbandsearch.net/blog/average-daily-time-on-social-media
(last visited Apr. 26, 2022) (“On average, [we] spend . . .two hours and twenty-seven minutes[] on social media
each day.”).
37
See, e.g., supra note 36; Trevor Wheelwright, 2022 Cell Phone Usage Statistics: How Obsessed Are
We?, REVIEWS.ORG (Jan. 24, 2022), https://www.reviews.org/mobile/cell-phone-addiction/.

HARTZOGRICHARDS_5.20.22

998

5/25/2022 1:45 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71

engagement. For ad-driven businesses on an engagement business model, this is
the gold mine that generated the Facebook and Google fortunes, among the
fortunes of many others.38
3. Constructed
It is no secret that companies design their sales infrastructure to influence
their customers and clients.39 Grocery stores place milk and eggs at the opposite
side of the store from the entrance to encourage people to walk the aisles.40
Office designers make conference rooms totally transparent for when you want
everyone to see who you are meeting with, or completely opaque for when you
do not.41 It happens online as well. As Joel Reidenberg noted in his foundational
article Lex Informatica, companies leverage the power of information
technologies to create policy rules that affect people.42
But the extent to which tech companies control mediated environments is so
great that it deserves sustained scrutiny. Our dealings with platforms occur
entirely on their terms.43 They control who has access, what they see and do,
when they see it and take action, where they receive signals and make choices,
and why particular people see specific things and are given preconstructed
options.44 In unmediated relationships, people have a degree of flexibility to
work within a structured environment. They can choose from an endless array
of physical actions and social interactions and even change the structure of the
environment themselves, like moving the physical location items, modifying the
placement and content of signs, and switching between modes of
communication like writing or speaking.
But in digital environments, people can only click on the options they are
given. They can only address the audience they have been presented in the

38
See, e.g., Sarah Frier, Facebook Really Wants You to Come Back, Bloomberg (Jan. 31, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-01-31/facebook-really-wants-you-to-come-back.
39
See WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW
TECHNOLOGIES 34–35 (2018) (explaining that design shapes perceptions, behavior, and values).
40
Id. at 35.
41
Id.
42
Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through
Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554–55 (1998) (“Technological capabilities and system design choices impose
rules on participants. The creation and implementation of information policy are embedded in network designs
and standards as well as in system configurations. Even user preferences and technical choices create
overarching, local default rules.”).
43
Cf. HARTZOG, supra note 39, at 1 (explaining tech companies leverage design to control privacy
settings); Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1000–03 (2014).
44
See HARTZOG, supra note 39.
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format provided. Structures are designed to eliminate accidents and serendipity,
save for the emergent behavior of automated outputs powered by machine
learning. And tech companies keep a tight leash on their bots. Our ability to
interrogate, analyze, question, tinker, learn, and otherwise calibrate our dealings
with tech companies is virtually nonexistent.45 As human users of these
technologies, we are essentially powerless. Data subject rights of access,
rectification, and deletion like those offered by the GDPR in theory empower us
a little, but in practice these rights are difficult to exercise at scale; since they are
limited only to personal data, data subject rights do very little to improve our
agency within constructed environments outside of personal data transparency
and management.46
4. Interactive
When people read newspapers or magazines, watch television, or listen to
the radio, they are essentially passive. There is no give and take between the
mind and the medium. The flow of information is one way. It would be a stretch
to call these interactions relationships, even when we have subscription contracts
with them.47 But of course, the relationship between people and platforms is
highly interactive. We create detailed accounts and profiles. We search, amass
networked connections, post pictures and status updates, press buttons, tweak
settings, adjust sliders, arrange layouts, and project information streams that we
don’t even know about. We essentially do uncompensated work that creates
huge value for them. And of course, all this interactivity can be further
quantified, optimized, and utilized to benefit the platform.
5. Responsive
The final component of modern information relationships is that the
ongoing, frequent, constructed, and interactive nature of the exchanges between
people and platforms enables companies to design their mediated environment
to be acutely responsive to people’s choices and profiles. News feeds, suggested
products, and information change on the fly according to previous clicks, and
profiles created from personal data accumulate over time. Our mediated
environments are tweaked based on individual data and up-to-the-second

45
46
47

See id. chs. 2 & 6.
See Daniel J. Solove, The Limitations of Privacy Rights, 98 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2023).
See, e.g., Hartzog, The New Price to Play, supra note 21, at 405–06.

HARTZOGRICHARDS_5.20.22

1000

5/25/2022 1:45 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71

wisdom from constant experiments on us through A/B testing designed to
maximize engagement and keep our eyes glued to the screen.48
This powerful incentive for such “growth hacking” makes the uniquely
intertwined relationship between platforms and people incredibly dangerous.49
It is far from what should be considered arms-length. Arms-length relationships
might have one or two of the traits listed above. But no legal, commercial, or
social relationship on earth, from merchants to professionals to employers to
loved ones, features the same potent combination of traits as modern
technologically-mediated information relationships. Platforms cannot be armslength when they are already living in in our heads.
We do not mean to imply that information relationships present wholly
unique problems. Rather, our analysis of the affordances of information
technologies suggests that it would be a mistake to treat these relationships as
arms-length, even if they are cabined to some extent by consumer protection and
data protection rules. They are too one-sided and prone to abuse to tolerate any
arms-length fiction. A duty of loyalty is not sufficient to solve all our privacy
problems. But it is necessary so long as the affordances of the tools, incentives
for self-dealing, and legal contracting status of the parties places people in
danger every time they create an account online. In this way, a surprising virtue
of a loyalty approach is that it reveals how modern information relationships do
not resemble anything approaching arms-length transactions. Once lawmakers
fix this problem and embrace the relational turn in privacy law, several different
possibilities open up, including supporting public governance, new substantive
rules, and a less individualistic approach to privacy.
II. LOYALTY ACHIEVES WHAT CARE CANNOT
A second set of critiques surrounding a duty of loyalty is that it would be
unnecessary. These criticisms take a variety of forms. Responding to Jack
Balkin’s proposal to impose common law fiduciary duties (including a duty of
loyalty) on platforms, Lina Khan and David Pozen have suggested that imposing
fiduciary duties like loyalty on platforms might (1) do little in practice and (2)
48

See, e.g., Calo, supra note 43.
The term “growth hacking” has been adopted to refer to aggressive strategies by tech companies to
grow their user base quickly and significantly. For more information on growth hacking, see RAYMOND FONG
& CHAD RIDDERSEN, GROWTH HACKING: SILICON VALLEY’S BEST KEPT SECRET (2017); Timo Herttua, Elisa
Jakob, Sabrina Nave, Rambabu Gupta & Matthäus P. Zylka, Growth Hacking: Exploring the Meaning of an
Internet-Born Digital Marketing Buzzword, in DESIGNING NETWORKS FOR INNOVATION AND IMPROVISATION
151, 151–61 (2016); René Bohnsack & Meike Malena Liesner, What the Hack? A Growth Hacking Taxonomy
and Practical Applications for Firms, 62 BUS. HORIZONS 799 (2019).
49
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forestall other, more radical approaches to the consumer protection problems
raised by platforms, including those involving competition law.50 There are
other forms of this critique, too, suggesting that loyalty duties are unnecessary
because (3) a duty of care placed on data collectors would be sufficient, or that
(4) an American version of Europe’s GDPR could solve the problem.51 Each of
the four variants of the “loyalty is unnecessary” argument are worth addressing
briefly in turn because doing so reveals the surprising virtue that loyalty is not
only necessary but also potentially inspirational. Loyalty, in other words,
represents a state of mind with revolutionary potential for privacy reform.
A. Loyalty Makes People’s Choices Less Dangerous
First, with respect to Khan and Pozen’s suggestion that imposing fiduciary
duties like a duty of loyalty on platforms might do little in practice,52 we must
respectfully disagree, at least as regards the version of a duty of loyalty we
articulate in this paper and in other work. As privacy law scholarship has
documented at length, the current default model of U.S. privacy law is one of
“notice and choice,” under which firms are subject to three principal rules: (1)
do not lie about data practices, (2) do not cause unreasonable harm (reasonable
harm is just fine), and (3) do follow the Fair Information Practices, most notably
“notice and choice.”53 In practice, these rules mean that companies can largely
do what they want with human data as long as they have a vague privacy policy,
do not cause significant economic or other harm, and do not lie about what they
are doing in their often inscrutable privacy notices. A duty of loyalty would
change this situation considerably by placing an enforceable obligation on
companies to act in the best interests of their human customers, rather than
allowing them to rely on vague terms and conditions hidden in a privacy policy
to justify whichever data practices serve their own purposes most efficiently.
This would mean that humans making choices could rest easy that one of the
choices they were given would allow betrayal or manipulation by the company.
Because betrayal or manipulation would be taken off the table, they could
50
Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 534–35. Pozen and Khan are particularly alarmed by a proposal by
Jack Balkin and Jonathan Zittrain to create a “grand bargain” for platforms in which fiduciary duties would be
imposed in exchange for a preemption of state privacy laws (and, Pozen and Khan fear, for competition
regulators paying less attention to the anticompetitive effects of platform size and power). Id. at 535.
51
See Hartzog & Richards. Privacy’s Constitutional Moment, supra note 11, at 1713 (discussing
proposals for a U.S. GDPR); see also Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 522, 535 (alleging the redundancy of
information fiduciary proposals).
52
Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 534.
53
See, e.g., HARTZOG, supra note 39, at 58; Richards & Hartzog, supra note 20, at 1463, 1471; Hartzog
& Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment, supra note 11, at 1704; Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy
Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1883 (2013).
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choose knowing that all choices were safe ones, rather than ones that exposed
them to unforeseeable dangers at the hands of the company. Placing duties of
loyalty on information collectors would thus “be a revolution in privacy law.”54
B. Loyalty Complements Other Interventions
Second, we must also disagree with Khan and Pozen’s claim that the
imposition of a duty of loyalty would foreclose other promising means of
addressing the relatively unchecked power of platforms over our lives and the
economy.55 We believe that a duty of loyalty must be one piece of a much larger
regulatory response—not merely to the problems of platform power and
unchecked informational capitalism but also to the problems of the information
revolution as a whole. The challenges of the industrial revolution were not
checked by a single legal rule like negligence, workplace safety, speed limits,
food labeling laws, or a prohibition on unfair and deceptive trade practices.56
Similarly, it defies both the insights of legal history and common sense to think
that a duty of loyalty, or any other rule in isolation, would solve the problems of
the information revolution. Indeed, in other work, we have argued in detail that
our approach to these problems must be multipronged and explicitly include
what we call “corporal” regulation, involving corporate and competition law, as
any part of a solution to the problems of platform power.57 (We also note in
conclusion that Khan and Pozen’s critique was tailored to Jack Balkin’s
“information fiduciary” model—a proposal that involves the imposition of statelaw fiduciary duties on platforms and has substantial differences from the duty
of loyalty we articulate here and in other papers.)58
C. Loyalty Avoids the Harm Trap
Third, with respect to the suggestion that a duty of loyalty would add little
that a duty of care would not already cover, such a suggestion misunderstands
the critical differences between duties of care and duties of loyalty. To be sure,

54

Richards & Hartzog, supra note 3 (manuscript at 72).
Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 513–14.
56
See, e.g., Judson MacLaury, Government Regulation of Workers’ Safety and Health, 1877-1917, U.S.
DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/mono-regsafeintrotoc (last visited Apr. 26, 2022);
Xaq Frohlich, The Informational Turn in Food Politics: The U.S. FDA’s Nutrition Label as Information
Infrastructure, 47 SOC. STUD. SCI. 145 (2017); Dee Pridgen, The Dynamic Duo of Consumer Protection: State
and Private Enforcement of Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Laws, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 911, 912–14 (2017)
(discussing the development of state and federal trade practice laws, which began well after the end of the
Industrial Revolution in the United States).
57
See Hartzog & Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment, supra note 11, at 1742–45.
58
Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 501.
55
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duties of loyalty and care share a common genealogy: they, along with the duty
of confidentiality, are the three most basic fiduciary duties.59 It follows from this
fact that the three duties have distinct components. The duty of care requires that
fiduciaries take care not to cause harm to those they owe fiduciary duties—most
often, the vulnerable parties that the law steps in to protect like wards,
shareholders, and professional clients.60 Its cousin negligence, one of the
common law’s many responses to the Industrial Revolution, imposes a weaker
duty as against the whole world not to act unreasonably and thus cause harm.61
Duties of care and negligence are therefore rooted in reasonable behavior and
harm avoidance—I have to act in a way that is reasonable under the
circumstances, so as not to cause you harm, and if I fail to do that, you can sue
me to remedy the harm I caused.
Loyalty is different from care. It is not about my state of mind with respect
to the injury I cause. Loyalty is instead about avoiding betrayal. It is about my
state of mind with respect to your best interests, and it is about not exploiting
conflicts of interest for my own advantage.62 For instance, a clear example of
disloyalty would be when Target Corporation famously discovered that its
pregnant customers did not like receiving coupons that revealed Target’s data
scientists had figured out they were pregnant.63 Target changed its marketing
practices to hide the coupons in a sea of intentionally irrelevant ones (like wine
glasses and lawn mower blades) so that its customers would use the coupons
instead of freaking out, and then become habituated Target customers once the
baby arrived and they ran out of energy.64 Such use of sensitive information
about current customers is legal under current U.S. law.65 It has nothing to do
with any duty of care, but it would be a clear violation of a duty of loyalty.
At bottom, then, care is about avoiding harm while loyalty is about avoiding
betrayal.66 The legal wrong in a breach of care is the resulting economic,
59

See Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 3, at 1207–08; Haupt, supra note 3, at 36.
Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 3, at 1207–08.
61
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 183 (1941).
62
Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 3, at 1208.
63
Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 19, 2012, at 30.
64
Id. For an elaboration of this point, see NEIL RICHARDS, WHY PRIVACY MATTERS 33–37 (2022).
65
See generally Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125 (2015) (exploring the category
of sensitive information in data privacy frameworks).
66
To complete the set, the legal wrong in a breach of a duty of confidentiality is an improper disclosure
of confidential information. See Richard Painter, Fiduciary Principles in Legal Representation, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 265, 269–71 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019); TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY
LAW, 107–08 (2008) (“The duty of loyalty supports the main purpose of fiduciary law: to prohibit fiduciaries
from misappropriating or misusing entrusted property or power. Thus, the duty of loyalty is manifested by
important preventative rules. Such rules prohibit actions even though they are not necessarily injurious to
60
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physical, or other kind of harm, but the legal wrong of disloyalty is, first and
foremost, the damage done to the relationship itself. This is a particularly
significant distinction for privacy law because plaintiffs in privacy and data
breach lawsuits have struggled to articulate diffuse but real informational
injuries. This situation has been made worse in recent years as courts have
substantially tightened the rules for what counts as a legally cognizable
“concrete” injury under Article III standing doctrine.67 A new and stringent
requirement of “concreteness” makes it more difficult to prove harm and
threatens the ability of legislatures to authorize novel forms of legal remedies.
Crucially, though, loyalty does not have this problem—not merely because the
legal injury in loyalty cases is the disloyalty itself but also because this injury is
one that has been already recognized by courts as legally sufficient within
standing doctrine.68 To the extent the tightening of standing doctrine means that
only long-recognized claims can be brought in federal court, another surprising
virtue of a duty of loyalty is that it is an old common-law doctrine, and thus,
breaches of loyalty are undeniably concrete and actionable.
In sum, then, duties of loyalty and duties of care are distinct. Duties of care
are about acting reasonably to avoid harm, but the focus of loyalty is on the
sanctity of a relationship and removing an incentive and ability to wrongfully
profit by taking advantage of a power disparity. We believe that privacy law has
room for both duties of care and of loyalty, but they should not be conflated
because they serve different purposes. Critically, because loyalty duties are
rooted in betrayal rather than harm, they have significant consumer protection
advantages that care duties do not.69
entrustors.”).
67
E.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–49 (2016).
68
To get a bit technical, in Spokeo terms, then, a breach of a legally-imposed duty of loyalty would be a
“concrete” intangible harm. To satisfy this requirement, Spokeo requires courts “to consider whether an alleged
intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a
lawsuit in English or American courts.” Id. at 1549. But because a breach of a duty of loyalty has been recognized
as such a basis for centuries, duties of loyalty do not raise this Spokeo problem. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron
& Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Harms, 102 B.U. L. REV. 793, 860–61 (2022); TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW
107–08 (2011) (“The duty of loyalty supports the main purpose of fiduciary law: to prohibit fiduciaries from
misappropriating or misusing entrusted property or power. Thus, the duty of loyalty is manifested by important
preventative rules. Such rules prohibit actions even though they are not necessarily injurious to entrustors.”). By
contrast, although duties of care in general would be concrete, statutory causes of action rooted in novel theories
of harm would seem to have to run through the Spokeo test.
69
See Data Care Act of 2019, S. 2961, 116th Cong. §§ 2–3(b)(2) (2019) (“Duty of Loyalty: An online
service provider may not use individual identifying data, or data derived from individual identifying data, in any
way that—(A) will benefit the online service provider to the detriment of an end user; and (B) (i) will result in
reasonably foreseeable and material physical or financial harm to an end user; or (ii) would be unexpected and
highly offensive to a reasonable end user.”); Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2968, 116th Cong. § 101
(2019) (“Duty of Loyalty: (a) In General.—A covered entity shall not—(1) engage in a deceptive data practice
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D. Loyalty Animates Legislation and Enforcement
Fourth, and finally, while the notion of a U.S. GDPR may have intuitive
appeal in theory, we believe that any such law would be insufficiently protective
in practice. There are several reasons for this conclusion, but the most important
one is that U.S. privacy rights against companies are different from those in the
European Union. In the United States, such rights would likely be consumer
protection rights protecting economic interests and could be whittled down in
the legislative process by tech company lobbying efforts. By contrast, the GDPR
rests upon a solid constitutional footing of fundamental rights to privacy that are
simply not present under current American law. In sharp contrast to the United
States, E.U. fundamental rights law has long protected privacy as an explicit
constitutional right.70 Today, the E.U. Charter recognizes two separate
fundamental rights to privacy: a right to “respect for his or her private and family
life,” in Article 7, and a separate right to “protection of personal data,” in Article
8.71 Moreover, these European rights are subject to the doctrine of “horizontal
effect.” Under this doctrine, a member state can violate a person’s fundamental
rights when it fails to protect it sufficiently against violations by other members
of society.72 Thus, the GDPR’s guarantee of privacy and data protection rights
against companies is more than mere commercial regulation—because it is the
direct implementation and extension of constitutional rights, the GDPR should
be understood as having constitutional status.
Similarly, as we have just noted, American privacy plaintiffs have struggled
to overcome the hurdles of limited remedies and procedural obstacles like
Article III standing doctrine. Again, by contrast, European data protection
plaintiffs have achieved a remarkable string of victories vindicating rights under
the GDPR and its precursor, the Data Protection Directive, establishing the
“right to be forgotten” and invalidating both data retention rules and inadequate
cross-border transfer agreements.73 Crucial to these results has been the
or a harmful data practice; or (2) process or transfer covered data in a manner that violates any provision of this
Act.”).
70
E.g., Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
71
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 7–8, Nov. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326).
72
Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L. REV. 387, 395,
397 (2003) (describing the European horizontal effect doctrine as “impos[ing] constitutional duties on private
actors as well as on government”).
73
Case C‐131/12, Google Spain v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) & Mario Costeja
González, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶¶ 91, 94 (May 13, 2014); see, e.g., Case C‐293/12 and Case C‐594/12, Digital
Rts. Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Commc’ns, Marine and Nat. Res. & Kärntner Landesregierung and Others,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, ¶¶ 66–71 (Apr. 8, 2014); Case C‐362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 102 (Oct. 6, 2015).
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European Court of Justice (CJEU), the highest court for questions of E.U. law.
In these and other cases, the CJEU has simultaneously established these new
data protection rights while also establishing its own relevance as a major player
in the new European constitutional order.74 As Bilyana Petkova has argued, the
CJEU’s decisions have enshrined data protection as “the main tenet of
constitutional identity” in the European Union.75 This is why European data
protection law often seems so strikingly powerful to American observers
compared to domestic consumer privacy rights.76 As much as anything, then, the
GDPR is a state of mind for Europeans. And it is why a U.S. version of the
GDPR would inevitably be both a weak and inadequate version of the real
GDPR, something we have elsewhere termed “GDPR-lite.”77
To be sure, a GDPR-like approach has undeniable virtues, even in a
weakened “GDPR-lite” form. The European model of data protection regulation
is the product of great wisdom, experience, and effort. Its framework has proven
resilient and durable across the decades, and data protection rules can be
formidable and empowering when done properly. It also offers an emerging
global standard for interoperable data sharing. But the data protection model has
some real weaknesses as well. It can treat data processing as something
inevitable or even virtuous, with the effect of normalizing surveillance and
processing. To the extent that data protection rights are usually long on
procedural requirements, they are often short on the kinds of substantive
prohibitions that would take certain kinds of invidious data uses off the table.
And data protection rules focus primarily on the data itself, rather than on the
relationships and in the contexts in which those data are collected, used, and
disclosed.78 Perhaps, then, it should be no surprise that EU regulators are starting
to flirt with imposing substantive loyalty duties upon the largely procedural
GDPR baseline. In the European Union, regulators have proposed a new draft
data governance act that includes a duty of loyalty for data. And in post-Brexit

74
Joshua P. Meltzer, The Court of Justice of the European Union in Schrems II: The Impact of GDPR on
Data Flows and National Security, BROOKINGS (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-courtof-justice-of-the-european-union-in-schrems-ii-the-impact-of-gdpr-on-data-flows-and-national-security/.
75
Bilyana Petkova, Privacy as Europe’s First Amendment, 25 EUR. L.J. 140, 154 (2019).
76
See, e.g., Aarti Shahani, 3 Things You Should Know About Europe’s Sweeping New Data Privacy Law,
NPR (May 24, 2018, 11:37 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2018/05/24/613983268/a-cheat-sheeton-europe-s-sweeping-privacy-law (discussing the GDPR and its robust protection for consumer data privacy
and noting concerns that GDPR will “hurt businesses that rely on data collection”).
77
For an extended version of an argument along these lines, see Hartzog & Richards, Privacy’s
Constitutional Moment, supra note 11, at 1727–32.
78
Id. at 1717–21.
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Britain (where the GDPR still applies), the British Information Commissioner’s
Office has imposed a duty of loyalty on those who process children’s data.79
This analysis points us towards the first of the surprising virtues of a duty of
loyalty for privacy law. Loyalty is not ineffective or redundant. On the contrary,
loyalty is both powerful and distinctive. Loyalty can be a state of mind for
American privacy reform, one that could offer the same vitality and political
salience in American legal culture that the fundamental right of data protection
possesses in Europe. As we have seen, the GDPR is the manifestation of data
protection as a fundamental human right, which itself is a commitment to the
idea that people should be able to determine their informational fates for
themselves. But when it comes to data privacy in the United States, we lack an
equivalent coherent guiding light. “The right to be let alone” worked for a while,
but it has crumbled under its capaciousness. “Do not lie” and “do not harm” are
bedrock ideals, but they are also the status quo—and it is clear that the status
quo is inadequate. “Follow the fair information practices” (FIPs), while
necessary, is about as inspirational as a CVS receipt.80 And we have already seen
that a U.S. version of the GDPR would be insufficient.
A duty of loyalty could fill this role for U.S. privacy law. Of course, loyalty
cannot solve all privacy problems on its own. But it can do three important
things. First, loyalty can supplement public governance of privacy rules by
authorizing effective private rights of action for breaches of the duty—ones that
sidestep the standing doctrine problems that have plagued harm-based theories
of relief.81 Second, loyalty could supply an interpretive lodestar to U.S. privacy
law, an equivalent to Europe’s robust protection of existing data protection rules,
and one that even improves upon some of the limitations of the European
approach.
Third, and perhaps most important, loyalty could supply a political lodestar
for privacy reform more generally. In contrast to technocratic terms like “data
minimization” and “legitimate interests of the data controller,” loyalty is clear,
it is easy to understand, and it is potentially robust enough to counterbalance
industry claims about the importance of “innovation” or the seductive but false
79
See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
European Data Governance (Data Governance Act), at 18–19, COM (2020) 767 final (Nov. 25, 2020); INFO.
COMM’RS OFF., AGE APPROPRIATE DESIGN: A CODE OF PRACTICE FOR ONLINE SERVICES 9–10 (2020).
80
See generally Hartzog, supra note 20 (presenting a balanced view of the strengths and shortcomings of
FIPs).
81
Scholz, supra note 3, at 197 (“If public regulation is needed to further protect consumers, as is likely,
the information-sharing and norm-sharing function of fiduciary duties, as described above, will aid in the
development of appropriate consumer protection laws through the information-forcing . . . .”).
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idea that commercial data processing carries First Amendment value. If
companies owe us duties of loyalty, then “innovative” uses of data to exploit us
start to resemble betrayal and fraud, and claims of First Amendment protection
for manipulative uses of data look appropriately laughable. Loyalty also has the
virtue of placing the obligation for ethical data processing right where it belongs,
ensuring those to whom we expose our data vulnerabilities do not betray us. In
this way, loyalty can be a state of mind; one that has revolutionary potential to
stimulate meaningful privacy reform.
III. LOYALTY PRIORITIZES HUMAN VALUES
One of the most prominent critiques levied against the idea of imposing
duties of data loyalty on companies is Khan and Pozen’s claim that relational
rules might create conflicting loyalties. The authors assert that “[t]he tension
between what it would take to implement a fiduciary duty of loyalty to users, on
the one hand, and these companies’ economic incentives and duties to
shareholders, on the other, is too deep to resolve without fundamental reform.”82
Khan and Pozen reject the idea of conflicting loyalties as well as the possibility
of prioritizing the interests of customers over shareholders, which they contend
would conflict with the dominant understanding of corporate law.
Responding to this criticism highlights another surprising virtue of data
loyalty: it prioritizes people over profits and, in doing so, facilitates a substantive
embrace of a broad array of human values over privacy law’s reflexive deference
to individual choice, consent, and control. Lawmakers and industry love “notice
and choice” proceduralism because it allows them to avoid the difficult task of
prioritizing human interests and making substantive interventions. If preferences
vary wildly, then this fallacy tempts us, and surely an approach rooted in choice
would solve the problem. But lawmakers imposing a duty of loyalty cannot
avoid this task. In essence, lawmakers embracing a properly conceptualized duty
of loyalty would center human values at the heart of our information rules while
simultaneously clarifying the order of operations regarding duties owed to
different parties.

82
Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 534. The authors also note that “the information-fiduciary proposal
could cure at most a small fraction of the problems associated with online platforms—and to the extent it does,
only by undercutting directors’ duties to shareholders, undermining foundational principles of fiduciary law, or
both.” Id. at 529.
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A. Data Loyalty’s Illusory Conflicts
As an initial matter, the “divided loyalties” argument against relational
duties is debatable and, at most, can be fixed by lawmakers without substantially
remaking corporate law.83 Andrew Tuch argues that Khan and Pozen
“significantly overstate the threat that corporate and fiduciary law pose for the
information fiduciary model.”84 Tuch explains that “imposing user-regarding
obligations on corporations will not create untenable frictions between duties to
users and duties to shareholders. . . . [T]he primary criticism—that Delaware
corporate law undermines the information fiduciary regime—should be
dismissed.”85
Tuch also argues that “the plausible outcome of an information fiduciary
regime is exactly the opposite of what Khan and Pozen fear. Under the
information fiduciary model, corporate law would require compliance with userregarding obligations, creating incentives for directors to favor users’ interests
over those of shareholders.”86 In other words, the loyalty that directors owe to
shareholders takes a backseat to all other legal obligations placed upon the
corporation, including duties of loyalty to customers.87 In fact, if a duty of data
83
See, e.g., Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, supra note 3, at 23 (“Management’s fiduciary
obligations to shareholders assume that the corporation will attempt to comply with the legal duties owed to
those affected by the corporation’s business practices, even if this reduces shareholder value.”).
84
Andrew F. Tuch, A General Defense of Information Fiduciaries, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 1897, 1902,
1909–10 (2021). Tuch argues that corporate law only imposes duties on directors, not corporations, and the
information fiduciaries proposal imposes duties on corporations, not directors. Id. Relational duties would not
create a set of inconsistent obligations among a single fiduciary. The issue of parallel fiduciary obligations owed
by corporations as a whole to clients and directors to shareholders is routine. Not only is “the likelihood of
fiduciary breach that Khan and Pozen point to in claiming tension between Balkin’s proposal and corporate law
. . . theoretically remote,” it is “in practical terms, nonexistent.” Id. at 1915. Additionally, if lawmakers obligate
a duty of loyalty, then directors are bound to privilege it over shareholder interests. Id. at 1916–17 (“Delaware
law altogether avoids tension with regimes such as Balkin’s. Delaware corporate law requires directors to
exercise their discretion within legal limits imposed on the corporation; it does not license or excuse noncompliance with corporate obligations, even if directors believe that doing so would maximize shareholder
value. And Delaware law offers no suggestion that a corporation’s duties or responsibilities should be diluted or
otherwise shaped by the content of directors’ duties. Instead, case law indicates clearly that directors must act
‘within the law.’”).
85
Id. at 1902 (“The criticism rests on a partial understanding of corporate law doctrine and theory. The
criticism sees conflicting obligations where none plausibly exist and identifies strategies for resolving these
apparent conflicts that are unknown to corporate law. . . . I also argue that Khan and Pozen’s arguments are not
merely mistaken but, if accepted, may do harm. Applying their case to financial conglomerates—more apt
analogues for social media companies than the ‘[d]octors, lawyers, accountants, and the like’ to whom scholars
often draw their comparison—shows that Khan and Pozen’s arguments, if accepted, would have pernicious
effects on broad spheres of corporate regulation.”).
86
Id.
87
Id. at 1917–18 (“Reflecting corporate law’s attitude toward legal compliance, former Harvard Law
Dean Robert Clark identifies the corporation’s purpose as to ‘maximize the value of the company’s shares,

HARTZOGRICHARDS_5.20.22

1010

5/25/2022 1:45 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71

loyalty owed by platforms to people is made positive law, a director that acts
with the intent to act in conflict with a customer’s best interests or who fails to
act in the face of a known loyalty obligation may be liable for breach to
shareholders of their fiduciary obligation as well as their duty to customers.88
It is thus indisputable that lawmakers can place duties of data loyalty on
corporations. But, if they do so, they must prioritize loyalties. This would resolve
any lingering “divided loyalty” concerns regarding shareholders, as well as
conflicting loyalties between customers and third-party vendors. Self-interested
actions would be allowed, but only if they don’t conflict with a customer’s best
interests regarding their data and mediated experiences. Duties of data loyalty
thus face no problems from other state laws. Moreover, a federal law imposing
data loyalty obligations would avoid the Khan and Pozen conflicting loyalty
argument for a second reason: it is an elementary principle of U.S. constitutional
law that a federal duty of loyalty would take precedence over any state duties by
operation of the Supremacy Clause. The federal minimum wage law is consistent
with shareholder fiduciary duties, and a federal duty of loyalty would be as well.
But what about conflicts between different kinds of customers? James
Grimmelmann noted that platforms like eBay serve both buyers and sellers,
serving up potentially conflicting loyalties.89 To Grimmelmann’s example, we
could also add Uber and Lyft serving drivers and passengers, AirBnb serving
renters and leasers, and even Google serving advertiser and human users of its
services. This, too, is a common problem in the law of fiduciaries, which has
developed several ways to deal with such inevitable conflicts. Andrew Gold
explains that “conflicts among best interests obligations [owed to multiple
beneficiaries] are unavoidable. Where such conflicts exist, one answer is to find
that loyalty must manifest itself as fairness and reasonableness. Another answer
is to impose a duty of impartiality,” which would demand “due regard” (though
not necessarily equality).90 The “best interests” polestar of loyalty, by design,
accommodates all kinds of self-serving behavior. It simply makes self-serving

subject to the constraint that the corporation must meet all its legal obligations to others who are related to or
affected by it.’ . . . Even the most ardent advocates of shareholder primacy have not suggested that corporate
law requires, or should require, corporations or directors to maximize shareholder value in violation of a
corporation’s legal obligations.”).
88
See id. at 1919 n.120 (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)); see
also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (“The failure to act in good faith may result in liability
[for directors] because the requirement to act in good faith ‘is a subsidiary element[,]’ i.e., a condition, ‘of the
fundamental duty of loyalty.’” (citing Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003))).
89
Grimmelmann, supra note 10.
90
Andrew S. Gold, The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 385,
390, 398 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019).
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behavior allowable only in instances where it aligns with the best interests of the
primary trusting party.91 Even among the same type of customer, a reasonable
critique of applying a novel duty of loyalty to large tech companies is that these
entities would be obligated to act in the best interests of billions of individuals,
whose “best interests” might differ from person to person. There are several
steps that lawmakers might take to help resolve this looming conflict.
The first step would be to limit the scope of the duty to the extent of the
vulnerability. Trusted parties must be loyal when collecting and processing
people’s data and making design choices that affect their mediated experiences.
Under this rule, consideration of a trusting party’s best interests would be limited
to what was entrusted, the purpose of exposure and the relationship, and whether
a trusted party’s actions relating to that exposure are self-serving and adversarial
to a human customer’s wishes or well-being. So, for example, under such an
approach, Snapchat would not generally be responsible for making sure their
app users were responsible drivers, but they would be prohibited from taking
money from car insurance companies to create a mini-game asks people to
upload pictures of them driving so that insurance companies could track them
and increase their premiums for dangerous drivers. Snapchat would also be
prohibited from creating algorithms that amplified other people’s driving videos
solely for the purpose of distorting how popular the driving game was and to
juice engagement metrics.92 However, Snapchat degrading or blocking an app
user’s driving videos would not count as a breach of loyalty because deleting
posts in this context would not increase their vulnerabilities from exposure.
Limiting a trusting party’s “bests interests” to those affected by its exposure of
data and attention would help keep loyalty-bound companies from having to
serve as general-purpose caretakers for trusting parties.
Regarding the difficulties of accounting for the “best interests” of millions
of unique trusting parties, lawmakers could also follow tort law’s move to a more
objective standard: the reasonable customer. Not only would a reasonable
customer standard help companies better determine the scope of their duties but
it would also inject a normative element into the analysis. A reasonable customer
91
See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114
YALE L.J. 929, 932 (2005) (“[A] transaction prudently undertaken to advance the best interest of the beneficiaries
best serves the purpose of the duty of loyalty, even if the trustee also does or might derive some benefit. A
transaction in which there has been conflict or overlap of interest should be sustained if the trustee can prove
that the transaction was prudently undertaken in the best interest of the beneficiaries.”).
92
James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 929–31 (2014) (resenting a “subjective
dishonesty” standard for search engines); Grimmelmann, supra note 10 (arguing that since a search engine
“requires substantial discretion to determine what its users consider relevant” (because different people might
want different things), the legal system should defer to search engines’ best judgments).
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approach would also be consistent with the parallel duty of care and sensitive to
the fact that tech companies deal in bulk and batched relationships. A
reasonableness, context-sensitive approach would require loyalty obligations
that are proportional to the risks of abuse. The duty would be the most robust
where the volume of data collected, the company’s role in mediating other
transactions and relationships, and the potential for manipulation are the
greatest. Because this duty of loyalty would be new and novel for privacy law
and would need to be tailored to the unique characteristics of modern
information relationships, lawmakers can craft a unique and tailored approach
that borrows from how duties of loyalty operate in other contexts without being
bound by them.
B. The Diverse Value-Forcing Function of Data Loyalty
In fact, the need to clarify how a duty of loyalty would work within
information relationships could help bring a substance and normative
commitment that has been missing in privacy law. Lawmakers who embraced a
data loyalty approach would be forced to make substantive decisions about who
is protected, who is duty-bound, and what specific conduct is prohibited in
service of specific goals beyond just informational self-determination.
For years, lawmakers have avoided the hard questions of whether privacy
law should serve any goal beyond giving people control over their personal
information and respecting their choices about their data. But informational
capitalism is jeopardizing so much more than that, including our civil rights,
intellectual self-development, mental well-being, life opportunities,
relationships, capacity for self-governance, and even our environment. A
myopic approach prioritizing individuals’ (often illusory) choices obscures these
larger, collective harms. An approach to data loyalty that required fealty only to
individual choice would doom us to the same fate. Not only must any data
loyalty framework explicitly exist alongside deeper, structural, collective
changes imposed by public governance, but also any determination of people’s
“best interests” must include a consideration of the common good. Notice,
choice, and consent regimes, and even more demanding individualistic, harmbased regimes are only peripherally concerned with systemic, collective harms,
if at all. Zeynep Tufecki explains helpfully that “[d]ata privacy is not like a
consumer good, where you click ‘I accept’ and all is well. [It] is more like air
quality or safe drinking water, a public good that cannot be effectively regulated
by trusting in the wisdom of millions of individual choices.”93 People aren’t
93

Zeynep Tufecki, The Latest Data Privacy Debacle, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
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generally motivated to consider collective risks or risks to vulnerable groups that
they are not a part of when giving consent to data practices, any more than people
who might “choose not to wear a mask” as permitted by law during a pandemic
might consider the public health consequences. Framing things in individual
rights terms can cause us to miss the public and social consequences of our
actions.94
Along similar lines, a properly crafted duty of loyalty would also help free
privacy law from its overly individualistic focus by protecting against systemic
harms felt by entire groups, given the scale on which platforms operate.95 One
way to do this, while simultaneously resolving the problem of billions of
possibly divergent “best interests,” is for lawmakers to specifically prioritize
interests that are held collectively by groups of customers, with certain
individually held interests holding sway only to the extent they do not conflict
with collective user interests.96 Thus, while there will inevitably be (as is often
the case in law) hard cases at the margins, the claim that data loyalty conflicts
with other duties is not just incorrect but also points to the surprising virtue that
loyalty duties promote human values in all their complexity.
IV. LOYALTY CAN BE BOTH FLEXIBLE AND CLEAR
Of all the objections to a duty of loyalty for privacy law, the most frequent
and prominent is that the duty is just too vague.97 In a hearing on the future of
transatlantic data flows called by the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, Senator Wicker asked of a panelist who advocated
for a duty of loyalty in privacy law, “Where is there a working duty of loyalty
in place in law somewhere that we can look to[?] . . . When we’re able to be
specific in those instances, then we’re getting somewhere. But beyond that, it’s
hard actually to define [a duty of loyalty.]”98 James Grimmelmann also suggests
com/2018/01/30/opinion/strava-privacy.html.
94
See RICHARDS, supra note 64, at 77–78; see also Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, The
Inconsentability of Facial Surveillance, 66 LOY. L. REV. 33, 42 (2020) (exploring how individually-motivated
“informed consent” regimes fail to adequately protect vulnerable and marginalized groups).
95
See Julie E. Cohen, Scaling Trust and Other Fictions, supra note 5.
96
Gold, supra note 90, at 385, 390, 398 (discussing the hierarchy of obligations approach to how
“common shares might ordinarily benefit from fiduciary obligations while preferred shares will only benefit in
exceptional circumstances”).
97
Grimmelmann, supra note 10.
98
The Invalidation of the EU-US Privacy Shield and the Future of Transatlantic Data Flows: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci. & Transp., 116th Cong. (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/
2020/12/the-invalidation-of-the-eu-us-privacy-shield-and-the-future-of-transatlantic-data-flows (statement of
Sen. Wicker at 2:05:42–02:07:48). Senator Wicker is the sponsor of one of the most prominent proposals for an
omnibus federal privacy law in the United States. The Senator actually expressed tentative support for a duty of
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that when applied to digital platforms, it becomes clear that “the rule against
self-dealing is either absurdly under-inclusive, absurdly over-inclusive, or
both.”99 More generally, when the topic of data loyalty comes up even in casual
conversation, people often express skepticism over a duty of loyalty because
they view it as remarkably vague.100
There are three different versions of this critique. First, if the duty is
interpreted too broadly, it could prove unduly burdensome and costly to
businesses.101 Second, the indeterminacy of a duty of loyalty creates room for
companies to interpret their obligations in their weakest possible form, watering
them down to mere compliance exercises with little protection for people and
little hope for changing incentives for abuse.102 Third, if a duty of loyalty isn’t
clarified, then companies might be left with no clue about what kinds of conduct
are prohibited and what data practices and design choices are permissible.103
Once again, this is a form of the Goldilocks Problem–it’s too hot, it’s too cold,
or even if it’s just right, it’s still a bowl of mush.
We understand the impulses behind these arguments. Robust rules inevitably
come with high compliance costs. Companies have a long history of exploiting
the indeterminacy of privacy rules to their advantage and fighting for rules that
allow for threadbare compliance without meaningful accountability.104 They
will undoubtedly try to do the same for a duty of loyalty. And courts have taken
an interest in ensuring companies have proper notice of what is expected of them
from privacy rules.105 But we think all three concerns around vagueness can be
meaningfully addressed with a properly articulated duty of loyalty.
loyalty, even though such a duty does not explicitly appear in the bill he sponsored. And in full disclosure, the
panelist was one of the authors of this Article. Also, thank you for reading so deeply in our paper—and its
footnotes.
99
Grimmelmann, supra note 10.
100
See @JulesPolonetsky, TWITTER (Mar. 23, 2021, 11:30 PM), https://twitter.com/JulesPolonetsky/
status/1374564164568559616?s=20 (“Due to years of regulation, we know what fiduciary means in other
sectors. Do we know what exactly what a browser fiduciary should do with ads/tracking? Block all ads, if user
wishes or surveys of users support?”).
101
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 3 (manuscript at 63–64).
102
Id. at 64.
103
Id. at 64–65.
104
See Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Practice, and Performance, 110 CALIF. L. REV. (manuscript at 18–
19) (forthcoming 2022) [hereinafter Waldman, Privacy]; ARI EZRA WALDMAN, INDUSTRY UNBOUND: THE
INSIDE STORY OF PRIVACY, DATA, AND CORPORATE POWER (2021) [hereinafter WALDMAN, INDUSTRY
UNBOUND].
105
See LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 894 F.3d 1221, 1237 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that an FTC
cease and desist order was unenforceable because it “[did] not enjoin a specific act or practice” about how to
accomplish an overhaul of a data security program); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799
F.3d 236, 255 (3d Cir. 2015) (concluding that the applicable FTC cybersecurity standard was precise enough to
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This reveals a final surprising virtue of data loyalty: its flexibility, which is
just like the flexibility of other standards-based frameworks like negligence,
unfairness, Fourth Amendment reasonableness, and legitimate interests.
Because of this flexibility, a duty of loyalty can be responsive to bigger structural
power concerns and emergent problems driven by the affordances of new
tools.106 Data loyalty is not in opposition to robust public governance
approaches; it can be a complement to public governance, serving as a catchall
to keep things from falling through the cracks. As we discuss below, loyalty is
typically implemented on two separate levels. The first, more general level is a
broad duty applying to all interactions within an information relationship. The
second, more specific level is through the articulation of detailed and substantive
subsidiary rules. This second level targets particular contexts and actions that
provide clear rules and less wiggle room, to ensure accountability and keep the
frameworks from becoming watered down.
A. “Best Interests” Standard Clarified by Specific Rules
Of course, organizations will inevitably try to dilute the effectiveness of
privacy rules. Ari Waldman has detailed the many different ways that
organizations leverage the substance and structure of privacy law and the
lawmaking process to lower the costs of regulation on their business model.107
But a two-tiered duty of loyalty that features flexible general standards and
context-specific rules would appear to be more resistant to sabotage and cooption than either specific rules or broad duties would be in isolation.108 The
layered structure of data loyalty, combined with the fact that loyalty is amenable
to robust enforcement mechanisms like private causes of action and equity
interventions like disgorgement, injunctions, and estoppel, make it more likely
to have bite, as well as provide ample opportunities for broad standards to
become refined, just like negligence has over time.

inform the relevant inquiry to be carried out by the company).
106
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 3 (manuscript at 39) (discussing structural power concerns).
107
See WALDMAN, INDUSTRY UNBOUND, supra note 104, at 99–160; Waldman, Privacy, supra note 104,
at 12–33.
108
Robert H. Sitkoff, Other Fiduciary Duties: Implementing Loyalty and Care, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 419, 421 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019) (“[B]y making use of an integrated
mix of overlapping open-ended standards, more specific standards, and rules, fiduciary law improves upon the
familiar trope of rules versus standards as competing governance strategies. . . . Fiduciary law’s combination of
the primary duties of loyalty and care (open-ended standards) plus specific subsidiary duties (more specific
standards and rules) provides the flexibility of standards plus the specification of rules while minimizing their
respective disadvantages.”).
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Over time, all standards creep towards rules, and a duty of loyalty for privacy
law would be no different. Standards like the FTC’s unfairness authority or the
“reasonable expectation of privacy” component of the Fourth Amendment cover
a wide range of possible behaviors but over time have come to target very
specific kinds of behavior such as pretexting, dangerous data security practices,
wiretapping, and other kinds of surreptitious surveillance.109 A duty of loyalty
in privacy law would require work and tending, but that is true of all meaningful
legal principles. We also note in passing that the FTC’s unfairness authority and
the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures might
be the two most important principles in U.S. privacy law—despite the fact that
both are over a century old.
However, the virtues of standards do not obviate the need for clear subsidiary
rules. A general standard like a prohibition on conflicted self-dealing can serve
as a catchall, but clear rules are required to hold organizations accountable and
make rules implementable. They can also single out particularly egregious
examples of disloyal conduct to make them clearly prohibited, as the canons of
legal ethics do in prohibiting commingling client funds, making business deals
with clients, and even having sex with clients. All of these are disloyal, but our
canons of ethics mark them out as forbidden just to be clear.110 We also
emphatically agree with Julie Cohen’s claim that “while problems of trust and
market domination each undeniably contribute to the dysfunctions that
surveillance-based business models create, responding adequately to those
dysfunctions requires moving beyond reactive conceptions of data protection
toward a governance model organized around problems of design, networked
flow, and scale.”111 Cohen argued that a meaningful privacy framework should
be “framed in terms of concrete requirements that must be satisfied by firms
collecting, processing, and exchanging personal information.”112
To clarify a duty of loyalty for privacy law, lawmakers should limit the duty
to the extent of people’s exposure and provide for the creation of specific
subsidiary rules containing the concrete requirements called for by Cohen and
others.113 In our previous work on trust, we have defined the concept of trust as
the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to the actions of others.114 As a key

109

Richards & Hartzog, supra note 3 (manuscript at 44, 64).
See Anthony E. Davis & Judith Grimaldi, Sexual Confusion: Attorney-Client Sex and the Need for a
Clear Ethical Rule, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 57 (1993).
111
COHEN, HOW (NOT) TO WRITE A PRIVACY LAW, supra note 5, at 13.
112
Id.
113
See, e.g., id.; Waldman, Privacy, supra note 104.
114
Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
110
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component of trust, our duty of loyalty would be properly limited to the extent
of that vulnerability. To determine the extent of people’s exposure, we must
examine what is entrusted to companies that collect people’s data: people’s data
and their mediated experiences. These concepts require a little explanation.115
When people expose themselves to organizations through modern, powerful
digital technologies, they entrust more than just discrete pieces of information.
It is not as simple as merely giving your phone number to the cashier at Best
Buy. For such atomized transactions, we might simply hew to a purpose
limitation rule and prohibit using the number for things like robocalls, spam
marketing, or using your number as a universal ID through which to hand over
all sorts of other information about you. Given the jaw-dropping quantity and
quality of information that can be extracted through modern apps and websites,
people expose their narratives and identities to those services. In the process,
they can endanger their individual and collective well-being by empowering
trusted parties and their “partners” to gain knowledge about them, judge them,
make decisions affecting them, and exert power over them in ways that that are
contrary to their best interests. So, the relevant question for organizations bound
by a duty of loyalty would be what the affordances are of the data entrusted to
them.116 In other words, what actions do the data make significantly easier or
harder? Data systems lower the cost of information storage, search, and delivery.
This makes every choice to create data a moral act. Loyalty would demand that
organizations refrain from acting upon an affordance of the data that conflicts
with a reasonable trusting party’s best interests.
Similarly, those entrusted with people’s mediated experiences should look
to the affordances of mediated technologies to determine the scope of their
loyalty obligations. All of our experiences online are mediated by the company
whose services we are using. That company chooses what we see, what we can
click, and what we expose and determines how, when, and where that
information is viewed. When people use a website or app, they are entrusting
things of value to companies that can be easily taken advantage of, including

431, 433 (2016).
115
See Richard S. Whitt, Old School Goes Online: Exploring Fiduciary Obligations of Loyalty and Care
in the Digital Platforms Era, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 75, 89 (2019) (“So, the ‘what’ of fiduciary
power extends to information derived from the underlying relationship. . . . ‘[R]elational knowledge’—special
information that fiduciaries acquire about their beneficiaries—is key to the economic logic and the law
supporting these relationships.”).
116
For more information on affordances, see, for example, James J. Gibson, The Theory of Affordances,
in PERCEIVING, ACTING, AND KNOWING: TOWARD AN ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 67, 67–72, 76 (Robert Shaw &
John Bransford eds., 1977).
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their attention, their labor, and their time.117 While structures in the physical
world are routinely leveraged against people in extractive and manipulative
ways (like the placement of eggs in the back of the supermarket), modern
platform designers have distinctly more power over people interacting in the
digitally mediated environments they create.118 In pre-structured, mediated
environments, there is no improvisation. You click the buttons and fill in the text
boxes that you are given, or you get out. Mediated environments are
astonishingly opaque because device screens have limited viewing space and
there are no physical constraints limiting what happens behind the curtains.
People cannot see all the options available, only what is presented, and they
often do not understand how or why what is on their screen came to be there or
that different people using the same service are seeing different things. Platforms
have massive incentives to extract labor and data and the ability to change and
optimize design on the fly to keep you engaged.
Ryan Calo argues that “society is only beginning to understand how vast
asymmetries of information coupled with the unilateral power to design the legal
and visual terms of the transaction could alter the consumer landscape.”119 Calo
identifies three phenomena of what he calls “digital market manipulation,” all
intimately related to data, that supercharged the potential for abuse in online
markets: (1) the “mass production of bias” through big data, (2) the possibility
of far greater consumer intelligence through “disclosure ratcheting,” and (3) the
move from ends-based to means-based ad targeting and interface design.120
Thus, when it comes to digital environments, it is not as simple as grocery
stores putting the milk at the back of the building to force you to walk through
the whole store, which will increase the odds of an impulse purchase. For such
localized and static tactics, we might simply hew to the rule against unfair and
deceptive trade practices to keep stores honest and people safe while allowing
for optimized choice architecture, even if it is slightly extractive and slightly
coercive. But modern platforms can use the affordances of digital tools to extract
so much data, attention, and labor from people; these tools endanger people’s
individual and collective well-being by empowering trusted parties to have
complete control over what they see, what they can click, and what they can
accomplish online. So, the relevant question for organizations bound by a duty
of loyalty is what are the affordances of specific user interfaces? In other words,
117
See, e.g., ALICE MARWICK, THE PRIVATE IS POLITICAL: NETWORKED PRIVACY
(forthcoming) (including a discussion on the concept of “privacy work”).
118
HARTZOG, supra note 39; Calo, supra note 43, at 1006–07.
119
Calo, supra note 43, at 1006–07.
120
Id.
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what outcomes do specific design choices make significantly more or less
likely? Design choices accomplish two things: they convey signals and make
tasks easier or harder. Every technological design choice makes a certain reality
more or less likely, which makes every design choice a moral act. Loyalty would
demand that organizations refrain from design choices that foreseeably extract
data, labor, or attention from trusting parties or prey on trusting parties’ limited
resources or cognition for coercive purposes that conflict with a trusting party’s
best interests.
Lawmakers could conceptualize the “best interests” of trusting parties in
several different ways. Andrew Gold explains that when the law centers “best
interests” around human well-being, “attending to someone’s best interests is
not easily reducible to a simple formula.”121 He notes, “We can focus on how a
person experiences her life, for example whether she is happy; we can focus on
whether she has been able to satisfy her preferences, whatever those may be; or,
we can focus on whether her life measures up well against some good or group
of goods that is considered valuable.”122 Gold comments that “quite possibly,
overall well-being involves some combination of success in each of these areas,
and the key question is the difficult question of how to weigh the different
components. Each individual theory has its proponents and detractors.”123 While
the general open-ended nature of what constitutes one’s best interest certainly
must be addressed, the flexibility of this standard provides room for lawmakers
to sufficiently tailor this duty to the contours of the relationship between people
and the organizations they trust with their data and online experiences.
We recommend two ways to limit what constitutes a person’s “best interests”
within the context of data loyalty. First, the “best interests” should be limited to
the interests affected by the entrustment of data and attention, instead of an
overall well-being standard. Organizations would be directed to ask which
interests were implicated by the affordances of the data and design of user
interfaces. So, while it might be disloyal for a company to design a system that
used trusting parties location data to allow pharmaceutical companies to target
them when they are currently in the hospital (and thus vulnerable), it would
probably not be disloyal for that company to generally allow pharmaceutical
companies to place advertisements on their app or website. Systems that allow
for such microtargeted advertising based on highly detailed profiles rather than

121
122
123

Andrew S. Gold, Purposive Loyalty, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 881, 899 (2017).
Id.
Id. at 894–95.
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isolated contexts make exploitation of vulnerable parties easier and compound
incentives for companies to engineer exposure for financial gains.124
Second, although a virtue of loyalty is that it does not demand a strict
showing of harm (as we have seen, the violation is to the integrity of the
relationship), when considering ways an action can be adverse to the interests of
a trusting party, entrustees should look to the foreseeable dangers of exposure.125
A great place to start is the scholarly work identifying and explaining various
kinds of privacy harms by Danielle Citron, Daniel Solove, Ryan Calo, and
others.126
Another key aspect of loyalty is that, in conjunction with a duty of care, it
can animate a number of different broad subsidiary duties, such as duties of
candor, good faith, nondelegation of key services, and confidentiality.127 But,
once again, legislatures and courts often go further and create or delegate
authority for the creation of a series of clearer subsidiary obligations that are
more like rules than vague standards. Robert Sitkoff explains that “[t]he duties
of loyalty and care, which we might call the primary fiduciary duties, are
typically structured as broad, open-ended standards that speak generally.”128 He
notes that “[b]y contrast, the other fiduciary duties, which we might call the
subsidiary or implementing fiduciary duties, are typically structured as rules, or
at least as more specific standards that speak with greater specificity.”129
This two-tiered approach allows lawmakers to tailor rules to specific
relationships, allowing for the avoidance of specific foreseeable conduct while

124
Ariel Fox Johnson, Behavioral Ads Are Bad for Kids, COMMON SENSE (May 10, 2021), https://www.
commonsensemedia.org/kids-action/articles/behavioral-ads-are-bad-for-kids.
125
See, e.g., Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information
Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1097 (2019) (“In addition to expanding the notion of legally
cognizable digital harms, an effective information fiduciary framework should expand the definition of what a
privacy harm is.”).
126
See, e.g., Citron & Solove, supra note 68, at 830–61 (breaking down privacy harms into physical,
economic, reputational, and emotional harms, and describing issues of chilling effects, discrimination, thwarted
expectations, control, data quality, informed choice, vulnerability, disturbance, and autonomy harms); M. Ryan
Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131 (2011).
127
See Whitt, supra note 115, at 94–95 (“Additional fiduciary obligations recognized by courts of equity
over many centuries include the duty of candor, duty of good faith, duty not to delegate the services to others,
and the duty of confidentiality. Typically they are subsumed as ‘subsidiary’ or ‘implementing’ obligations under
either the duty of care or of loyalty. However, in some legal quarters the duty of confidentiality has been deemed
an important supportive component of the ‘primary’ fiduciary duties. . . . [T]he duty of confidentiality deserves
special status in the digital environment as an ‘enabling’ obligation that strengthens the more well-established
fiduciary duties of care and of loyalty.”).
128
Sitkoff, supra note 108, at 419.
129
Id.
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maintaining flexibility for new and changed rules in the future.130 As applied to
privacy law, it would allow lawmakers to target large platforms or social media
companies that presented specific problems of gatekeeping for third parties or
self-dealing due to two-way markets without applying the same specific rules to
traditional e-commerce or media streaming companies bound by a general duty
of loyalty. Companies not bound by specific subsidiary rules would still be
bound by a general duty of loyalty.
A look at duties of loyalty in other contexts can help shed some light on how
such a duty might be conceptualized in privacy law. For example, a
Massachusetts law laying out the duties of a guardian ad litem requires that a
guardian “shall act at all times in the ward’s best interest and exercise reasonable
care, diligence and prudence.”131 California law provides that “[t]he trustee has
a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.”132 A
similar prohibition could be articulated for a duty of loyalty in positive terms
(hypothetically, “a covered entity must act at all times in the trusting parties’
best interests regarding their data”) or in terms of a “no-conflict” rule (for
example, “a covered entity shall be prohibited from taking any actions with
respect to processing data or designing user interfaces that conflict with trusting
parties’ best interests.”).
Enacting legislation should also either provide for subsidiary duties or
delegate rulemaking authority to entities like the FTC for future subsidiary rules.
Looking to the content of subsidiary duties in other contexts might be helpful
for lawmakers enacting rules for data loyalty. In areas like agency law, the duty
of loyalty has been built out with more specific subsidiary duties governing
“self-dealing, material benefit, competition with the principal, and use of the
principal’s property.”133 In the law of trusts, subsidiary loyalty and care duties
include administering the trust according to its terms but petitioning the court if
doing so would harm the beneficiaries, collecting and protecting the trust
property and keeping it separate from other properties, extensive record-keeping

130
Sitkoff gives the prudent investor rule as an example of how subsidiary rules develop in trust law. Id.
at 420–21 (“Structurally, the prudent investor rule is an elaborated standard that, by focusing on risk-and-return
and diversification, gives specific content to the open-ended, primary duty of care, called prudence in trust
parlance, as applied to the investment function of trusteeship. . . . [W]ithin the fiduciary fields that do include an
investment function, the prudent investor rule encompasses the accumulated learning on what the duty of care
requires in fiduciary investment. In consequence, rather than start from scratch in every fiduciary investment
matter, fiduciaries, beneficiaries, and courts may look to the elaboration with the prudent investor rule to discern
the application of a duty of care.”).
131
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-209(a) (2010).
132
CAL. PROB. CODE § 16002 (West 2010).
133
Sitkoff, supra note 108, at 429.
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and disclosure requirements, duties to bring and defend claims to the trust, and
a duty to be cost-sensitive in the administration of the trust.134 In corporate law,
subsidiary fiduciary duties address issues like the usurpation of corporate
opportunity, management’s role during contests for corporate control, actions
that might impair the efficacy of shareholder voting or meetings, the need for
internal monitoring and compliance, and requires to disclosure information to
shareholders.135 Nonprofit law includes subsidiary fiduciary obligations such as
accounting for profits, rules against competition and usuring opportunities,
prudent investment requirements, and rules against private inurement.136
Bankruptcy, investment advice, and employment law impose similar subsidiary
duties regarding accounting for property and profits, prudence, and noncompetition.137 For lawyers, as we have seen, subsidiary duties elaborate on the
general duty of loyalty to address conflicts of interest, confidentiality,
identification of and communication with clients, and familiarity with client
affairs.138 In health care, subsidiary fiduciary duties apply safeguarding client
confidences, informed consent, and conflicts of interests.139 Even public
fiduciary law has built out the duty of loyalty with subsidiary obligations. The
Emoluments Clauses of the U.S. Constitution are, in effect, loyalty rules, as are
conflict of interest, disclosure, and antibias rules for judges and prohibitions
under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations on diplomats to refrain
from commercial activity abroad for personal profit.140
For privacy law, subsidiary data loyalty rules might look like tailored
versions of non-privacy fiduciary duties such as disclosure of material facts,
consent, accounting for property (access and portability rights), confidentiality,
and the full suite of the FIPS. This could apply some of the most significant
obligations compelled by the GDPR. A duty of loyalty, combined with a duty of
care, could help effectuate the most robust versions of existing data privacy
rules—such as data minimization, purpose limitation, and legitimate basis for
processing requirements—bound together and safeguarded by an anti-betrayal
ethos.
Since deference to the data subjects’ interests is also central to data
protection regimes and rules requiring disclosure, and accounting and record-

134
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137
138
139
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keeping requirements are designed to hold trusted parties accountable for loyal
behavior, a duty of loyalty would be an effective mechanism to animate the best
of data protection frameworks. Loyal and careful organizations also do not take
advantage of their superior position to lie to or harm those that trust them. So,
heightened prohibitions against unfair and deceptive conduct would also make
strong subsidiary duties.
Lawmakers need not stop there. One of the most important subsidiary duties
to stem opportunistic behavior would be a robust prohibition on abusive trade
practices. As we have detailed in prior work, companies turning people’s own
cognitive and resource limitations against them to wrongfully extract data and
labor is an endemic problem online.141 Subsidiary rules prohibiting abusive trade
practices would prohibit entrustees from materially interfering with the ability
of trusting parties to understand the terms of the relationship and lower the risk
associated with exposure and engagement. Rules against abuse would also
prohibit entrustees from taking unreasonable advantage of a trusting party’s lack
of understanding about the material risks, costs, or conditions of the service or
the inability of trusting parties to protect their interests within the relationship.
Finally, anti-abuse rules could prohibit entrustees from taking unreasonable
advantage of the reasonable reliance by trusting parties on an entrustee’s
representation to act in the trusting party’s interests.
Lawmakers might also consider rigid prohibitions on specific practices, like
the deployment of unreasonably dangerous automated tools or the use of
personal data to train those automated systems. They could create subsidiary
rules for inherently dangerous practices and technologies that, at the systemic
level, are in fundamental conflict with the best interests of trusting parties, such
as microtargeting (a practice that paves the way for third party abuse and
imposes more externalities than benefits for trusting parties) or affect
recognition (the use of machines to read emotional states so as to enhance
technology-based persuasion).142 Lawmakers could craft even more rules
designed for specific parties, such as a rule that “social media platforms may not
deploy affect recognition technologies on photos or videos submitted by trusting

141

Richards & Hartzog, supra note 114, at 470–71.
For an exploration of the dangers of affect recognition systems, see, e.g., KATE CRAWFORD, ATLAS OF
AI: POWER, POLITICS, AND THE PLANETARY COSTS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 176–79 (2021); Kate Crawford,
Artificial Intelligence Is Misreading Human Emotion, ATLANTIC (Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2021/04/artificial-intelligence-misreading-human-emotion/618696/; Luke Stark & Jesse
Hoey, The Ethics of Emotion in Artificial Intelligence Systems, in FACCT ‘21: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2021 ACM
CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 782, 787–88 (2021), https://doi.org/10.
1145/3442188.3445939.
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parties.” There might be disclosure mandates, process requirements,
prohibitions on conduct, or obligated tasks. But fundamentally, each such rule
should target specific areas where trusted parties have an incentive to engage in
self-dealing.143
Lawmakers could, of course, impose all these rules even without couching
them within an umbrella duty of loyalty. We have proposed in previous research
that trust-building and trust-enforcing rules could be meaningful complements
or the next best thing to broad and strong relational obligations.144 Many of these
rules, such as generally applicable data protection obligations, should have
sibling rules that apply regardless of whether data controllers are in an
information relationship with a trusting party. But we believe, as argued in Part
I, that a duty of loyalty would act as an important animating force, interpretive
guide, and catchall provision to bring more coherence, flexibility, and
accountability through enforcement than these rules would as standalone laws.
Lawmakers also could create subsidiary rules built around wrongful gains
by companies, as opposed to rules focused on harm to individuals.145 This is
because loyalty is about mitigating the lopsided power advantage certain trusted
parties have that gives them both significant incentives and abilities for wrongful
self-dealing. While the ultimate goal is to prevent outcomes adverse to the
trusting party, the direct goal of a duty of loyalty is to preserve the integrity and
reliability of relationships of trust by short-circuiting through law the ability of
powerful parties to take wrongful advantage of their dominant position.
B. Five Areas for Subsidiary Data Loyalty Rules
Scholars and lawmakers have identified a number of different contexts
where the incentives for self-dealing by the powerful party in an information
relationship are overwhelming, making these contexts particularly suitable for
subsidiary data loyalty rules.146 In this section, we synthesize these contexts into
143
See Gold, supra note 90, at 401 (“Different opportunism risks will then justify different loyalty content
and approaches to legal decision-making.”).
144
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 114, at 435–36.
145
See, e.g., Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Remedies, 94 IND. L.J. 653, 659, 677–78 (2019) (arguing for
restitution as the best fit for privacy infringement).
146
See, e.g., Balkin, Fiduciary Model of Privacy, supra note 3, at 15 (“The nature of fiduciary obligations
depends on . . . the potential dangers of abuse, manipulation, self-dealing, and overreaching by the more
powerful party.”); Scholz, supra note 3, at 197; Ariel Dobkin, Information Fiduciaries in Practice: Data Privacy
and User Expectations, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 17 (2018) (identifying four major ways of breaching an
information fiduciary duty: “manipulation, discrimination, third-party sharing, and violating a company’s own
privacy policy”); Barrett, supra note 125, at 1100 (“[A]n information fiduciary framework should also address
manipulation and discrimination in order to ensure that people are protected from the full array of modern digital
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five main areas to provide even more specificity to the kinds of subsidiary rules
that could give protection to those contexts that are the ripest for abuse. First,
entrustees should be loyal when collecting information. Even in relationships of
trust, data should only be collected when it is in the best interests of trusting
parties. Second, entrustees should be loyal when personalizing (i.e., treating
people differently based upon personal information or characteristics). Third,
entrustees should be loyal when gatekeeping, avoiding conflicts when allowing
government and other third-party access to trusting parties and their data. Fourth,
entrustees should be loyal when influencing trusting parties, such as when they
leverage personal data and digital tools to exert sway over people to achieve
particular results. Fifth and finally, entrustees should be loyal when mediating
interactions between their human customers, specifically in the creation and
administration of systems that govern how people are allowed to interact with
each other. These contexts often overlap and involve issues like discriminatory
microtargeting, harmful amplification of misinformation, failure of process for
content moderation, and abusive dark patterns. We propose that lawmakers
create an overlapping web of subsidiary loyalty rules to mitigate these kinds of
disloyal behavior.
1. Loyal Collection
A duty of loyalty should begin the moment a trusted party invites disclosure
and makes the decision to collect personal information. In this way, data loyalty
could embolden the fair information principle of data minimization. This
principle holds that data collectors should only identify the minimum amount of
personal information needed to fulfill a legitimate purpose and collection, and
hold that much information and no more.147 Combined with the storage
limitation principle, which holds that organizations should not keep data longer
than needed for their stated purpose, data minimization is a central pillar in data
protection regimes around the world, but it too often fails to find traction.148
Data loyalty could provide a normative vision for when companies have
exceeded their duty to minimize collection and retention—when it conflicts with
a trusting party’s (or collective trusting parties’) best interests. Under general

threats that they face.”).
147
Data Minimisation, INFO. COMM’RS OFF., https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/
guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/principles/data-minimisation/#data_minimisation (last visited Apr.
26, 2022).
148
Id.; David A. Zetoony, Does the CCPA Require Data Minimization with Regard to the Collection and
Use of Information?, GREENBERGTRAURIG (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.gtlaw-dataprivacydish.com/2020/10/
does-the-ccpa-require-data-minimization-with-regard-to-the-collection-and-use-of-information/.
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data protection frameworks that impose data minimization requirements,
organizations must typically ensure that the data they are processing is adequate
(sufficient to fulfill the stated purpose), relevant (has a relevant link to that
purpose), and necessary (collecting and holding only that which is needed for
that purpose). But there is a fair amount of uncertainty as to how to interpret
these requirements. The U.K. Information Commissioner’s Office explains that
“[t]he UK GDPR does not define [what is adequate, relevant, and limited].
Clearly, though, this will depend on your specified purpose for collecting and
using the personal data. It may also differ from one individual to another.”149 A
duty of loyalty could provide a value-laden baseline that not only requires an
examination of the purpose of the collection but also elevates the interests of
those affected by the collection. It is likely that more data of specific kinds or in
specific contexts might be collected within trusted relationships than would
otherwise be acceptable for parties outside of information relationships, but this
collection should come with much stricter obligations. Of course, loyal
collection also means that trusted parties must often refrain from collecting
entire kinds of information. While parties at arm’s length might act
opportunistically in collecting as much data as possible, trusted parties remain
loyal by leaving all data that does not serve trusting parties’ best interests on the
table. Moreover, to the extent that we might be concerned about the later stages
of Zuboff’s theory of surveillance capitalism, in which data are collected to
predict and persuade, a robust regime of loyal collection would ensure that we
remain only at the first stage, in which data are collected to improve the quality
of service in the loyal customer’s interest.150
2. Loyal Personalization
The modern Internet routinely and systemically treats people differently
based upon their personal information or characteristics. Targeted and
behavioral advertising are the most infamous examples of this, but first-party
product and streaming recommendations, news feeds, default settings, layouts,
and more are all designed to automatically look and act differently based on a
person’s personal characteristics. Some of this personalization, such as targeted
recommendations for networked connections based upon intentionally revealed
data (for example, where you work or attended high school), would probably be
loyal. Other personalization systems, however, such as those that wrongfully
discriminate or have a disparate impact on protected, marginalized, or vulnerable
groups of people, would likely conflict with that trusting collective’s best
149
150
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interests. Ariel Dobkin argues in favor of antidiscrimination rules for those
bound by duties of loyalty and care, which would prohibit companies in
information relationships from “discriminating between or against users based
on characteristics like race or gender.”151 Dobkin adds that “[t]he set of data
points available to companies often includes these qualities and many others.
There are three main methods by which a company might discriminate based on
these characteristics: (1) access to services, (2) prices, and (3) digital
redlining.”152
Some fear that rules requiring loyal personalization might jeopardize the
entire enterprise of targeted and behavioral advertising. However, such fears are
overblown. Balkin responds to this concern: “This conclusion does not follow
unless we assume that all targeted advertising is inherently abusive and
inconsistent with the best interests of end users. Since much of modern
advertising is based on increasing efficiencies in locating and reaching interested
audiences, this would be a very surprising conclusion.”153 Instead, Balkin
argues, “[W]e should ask what practices of advertising, targeted at end users, do
not betray their trust or operate against their interests. Only this kind of targeted
advertising should be permitted.”154
We agree with Balkin and would save the existential debate around targeted
advertising for a different day. Our point here is merely to emphasize that
subsidiary rules built around the concept of loyal personalization could firmly
and clearly address a systemic problem that traditional data protection
frameworks have been unable to solve.
3. Loyal Gatekeeping
Entrustees have a remarkable ability to give third parties access to trusting
parties and their data. They can do so through their APIs, advertiser portals,
fusion centers, and government backdoors. This access is the source of most
major platforms’ power. And everyone wants a piece of the “users.” Advertisers
clamor for their attention. Data brokers and companies training AI models lust
for their data. And governments demand evidence for investigations, trials, and
intelligence. Entrustees have financial incentives to build portals and facilitate
151

Dobkin, supra note 146, at 26.
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Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, supra note 3, at 27.
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Id. at 28 (“A rule that allowed only contextual targeted advertising but not behavioral advertising
would, at a stroke, transform the landscape of surveillance capitalism, but it would still allow targeted ads . . . .
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access for third parties. Some access granted by trustees to third parties is not in
conflict with trusting parties’ best interests. For example, contextual advertising
usually does not significantly turn people’s own data or limitations against them,
nor does it usually expose trusting parties to significant privacy harms. Protocols
for interoperability to help people transfer data from one place to another also
serve the interests (and often the wishes) of trusting parties.
However, certain lax gatekeeping practices would be disloyal because of
how they endanger trusting parties by obscuring risk and breaking promises
while facilitating access to third parties for organizational gains or to avoid costs.
The three most resonant privacy scandals in the past decade—the government
surveillance revelations by Edward Snowden, the FBI’s request that Apple help
them bypass encryption protections, and Cambridge Analytica’s massive
Facebook data exfiltration—all involved gatekeeping issues.155 Facebook’s
system for facilitating third-party applications’ access to their customer base was
a clear example of making collective user interests subservient to growth
metrics, as the company touted to its human customers the virtues of being able
to control their audiences while obscuring the true risk of exposure and the steps
needed to limit it.156 Similarly, although companies typically have little choice
in respecting legal process compelling customer data, a duty of loyalty would
justify rules that mandated additional process for certain kinds of
relationships.157 Kiel Brennan-Marquez argues the following:
Fourth Amendment doctrine must abandon the pretense that all private
actors are alike. The implication of A’s decision to share information
with B should not be uniform across contexts. Rather, it should depend
on what type of “third party” B is, on B’s role in the world vis-à-vis A.
In many settings, it is perfectly acceptable—indeed, it serves an
important public function—for B to help investigate A’s illicit activity.
155
Kennedy Elliott & Terri Rupar, Six Months of Revelations on NSA, WASH. POST (June 5-6, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/nsa-timeline/m/; The Cambridge Analytica Files,
GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/cambridge-analytica-files (last visited Apr. 26, 2022);
Arjun Kharpal, Apple v. FBI: All You Need to Know, CNBC (Mar. 29, 2016, 6:34 AM); https://www.cnbc.com/
2016/03/29/apple-vs-fbi-all-you-need-to-know.html.
156
FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on Facebook, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (July 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penaltysweeping-new-privacy-restrictions.
157
See, e.g., Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, supra note 3, at 19 (“Under the fiduciary model, the
question is not whether consumers reasonably expect that a particular type of data will be kept private. Rather,
the question is whether the relationship between end users and digital companies is a fiduciary relationship of
trust. If so, then the question becomes whether the digital business can freely disclose this information to others
consistent with their fiduciary obligations. If not, then the government needs to obtain a warrant. The fiduciary
model helps preserve our security from the government as we hand over more and more information about
ourselves to digital businesses.”).
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But there is also an important class of cases in which B is not a run-ofthe-mill private actor, but rather an information fiduciary, beholden to
A’s interests first and foremost.158

In these ways, a duty of loyal gatekeeping could help reduce the exposure of
customers to third parties who would almost certainly not have their best
interests at heart. And a requirement that a loyal entrustee make sure that the
trusting party is protected from third-party access in the entrustee’s control
would be both well within the heartland of a duty of loyalty and also important
enough to safeguard through subsidiary rules.
4. Loyal Influencing
Technologies are artifacts built to act upon the world. Every conscious
design decision made in the creation of a website or app is meant to facilitate a
particular kind of behavior.159 In addressing the ethics of “nudging,” Cass
Sunstein explains the following:
When people make decisions, they do so against a background
consisting of choice architecture. A cafeteria has a design, and the
design will affect what people choose [to eat]. The same is true of
websites. Department stores have architectures, and they can be
designed so as to promote or discourage certain choices by shoppers
(such as leaving without making a purchase).160

The structure of digital technologies affects people’s choices even if the effect
is not intended by designers. When designers create drop-down menus, privacy
settings, “I agree” buttons, and other features that implicate privacy, they
influence people’s behavior. They can’t avoid it.161 Given their power, interface
designers and other choice architects should be loyal in exercising their
influence.
The most prominent example of disloyal influence involves organizations
leveraging “dark patterns” or “malicious interfaces,” which are user interface
elements meant to influence a person’s behavior against their intentions or best
158

Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 616 (2015).
Cf. LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF
TECHNOLOGY 124 (1986) (explaining the politics of artifacts).
160
Cass R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging, 32 YALE J. REGUL. 413, 417 (2015).
161
Id. at 421 (“Human beings . . . cannot wish [choice architecture] away. Any store has a design; some
products are seen first, and others are not. Any menu places options at various locations. Television stations
come with different numbers, and strikingly, numbers matter, even when the costs of switching are vanishingly
low; people tend to choose the station at the lower number, so that channel 3 will obtain more viewers than
channel 53.”).
159
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interests.162 Companies deploy “effort traps” to make deleting an account
confusing and difficult. They make “cancel” buttons hard to see and press,
obscure important details in tiny fonts or walls of boilerplate, and leverage our
deeply-entrenched and empirically-validated overconfidence regarding risk,
deference for conformity, endowment effects, status quo bias, and other biases
and mental shortcuts to manipulate us to their ends. (“Are you sure you want to
delete and miss valuable offers? Your friends will also be so sad to see you go!”)
Jamie Luguri and Lior Strahilevitz recently published some of the first
comparative evidence quantifying the effectiveness of dark patterns. The
scholars explain that “dark patterns are strikingly effective in getting consumers
to do what they would not do when confronted with more neutral user
interfaces.”163 Luguri and Strahilevitz found that “[r]elatively mild dark patterns
more than doubled the percentage of consumers who signed up for a dubious
identity theft protection service, . . . and aggressive dark patterns nearly
quadrupled the percentage of consumers signing up. In social science terms, the
magnitudes of these treatment effects are enormous.”164

162
See, e.g., HARTZOG, supra note 39, at 161; Jamie Luguri & Lior Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark
Patterns, 13 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 43, 44 (2021); Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, supra note 43, at 1005–06;
Gregory Conti & Edward Sobiesk, Malicious Interfaces and Personalization’s Uninviting Future, IEEE SEC. &
PRIV., May–June 2009, at 72–73, http://www.rumint.org/gregconti/publications/j3pri.pdf; Johanna Gunawan,
David Choffnes, Woodrow Hartzog & Christo Wilson, Towards an Understanding of Dark Patterns Privacy
Harms, in CHI WORKSHOP, WHAT CAN CHI DO ABOUT DARK PATTERNS? 1, 1 (2021), https://
darkpatternsindesign.com/position-papers/; Harry Brignull, Dark Patterns: Deception vs. Honesty in UI Design,
A LIST APART (Nov. 1, 2011), https://alistapart.com/article/dark-patterns-deception-vs-honesty-in-ui-design/;
Colin M. Gray, Yubo Kou, Bryan Battles, Joseph Hoggatt & Austin L. Toombs, The Dark (Patterns) Side of UX
Design, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2018 CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS, 1, 1, 8–
9 (2018), http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=3173574.3174108; Arunesh Mathur, Gunes Acar, Michael J.
Friedman, Elena Lucherini, Jonathan Mayer, Marshini Chetty & Arvind Narayanan, Dark Patterns at Scale:
Findings from a Crawl of 11K Shopping Websites, 3 PROC. ACM HUM-COMPUT. INTERACTIONS 1, 4 (2019);
Arunesh Mathur, Jonathan Mayer & Mihir Kshirsagar, What Makes a Dark Pattern . . . Dark? Design Attributes,
Normative Considerations, and Measurement Methods, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2018 CHI CONFERENCE ON
HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS, supra, at 1, 13, http://arxiv.org/abs/2101.04843; Christoph Bösch,
Benjamin Erb, Frank Kargl, Henning Kopp & Stefan Pfattheicher, Tales from the Dark Side: Privacy Dark
Strategies and Privacy Dark Patterns, 4 PROC. ON PRIV. ENHANCING TECHS. 237, 248–49 (2016); Ari Ezra
Waldman, Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and the “Privacy Paradox,” 31 CURRENT OP. PSYCH. 105, 105,
107–08 (2020).
163
Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 162, at 46 (emphasis omitted).
164
Id. They add, “We found that the most effective dark pattern strategies were hidden information
(smaller print in a less visually prominent location), obstruction (making users jump through unnecessary hoops
to reject a service), trick questions (intentionally confusing prompts), and social proof (efforts to generate a
bandwagon effect). Other effective strategies included loaded questions and making acceptance the default. . . .
In many cases, consumers exposed to dark patterns did not understand that they had signed up for a costly
service.” Id. at 47.
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These findings have important implications for lawmakers considering
subsidiary rules for dark patterns, particularly for a duty of loyalty. Luguri and
Strahilevitz found evidence that the robustness of dark patterns matters in a
powerfully counterintuitive way. As they explain, “aggressive dark patterns
generate a powerful customer backlash whereas mild dark patterns usually do
not. Therefore, counterintuitively, the strongest case for regulation and other
legal interventions concern subtle uses of dark patterns.”165 (This also,
incidentally, explains why Target’s subtle hiding of habit-inducing baby formula
coupons in marketing to women it knew to be pregnant to avoid tipping them
off was both effective and problematic.166) Legal remedies that require
demonstrable injury, such as duties of care and prohibitions on unfair trade
practices, will likely struggle to redress the more subtle forms of manipulation
that Luguri and Strahilevitz highlighted as the most dangerous and profitable for
companies. Lawmakers, after all, have struggled for years to articulate when
attempts at persuasion become harmful.167
But trusting parties do not need to be injured for entrustees to violate a duty
of loyalty. Subsidiary rules around disloyal attempts to influence would address
the most pernicious and dangerous dark patterns head-on.168 Lawmakers should
focus on how the design (plus data science plus behavioral science) is meant to
take advantage of a person’s limitations or vulnerabilities to benefit the designer
in a way that is against the trusting party’s best interests.169

165

Id. at 46–47.
See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
167
See Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 162, at 99–102 (analyzing constitutional issues presented by dark
pattern regulation); see also Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation: Hidden
Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 3 (2019) (“[A]t its core, manipulation is hidden
influence—the covert subversion of another person’s decision-making power. In contrast with persuasion, which
is the forthright appeal to another person’s decision-making power, or coercion, which is the restriction of
acceptable options from which another person might choose, manipulation functions by exploiting the
manipulee’s cognitive (or affective) weaknesses and vulnerabilities in order to steer his or her decision-making
process towards the manipulator’s ends.”).
168
Luguri and Strahilevitz recommend a multi-factor test to help determine when dark patterns cross the
line that looks to considerations such as “(i) evidence of a defendant’s malicious intent or knowledge of
detrimental aspects of the user interface’s design, (ii) whether vulnerable populations—like less educated
consumers, the elderly, or people suffering from chronic medical conditions—are particularly susceptible to the
dark pattern, and (iii) the magnitude of the costs and benefits produced by the dark pattern.” Luguri &
Strahilevitz, supra note 162, at 99.
169
Balkin has proposed looking to “techniques of persuasion and influence that (1) prey on another
person’s emotional vulnerabilities and lack of knowledge (2) to benefit oneself or one’s allies and (3) reduce the
welfare of the other person.” Jack M. Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain 4 (Hoover Working Grp.
on Nat’l Sec., Tech, & L., Aegis Series Paper No. 1814, 2018), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/
research/docs/balkin_webreadypdf.pdf.
166
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5. Loyal Mediation
Certain kinds of organizations design their platforms so that their customers
interact not just with the organization itself but also with each other. In other
words, they mediate people’s social and market experiences with other people
using their service. Often, the interests of the platforms and their customers do
not diverge regarding how their experiences with each other are mediated. Some
people want to share pictures of their dogs on Instagram while some people want
to see pictures of other people’s dogs, and Instagram has the incentive to make
this possible so everyone can be happy sharing and viewing each other’s dogs
(or, not).
But things can go off the rails quickly if companies feel pressured to achieve
continual and endless growth. They create systems that reward virality and the
most outrageous or venomous “hot takes” instead of the alleged purpose of
meaningful social interaction and social, emotional, and intellectual
nourishment. They optimize their algorithms and interfaces to reward our most
impulsive and petty reactions. Amplification of certain kinds of information—
combined with strategic roadblocks that make it difficult to report harmful
speech and hide from other users—leads to acute individual harms like
harassment as well as systemic harms like polarization, reduced ability to engage
in self-governance, negative public health outcomes, and chilling effects for
large groups of vulnerable people.170
A duty of loyalty cannot solve all the complex problems of content
moderation or harassment. As we have maintained, a duty of loyalty is merely
one important tool in a larger toolkit. But companies do have remarkable power
to influence how people using their systems interact with each other.171 They are
disloyal when they exert this power to optimize growth in ways that conflict with
the best interests of their customers. Subsidiary rules for loyal mediation are, of
course, complicated because of the potentially conflicting interests amongst
actors and those potentially adversely affected by the act. One trusting party
wants to speak while the others are made worse because of it. This is where our
proposed systemic focus and the traditional fiduciary law method of developing
a hierarchy of loyalties would help clarify lawmakers’ actions and firm’s
obligations.

170
See, e.g., DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 83–85 (2014) (explaining that
individuals who share the virtual harm they are receiving with law enforcement typically do not receive much
assistance).
171
See, e.g., id. at 66–68; HARTZOG, supra note 39, at 161–62.
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CONCLUSION
If, at this point, you are thinking that the conception of loyalty we have
articulated in this paper sounds quite different from traditional duties of loyalty,
you would be right. Traditional fiduciary models are ill-equipped to simply be
dropped onto online platforms. In her book Between Truth and Power, Julie
Cohen argues that legal changes that “simply adopt yesterday’s methods are
unlikely to succeed. Just as the most effective institutional changes of a previous
era engaged directly with the logistics of commodification and marketization, so
institutional changes for the current era will need to engage directly with the
logistics of dematerialization, datafication, and platformization.”172 The critics
of a duty of loyalty have correctly identified that the power of modern platforms
is unprecedented and will require multiple new approaches to disrupt it.
But the critiques that focus on the affordances and tools used by these
organizations also reveal a number of surprising virtues of data loyalty,
including its core, fundamental purpose: to limit the ability of one party in a
relationship to exploit the massive power advantage they have over the other for
self-gain. In this Article, we have tried to highlight those virtues to plot a new
vision for data loyalty, one that looks beyond individualistic approaches to
privacy to remedy systemic problems of power in relationships. This new vision
works to reinforce public governance efforts rather than serve as an alternative
to them. And it is capable of inspiring a public tired of being betrayed and
commodified to demand rules that compel loyal behavior and put their interests
first. Relational rules like data loyalty will not be sufficient, but they will be
necessary to mitigate the vulnerabilities within the information relationships that
will continue to be a part of our daily lives for the foreseeable future. Loyalty, it
turns out, can be a powerful state of mind for reenergizing privacy reform; it
embraces privacy’s relational turn, prioritizes human values, and offers solutions
that are flexible and clear, rather than vague and indeterminate. And while
loyalty, to be sure, will be only one piece of the puzzle of making the best of our
information revolution, it may just be the key piece that makes all the others
work.

172

COHEN, supra note 4, at 270.

LEGISLATING DATA LOYALTY
Woodrow Hartzog* & Neil Richards**
Lawmakers looking to embolden privacy law have begun to consider imposing duties of
loyalty on organizations trusted with people’s data and online experiences. The idea behind
loyalty is simple: organizations should not process data or design technologies that conflict with
the best interests of trusting parties. But the logistics and implementation of data loyalty need to
be developed if the concept is going to be capable of moving privacy law beyond its “notice and
consent” roots to confront people’s vulnerabilities in their relationship with powerful data
collectors.
In this short Essay, we propose a model for legislating data loyalty. Our model takes
advantage of loyalty’s strengths—it is well-established in our law, it is flexible, and it can
accommodate conflicting values. Our Essay also explains how data loyalty can embolden our
existing data privacy rules, address emergent dangers, solve privacy’s problems around consent
and harm, and establish an antibetrayal ethos as America’s privacy identity.
We propose that lawmakers use a two-step process to (1) articulate a primary, general duty
of loyalty, then (2) articulate “subsidiary” duties that are more specific and sensitive to context.
Subsidiary duties regarding collection, personalization, gatekeeping, persuasion, and mediation
would target the most opportunistic contexts for self-dealing and result in flexible open-ended
duties combined with highly specific rules. In this way, a duty of data loyalty is not just appealing
in theory—it can be effectively implemented in practice just like the other duties of loyalty our law
has recognized for hundreds of years. Loyalty is thus not only flexible, but it is capable of
breathing life into America’s historically tepid privacy frameworks.

INTRODUCTION
American privacy law is in a rut. It has no privacy identity. Its
traditional rules mandating transparency and consent are outdated,
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porous, and poorly enforced. It is a far cry from the “adequacy”
necessary for a profitable and sustainable data trade with the European
Union (EU) and Britain. It has, in short, proven no match for the likes
of the modern tech giants and a world awash in data and devices.
What’s worse, while privacy reform appears to be on the agenda, many
of the existing proposals—particularly those touted as “businessfriendly”—are so weak as to risk codifying a privacy rights status quo
that virtually everyone agrees is unacceptable.1 In searching for a
meaningful new approach to regulating data privacy, lawmakers have
begun to seriously explore the idea that tech companies should be
bound by a duty of loyalty to those who trust them with their data and
online experiences.2
Scholars have proposed versions of a duty of loyalty for the past
twenty years, but not all lawmakers are convinced.3 Some may be
1 This is an argument we have been making for several years. See e.g., Woodrow
Hartzog & Neil Richards, Opinion, There’s a Lot to Like About the Senate Privacy Bill, if It’s Not
Watered Down, THE HILL (Dec. 6, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/472892theres-a-lot-to-like-about-the-senate-privacy-bill-if-its-not-watered [https://perma.cc/W87YZGPG]; Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, Opinion, It’s Time to Try Something Different on
Internet Privacy, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/its-time-to-try-something-different-on-internet-privacy/2018/12/20/bc1d71c0-0315-11e99122-82e98f91ee6f_story.html [https://perma.cc/W63X-UHCP].
2 See, e.g., Data Care Act of 2019, S. 2961, 116th Cong. § 3(b)(2) (2019) (Duty of
Loyalty—An online service provider may not use individual identifying data, or data derived
from individual identifying data, in any way that—(A) will benefit the online service
provider to the detriment of an end user; and (B) (i) will result in reasonably foreseeable
and material physical or financial harm to an end user; or (ii) would be unexpected and
highly offensive to a reasonable end user); Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2968,
116th Cong. § 101 (2019) (Duty of Loyalty. (a) In General.—A covered entity shall not—
(1) engage in a deceptive data practice or a harmful data practice; or (2) process or transfer
covered data in a manner that violates any provision of this Act); New York Privacy Act, S.
5642, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (“Every legal entity, or any affiliate of such entity,
and every controller and data broker, which collects, sells or licenses personal information
of consumers, shall exercise the duty of care, loyalty and confidentiality expected of a
fiduciary with respect to securing the personal data of a consumer against a privacy risk;
and shall act in the best interests of the consumer, without regard to the interests of the
entity, controller or data broker, in a manner expected by a reasonable consumer under
the circumstances.”); Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on European Data Governance (Data Governance Act), COM (2020) 767 final (Nov.
25, 2020); Data Protection Act 2018, c. 123 (UK); An Act to Provide Facial Recognition
Accountability and Comprehensive Enforcement, H.R. 117, 192d Gen. Ct., §2(a) (Mass.
2021) (“A covered entity shall be prohibited from taking any actions with respect to
processing facial recognition data or designing facial recognition technologies that conflict
with an end user’s best interests.”).
3 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 11 (2020)
[hereinafter Balkin, The Fiduciary Model]; Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First
Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016) [hereinafter Balkin, Information Fiduciaries];
Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law, 99 WASH. U. L. REV.
961 (2021) [hereinafter Richards & Hartzog, Duty of Loyalty]; Lauren Henry Scholz,
Fiduciary Boilerplate: Locating Fiduciary Relationships in Information Age Consumer Transactions,
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concerned that it is too vague, or that it would be bad for business.
Others wonder what data loyalty would get us that we couldn’t get from
EU or California-style statutes. Others are uncertain about how a duty
of loyalty would work and what specific legislation for data loyalty
should look like.
In this short Essay, we propose a model for legislating data loyalty.
Our model takes advantage of loyalty’s strengths—it is well-established
in our law, it is flexible, and it can accommodate conflicting values.
Our Essay also explains how data loyalty can and should fit within the
existing fabric of information privacy law, building on our research
exploring how better privacy rules can protect and build trust in
relationships between consumers and companies. It lays out the what
and the why of data loyalty for legislators seeking a robust alternative
to the failed “notice-and-choice” regime in the United States.
Our argument is simple—a duty of data loyalty is not just
appealing in theory—it can be effectively implemented in practice just
like the other duties of loyalty our law has recognized for hundreds of
years. Loyalty is not only flexible, but it is capable of breathing life into
America’s historically tepid privacy efforts. It is a meaningful
alternative to ineffective regimes that rely too much upon illusory
notions of consent and restrictive notions of harm, while being flexible
enough to confront new privacy challenges and accommodating
mutually beneficial data practices. A properly implemented duty of
loyalty could thus represent an answer to many of the problems of
information privacy, creating real value for consumers, businesses, and
our society as a whole.

46 J. CORP. L. 143 (2020); see also ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION
PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE (2018); Claudia E. Haupt, Platforms as Trustees:
Information Fiduciaries and the Value of Analogy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 34 (2020); Lilian
Edwards, The Problem with Privacy: A Modest Proposal, 18 INT’L REV. L. COMPUTS. & TECH. 309
(2004); Christopher W. Savage, Managing the Ambient Trust Commons: The Economics of Online
Consumer Information Privacy, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 95 (2019); Jonathan Zittrain,
Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 340 (2014); Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in
Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057
(2019); Ariel Dobkin, Information Fiduciaries in Practice: Data Privacy and User Expectations, 33
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 1 (2018); Cameron F. Kerry, Why Protecting Privacy Is a Losing Game
Today—and How to Change the Game, BROOKINGS (July 12, 2018), https://
www.brookings.edu/research/why-protecting-privacy-is-a-losing-game-today-and-how-tochange-the-game/ [https://perma.cc/L8DQ-SK79]; Ian R. Kerr, The Legal Relationship
Between Online Service Providers and Users, 35 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 419 (2001); Richard S.
Whitt, Old School Goes Online: Exploring Fiduciary Obligations of Loyalty and Care in the Digital
Platforms Era, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 75 (2020); Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth
Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 612 (2015); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE
DIGITAL PERSON (2004); but see Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of
Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497 (2019).
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WHAT IS DATA LOYALTY?

Data loyalty is the simple idea that the organizations we trust
should not process our data or design their tools in ways that conflict
with our best interests. It borrows from notions of loyalty in fiduciary
law, but it is distinct from them. The model we propose here would be
crafted by legislators to the specific vulnerabilities and incentives in the
relationships between consumers and the data-extractive companies
they deal with every day.
Scholars have proposed duties of loyalty in a variety of forms—
including loyalty duties for data collectors, “information fiduciaries,”
or fiduciary boilerplate—in part because loyalty represents a
substantive check on the ability of companies to use human data to
nudge, influence, coerce, and amass vast profits from the exploitation
of human information.4 It cannot be avoided by trickery, hidden fine
print, or manipulative interfaces known as “dark patterns.” At its core,
it protects the expectations consumers bring to relationships with
companies, and it builds trust in those relationships that allows them
to flourish to the benefit of both parties.
In other work we have articulated a duty for loyalty for privacy law
as the duty of data collectors to act in the best interests of those whose
data they collect.5 A duty of loyalty for privacy law is neither perfect
nor a tool for all tasks. But loyalty has one great virtue: it places the
focus for information age problems on the relationships that define
our social lives rather than on the data which is the byproduct of those
relationships. Loyalty shifts the law’s attention from the procedural
rules of privacy law that are too easy to manipulate (“Did you hide a
vague sentence in the privacy policy?” “Did the consumer fail to hit
the tiny opt-out button?”) to the substantive question of what practices
go too far. It is flexible and adaptable across contexts, cultures, and
times. Loyalty can thus be a powerful response to what Shoshana

4 See, e.g., Balkin, The Fiduciary Model, supra note 3; Balkin, Information Fiduciaries,
supra note 3; Richards & Hartzog, Duty of Loyalty, supra note 3; Scholz, supra note 3; see also
WALDMAN, supra note 3; Haupt, supra note 3; Edwards, supra note 3; Savage, supra note 3;
Zittrain, supra note 3, at 340; Barrett, supra note 3; Dobkin, supra note 3, at 1; Kerry, supra
note 3; Kerr, supra note 3; Whitt, supra note 3; Brennan-Marquez, supra note 3, at 612;
SOLOVE, supra note 3.
5 See, e.g., Richards & Hartzog, Duty of Loyalty, supra note 3; Woodrow Hartzog & Neil
Richards, The Surprising Virtues of Data Loyalty, 71 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2022); Woodrow
Hartzog & Neil Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment and the Limits of Data Protection, 61
B.C. L. REV. 1687 (2020) [hereinafter Hartzog & Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment];
Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 431 (2016) [hereinafter Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously]; Neil Richards &
Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461 (2019)
[hereinafter Richards & Hartzog, Pathologies of Digital Consent]; Neil Richards & Woodrow
Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap: A Review, 126 YALE L.J. 1180 (2017) (book review).
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Zuboff calls “surveillance capitalism,” the claiming of “human
experience as free raw material for hidden commercial practices of
extraction, prediction, and sales . . . As significant a threat to human
nature in the twenty-first century as industrial capitalism was to the
natural world in the nineteenth and twentieth.”6
Data loyalty has three key features—it is a (1) relational duty (2)
that prohibits self-dealing (3) at the expense of a trusting party. Let’s break
these three features apart.
A. A Relational Duty
Lawmakers who decide they want to regulate privacy can begin
their task by focusing on at least three different things. First, they
could focus on the data itself, like what can be collected and whether
datasets are deidentified. This is the approach that most federal and
European privacy laws have taken to date with laws like the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the California Consumer
Privacy Act (CCPA). Second, there are structural concerns, like
requiring companies to appoint a data privacy officer or focusing on
monopoly power. This is the approach familiar to antitrust and
corporate law. There’s also a third option—lawmakers could focus on
our relationships, like requiring confidentiality from physicians,
lawyers, and other professionals.7
In addition to being one of the oldest contexts for privacy to
flourish, relationships have a few distinct advantages for lawmakers
looking to fight the excesses and abuses of data-hungry organizations.
First, relational duties are acutely sensitive to the power disparities within
information relationships. Tech companies control what we see, what
we can click on, and what sorts of information they want to extract
from their customers. They have incredible resources that help them
predict and nudge our behavior and have the financial incentive to
keep us ever more exposed. Duties of loyalty protect against selfdealing, while related duties of care placed on relationships protect
against dangerous behavior and the risks of harm. The greater the
power imbalance and the more vulnerable people are through
exposure, so should the duty to which the trusted party is held be
greater.8
Second, relational duties are a way out of privacy’s consent trap. For
years lawmakers, regulators, and companies have been obsessing over
whether the consent people gave was a truly meaningful, informed,
and revocable choice. People click “I Agree” buttons and slightly
6 SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER, at vii (2019).
7 See Hartzog & Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment, supra note 5, at 1697.
8 See, e.g., Balkin, The Fiduciary Model, supra note 3, at 13–14.
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wince without reading the terms because it is impossible to do so, even
when what they click states that they read and understand the terms.
Consent is broken, but lawmakers have stuck to notice and consent
regimes anyway, even though it is common knowledge that digital
consent is rarely meaningful. Relational duties allow for a decoupling
of choice and consent. These duties allow trusting parties to enter into
information relationships without accepting the risks of whatever
harmful data practices and consequences lurk in the fine print, the
business model, or the technology. They can also allow trusting parties
to select from a range of choices without fear of betrayal because they
would be protected no matter what they chose.9
Finally, relationships open the possibility of more robust
enforcement rules because they are voluntarily entered into and hold a
unique place in the law as a result. The concept of contractual privity
could also be used to extend relational duties beyond the initial
trusting party and entrustee. Under a “chain-link” approach to
relational privacy rules, lawmakers could directly—or using mandated
terms in data-sharing contracts—link the disclosure of personal
information to obligations of loyalty to protect information as it is
disclosed downstream.10 To create the chain of protection, contracts
would be used to link each new recipient of information to a previous
recipient who wished to disclose the information. At the same time,
relational duties raise even fewer free expression issues than other
forms of data regulation because they regulate relationships rather
than information flows. In relationships, parties assume these duties
by soliciting trust and voluntarily entering into these relationships.
Moreover, protections for power-imbalanced relationships have a deep
tradition in U.S. law in harmony with free expression frameworks. This
is, for example, why lawyers do not have a First Amendment right to
disclose client confidences, no matter how “newsworthy” they might
be.11
For these reasons, shifting the focus of privacy law from data to
relationships offers significant advantages for effective policy.

9 For an extended critique of consent-based models for data processing, see Richards
& Hartzog, Pathologies of Digital Consent, supra note 5.
10 See Woodrow Hartzog, Chain-Link Confidentiality, 46 GA. L. REV. 657, 658–61 (2012).
11 Cf. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 3; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About
You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1057–58 (2000) (explaining that enforcement of contracts to
maintain confidentiality create no First Amendment problems); Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss
and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74
U. CIN. L. REV. 887 (2006). But see Khan & Pozen, supra note 3.
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B. That Prohibits Self-Dealing
Many of the problems of surveillance capitalism come down to the
problem of self-dealing, where an organization exploits an advantage
over a trusting party to its own benefit.12 The failures of American
privacy law have enabled such corporate opportunism and
manipulation of consumers using human information. This problem
is particularly serious in the context of “personalized” technologies
that promise to know us so that they can better satisfy our needs and
wants. Insufficiently constrained by privacy law and driven to
maximize quarterly profits by corporate law, companies can deploy a
potent cocktail of techniques derived from cognitive and behavioral
science to “nudge” or otherwise influence the choices we make.13
These highly capitalized tech companies have not acted like the
benevolent choice architects some had hoped for.14 Technologies—
and choice architecture—advertised as serving consumers have instead
become weaponized, serving commodified consumers up to the
companies and their commercial and political advertiser clients.15
Loyalty rules directly prohibit conflicted self-dealing. In so doing,
they can change the incentives and business models of entire
industries. Many critics believe that U.S. data privacy law has failed to
change the corrosive business models that endanger, manipulate,
mislead, misinform, and polarize people every day. The law, these
critics suggest, merely prunes the edges of wrongdoing rather than
getting to the core of the problem.16 A duty of data loyalty would
directly address this problem by taking self-dealing off the table as a
general matter. More specific, subsidiary data loyalty rules for targeted
advertising, web scraping, manipulative interfaces, and optimized
human engagement metrics could revolutionize entire industries with
clearer rules of the road. They could make certain abusive business
models obsolete overnight. This would be a sharp contrast to the
piecemeal and procedural approach of current U.S. data privacy law,
which presupposes that all possible extraction models can be valid if
they follow the right procedures and give people some semblance of
control over their information. Data loyalty rules instead look directly
to corporate profit motives and ask if they conflict with a trusting

12 See JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM (2019); ZUBOFF, supra note 6.
13 See NEIL RICHARDS, WHY PRIVACY MATTERS 39–50 (2022).
14 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 11–13 (2008).
15 See RICHARDS, supra note 13, at 46–49.
16 See, e.g., Facebook, Inc., F.T.C. No. 1823109 (July 24, 2019) (Chopra, Comm’r,
dissenting); Facebook, Inc., F.T.C. No. 1823109 (July 24, 2019) (Kelly, Comm’r, dissenting).
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party’s best interests. They require profit models to be based on the
provision of valuable services rather than exploitation and extraction.
C. At the Expense of a Trusting Party
Loyalty rules safeguard trusting parties from betrayal, looking to
whether a trusting party has been disadvantaged by an organization’s
self-dealing. When organizations enrich themselves with trusting
parties’ data, people consistently end up paying with their time,
attention, mental well-being, reputation, and significant life
opportunities.17 These costs include everything from notifications
interrupting our attention to advance the interests of the platform, to
manipulative advertising that causes people to buy (or vote) differently
in ways that serve advertisers, to the well-documented emotional
injuries wrought by engagement-driven social media. Crucially, these
costs, impositions, and manipulations are made substantially more
damaging by “personalization” enabled by self-dealing in personal
data. Thus, it’s not just a random notification or one serving your
interests like a reminder to attend a meeting, but one teasing you out
of the blue that someone you know may have done something cool.
It’s not just an ad or a political message, but one calculated to your
precisely known psychology and vulnerabilities.18 And it’s not just
social media telling you what your friends are doing, it’s being done in
a way that is calibrated to push your buttons to keep you scrolling (or
doom-scrolling) with a reckless indifference to your mental health.19
The scope of protection that loyalty rules safeguard includes, but
is broader than, recognized privacy harms like identity theft, emotional
harms, breaches of confidence, and dangerous exposure.20 It also
includes more subtle individual and collective costs to our identity, our
ability to create relationships, our collectively held truths, and the
obscurity that protects our ability to share and move about freely. As

17 See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Against Engagement (draft manuscript) (on
file with authors).
18 This is precisely what happened in the Cambridge Analytica scandal, in which
Facebook data was used to create finely calibrated psychological profiles of voters identified
by their real names, suggesting which kinds of arguments would be most effective at getting
them to act in the ways that the paying political advertisers wanted them to. See RICHARDS,
supra note 13, at 25–26.
19 These are the allegations Facebook whistleblower Frances Haugen presented
under oath before lawmakers in the United States and around the world in 2021. See, e.g.,
Billy Perrigo, Inside Frances Haugen’s Decision to Take on Facebook, TIME (Nov. 22, 2021)
https://time.com/6121931/frances-haugen-facebook-whistleblower-profile/ [https://per
ma.cc/L8QN-6GD5].
20 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Harms, 102 B.U. L. REV.
793 (2022); M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131 (2011).
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such, it protects against the full range of betrayals that powerful parties
in an information relationship can engage in.
*

*

*

Loyalty duties are thus quite straightforward when understood as
relational duties that prevent self-dealing at the expense of a trusting
party. They accord with basic notions of fairness and decency—if you
have power over someone who trusts you, you shouldn’t betray them
or manipulate them to serve your own interests. It is undoubtedly for
these reasons that our law has placed duties of loyalty on relationships
with power imbalances for centuries in a wide variety of contexts.
II.

WHY DATA LOYALTY?

One common question that proposals for a duty of data loyalty
often face is, “What does a duty of loyalty get you that other approaches
to regulation do not?” This is an excellent question that asks why a
duty of loyalty might be the right regulatory tool rather than some
other approach. We believe that duties of data loyalty offer four
important advantages that other approaches do not.
First, loyalty represents a central policy commitment that could be
the missing ingredient to embolden existing U.S. privacy frameworks.
Second, it is substantially more capable than a traditional data
protection approach when it comes to modern privacy problems like
algorithmic discrimination, manipulation, oppression, and shaming
that are caused by unceasing digital contact and the astonishing scale
and power of modern technology platforms. Third, loyalty helps solve
privacy law’s harm problem in a way that is consistent with the
direction of current Supreme Court doctrine. Finally, data loyalty has
a straightforward and strong rhetorical appeal; it offers a clear
explanation for better privacy rules, it could help define America’s
privacy identity, and it could be used to gather broad popular support
for stronger privacy rules.
A. To Embolden Existing Data Privacy Frameworks
Law professor Ryan Calo is fond of saying that technology law’s
biggest problem is that we lack the political will to enforce the rules we
already have.21 We believe that this problem persists in privacy law as

21 See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence and the Carousel of Soft Law, 2 IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON TECH. & SOC’Y 171, 171 (2021) (“But ultimately what is missing is not
knowledge about the content of ethics as much as political will.”); Enlisting Big Data in the
Fight Against Coronavirus: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 116th Cong.
(2020) (statement of Ryan Calo, Law Professor, University of Washington) (“It is also
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well. Many privacy regulators lack the same political will and support
from lawmakers and the executive branch to enforce existing data
rules in a robust way. Many privacy rules are also vague, leaving their
interpretation (and enforcement based upon that interpretation) up
in the air. For example, what constitutes an “unfair trade practice,” a
“reasonable expectation of privacy,” or the collection of “more data
than is necessary” is a perennial topic of debate.
One of the reasons why U.S. data privacy frameworks tend to wilt
is that they lack a clear touchstone to guide interpretation that would
lead to effective enforcement. The collection of U.S. privacy statutes,
enforcement actions, and common law remedies adhere to basic
commitments like “do not lie,” “do not harm,” and “follow the Fair
Information Practices (FIPS).”22 But such edicts tend not to
interrogate the wrongful motives of data processors and do little to
force companies into any practice beyond bare compliance.
A duty of loyalty could change that. Lawmakers should use loyalty
duties to embolden and revitalize existing approaches to regulating
data privacy, such as robust implementation of data minimization
requirements, rules against unfair and deceptive trade practices, and
expansion of products liability theories of accountability. Data loyalty
can empower lawmakers to use tools that have already been developed,
by expanding the contexts in which rules should be followed, who must
follow them, and the level of adherence necessary for compliance.
Take as an example data minimization, the idea that organizations
should only collect, maintain, and use data that is necessary to fulfill a
designated and legitimate purpose. Data minimization rules are a
fundamental commitment of data protection and data security laws.
They are scattered throughout U.S. law, including the California
Consumer Privacy Act,23 the Wiretap Act,24 and are implicitly a part of
important to note that a lack of political will is sometimes the greater hurdle than a lack of
information.”).
22 See, e.g., WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE
DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 15 (2018); Hartzog & Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional
Moment, supra note 5, at 1704 & n.66; Richards & Hartzog, Duty of Loyalty, supra note 3, at
42.
23 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(c) (2018) (“A business’ collection, use, retention, and
sharing of a consumer’s personal information shall be reasonably necessary and
proportionate to achieve the purposes for which the personal information was collected or
processed, or for another disclosed purpose that is compatible with the context in which
the personal information was collected, and not processed in a manner that is incompatible
with those purposes.”).
24 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2018) (“No order entered under this section may authorize
or approve the interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communication for any period
longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any event
longer than thirty days. . . . Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that
the authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be conducted
in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to
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the data security requirements of Section 5 of the FTC Act.25 Data
minimization, if robustly interpreted and enforced as a way for
companies to remain loyal to trusting parties, could be a remarkably
effective tool for regulators since it targets both collection and use of
data and is meant to counter abusive purpose creep by companies.26 If
data loyalty became a guiding obligation for data minimization rules,
it would give regulators and judges interpreting potential violations an
additional layer of interrogation. Data loyalty would compel an
examination of a company’s motives and the potential adverse
consequences to consumers in determining if more data than
necessary was collected or if the use of data deviated too far from its
original purpose. Such foundational support would prevent an arid
and strictly textual analysis by explicitly forcing regulators and judges
to look at the big picture of exploitative motives of organizations and
the trusting parties’ wellbeing.
Another example would be laws based on the Fair Information
Practices, the most common standard for privacy laws worldwide.
Under current U.S. privacy law, perhaps the most important question
for regulators and compliance professionals is whether consumers
have been given “notice and choice.” In principle, this is a good thing,
emphasizing consent to data practices and evoking the gold standard
of “knowing and voluntary” consent familiar to lawyers and medical
researchers. But in practice, under current American law, “notice and
choice” all too often means just that consumers have merely vague
“notice” of data practices that are buried in the fine print and illusory
“choice” with respect to these practices such as a take-it-or-leave-it
choice about whether to use the service.
In practice, such rules not only place few constraints on
companies, but they also represent a kind of cookbook to create and
justify even deeply disloyal data practices by checking the boxes of
fictional notice and illusory consent. This is likely why companies like
Amazon have been engaged in aggressive lobbying in many state
capitols to get weak notice-and-choice (and only weak notice-and-

interception under this chapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized
objective, or in any event in thirty days.”).
25 See FTC, COMMISSION STATEMENT MARKING THE FTC’S 50TH DATA SECURITY
SETTLEMENT (2014) (“The Commission has also provided educational materials to industry
and the public about reasonable data security practices. These materials explain that, while
there is no single solution, such a program follows certain basic principles. . . . [Among
them,] companies should limit the information they collect and retain based on their
legitimate business needs so that needless storage of data does not create unnecessary risks
of unauthorized access to the data.”).
26 See, e.g., DANIEL SOLOVE & WOODROW HARTZOG, BREACHED! WHY DATA SECURITY
LAW FAILS AND HOW TO IMPROVE IT (forthcoming 2022).
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choice) laws on the books.27 But here, too, a duty of loyalty could help.
If data loyalty became a guiding obligation for data processing, noticeand-choice requirements would become more than a checkbox
compliance exercise at best and a cookbook for manipulation at worst.
Instead, “notice” would become an obligation of honesty, ensuring
that consumers actually understood what was happening with their
data before they agreed to it, and preventing companies from all sorts
of self-interested practices where meaningful understanding was not
present. “Choice” would mean knowing and voluntary agreement to
particular data practices among reasonable alternatives that do not
conflict with a trusting party’s best interests, rather than a “choice”
about whether to live in the modern world or not.
In these ways, by reorienting the question for companies from
“What can we get away with” to “Are we being loyal to our human
customers,” a duty of data loyalty could breathe new life into existing
regimes that are moribund at best and exploitation-enabling at their
worst.
B. To Address Emergent Dangers
A second benefit of data loyalty is that it can safeguard consumers
against novel and emerging digital risks. Data loyalty duties can go
beyond the standard data processing concerns and traditional privacy
harms. In crafting such rules, lawmakers should look to the ways in
which the affordances of modern technologies endanger people by
bestowing power in trusted entities. Data loyalty duties should
scrutinize how those organizations have incentives to use the power
human information gives them in self-interested ways that conflict with
a trusting party’s best interests. Duties crafted in this way would
meaningfully respond to concerns about manipulative user interfaces
(sometimes called “dark patterns”), the wrongful extraction of human
labor by dominant platforms, algorithmic discrimination, and
protection against third parties and other users while using a service.
Duties of data loyalty can thus go beyond often hard-to-quantify
injuries of individual pieces of data and address the structural power
imbalances and inequalities that characterize the relationships
between individual harried consumers and the richest corporations in
the history of the world.

27 See Jeffrey Dastin, Chris Kirkham & Aditya Kalra, Amazon Wages Secret War on
Americans’ Privacy, Documents Show, REUTERS (Nov. 19, 2021), https://www.reuters.com
/investigates/special-report/amazon-privacy-lobbying/ [https://perma.cc/LE8N-PBCM].
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C. To Solve Privacy’s Harm Problem
Third, and related to the problem of emergent dangers, a duty of
data loyalty would help lawmakers solve one of privacy law’s most
difficult problems: the problem of cognizable harm. Many privacy
rules require some kind of economic, physical, emotional, or other
kind of concrete and traditionally recognized harm to be legally
cognizable. However, loyalty rules look to the trusted party’s
inequitable conduct of wrongfully exploiting an advantage gained by
an information relationship. The exploitation of the relationship
against a trusting party’s interests can itself be the wrong, such as in a
case of conflict of interest, even if no other tangible harm manifests.28
In privacy cases, this is significant because American plaintiffs in
privacy and data breach lawsuits have struggled to articulate diffuse but
real informational injuries, and this situation has been made worse in
recent years as courts have tightened the rules for what counts as a
legally cognizable injury under Article III standing doctrine.29
Critically, loyalty duties do not have this problem—not just because the
legal injury in loyalty cases is the disloyalty itself, but because this injury
is one that has been already recognized by courts as legally sufficient
within standing doctrine.30
The focus of loyalty is on the integrity of a relationship and
removing an incentive and ability to wrongfully profit by taking
advantage of a power disparity. Because loyalty duties are rooted in
betrayal rather than harm or injury, they have significant consumer

28 See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 107–08 (2011) (“The duty of loyalty supports
the main purpose of fiduciary law: to prohibit fiduciaries from misappropriating or
misusing entrusted property or power. Thus, the duty of loyalty is manifested by important
preventative rules. Such rules prohibit actions even though they are not necessarily
injurious to entrustors.”).
29 See, e.g., TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2214 (2021); Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 342 (2016).
30 To get a bit technical for a moment, in TransUnion/Spokeo terms, then, a breach of
a legally imposed duty of loyalty would be a “concrete” and “traditionally recognized”
intangible harm. To satisfy this requirement, Spokeo requires courts “to consider whether
an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been
regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.” Spokeo, 578 U.S.
at 341. Ramirez uses a slightly different formulation—asking whether an intangible injury
bears “a close relationship to harms traditionally recognized as providing a basis for lawsuits
in American courts.” Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. at 2204. But because a breach of a duty of loyalty
has been recognized as a basis for lawsuits for centuries, duties of loyalty simply do not raise
concreteness problems. See also Citron & Solove, supra note 20. By contrast, although duties
of care in general would be concrete, statutory causes of action rooted in novel theories of
harm (including procedural data protection requirements) would seem to have to run
through the Spokeo test, with an uncertain likelihood of success.
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protection advantages over existing privacy rules that demand proof of
injury.31
D. To Define America’s Privacy Identity
Finally, a duty of data loyalty could offer a defining value for
America’s privacy law identity, rather than forcing it to adopt a
watered-down and sometimes ill-fitting version of the European GDPR
approach. While American privacy law is weak, permissive, and
seemingly rudderless, in Europe, privacy law is on firmer ground.
Privacy and data protection are both considered fundamental human
rights in the EU.32 The GDPR is the manifestation of these rights, a
commitment to the idea that people should be able to determine their
informational fates for themselves. Bilyana Petkova has argued that
data protection is “the main tenet of constitutional identity” in the
EU.33 This is why European data protection law often seems so
strikingly powerful to American observers compared to domestic
consumer privacy rights. As much as anything, then, for Europeans
the GDPR is a state of mind. And it is why a U.S. version of the GDPR
would inevitably be both a weak and inadequate version of the real
GDPR, something we have elsewhere called a “GDPR-lite.”34
A duty of loyalty could fill this definitional role for U.S. privacy
law. It could supply a political lodestar for privacy reform that defines
America’s privacy identity on its own terms rather than those of the
EU.
Lawmakers should not underestimate loyalty’s rhetorical
potential. A rallying cry requiring companies to “act in our best
interests” could motivate American privacy reform in the way that “the
right to be let alone” did at the turn of the twentieth century.
Technocratic terms like “data minimization” and “legitimate interests
of the data controller” do little for public imagination or
comprehension. By contrast, loyalty is clear, it is easy to understand,
and it is potentially robust enough to counterbalance spurious industry
claims about the importance of “innovation” or the idea that
commercial data processing carries First Amendment value. GDPRstyle ideas like requiring companies to undergo data protection impact
assessments can feel wonky and feeble, but every person in America
likely knows how it feels to be betrayed.
31 See, e.g., H.R. 117, 192d Gen. Ct., §2(a) (Mass. 2021) (“A covered entity shall be
prohibited from taking any actions with respect to processing facial recognition data or
designing facial recognition technologies that conflict with an end user’s best interests.”).
32 See, e.g., U.N. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union arts. 7–8, 2000 O.J. (C 364).
33 Bilyana Petkova, Privacy as Europe’s First Amendment, 25 EUR. L.J. 140, 154 (2019).
34 For an extended version of an argument along these lines, see Hartzog & Richards,
Privacy’s Constitutional Moment, supra note 5, at 1727–32.
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If companies owe us duties of loyalty, then “innovative” uses of
data to exploit us start to resemble betrayal and fraud, and claims of
First Amendment protection for manipulative uses of data look
appropriately laughable. Loyalty also has the virtue of placing the
obligation for ethical data processing right where it belongs, ensuring
those to whom we expose our data vulnerabilities do not betray us. A
duty of loyalty in privacy law would be important not just as a set of
rules, but as an idea capable of rallying democratic support for strong
rules.
Finally, loyalty can be good for business. At a U.S. Senate hearing
in 2020, Senator Brian Schatz expressed the idea that duties of loyalty
are only needed for bad businesses, because good businesses know that
the best way to make money over the long term is to be loyal to their
customers.35 On the other hand, if disloyalty is permitted by the law,
the pressures on business to show quarterly profits create strong shortterm and short-sighted incentives to cheat and behave in disloyal ways.
This in many respects is the story of the contemporary digital economy,
a story that data loyalty offers the potential to change for the better.
III.

A MODEL FOR LEGISLATING DATA LOYALTY

One undeniable virtue of creating a duty of data loyalty is that it
would not be necessary to invent it from whole cloth. Loyalty duties
have a long and established pedigree in our law, most famously in the
law of fiduciaries. A duty of data loyalty could draw heavily from this
tradition and its proven ability to protect against the power imbalances
in relationships in a fair, principled, and meaningful way.
Fiduciary law scholars have identified a two-step process
lawmakers use to implement loyalty obligations in such a fair and just
way.36 Lawmakers initially articulate a primary, general duty of loyalty.
Next, courts and lawmakers go about the task of creating and refining
what have been referred to as “subsidiary” duties that are more specific
and sensitive to context. These subsidiary duties target the most
opportunistic contexts for self-dealing and typically result in a mix of
overlapping open-ended rules, maxims, more specific standards, and
highly specific rules.

35 See Revisiting the Need for Federal Data Privacy Legislation: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Com., Sci., & Transp., 116th Cong. (2020) (statement of Sen. Brian Schatz).
36 See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, Other Fiduciary Duties: Implementing Loyalty and Care, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 419 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert
H. Sitkoff eds., 2019) (“The duties of loyalty and care, which we might call the primary
fiduciary duties, are typically structured as broad, open-ended standards that speak
generally. . . . By contrast, the other fiduciary duties, which we might call the subsidiary or
implementing fiduciary duties, are typically structured as rules or at least as more specific
standards that speak with greater specificity.”).
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Thus, we propose that a duty of data loyalty should be
implemented on two levels. The first level is a broad and general
prohibition on substantial conflicts with the trusting party’s best
interests. This would prevent the most egregious forms of disloyalty
across the board, and it would also serve to orient the company’s
incentives generally against betrayal rather than micromanaging
specific instances. The second level of a duty of loyalty would be more
specific and, where necessary, restrictive. This would involve the
articulation of specific and substantive subsidiary duties targeting
particular contexts and actions that provide clear rules and less wiggle
room to ensure accountability and keep the frameworks from
becoming watered down. Though this two-step approach, a duty of
data loyalty could provide both general applicability as well as
sensitivity to individual contexts.
A. First, a General Catchall Duty
We propose a general rule of data loyalty as follows:
Organizations shall not process data or design systems and tools in ways that
significantly conflict with trusting parties’ best interests that are implicated by
their exposure.
Let’s break this proposed duty down a little.
1. A No-Conflict Rule for Data and Design
Organizations gain a power advantage over trusting parties in two
different ways: collecting and processing data and controlling our
mediated experiences.37 If the duty of loyalty is to accomplish
anything, it should prohibit the conflicted design of digital tools and
data processing. Avoiding conflicts is loyalty’s core mandate and the
logical starting point for lawmakers, judges, industry, and civil society.
A general rule against conflicted design and data processing could
serve as the foundation for a host of regulatory regimes, self-regulatory
efforts, and guidance to the public to encourage and nurture its trust.
A general no-conflict rule has the remarkable advantage of
directing lawmakers (and trusted parties themselves) to interrogate
not just actions but motives and gains.38 Established fiduciary noconflict rules

37 See, e.g., RICHARDS, supra note 13; HARTZOG, supra note 22.
38 See Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
513, 557–58 (2015) (quoting Lionel Smith, The Motive, Not the Deed, in RATIONALIZING
PROPERTY, EQUITY AND TRUSTS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EDWARD BURN 53, 67 (Joshua Getzler
ed., 2003) (“[T]he motives of the fiduciary are the crucial element in determining whether
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do not require the fiduciary to act in any particular way but are instead
thought to establish boundaries within which the fiduciary may reasonably
be expected to act loyally, at least to the extent that the rules isolate biasing
factors that might induce the fiduciary to subjugate the interests of
beneficiaries to the interests of others.39

2. People Over Profits
Some lawmakers are reluctant to adopt duties of data loyalty
because they fear creating a conflict with the duties of loyalty that
directors of organizations owe to shareholders.40 This is an illusory
conflict and, at most, is resolvable by lawmakers without substantially
remaking corporate law.41 The supposed conflict between trusting
parties and shareholders has been wildly overstated.42 Fiduciary law
scholar Andrew Tuch explains that “imposing user-regarding

the fiduciary has acted loyally, and the requirement of motive is quite specific—the fiduciary
‘must act (or not act) in what he perceives to be the best interests of the beneficiary.’”)).
39 Id. at 557.
40 One of the most repeated critiques levied against the idea of imposing duties of
data loyalty on companies is Lina Khan and David Pozen’s claim that relational rules might
create conflicting loyalties. The authors assert that “[t]he tension between what it would
take to implement a fiduciary duty of loyalty to users, on the one hand, and these
companies’ economic incentives and duties to shareholders, on the other, is too deep to
resolve without fundamental reform.” Khan & Pozen, supra note 3, at 529, 534 (“[T]he
information-fiduciary proposal could cure at most a small fraction of the problems
associated with online platforms—and to the extent it does, only by undercutting directors’
duties to shareholders, undermining foundational principles of fiduciary law, or both.”).
41 See, e.g., Balkin, The Fiduciary Model, supra note 3, at 23 (“Management’s fiduciary
obligations to shareholders assume that the corporation will attempt to comply with the legal
duties owed to those affected by the corporation’s business practices, even if this reduces
shareholder value.”).
42 See Andrew F. Tuch, A General Defense of Information Fiduciaries, 98 WASH. U. L. REV.
1897, 1902 (2021) (arguing that Khan and Pozen “significantly overstate the threat that
corporate and fiduciary law poses for the information fiduciary model.”). Tuch argues that
corporate law only imposes duties on directors, not corporations, and the information
fiduciaries proposal imposes duties on corporations, not directors. See id. at 1909. Relational
duties would not create a set of inconsistent obligations among a single fiduciary. See id. at
1910. The issue of parallel fiduciary obligations owed by corporations as a whole to clients
and directors to shareholders is routine. See id. Not only is the “likelihood of fiduciary
breach that Khan and Pozen point to in claiming tension between Balkin’s proposal and
corporate law . . . theoretically remote,” it is “in practical terms, nonexistent.” Id. at 1915.
Additionally, if lawmakers obligate a duty of loyalty, then directors are bound to privilege it
over shareholder interests. See id. at 1916–17 (“Delaware law altogether avoids tension with
regimes such as Balkin’s. Delaware corporate law requires directors to exercise their
discretion within legal limits imposed on the corporation; it does not license or excuse noncompliance with corporate obligations, even if directors believe that doing so would
maximize shareholder value. And Delaware law offers no suggestion that a corporation’s
duties or responsibilities should be diluted or otherwise shaped by the content of directors’
duties. Instead, case law indicates that directors must act ‘within the law.’” (footnotes
omitted)).
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obligations on corporations will not create untenable frictions between
duties to users and duties to shareholders. . . . [T]he primary
criticism—that Delaware corporate law undermines the information
fiduciary regime—should be dismissed.”43
If lawmakers were to adopt data loyalty rules, then corporate law
would in fact demand that directors adhere to them first and
foremost.44 In other words, the loyalty that directors owe to
shareholders takes a backseat to legal obligations placed upon the
corporation, including duties of loyalty to customers.45 In fact, if a duty
of data loyalty owed by platforms to people is made positive law, a
director that acts with the intent to act in conflict with users’ best
interests or fails to act in the face of a known loyalty obligation may be
liable for breach to shareholders of their fiduciary obligation as well as
their duty to users.46
If data loyalty is going to work, then trusting parties must be
prioritized over other loyalties owed by organizations, such as loyalty
duties owed by firms to shareholders. Prioritizing trusting parties over
shareholders would resolve any lingering “divided loyalty” concerns,
as well as conflicting loyalties between users and third-party vendors.
Self-interested actions would be allowed, but only if they didn’t conflict
with trusting parties’ best interests regarding their data and mediated
experiences. And of course, it is an elementary principle of U.S.

43 Id. at 1902 (“The criticism rests on a partial understanding of corporate law
doctrine and theory. The criticism sees conflicting obligations where none exist and
identifies strategies for resolving these apparent conflicts that are unknown to corporate
law. . . . I also argue that Khan and Pozen’s arguments are not merely mistaken but, if
accepted, may do harm. Applying their case to financial conglomerates—more apt
analogues for social media companies than the ‘[d]octors, lawyers, accountants, and the
like’ to whom scholars often draw their comparison—shows that Khan and Pozen’s
arguments, if accepted, would have pernicious effects on broad spheres of corporate
regulation.” (quoting Khan & Pozen, supra note 3, at 506)).
44 Tuch argues that “[u]nder the information fiduciary model, corporate law would
require compliance with user-regarding obligations, creating incentives for directors to
favor users’ interests over those of shareholders.” Id.
45 Id. at 1917–18 (“Reflecting corporate law’s attitude toward legal compliance,
former Harvard Law Dean Robert Clark identifies the corporation’s purpose as to
‘maximize the value of the company’s shares, subject to the constraint that the corporation
must meet all its legal obligations to others who are related to or affected by it.’ . . . Even
the most ardent advocates of shareholder primacy have not suggested that corporate law
requires, or should require, corporations or directors to maximize shareholder value in
violation of a corporation’s legal obligations.” (quoting ROBERT CHARLES CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW 17–18 (1986))).
46 See id. at 1918–19 (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67
(Del. 2006); see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (“The failure to act
in good faith may result in liability [for directors] because the requirement to act in good
faith ‘is a subsidiary element[,]’ i.e., a condition, ‘of the fundamental duty of loyalty.’”)
(citing Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
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constitutional law that a federal duty of loyalty would take precedence
over any state duties by operation of the Supremacy Clause.
Data loyalty would still allow companies to profit and flourish.
The “best interests” polestar of loyalty, by design, accommodates all
kinds of self-serving behavior. It simply makes self-serving behavior
allowable only in instances where it aligns with the best interests of the
primary trusting party.47
3. The Collective Best Interests of Trusting Parties
There are a few different ways to deal with inevitable conflicts
between trusting parties as well. The first would be to impose a
reasonableness and fairness approach, or a duty of impartiality
between people who expose themselves to organizations.48 In trying to
accommodate the best interests of billions of individuals, whose “best
interests” might differ from person to person, lawmakers could also
follow tort law’s move to a more objective standard: the reasonable
user. Not only would a reasonable user standard help companies
better determine the scope of their duties, but it would also inject a
normative element into the analysis.
Our proposal adopts a collective approach to “best interests,” to
better avoid conflicts between trusting parties and help free privacy law
from its overly individualistic focus.
Allowing lawmakers and
regulators to focus on the collective best interests of “trusting parties,”
they can better respond to systemic harms detected sporadically by
individuals but strongly at the group level. We recommend that
lawmakers specifically prioritize interests that are held collectively by
groups of users, with certain individually held interests holding sway
only to the extent they do not conflict with collective user interests.49
A more collective best interests approach would be an
improvement over the individual self-determination model, which
does not compel people to consider the common good or threats to
47 See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 932 (2005) (“[A] transaction prudently undertaken to advance
the best interest of the beneficiaries best serves the purpose of the duty of loyalty, even if
the trustee also does or might derive some benefit. A transaction in which there has been
conflict or overlap of interest should be sustained if the trustee can prove that the
transaction was prudently undertaken in the best interest of the beneficiaries.”).
48 Andrew S. Gold, The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 36, at 398 (“[C]onflicts among best interests obligations [owed
to multiple beneficiaries] are unavoidable. Where such conflicts exist, one answer is to find
that loyalty must manifest itself as fairness and reasonableness. Another answer is to impose
a duty of impartiality,” which would demand “due regard” (though not necessarily
equality). (footnotes omitted)).
49 Id. (discussing the hierarchy of obligations approach to how “common shares
might ordinarily benefit from fiduciary obligations while preferred shares will only benefit
in exceptional [circumstances]”).
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groups they are not a part of. When people give consent to data
practices, they usually aren’t motivated to reflect upon how their
decision will affect vulnerable groups that they are not a part of.50 This
is similar to some people’s indifference to public health when they
“choose” not to wear a mask during a pandemic.
A reasonable user approach would also be consistent with the
parallel duty of care and sensitive to the fact that tech companies deal
in bulk and batched relationships. A reasonableness, context-sensitive
approach would require loyalty obligations that are proportional to
risk of abuse. The duty would be the most robust where the volume of
data collected is highest and organization’s power over people is the
greatest. Because this duty of loyalty would be new and novel for
privacy law and would need to be tailored to the unique characteristics
of modern information relationships, lawmakers have the ability to
craft a unique and fitting approach that borrows from how duties of
loyalty operate in other contexts without being bound by it.
4. Limited to Trusting Parties’ Exposure
In our previous work on trust, we defined the concept of trust as
the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to the actions of others.51
Our proposed general duty of loyalty would be limited to the extent of
that vulnerability. Specifically, the “best interests” should be limited
to the interests affected by the entrustment of data, labor, and
attention, instead of an overall well-being standard. Organizations
would be directed to ask what interests were implicated by the
affordances of the data and design of user interfaces. So while it might
be disloyal for a company to design a system that leveraged trusting
parties’ geolocation to allow pharmaceutical companies to target
people when they are currently in the hospital (and thus vulnerable),
it would probably not be disloyal for that company to generally allow
pharmaceutical companies to place advertisements on their app or
website. Systems that allow for such microtargeted advertising based
on highly detailed profiles rather than isolated contexts make
exploitation of vulnerable parties easier and compound incentives for
companies to engineer exposure for financial gains.52
In conjunction with a duty of care, a duty of loyalty animates a
number of different broad subsidiary duties, such as duties of candor,

50 See, e.g., Richards & Hartzog, Pathologies of Digital Consent, supra note 5, at 1498;
Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, The Inconsentability of Facial Surveillance, 66 LOY. L. REV.
33, 44 (2020).
51 Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 5, at 448.
52 See, e.g., JOSEPH JEROME & ARIEL FOX JOHNSON, ADTECH AND KIDS: BEHAVIORAL
ADS NEED A TIME OUT (2021).
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good faith, nondelegation of key services, and confidentiality.53 But
legislatures and courts often go further and create or delegate
authority for the creation of a series of clearer subsidiary obligations
that are more like rules than vague standards.54
This two-tiered approach allows lawmakers to tailor rules to
specific relationships to avoid specific foreseeable conduct while
maintaining flexibility for new and changed rules in the future.55 As
applied to privacy law, it would allow lawmakers to target large
platforms or social media companies that presented specific problems
of gatekeeping for third parties or self-dealing due to two-way markets
without applying the same specific rules to traditional e-commerce or
media streaming companies bound by a general duty of loyalty.
Companies not bound by specific subsidiary rules would still be bound
by a general duty of loyalty.
B. Second, Rules for Subsidiary Implementing Duties
Lawmakers can create specific subsidiary rules to help resolve
objections that a duty of data loyalty is just too vague.56 Enacting
53 See Whitt, supra note 3, at 94–95 (“Additional fiduciary obligations recognized by
courts of equity over many centuries include the duty of candor, duty of good faith, duty
not to delegate the services to others, and the duty of confidentiality. Typically they are
subsumed as ‘subsidiary’ or ‘implementing’ obligations under either the duty of care or of
loyalty. However, in some legal quarters the duty of confidentiality has been deemed an
important supportive component of the ‘primary’ fiduciary duties. . . . [T]he duty of
confidentiality deserves special status in the digital environment as an ‘enabling’ obligation
that strengthens the more well-established fiduciary duties of care and of loyalty.”
(footnotes omitted)).
54 Robert Sitkoff explains that
[t]he duties of loyalty and care, which we might call the primary fiduciary duties,
are typically structured as broad, open-ended standards that speak generally. . . .
By contrast, the other fiduciary duties, which we might call the subsidiary or
implementing fiduciary duties, are typically structured as rules or at least as more
specific standards that speak with greater specificity.
Robert H. Sitkoff, Other Fiduciary Duties: Implementing Loyalty and Care, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 36, at 419.
55 Sitkoff gives the prudent investor rule as an example of a how subsidiary rules
develop in trust law. Id. at 421 (“Structurally the prudent investor rule is an elaborated
standard that, by focusing on risk-and-return and diversification, gives specific content to
the open-ended, primary duty of care, called prudence in trust parlance, as applied to the
investment function of trusteeship . . . . [W]ithin the fiduciary fields that do include an
investment function, the prudent investor rule encompasses the accumulated learning on
what the duty of care requires in fiduciary investment. In consequence, rather than start
from scratch in every fiduciary investment matter, fiduciaries, beneficiaries, and courts may
look to the elaboration within the prudent investor rule to discern the application of the
duty of care.”).
56 In a hearing on the future of transatlantic data flows called by the U.S. Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, Senator Wicker asked of a panelist
who advocated for a duty of loyalty in privacy law, “[w]here is there a working duty of loyalty
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legislation should also either provide for subsidiary duties or delegate
rulemaking authority for future subsidiary rules. These subsidiary data
loyalty rules might take a page from and model information privacy
versions of nonprivacy fiduciary duties such as disclosure, consent,
accounting for property (access and portability rights), confidentiality,
and the full suite of fair information practice principles. This would
apply some of the most significant obligations compelled by the GDPR.
A duty of loyalty, combined with a duty of care, could spur on specific
rulemaking for concepts like data minimization and legitimate basis
requirements that would be bound together by an antibetrayal ethos.
But lawmakers need not stop there. One of the most important
subsidiary duties to stem opportunistic behavior would be a robust
prohibition on abusive trade practices. As we detailed in prior work,
companies leveraging people’s own cognitive and resource limitations
against them to wrongfully extract data and labor is an endemic
problem online.
Subsidiary rules prohibiting abusive trade practices would
prohibit entrustees from materially interfering with the ability of
trusting parties to understand the terms of the relationship and the
risk associated with exposure and engagement.57 Rules against abuse
would also prohibit entrustees from taking unreasonable advantage of
trusting parties’ lack of understanding about the material risks, costs,
or conditions of the entrustees’ service or the inability of trusting
in place in law somewhere that we can look to? When we’re able to be specific in those
instances, then we’re getting somewhere. But beyond that, it’s hard actually to define [a
duty of loyalty].” The Invalidation of the EU-US Privacy Shield and the Future of Transatlantic
Data Flows: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 116th Cong. (2020)
(statement of Sen. Roger Wicker, Chairman, S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp.). Senator
Wicker is the sponsor of one of the most prominent proposals for an omnibus federal
privacy law in the United States. The Senator actually expressed tentative support for a duty
of loyalty, even though such a duty does not explicitly appear in the bill he sponsored. And
in full disclosure, the panelist was one of the authors of this Essay. Also, thank you for
reading so deeply in our paper—and in its footnotes. See also James Grimmelmann, When
All You Have Is a Fiduciary, LAW & POL. ECON. PROJECT (May 30, 2019),
https://lpeproject.org/blog/when-all-you-have-is-a-fiduciary
[https://perma.cc/V5PB4D6B] (arguing that when applied to digital platforms “the rule against self-dealing is either
absurdly under-inclusive, absurdly over-inclusive, or both”).
57 We propose that lawmakers adapt language from the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau’s authority to regulate abusive trade practices along these lines: “Abusive
trade practice” means any conduct by a covered entity that 1) materially interferes with the
ability of a trusting party to understand a term or condition of the agreement between
covered entities and trusting party relating to the processing of personal data or effect or
functionality of a system, tool, or user interface deployed by the covered entity; or 2) takes
unreasonable advantage of: a) a lack of understanding on the part of the trusting party of
the material risks, costs, or conditions of the covered entity’s product or service; or b) the
inability of the trusting parties to protect their interests in selecting or using a covered
entity’s product or service; or c) the reasonable reliance by the trusting party on a covered
entity’s representation to act in the interests of the trusting party.
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parties to protect their interests within the relationship. Finally, antiabuse rules would prohibit entrustees from taking unreasonable
advantage of the reasonable reliance by trusting parties on entrustees’
representations to act in the trusting parties’ interests.
Lawmakers might also consider rigid prohibitions on specific
practices like the deployment of unreasonably dangerous automated
tools or the use of personal data to train those automated systems.
They could create subsidiary rules for inherently dangerous practices
and technologies that, at the systemic level, are in fundamental conflict
with the best interests of trusting parties, such as microtargeting, a
practice that paves the path for third party abuse and imposes more
externalities than benefits for trusting parties; and affect recognition,
a fundamentally misguided, mistaken, and oppressive tool.58
Lawmakers could craft even more rules designed for specific parties
such as “social media platforms may not deploy affect recognition
technologies on photos or videos submitted by trusting parties.” There
might also be disclosure mandates, process requirements, prohibitions
on conduct, or obligated tasks. Each rule should target specific areas
where trusted parties have an incentive to engage in self-dealing.59
Lawmakers could, of course, impose all these rules even without
couching them within an umbrella duty of loyalty. We have proposed
in previous research that trust-building and trust-enforcing rules
irrespective of a relationship between the parties could be meaningful
complements or the next best thing to broad and strong relational
obligations.60 Many of these rules, such as data protection obligations,
should have sibling rules that apply regardless of whether data
controllers are in an information relationship with a trusting party.
But we believe that a duty of loyalty would act as an important
animating force, interpretive guide, and catchall provision that would
bring more coherence, flexibility, and accountability through
enforcement than these rules would have as stand-alone laws.
Nonetheless, we propose specific subsidiary rules within
information relationships to maximize the advantages of a relational
approach to privacy. Scholars and lawmakers have identified different
contexts where the incentives for self-dealing by the powerful party in

58 For an exploration on the dangers of affect recognition systems see, e.g., KATE
CRAWFORD, ATLAS OF AI (2021); Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence Is Misreading Human
Emotion, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive
/2021/04/artificial-intelligence-misreading-human-emotion/618696/
[https://perma.cc/T6AV-J25T]; LUKE STARK & JESSE HOEY, THE ETHICS OF EMOTION IN
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS (2021).
59 See Andrew S. Gold, The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 36, at 401 (“Different opportunism risks will then justify
different loyalty content and approaches to legal decision-making.”).
60 See Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 5.
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an information relationship are overwhelming, making these contexts
ripe for subsidiary data loyalty rules.61 We synthesize these contexts
into five main areas: Entrustees should be loyal when collecting
information, being sure to collect only information for purposes that
do not conflict with a trusting party’s best interests. Entrusees should
be loyal when personalizing, i.e., treating people differently based upon
personal information or characteristics. Entrustees should be loyal
gatekeepers, avoiding conflicts when allowing government and other
third-party access to trusting parties and their data. Entrustees should
be loyal when trying to influence trusting parties, such as when they
leverage personal data and digital tools to exert sway over people to
achieve particular results. Finally, entrustees should be loyal in the
ways they mediate interactions between users of their platform,
specifically in the creation and administration of systems that govern
how people are allowed to interact with each other. These contexts
often overlap and involve issues like discriminatory microtargeting,
harmful amplification of misinformation, failure of process for content
moderation, and abusive dark patterns. We propose that lawmakers
create subsidiary loyalty rules and standards to mitigate these kinds of
disloyal behaviors.
1. Loyal Collection
A duty of loyalty should attach the moment a trusted party invites
disclosure and makes the decision to collect personal information. In
this way, data loyalty could embolden the fair information principle of
data minimization. This principle holds that data collectors should
only identify the minimum amount of personal information needed to
fulfill a legitimate purpose and collection and hold that much
information and no more.62 Combined with the storage limitation
principle, which holds that organizations should not keep data longer
than they need it for their stated purpose, data minimization is a
central pillar in data protection regimes around the world, but it too
often fails to find traction.63

61 See, e.g., Balkin, The Fiduciary Model, supra note 3; Scholz, supra note 3, at 197;
Dobkin, supra note 3, at 17 (identifying four major ways of breaching an information
fiduciary duty: “manipulation, discrimination, third-party sharing, and violating a
company’s own privacy policy”); Barrett, supra note 3, at 1100 (“[A]n information fiduciary
framework should also address manipulation and discrimination in order to ensure that
people are protected from the full array of modern digital threats that they face.”).
62 See Principle (c): Data Minimisation, INFO. COMM’RS OFF., https://ico.org.uk/fororganisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gd
pr/principles/data-minimisation/#data_minimisation [https://perma.cc/6TTU-BJ8H].
63 See id.; Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 5(e) 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) (providing
the GDPR’s storage limitation principle).
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Data loyalty could provide a normative vision for when companies
have exceeded their duty to minimize collection and retention—when
it conflicts with a trusting party’s (or collective trusting parties’) best
interests. Under general data protection frameworks that impose data
minimization requirements, organizations must typically ensure that
the data they are processing is adequate (sufficient to fulfil the stated
purpose), relevant (has a relevant link to that purpose), and limited to
what is necessary (collecting and holding only that which is needed for
that purpose).64 A duty of loyalty could provide a value-laden baseline
that requires an examination of not just the purpose of the collection
but also elevates the interests of those affected by the collection. While
parties at an arm’s length might act opportunistically in collecting as
much data as possible, trusted parties remain loyal by leaving all data
that, if collected, would conflict with the trusting parties’ best interests
on the table.
2. Loyal Personalization
The modern Internet routinely and systemically treats people
differently based upon personal information or characteristics.
Targeted and behavioral advertising is the most prominent example of
this, but first-party product and streaming recommendations, news
feeds, default settings, layouts, and more are all designed automatically
to look and act differently based on people’s personal characteristics.
Some of this personalization, such as targeted recommendations for
networked connections based upon intentionally revealed data such as
where you work or attended high school, would probably be loyal.
Other personalization systems, however, such as those that wrongfully
discriminate or have a disparate impact on protected, marginalized, or
vulnerable groups of people, would likely conflict with that trusting
collective’s best interests. Subsidiary rules built around the concept of
loyal personalization could firmly and clearly address a systemic
problem in a way that traditional data protection frameworks have
been unable to mitigate.
3. Loyal Gatekeeping
Entrustees have a remarkable ability to facilitate third party access
to trusting parties and their data. They can do so through their APIs,
advertiser portals, fusion centers, and government backdoors. This
access is the source of most major platforms’ power. And everyone
wants a piece of the users. Advertisers clamor for their attention. Data
brokers and companies training AI models lust for their data. And

64 Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 5(c) 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) (providing the
GDPR’s data minimization principle).
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governments demand evidence. Entrustees have financial incentives
to build portals and facilitate access for third parties. Some access
granted by trustees to third parties is not in conflict with trusting
parties’ best interests. For example, contextual advertising usually
doesn’t significantly leverage people’s own data or limitations against
them, nor does it usually expose trusting parties to significant privacy
harms. Protocols for interoperability to help people transfer data from
one place to another also serve the interests (and wishes) of trusting
parties.
However, certain lax gatekeeping practices would be disloyal
because of how they endanger trusting parties by obscuring risk and
breaking promises while facilitating access to third parties for
organizational gains or to avoid costs. The three most resonant privacy
scandals in the past decade, the government surveillance revelations
by Edward Snowden, the FBI’s request that Apple help it bypass
encryption protections, and Cambridge Analytica’s massive Facebook
data exfiltration, all involved gatekeeping issues. Subsidiary rules built
around the concept of loyal gatekeeping would help resolve
longstanding debates around what obligations trusted organizations
have regarding third-party access through portals, APIs, interfaces, and
the automated scraping of websites. And in combination with a duty
of confidentiality, subsidiary rules could also help clarify when sharing
a trusting party’s data with third parties is disloyal.
4. Loyal Influencing
Technologies are artifacts built to act upon the world. Every
single design decision made in the creation of a website or app is
meant to facilitate a particular kind of behavior.65 The structure of
digital technologies will affect people’s choices even if the effect is not
intended by designers. When designers create a drop-down menu,
privacy settings, “I agree” buttons, and any other feature that
implicates people’s privacy, they are influencing them. They can’t
avoid it.66 Given their power, they should be loyal in exercising their
influence.
The most prominent example of disloyal influence involves
organizations leveraging “dark patterns” or “malicious interfaces”

65

See, e.g., LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS
94 (1986).
66 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging, 32 YALE J. ON REGUL. 413, 421 (2015)
(“Human beings . . . cannot wish [choice architecture] away. Any store has a design; some
products are seen first, and others are not. Any menu places options at various locations.
Television stations come with different numbers, and strikingly, numbers matter, even when
the costs of switching are vanishingly low; people tend to choose the station at the lower
number, so that channel 3 will obtain more viewers than channel 53.”).
IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY
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which are user interface elements meant to influence a person’s
behavior against their intentions or best interests.67 Companies deploy
effort traps to make deleting an account confusing and difficult. They
make “cancel” buttons hard to see and press, they obscure important
details in tiny fonts or walls of boilerplate, and they leverage our deeply
entrenched and empirically validated overconfidence regarding risk,
deference for conformity, endowment effects, status quo bias, and
other biases and mental shortcuts to manipulate us to their ends.
Jamie Luguri and Lior Strahilevitz have observed that “dark patterns
are strikingly effective in getting consumers to do what they would not
do when confronted with more neutral user interfaces.”68

67 See, e.g., HARTZOG, supra note 22, at 148, 162; Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns, 13 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 43 (2021); Ryan Calo,
Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014); Gregory Conti & Edward
Sobiesk, Malcious Interfaces and Personalization’s Uninviting Future, IEEE PRIV. & SEC.,
May/June 2009, at 72, 73; JOHANNA GUNAWAN, DAVID CHOFFNES, WOODROW HARTZOG &
CHRISTO WILSON, TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF DARK PATTERN PRIVACY HARMS (2021);
Harry Brignull, Dark Patterns: Deception vs. Honesty in UI Design, A LIST APART (Nov. 1, 2011),
https://alistapart.com/article/dark-patterns-deception-vs-honesty-in-ui-design/
[https://perma.cc/4VBK-HEEG]; COLIN M. GRAY, YUBO KOU, BRYAN BATTLES, JOSEPH
HOGGATT & AUSTIN L. TOOMBS, THE DARK (PATTERNS) SIDE OF UX DESIGN (2018);
Arunesh Mathur, Gunes Acar, Michael J. Friedman, Elena Lucherini, Jonathan Mayer,
Marshini Chetty & Arvind Narayanan, Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings from a Crawl of 11K
Shopping Websites, 3 PROCEEDINGS ACM HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTION 81 (2019); ARUNESH
MATHUR, JONATHAN MAYER & MIHIR KSHIRSAGAR, WHAT MAKES A DARK PATTERN. . . DARK?
(2021); Christoph Bösch, Benjamin Erb, Frank Kargl, Henning Kopp & Stefan Pfattheicher,
Tales from the Dark Side: Privacy Dark Strategies and Privacy Dark Patterns, 4 PROC. ON PRIV.
ENHANCING TECHS. 237, 248 (2016); Ari Ezra Waldman, Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and
the ‘Privacy Paradox’, 31 CURRENT OP. PSYCH. 105, 105, 107–09 (2020).
68 Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 67, at 46 (emphasis omitted). Luguri and
Strahilevitz found that
[r]elatively mild dark patterns more than doubled the percentage of consumers
who signed up for a dubious identity theft protection service, which we told our
subjects we were selling, and aggressive dark patterns nearly quadrupled the
percentage of consumers signing up. In social science terms, the magnitudes of
these treatment effects are enormous.
Id. They further found that
the most effective dark pattern strategies were hidden information (smaller print
in a less visually prominent location), obstruction (making users jump through
unnecessary hoops to reject a service), trick questions (intentionally confusing
prompts), and social proof (efforts to generate a bandwagon effect). Other
effective strategies included loaded questions and making acceptance the
default. . . . In many cases, consumers exposed to dark patterns did not
understand that they had signed up for a costly service. These results confirm the
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Lawmakers have struggled for years to articulate when attempts at
persuasion become harmful.69 But trusting parties do not need to be
injured for entrustees to violate a duty of loyalty. Subsidiary rules
around disloyal attempts to influence would address the most
pernicious and dangerous dark patterns head-on.70 Lawmakers should
focus on how the design is meant to take advantage of a person’s
limitations or vulnerabilities to benefit the designer in a way that is
against the best interests of the trusting party.71
5. Loyal Mediation
Certain kinds of organizations design their platforms so that their
users interact not just with the organization itself, but with each other.
In other words, they mediate people’s social and market experiences
with other people using their service. Sometimes this is a great
experience for people who use these services. But things can go off
the rails quickly as companies feel pressured to achieve continual and
endless growth. They create systems that reward virality and the most
outrageous or venomous hot takes instead of the ostensible purpose of
meaningful social interaction and social, emotional, and intellectual
nourishment. They optimize their algorithms and interfaces to reward
our most impulsive and petty reactions. Amplification of certain kinds
of information combined with strategically reduced or increased
transaction costs to speak, report harmful and dangerous speech, and
hide from other users leads to acute individual harms like harassment72

69 See id. at 104; see also Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Online
Manipulation: Hidden Influences in A Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 3 (2019) (“[A]t
its core, manipulation is hidden influence—the covert subversion of another person’s
decision-making power. In contrast with persuasion, which is the forthright appeal to
another person’s decision-making power, or coercion, which is the restriction of acceptable
options from which another person might choose, manipulation functions by exploiting
the manipulee’s cognitive (or affective) weaknesses and vulnerabilities in order to steer his
or her decision-making process towards the manipulator’s ends.”).
70 Luguri and Strahilevitz recommend a multi-factor test to help determine when dark
patterns cross the line
that looks to considerations such as (i) evidence of a defendant’s malicious intent
or knowledge of detrimental aspects of the user interface’s design, (ii) whether
vulnerable populations—like less educated consumers, the elderly, or people
suffering from chronic medical conditions—are particularly susceptible to the
dark pattern, and (iii) the magnitude of the costs and benefits produced by the
dark pattern.
Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 67, at 99.
71 Balkin has proposed looking to “techniques of persuasion and influence that (1)
prey on another person’s emotional vulnerabilities and lack of knowledge (2) to benefit
oneself or one’s allies and (3) reduce the welfare of the other person.” JACK M. BALKIN,
HOOVER INST., FIXING SOCIAL MEDIA’S GRAND BARGAIN 4 (2018).
72 See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014).
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as well as systemic harms like polarization, reduced ability to engage in
self-governance, negative public health outcomes, and chilling effects
for large groups of vulnerable users.
A duty of loyalty cannot solve all of the complex problems of
content moderation or harassment. As we have maintained, a duty of
loyalty is merely one important tool in a larger toolkit. But companies
do have remarkable power to influence how people using their systems
interact with each other.73 When they use this power in a way that
conflicts with the best interests of their users in order to optimize
growth, they are being disloyal. Subsidiary rules for loyal mediation
are, of course, complicated because of the potentially conflicting
interests amongst actors and those potentially adversely affected by the
act. One trusting party wants to speak while the other(s) is made worse
because of it. This is where our proposed systemic focus and the
traditional fiduciary law method of developing a hierarchy of loyalties
would help clarify lawmakers’ actions.
CONCLUSION
Duties of data loyalty will take time and effort to meaningfully
implement as a part of U.S. privacy law. Data loyalty is a significant and
necessary departure from privacy law’s ineffective notice and consent
approach. But lawmakers can confidently embrace loyalty and other
relational duties as part of a holistic approach to mitigating the power
and abuses of data collectors. If done clearly, carefully, and with
commitment, lawmakers can chart a bold new vision for our privacy
rules that is capable of nurturing a sustainable and flourishing future
for those who share their personal information as well as those
entrusted with it.

73 Id. at 25; see also Hartzog & Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment, supra note 5,
at 1695.

